USA > Connecticut > History of Connecticut, Volume I > Part 28
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Meanwhile, the need to dislodge the British from Boston became pressing. Since assuming command of the American forces in July, 1775, Washington had reorganized the army and had supervised the erection of a fortification on Cobble Hill which was occupied by about 1,000 men of the Connecticut line under the command of Israel Putnam. From here a bombardment was begun which served to cover the erec- tion by the colonials of a ring of fortifications on the Dorchester Penin-
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sula. It was feared that the British would attack at dawn on the sixth of March when the tide was low. However, a violent storm made any such attempt impossible. Instead of an attack, the news came on March 8 that Howe intended to quit the city. This seemed uncertain, although the city appeared to be in confusion, and colonial forces continued to improve their fortifications and occupied the advanced position of Nook's Hill on the night of the sixteenth. The next day, the troops at Dorchester Heights watched the British vessels sail down the river. Bos- ton had truly been evacuated. With it secure, Washington turned his attention to the situation in New York.17
The importance of New York in the maintenance of a unity of colonial effort had been recognized early. The Hudson offered a broad avenue down which the British could float to attack the city, and, with success, divide New England and Southern efforts at opposition. With the failure of the Quebec expedition, which would have hindered the British from using their navy against New York, a plan had been ad- vanced for its defense by General Charles Lee. John Adams had been enthusiastic about Lee's suggestion to recruit volunteers in Connecticut for New York's defense and had declared that the people of Connecticut "are very ready upon such occasions."18 Lee, in fact, had recruited about 1,200 men "whose zeal and ardor," he reported, "cannot be sufficiently praised."19 However, the opposition of the Provincial Committee of Safety of New York and the unwillingness of an indecisive Congress to force the hand of the Tory-infested city had resulted in Lee's being re- lieved of his command and in New York's being left unprotected.20 After the British evacuation of Boston, the probability of an attack on New York increased.
Washington wrote Trumbull asking him to supply 2,000 emer- gency troops to help hold off the British until the army could arrive from Cambridge21 and immediately made preparations for the shift of the army to New York. Three contingents passed through Connecticut, and, when they arrived in New York, were all placed under the com- mand of Israel Putnam until Washington himself arrived on April 13.22 The build-up of British forces in New York was slow, but with the re- turn of Sir Henry Clinton from the South on August 7, it was evident that the British were planning to make a strenuous effort to divide the
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colonies. Five regiments of Samuel Parsons' Connecticut Brigade were readied to meet the attack, and, on the 26th, Putnam was on Long Is- land observing the defenses. The attack began the next day.23
To check the attack, the destruction of British naval vessels was at- tempted. The apparatus utilized could be submerged by an intake of water and surfaced by expelling water through pumping. The inventor of this first American submarine was David Bushnell of Saybrook, who, while at Yale, had conceived this as a means of blowing up the British fleet. Success depended upon driving a set screw into the bottom of the target ship. To the screw was to be attached a magazine to be set off by a timing device which started as soon as the magazine was cast from the torpedo boat. On the initial effort, because of the buoyancy of the tar- get, the Asia, it proved impossible to drive the screw into the ship's hull. After two hours' effort, since daylight was approaching, the navigator retreated to the American base.24
The plan of defense formulated earlier by General Lee and now followed was doomed from the start because of the great discrepancy in the numbers of colonial and of British troops. From the beginning, Howe's skillful maneuvering imperilled the American forces and by mid-September, they had been pushed east of the Hudson. The forces at Kip's Bay, which included five regiments of Connecticut militia, one regiment of Connecticut "levies," and three of the Continental Militia. retreated before a relentless British attack. Only at Harlem Heights did the colonials make an effective stand before the retreat to White Plains. where the troops took up positions in the Highlands north of the town. When it appeared that the British would imperil the whole of the American line, the British turned southwestward, in the direction of King's Bridge, to threaten Forts Washington and Lee. Toward the end of November, Washington led a column of about 2,000 men toward New Jersey. The main body of troops was left to guard the High- lands.25 The recently declared independence seemed to hang perilously in the balance.
