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29 State Rec., Vol. VIII, pp. 17-18 and note.
30 Ibid.
31 George S. and Helen McKearin, American Glass (New York: 1941), pp. 124-26; N. Hudson Moore, Old Glass, European and American (New York: 1935), pp. 315-16.
33 Penrose R. Hooper, Early Clockmaking in Connecticut, Tercentenary Commission of the State of Connecticut (New Haven: c. 1934 by P. R. Hoopes), pp. 3-7.
34 State Rec., Vol. VIII, p. xxi. The first turnpike established in this country extended from Alexandria, Virginia, to the Blue Ridge Mountains.
35 Ibid., p. xxii.
36 Ibid. The details of the construction in this century of particular turnpikes can be found by consulting the indexes to Vols. VIII and IX of the State Records.
37 In 1784, Connecticut delegates to Congress were authorized to cede those lands claimed by Connecticut in the Northwest Territory which were west of a line 120 miles beyond the western boundary of Pennsylvania. Lands between the Pennsyl- vania boundary and this line 120 miles to the west were to be specifically reserved for the use of Connecticut and to satisfy the claims of Connecticut soldiers. Because the Continental Congress objected seriously to this proposal, the General Assembly in the following year authorized a cession of land which omitted a specific reserva- tion, but which renounced rights only to the territory beyond the 120 mile line. Again this met with objections in Congress, since Connecticut had not ceded juris- diction as well as land. State Rec., Vol. VI, pp. 104-105, 171-72, note; Vol. V, pp. 277-78.
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HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
38 State Rec., Vol. VII, p. 449, note; B. A. Hinsdale, The Old Northwest, With a View of the Thirteen Colonies as Constituted by the Royal Charters, (N. Y .: 1888).
39 Harriet Taylor Upton, H. G. Cutler, et al., History of the Western Reserve, Vol. I, (N. Y .: 1910), pp. 10-11.
40 State Rec., Vol. VII, pp. 448-72; Hatcher, Western Reserve, p. 61.
41 "Connecticut Land Company and Accompanying Papers," Tract No. 96, Annual Re- port of the Western Reserve Historical Society, 1916, p. 90.
42 Hatcher, Western Reserve, pp. 62-75.
43 State Rec., Vol. VI, pp. 237-38; Harriet Upton, Western Reserve, Vol I, p. 10.
44 Connecticut Courant, Oct. 21, 1791, May 19, 1794, and June 2, 1794.
45 State Rec., Vol. VIII, p. 145, note.
46 Ibid., pp. 250-51.
47 Hatcher, Western Reserve, pp. 62-75.
48 Albert C. Bates, "The Connecticut Gore Land Company," Annual Report of the Amer- ican Historical Association for the Year 1898 (Washington: 1899), pp. 141-48.
49 Ibid., pp. 148-56.
50 Ibid., pp. 157-59.
51 Quoted in ibid., p. 161.
52 Ibid., pp. 159-161.
53 Quoted in ibid., p. 159.
53a Edward Warren Capen, The Historical Development of the Poor Law of Connecticut, Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law, Columbia University (New York: 1905), P. 53.
53b Ibid., pp. 97-106; State Rec., Vol. VII, pp. 66-69.
53c Capen, Poor Law of Connecticut, pp. 97-106. In 1810, the requirement for payment of taxes during this six years became an additional requirement for receiving legal settlement but was not a ground for removal, and thus did not interfere with free- dom of residence. In 1821, non-payment of these taxes was not listed as a bar to settlement but became a ground of removal during the six years. If not exercised, then legal settlement was achieved, apparently. In 1830, there was a reversion to the 1810 provision, withdrawing non-payment as a ground for removal but leaving it as a ground for not securing settlement.