To Connecticut, independence entailed the formalities of separa- tion from Great Britain, but it did not mean a radical alteration in the fundamental basis of government. The colony acted promptly on the proposal that the colonies ought to be free, and, in a special session of
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the General Assembly, on June 14, 1776, instructed the Connecticut delegation in Congress to vote for independence and "to move and pro- mote as fast as may be convenient, a regular and permanent plan of Union and Confederation of the Colonies."26 Troops from Connecticut joined in the rejoicing in New York on the ninth of July when they heard the Declaration of Independence read. In its October session, the General Assembly approved the Declaration and absolved the inhabit- ants of Connecticut from allegiance to the British Crown. Oaths of fi- delity to the state were substituted and made a prerequisite for voting, and all writs were to be issued in the name of the Governor and the Colony. The civil government, however, continued as established under the Charter of 1662. All the laws of the state were to continue in force and the offices of the state remain the same.27
The military debacle in the Fall of 1776 confirmed Washington in his earlier conviction that the army must be reorganized on the basis of long-term enlistments. On the very day of the battle of Harlem Heights, Congress passed a series of resolutions calling for the enlistment of 88 battalions to serve for the duration of the war and provided that men already in the service would be counted in their state's quota of these battalions if they committed themselves to enlistment for the duration. Washington told Roger Sherman and the other members of a committee of inquiry into the status of the army of the necessity of improving the quality of officers provided by the states and of the need of a bounty of clothing for the soldiers and of an adequate pay scale for officers. He requested that the states complete their levies by the tenth of Novem- ber.28
Connecticut resolved in the October session of the Assembly to raise the eight battalions requested of it, including four regiments of cavalry, and named a committee to go to Washington's headquarters to consult with him and the general officers concerning the appointment of new officers by the state.29 Resolutions did not place men in the field, and the first of the eight battalions did not approach readiness until the following March.3º Moreover, consultation did not secure from Con- necticut officers more skilled in the art of command than those who had been serving. Israel Putnam, who had failed, according to Douglas Southall Freeman's evaluation, "to add in the least to the reputation he
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had gained at Bunker Hill,"31 was continued in his command. Generals Samuel Parsons and Joseph Spencer, neither of whom had distinguished himself in military service, were named to the command of the two brigades added.
The strength of the continental forces and the willingness or ability of the states to meet troop quotas were always conditioned by the threats of the enemy, real or imaginary, to the home territory. During the en- tire war, Washington's fundamental strategic premise was the mainte- nance of troops in force. Consistently, he maintained as few posts as possible and insisted that the troops be distributed in accord with the general plan of war.32 Inevitably, this placed him at variance with co- lonial Governors who had to provide troops to answer alarms in their immediate area. It seemed to New England Governors that Rhode Island was always potentially subject to attack. When, in December, 1776, British ships were sighted off shore, delegates at the convention of New England states, meeting in Providence, determined that a force of 6,000, including three battalions of the continental army, should be maintained in Rhode Island.33 Connecticut was to contribute 1,092 troops and Major General Joseph Spencer was sent to command the force. It is doubtful, however, if any Connecticut troops other than militia regiments from the eastern part of the state were actually with him, because, in February, Spencer was back in Hartford seeking reen- forcements to dislodge the British, and, as late as April, the Deputy Governor of Rhode Island was requesting Connecticut to send the stip- ulated number of men. Connecticut had indicated its willingness to support the expedition, if other colonies approved, but the expedition was postponed until Fall.34
In the meantime, Connecticut faced a danger to her own territory. Danbury had become an important base of supply, partially because it was assumed to be safe from raiders and partly because of its location in relation to upstate New York.35 Rumors of an impending raid were confirmed by the landing of General William Tryon, the Royal Gov- ernor of New York, at Fairfield on April 25, 1777.36 By steady marching Tryon reached Danbury the next day. Generals Arnold, Wooster, and Sillman of the Connecticut militia took up pursuit. Wooster attacked, fell back, and attacked again to be fatally wounded in the blistering
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musketry response of the British. By a series of skirmishes, Arnold at- tempted unsuccessfully to cut off Tryon's retreat to his ships.37 A large portion of the stores at Danbury had been destroyed.38 The raid was
(Courtesy Conn. Devel. Comm.)