54 Ibid., pp. 138-43.
55 Ibid., pp. 116-17.
56 Ibid., p. 118.
57 Ibid., pp. 133-35.
58 Ibid., pp. 137-38.
59 Ibid., pp. 149-53.
60 Ibid., p. 155; State Rec., Vol. VIII, pp. 87, note, 116-17.
61 State Rec., Vol. VII, pp. 118, 175, 314; Vol. VIII, pp. 93, 144; Vol. IX, pp. xiv, 98, 260, note, 464-65.
62 Greene, Revolutionary Generation, p. 288.
63 State Rec., Vol. I, pp. 415-16; R. F. Weld, Slavery in Connecticut (New Haven: n. d.), pp. 13-14; Capen, Poor Law of Connecticut, pp. 37, 125-26.
64 State Record, Vol. VIII, p. xviii, note.
65 Ibid., Vol. IX, pp. 38-39.
66 Ibid., Vol. VI, pp. 472-73; Vol. VII, p. 379.
67 Ibid., Vol. VIII, p. xix.
68 Ibid., Vol. VII, pp. 165, 206-207, 282, 302; Capen, Poor Law of Connecticut, pp. 126-29.
69 State Rec., Vol. VIII, p. 11.
70 Ibid., Vol. IX, p. 87.
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FEDERALISM AT HIGH TIDE
71 Ibid., p. 183.
72 Purcell, Connecticut in Transition, pp. 9-10.
73 Ibid., pp. 12-13; Paul Wakeman Coons, The Achievement of Religious Liberty in Con- necticut, Tercentenary Commission of the State of Connecticut (New Haven, n. d.), PP. 21-22.
74 Ibid., pp. 22-23; Purcell, Connecticut in Transition, pp. 84-85.
75 Ibid., pp. 55-6.
76 Greene, Development of Religious Liberty, pp. 368-69.
77 Ibid., pp. 92-93.
78 Ibid., pp. 372-73; Purcell, Connecticut in Transition, pp. 92-93; Coons, Religious Lib- erty in Connecticut, p. 23; State Rec., Vol. VII, p. 256, note.
79 Greene, Development of Religious Liberty, Pp. 372-73.
80 Ibid., p. 377; State Rec., pp. 311-12, note.
81 Ibid., Vol. VII, pp. 488-89, note; Vol. IX, p. 265, note; Charles R. Keller, The Second Great Awakening in Connecticut (New Haven, 1942), pp. 70-94; Greene, Develop- ment of Religious Liberty, pp. 386-87.
82 Purcell, Connecticut in Transition, pp. 175-76.
82a S. N. Fisher, The Litchfield Law School, Tercentenary Commission of the State of Connecticut (New Haven, n.d.), pp. 1-5.
82b State Rec., Vol. VII, pp. 334-35, note, 392-94, note; Vol. VIII, pp. 403-404; Bernard Steiner, The History of Education in Connecticut (Washington: 1893), pp. 103-28; Greene, Development of Religious Liberty, pp. 368-80; Stiles, Diary, Vol. III, entries for January-June, 1792, esp., pp. 452-56.
83 Coons, Religious Liberty in Connecticut, pp. 22-23; Greene, Development of Religious Liberty, pp. 380-92; Charles L. Ames, "History of Education in Connecticut from 1818 to 1925," in Norris Galpin Osborn, ed., History of Connecticut in Monographic Form, Vol. V, pp. 184-87; Steiner, Education in Connecticut, pp. 103-28; State Rec., Vol. VIII, pp. 237-38, note.
84 Ibid., Vol. IX, p. 388. This record supersedes the note that "no society ever applied to have its funds diverted to ministerial support" in Vol. VIII, p. 238.
85 Ibid., Vol. IX, p. 388.
86 State Rec., Vol. IX, p. 179, note.
86a Carl Bowker Bomhoff, "The Development of State Support of Teacher Education in Connecticut's School-Reform Movement, 1825-1850," unpublished doctoral thesis, New York University, 1952, p. 10.
87 Orwin Bradford Griffin, Evolution of the Connecticut School System (New York: 1928), pp. 7-8.
87a Bomhoff, "Development of State Support of Teacher Education," pp. 11-13.
88 Steiner, Education in Connecticut, p. 35; State Rec., Vol. VIII, pp. 138-39.
89 Ibid., Vol. IX, pp. 178-81.
90 Bomhoff, "Development of State Support for Teacher Education," pp. 11-12.
91 Griffin, Evolution of the Connecticut School System, pp. 8-9.
91a Bomhoff, "Development of State Support of Teacher Education," p. 11. 92 State Rec., Vol. IX, p. 180, note.
93 Ibid., and p. 348.
94 Harry R. Warfel, Noah Webster; School Master to America (New York: 1936), pp. 52-85.
96 Steiner, Education in Connecticut, pp. 47-50; Ames, "Education in Connecticut," Os- born, ed., History of Connecticut, Vol. V, pp. 192-94.
97 Jarvis Means Morse, Connecticut Newspapers in the Eighteenth Century, Tercente- nary Commission of the State of Connecticut (New Haven, n. d), pp. 1-19.
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HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
98 Ibid.
99 Vernon Louis Parrington, The Connecticut Wits (New York: c. 1926), pp. ix-xxvi. 100 Ibid., pp. xxv-xxvi, xliii-xlviii.
101 State Rec., Vol. IX, pp. xi, 46, 456-58.
102 Ibid., pp. x, 252-53.
103 Ibid., pp. 259-60, note.
104 Ibid., pp. x, 357-59, note, 465. 105 Purcell, Connecticut in Transition, pp. 229-232.
Chapter XVI The Jeffersonian Challenge
T HE REPUBLICAN PARTY was strengthened in the state after the turn of the century. The campaign in the national election of 1800 began early, pamphlets were circulated, and open electioneering was engaged in for the first time. Although the Federalists were successful in electing the seven Congressional repre- sentatives, the Republicans were strong enough for two of their mem- bers, William Hart and Chauncey Goodrich, to secure eighth and ninth places. To launch their campaign in 1801, one thousand Republicans met in Wallingford to celebrate Jefferson's victory. The union of church and state was declared by the Republicans to be the crucial issue between the two parties.1 The Federalists defined this problem as a question of choice between "religion and infidelity, morality and debauchery, legal government and total disorganization."2 The Feder- alists returned Jonathan Trumbull, Jr., as Governor. Indeed, the 11,156 votes cast for him constituted the highest number the Federalists had ever received in an election. However, the Republicans won thirty- three, or about one-sixth, of the seats in the Assembly.3 The Republi- cans could expect to increase their strength further through appoint- ments which the national party would make in the state.
That the power of patronage could be used effectively in develop- ing a political party was understood by Jefferson. However, Jefferson viewed Connecticut as the "fortress of the 'Monarchial Party,' " where patronage might not suffice to force its dethronement.4 He was urged by Connecticut Republicans to use patronage to cement Republican loy- alties and counter current charges that he had used Republicans to secure office but now would depend upon Federalists. Gideon Granger
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HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
argued further that it was only "just, fair and honorable that the friends of the Government should have at least as great a proportion of the honors and offices of the Government as they are of the whole people," and that the relative strength was such that there was little to lose from adverse reaction.5 In addition to these practical considerations he pointed out "Lastly, the sacred rule that no man shall be persecuted for his opinions decently and reasonably maintained will not apply to any of our official Characters. I believe without a single exception All, and I know most have been bitter persecutors."6 The particular test which was urged was the replacement of Chauncey Goodrich, the Collector at New Haven, who was described as "violent, irritable, priest-ridden, implacable, a ferocious federalist, and a most indecent enimy" to the Executive and his administration.7 Goodrich had also advanced the interest of Aaron Burr before Congress;8 removal was urged by a letter from twenty-four Connecticut Republicans.9
Whether or not Jefferson believed strongly that Adams should have refrained from appointing men to positions in which they would serve another President, the reasoning accorded with his political pur- poses and had been chosen by him as justification for replacements.10 Chauncey Goodrich had been appointed to the Collector's position by Adams just before his retirement after the death in February 1801 of the previous collector. Goodrich was removed and Samuel Bishop was appointed to the collectorship.11 A violent political controversy raged in the state.