COVENTRY-NATHAN HALE MONUMENT AND HOMESTEAD
presumed by Connecticut residents to presage a major campaign. The rumor spread that forces were to attack New Haven, New London, and Saybrook and were to join with Carleton's forces moving down from the North.39 Trumbull sought to have a portion of the continental battal- ions remain in the state and be provisioned from continental supply bases.40 Washington had been caught unaware in the Danbury raid and
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ordered troops to start for Connecticut.41 When Tryon retired Washing- ton was convinced that the enemy would make no large-scale movement against Connecticut. Instead of sending troops, Washington reminded Trumbull that the Connecticut battalions were not as yet complete and added that if they were, he "would be glad to send troops to Connecti- cut." Three days later, in a more conciliatory tone, Washington assured the Governor that "no requisition has more weight with me than yours" and that his inability to grant it had distressed him very much. With equal cordiality, Trumbull acknowledged "the justice and propriety" of Washington's action. The defense of the Hudson was of first impor- tance and troops for its defense had already been detailed.+2
The critical year of the war was at hand. The entire Spring had been spent in building up the continental forces. General Samuel Par- sons gave preference to Washington's requests and all except those who had not had smallpox shots or who were convalescing were pushed on to Peekskill. Washington at first concluded from Howe's movements in midsummer 1777 that he would join with Burgoyne in an attack on Ticonderoga.43 When Howe's troops did not move, Washington con- jectured that Howe might move toward New England as a diversionary attack. Trumbull was authorized to draw upon continental supplies in this event. The actual plan of the campaigns became obvious when news came of the hasty retreat of colonial forces before Burgoyne at Ti- conderoga in July and of the withdrawal of Howe to Philadelphia later in the month. As Burgoyne bore down from the North and when Wash- ington's continental forces were severely depleted at the Battle of Bran- dywine, Connecticut regiments were detached to reenforce both Gates and Washington.44
The detachment of Connecticut regiments to Washington prompted Putnam to go over the head of his Commander-in-Chief and appeal to John Hancock. This resulted in one of the most violent command con- troversies of the war. In a detailed analysis of the issue, Freeman con- cluded that, probably, Washington was overly cautious concerning the security of his own army. On the other hand, however, Putnam had inaccurately indicated a larger number ready for actual duty than were available. The detachment of troops and the detail of a small force to
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White Plains, when Putnam anticipated an attack on New York, se- verely depleted the defenses of the Hudson. In October, when it ap- peared that Sir Henry Clinton, who had returned from the Jerseys, was preparing to attack the Highlands and possibly move to Albany to re- lieve Burgoyne, the forces at White Plains were recalled and reenforce- ments were requested from the Connecticut militia.46 Although 1,700 Connecticut militia arrived on October 7, they did not arrive soon enough to stop Clinton's advance nor to prevent his capturing the High- lands and opening the Hudson for the relief of Burgoyne. The British army moved unchecked to Livingston Manor, beyond Albany, where they received news of Burgoyne's surrender. Since their position was untenable, Clinton ordered the retreat to New York.47
The defense of the Hudson against Clinton remained the chief occupation of Washington's army during 1779. Enlistments had de- creased considerably since the French entered the war. Also, the calling out of the militia, wrote Trumbull, "was a great prejudice to the hus- bandry," and if the enemy continued in force near Connecticut, he could not promise more than one battalion of militia unless Connecticut could be assured of the assistance of the continental troops.48 The Command- ing General felt that the Army must remain in force in the Highlands to protect the Hudson. Clinton proved Washington right again when in the last of May he came up the Hudson with a force of about 6,000 men and quickly gained possession of the forts at Stony Point and Ver- plank. As a diversionary tactic, the Coast line was invaded by General Tryon, who landed at New Haven on the morning of July 8th, plun- dered the city and burned the long wharf. He embarked for Fairfield on the next day and there destroyed almost the entire town. That which was not burned was carried off as plunder. After crossing the sound for supplies, he returned to the Connecticut coast on the 11th to destroy all but a few homes in Norwalk. These depredations enraged the Con- necticut people. Not since Lexington and Concord had the war fever been so high. Still Washington felt he could not permit the diversion of large numbers of troops at the risk of endangering the Highlands.49
An effective campaign in the Summer of 1780 rested almost en- tirely on reenforcements from the French. The recruitment of troops had reached a low ebb. Advantage was being taken of the exemption
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law of 1777 and almost every fraud to dodge army service was being practiced. The term of the three year men had expired, and, in the absence of a formal request, the Connecticut General Assembly had delayed taking up the matter. The task was made even more difficult by the state's not having paid wages due in a manner satisfactory to the men. The regiments were so defective that news of the arrival of the hoped-for French troops off the coast of Newport was embarrassing and there was uneasiness lest the inability or unwillingness of the states to provide their quotas shake the confidence of the allies. The force of 5,000 with Rochambeau was far less than had been anticipated and when the much-needed arms and powder did not arrive at all, the plans for a campaign were cancelled.