New Haven Federalists immediately forwarded a protest to Jeffer- son criticizing the appointment of a man eighty years old, and so bur- dened with age and other offices, that he could execute his duties only through clerks and with the assistance of his son. The merchants, too, protested and the press, then, supported these protests. Jefferson entered the altercation, justifying his action as securing due participation of those selected by majority vote and hitherto completely excluded. Had he found a moderate participation in office of those of his majority party, Jefferson declared, he would have awaited time and accident to raise them to their just share. Their "total exclusion" called for "prompter corrections," and what, he asked, could be a more just way of securing a vacancy than by the displacement of "persons appointed
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THE JEFFERSONIAN CHALLENGE
in the last moments of an administration, not for its own aid, but to begin a career ... with their successors?"12 Although Bishop's age and many public offices made his appointment open to criticism, the Fed- eralist attack was somewhat blunted since he had been named to many of his positions by Federalists and his appointment had been well re- ceived initially by the Press.13
(Courtesy of the Academy)
NORWICH-NORWICH FREE ACADEMY
The Federalists believed that patronage revealed a vulnerable point for attack and did not relent as other appointments were made. Abraham Bishop succeeded his father as the collector in New Haven; Gideon Granger was made Postmaster General and appointed some of his Republican friends postmasters, including Bishop's brother-in- law, Jonathan Law of Hartford. Wolcott was named collector at Mid- dletown, Ephraim Kirby was appointed Judge of the Louisiana terri- tory, Joel Barlow received a French mission, and countless others bene- fited from lesser appointments and government contracts.14 The Fed- eralists were quick to compare the salaries of these national offices to those received by state officials and described Republican leaders as "a set of office holders and office seekers, under the National Govern-
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HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
ment ... using every possible exertion to destroy this State."15 Patron- age evolved as a sinew of party structure and laid a basis for the later success of the Republican Party.
Connecticut Republicans were carried along by the program of the national party during the first years of the century. The election of Jefferson and the purchase of the Louisiana territory provided rea- sons for state-wide "jubilees." These aroused interest but were de- nounced by the Federalists as "a contemptible pandering to the multi- tude."16 The Republicans identified themselves in favor of the separa- tion of church and state and the extension and purity of elections, and in opposition to the extravagance of local governments and the inequi- table taxation. From 1801 to 1804 the percentage of votes cast for Re- publican nominees for Governor rose from nine to forty-four percent, and, in the latter year, they elected 78 members of the General Assem- bly. Despite this success, the Republicans had not found a state issue which aroused the electorate. Then, flushed with the success of the Spring campaign and riding the tide of Jefferson's increasing acceptance, they called a convention in the Fall of 1804 for the drafting of a new con- stitution.17
Neither the demand for a new constitution nor the argument ad- vanced to support or oppose it was new. There was a new generation of disputants, however, and the newspapers gave the question almost their exclusive attention. As the delegates of ninety-six towns met in New Haven, it was in the atmosphere of a party political convention. The Republicans had found an issue upon which they could hang their political hat and it seemed that with the clever Abraham Bishop to di- rect their strategy the Republicans might gain their greatest victory. However, on the eve of the 1804 Fall election, a Federalist pamphleteer raised an issue which has ever since been perennially effective in block- ing similar legislation in the Connecticut General Assembly. Count the Cost, urged David Daggett, anonymously, in the title of his pamphlet, and questioned whether a change in government might be worth the cost and even suggested that it might endanger support of re- ligion, schools, libraries and the like. The arguments were effective. The electorate endorsed the Federalists who used their power to revoke the commissions of the justices who had participated in the New
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THE JEFFERSONIAN CHALLENGE
Haven meeting supporting a constitutional convention and questioning the existence of a state constitution.
The question continued to be agitated in elections of 1805 and 1806 with the Republicans no more than maintaining their strength and a diminution of interest on the part of the electorate indicated by a decreasing number of votes cast. In 1807, the Republicans made a small gain in the number of seats in the Assembly which they won. They had continued to poll about forty percent of the vote for Governor and to elect up to thirty-five percent of the members of the Assembly. Then in 1808, whereas in former years they had benefited from the national program of their party, they were hard pressed to defend the embargo in terms of state benefit.18
Jefferson's efforts to restore the freedom of the seas through nego- tiation seemed almost fruitless, and, in the Summer of 1807, the coun- try moved precipitously close to war when England halted the U. S. warship Chesapeake. The non-importation act which had been passed in 1806 limiting the commodities which could be imported from the British Empire was to expire in December, 1807. The administration believed that a more aggressive position should be taken to protect American rights and yet avoid war. In his message of December 18, 1807, he called for an embargo on American shipping. Connecticut's delegation to Congress favored limiting the embargo to sixty days, but the majority party passed the bill without a time limitation.19
Shipping was seriously affected. In New Haven alone, 78 vessels were embargoed in 1808. State exports fell from $1,625,000 in 1807 to $414,000 in 1808. By 1810, recovery was so slight that exports amounted to only about one-half of the 1807 amount. The shipping out of the port of New London was apparently the most seriously curtailed. In 1810, the customs reported for New London were only eleven percent of what they had been in 1807, whereas for the river port at Middle- town they compared at 75 percent and at New Haven at 35 percent.20 There is no doubt that the entire economy of the state was affected.
The extent and the long-range significance of the damage is more difficult to measure. Apparently the farmers did not suffer immediately from the loss of markets.21 While all shipping interests were sharply curtailed, theoretically more capital was available for the further ex-
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HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
pansion of manufacturing. The embargo offered extreme protection and the distress of shipping eased the labor market. The embargo coincided with an expansion in the raising of merino sheep in the state which gave a better basis for the woolen industry. By 1810, this industry was fairly well established. In that year, The Humphreysville Manu- facturing Company was chartered with a capital of $500,000, and im- mediately thereafter the Middletown Manufacturing Company was chartered with a capital of $200,000.23 Connecticut manufacturing con- tinued to expand during the War of 1812. Although it would be in- accurate to conclude that the embargo was responsible for the success of manufacturing, it did produce conditions which were conducive to expansion. Historical perspective leads to the conjecture that perhaps the embargo was fortunate for the economic development of the state. It is doubtful, at least, that the embargo was as calamitous as the Feder- alists wished the populace to believe.24
The Federalists, however, could not see beyond the idle ships which lined their harbors. The initial mild disapproval of the embargo quickly developed into a chorus of antagonism. The Hartford Courant derisively spoke of the "dambargo" and charged that "the little finger of Thomas Jefferson was heavier than the loins of George the Third." "Shew us," it demanded, "in any civilized government ... a stretch of tyranny equal to this."25 As more restrictive measures were proposed for a stricter enforcement of the embargo, Benjamin Talmadge con- jectured whether or not the Connecticut delegation should resign from Congress. Connecticut had endured the "waves of faction ... the bil- lows of democracy .... Unmoved by the numbers and sophisms of her enemies," she had followed the path of Washington. Now she had "a character to maintain."26 Governor Trumbull called a special session of the General Assembly for February, 1809.