The presence of the French increased the difficulty of supply. The French bought large supplies of staples on the Connecticut market of- fering gold in payment. By mutual agreement, the purchasing of sup- plies for the French and American army was made the exclusive respon- sibility and privilege of Jeremiah Wadsworth. To help meet the needs, an embargo on goods transported by land between the colonies was re- moved to provide for a free flow of goods between the colonies.50
Washington came to Hartford to confer with Rochambeau on a combined plan of action.51 The depleted status of American troops, un- certainty of their eventual strength, and ignorance of British plans or of their ability to execute them made it impossible to plan a truly co- ordinated attack. As Washington commented, "We could only combine possible plans."52
When Washington returned from Hartford, he was confronted with a circumstance more disheartening than the inability to complete details for the next campaign. There was "treason in the Highlands." Benedict Arnold had planned to turn West Point, over which he had recently assumed command, over to the British. Connecticut's hero of the Plains of Abraham and of the northern campaign of 1777 had re- tired temporarily from active service before assuming command at Philadelphia. It was there that the perfidy was plotted. Arrangements had been made for the passage through the line of John André, alias Mr. Anderson, to keep the rendezvous with Arnold. Providentially, André's return was interrupted by members of a marauding party which
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preyed on friend and foe alike. As he passed through the neutral land between the British and American lines, the marauders demanded to see his papers. When they were not satisfied with the credentials which he produced, he was ordered to remove his boots. The papers given him by Arnold were revealed. Despite his attempts to bribe the out- laws, the captive was marched to the headquarters of the Second Reg- iment of the Light Dragoons at North Castle.53
The Dragoons were under Arnold's command, and, since he was in- formed immediately of the capture, he was able to escape before Wash- ington arrived at West Point. Benjamin Talmadge of Wethersfield, a Major in the Dragoons, insisted that the prisoner's papers be forwarded directly to General Washington. The papers included the pass to An- dré, a report of the forces and ordnance at West Point, plans for the disposition of forces in the event of an alarm, and the minutes of Wash- ington's last council of war. In an attempt to secure more information from André, he was escorted to West Point by Talmadge and a strong party of Dragoons before being imprisoned at Army Headquarters at Tappan, New York. Arnold's papers revealed the details of the plot. It was evident that he had planned for some time to deliver the fort to the British and had secured his appointment with this end in view.
After the shock of learning that the brilliant senior officer had be- trayed his country had passed, Washington could write philosophically that it was a wonder that the catalogue of traitors was so small. Perhaps Washington understood, yet, despite the efforts of generations of his- torians, Arnold remains something of an enigma. Was he motivated by uncontrolled ambition, or covetous of wealth, or embittered by slights, or hackneyed in villainy and lost to all sense of honor? Contemporary judgments were severe, and in New Milford he was hanged in effigy. On the occasion of its tercentenary celebration in 1959, Arnold's native Norwich sought the restoration of his military honors, but the request was denied. Benjamin Talmadge spent hours with André after his cap- ture and was intrigued with the brilliance, graciousness, and suavity of the British spy. His personal characteristics aroused great feeling for him among the younger officers. The sympathy felt for him as he faced death, somewhat lessened the hate for Arnold.