A set of legal or quasi-legal principles was prepared which on other occasions had been antecedent to revolution or secession.27 Trumbull promptly called the embargo unconstitutional and pleaded for Heaven to avert the danger then before them. Ironically, in prepar- ing its defense, Connecticut chose premises which Jefferson himself had expressed cogently, which were reminiscent of Roger Sherman, and which anticipated the defense of states' rights, the Yale-Litchfield
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THE JEFFERSONIAN CHALLENGE
trained John Calhoun. It was asserted that it was the duty of the leg- islatures of the states "to watch over and vigorously to maintain, the powers not delegated to the states respectively, or to the people." The Assembly approved the action of the Governor in refusing to enforce the embargo, proposed constitutional alterations for the protection of commerce, and ordered that the resolution of the Assembly directing officials of the state to refrain from enforcing the embargo be published as general military orders.28
The Republicans identified the action as a move toward treason and civil war. The embargo was necessary to protect the country's po- sition among nations, they argued, and charged that the Federalists were playing politics with national security. The arguments used by Ells- worth in 1788 were hurled back at the Federalists: the proper way to control a tyrannical government was through the independent judiciary and ultimately through the elective franchise.29 The thread of the argu- ment was cut, however, when on February 27, the embargo was re- pealed. Shortly afterwards, Jefferson completed his tenure with Federal- ism still firmly enthroned in Connecticut.30
In the next years the people of Connecticut expressed their prefer- ence clearly. Support for the Republicans decreased steadily thereafter. They attracted 36 percent of the vote for their gubernatorial candidate in 1809 and only 11 percent in 1812. Despite their decline, as gauged by the votes cast, through a "fortunate schism" the Republicans were able to break the influence of the ministry in politics for the first time in 1811. Until that time, the Republicans were composed primarily of Methodists and Baptists. Then they were joined by the Episcopalians, who had given up hope of gaining equality with the Congregationalists. Also, in 1811, when the Republican nominee declined to accept the nomination, the Republicans decided to name as their candidate for Governor, Robert Griswold, who was the Federalist candidate for Lieutenant-Governor. Griswold was a Federalist, but was not a man of religion, which made him popular with the anti-clerical element, to whom he was presented as hostile to the union of church and state. Elijah Boardman, the Republican nominee for Lieutenant-Governor was popular with the Episcopalians. Griswold was easily elected, with votes for Lieutenant Governor divided so that no one had a majority.
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HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
The Assembly chose John Cotton Smith who had only one-third as many votes as Boardman. This nominal success soon proved hollow as Griswold revealed his Federalist leanings through his opposition to "Mr. Madison's War" of 1812.31
Efforts to avert war had failed, and, as the country moved from the embargo to the non-intercourse act to war, the New England Fed- eralists found themselves in an equivocal position. Their leaders had convinced themselves that there would be no war. Also, they had sought to convince their followers that the real design of Madison's administra- tion was to annihilate New England commerce for the benefit of the plantation states; that the status of New England in the depleted state of commerce was worse than war itself; and, although a war could not be justified, it was preferable to the evils being experienced.32 Yet, the "most furious party of Republicans" from the interior states who were "loud and urgent for war" were not supported by Connecticut Federal- ists.33 The Federalists bemoaned the lack of preparedness, but did not lend their influence to a bill pushed through by William B. Giles call- ing for 25,000 men to be enlisted for five years.34 Although they had op- posed every attempt to secure redress without war and had proclaimed that the administration "could not be kicked into war," they voted against the resolution endorsing the proclamation of war.35
Connecticut came dangerously close to traitorous action in her refusal to support the war. In the name of preserving "the liberties of the country," she officially refused the services of the militia. Instead, she established a military corps for the defense of the state which was subject only to the orders of its commanders and not obliged "on any occasion to do military duty out of the state."36 The state did not en- couragement enlistment in the national army and private individuals made recruitment difficult. The American Mercury reported that a mob of thirty or forty people "in the garb of gentlemen" had mobbed the recruiting officer in Litchfield where "sedition and treason" were without disguise.37 Madison underlined the seriousness of Connecti- cut's actions when he observed "if the authority of the United States ... can be thus frustrated even in a state of declared war, they are not one nation for the purpose most requiring it."38 Although there was a measure of cooperation when Stephen Decatur was forced into the
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