Sentiment was developing for a greater centralization. Delegates
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from the New England States meeting in Boston in August, 1780, rec- ommended that the several states implement the war effort by transport- ing their quotas of supplies to the Army, completing their complements of men. repealing any embargoes on interstate trade by land, sinking their state's quota of old continental bills, establishing sinking funds for new continental bills on which the credit of the bills would rest rather than attempting to support their credit by forcing them into circulation and refraining from emitting more state bills. Also, they recommended regional cooperation in supplying aid to sick soldiers and sailors charging the same to his state, preventing communication of intel- ligence to the enemy by newspapers and the like, and charging enlistees against the quota of the state of their origin. These were regarded as temporary expediencies, however, until a more final arrangement could be established. To achieve this, it was recommended that the states in- struct their delegates to the Continental Congress to confederate with those states which would agree to the Articles of Confederation and that they form a permanent system for carrying on the affairs of govern- ment.56
The desire for greater centralization was first effectuated by the reorganization of the army. In the Spring of 1780, a committee of Con- gress arrived at Army Headquarters to secure information on which to base an economic reorganization of the army. The unfilled regiments, the delay of the states in filling their quotas, the lack of supply, and the low morale of the troops made the reduction of the organization ad- visable. In October, a plan was announced in which enlistments were to be on a long-term basis as desired by the Commander-in-Chief. Had this provision been adopted in 1776, the war might have ended by 1780. Small regiments were to be united, and since this reduction in the total number of regiments meant that fewer officers were needed, these were to be selected from those who wished to continue in service. Those who wished to retire were to receive half pay for life. The Con- necticut regiments were reduced from eight to four, and Colonels Wylls, Bradley, Starr, and Meigs retired. These changes came late, but in recognition of a desperate situation.57
The Pennsylvania troops had mutinied and there was fear that this would spread to the main army. The year previously the fourth
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and eighth regiments of the Connecticut troops, after a sullen roll call, had risen in opposition to the command. Their allowance of meat had been ten days late and they had been on parade for hours, "growling like sore dogs." Only quick action on the part of the officers prevented their being joined by the third and sixth Connecticut regiments.58 The pay of the Connecticut line troops was months in arrears. In the Spring of 1781 a committee of the line officers met with the General Assembly in an attempt to resolve the difficulty. When the Assembly refused to make what the officers considered an equitable adjustment of the mon- ies which had been withheld by the state, the officers departed. On June 26, General Samuel Parsons reported the failure of the committee to Washington, who forwarded the report to Trumbull with the request 'that every satisfaction which can reasonably be requested should be given to these veteran troops." In the spirited correspondence which followed between Parsons and Trumbull, the Governor questioned if the officers meant "to press for more than justice from the necessity of their service," and Parsons replied that since truths were not agreeable, he would not trouble the Governor and Council on the subject.
Colonel Jonathan Trumbull, Jr., Washington's military secretary, took up the correspondence and invited his father to visit headquarters bringing some money with him. The troops' distresses, he wrote, "have so far operated upon their spirits as to render them impatient beyond further sufferance." This impatience was heightened, he said, "by the reflection that Connecticut is the only state who has not provided some pay for their troops, & when they consider that no State scarcely in the union have so much ability as theirs, the troops can construe the omis- sion into no other reason than absolute neglect, which galls them be- yond expression." Nothing would suffice but money. "The expectation of it ... is almost an insult."60 The state raised 35,000 pounds for the pay of the troops and reported that this sum would be at Danbury on the fifteenth of August. There is reason to believe that both the state and officers were guilty of attempting to drive hard bargains and neither had a proper appreciation of the difficulties of the other. The Assembly subsequently gave instructions that any mistakes in the previous settle- ment were to be rectified and the settlement extended to include 1781. A gratuity of twenty shillings was granted non-commissioned officers
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