USA > Connecticut > History of Connecticut, Volume I > Part 32
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sumed $1,600,000 of Connecticut's debt. By 1791, only $458,437 of the debt remained, and by 1795 Connecticut was entirely free of debt.65
The Constitutional Convention
When an invitation was received for delegates to meet in Phila- delphia to resolve the problems of finance, commerce, and tariff by strengthening the Confederation, Connecticut was not convinced that issues could be best resolved in convention. Confidence in Congress had been severely shaken as a result of the soldiers' pay issue and the organization of the Cincinnati. The conventions held in protest had rendered even the idea of a convention obnoxious. The General Assem- bly had refused to send delegates to the Annapolis convention and there was strong opposition to sending them to Philadelphia.66 As late as March 1787, David Humphreys wrote Washington that "Connecticut is under the influence of a few miserable, narrow-minded, I may say wicked politicians, that I question very much whether the legislature will choose members to appear in the Convention and if they do my apprehension is still greater that they will be sent on purpose to impede any salutary measures that might be proposed."67 Ezra Stiles added his doubts as to the expediency of the Federal convention.68 In spite of this opposition, there developed a strong block including Noah Webster, Josiah Meigs, and Jeremiah Wadsworth, who believed that Congress as it was then constituted was "too inert" for the solution of the issues of the moment. 69
The decision to send representatives was not reached without spirited discussion. The New Haven Gazette, which held a strong federalist sentiment, identified those who opposed the idea as "un- lettered backwoodsmen" and those who favored sending the delegates as "men of education and understanding." The Connecticut General Assembly delayed choosing its delegates until two days before they were scheduled to meet in Philadelphia "for the Sole and express pur- pose of revising the Articles of Confederation" and "to discuss upon such Alterations and Provisions agreeable to the General Principles of Republican Government."70 Oliver Ellsworth, William Samuel John- son, and Roger Sherman were delegates from Connecticut. It was re- ported that "the delegates from the eastward are for a very strong
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government & wish to prostrate all the state legislature," but the opin- ion prevailed that the people of Connecticut, in general, were not in agreement. "No man" in Connecticut, it was said, "would be elected to the office of constable if he was to declare that he meant to pay a cop- per towards the domestic debt."71 Roger Sherman, perhaps, was closer to the will of the populace than either of the other Connecticut dele- gates and was disposed "to patch up the old scheme of government."72
Characteristic of each of the Connecticut delegates was a broad experience in politics. Collectively, they represented almost three quarters of a century in public service. Each was a respected lawyer who had risen from local, to state, and to national prominence, having held both elective and appointive offices. William Samuel Johnson, an Episcopalian in a Puritan Commonwealth, was one of the most learned men of his time and had been appointed President of Columbia Univer- sity. In the critical decision for revolution, he could not serve the people against the King, but after taking the oath of allegiance in 1779 he once again was called to the service of the state as a legal consultant in the Susquehanna controversy and finally as a delegate to Congress in 1785. Elegant, gentle mannered, almost affectionate in his mode of address, he could quiet disturbed spirits.73 Oliver Ellsworth, born to the standing order as the son of a clever Yankee farmer, served in various capacities during the Revolution before taking a seat in Congress in 1778. Tall, dignified, commanding-logical, concise, argumentative- purposeful, arduous, and energetic, he could drive a point to effective conclusion.74 Roger Sherman had risen from shoemaker to a position of eminence. The Constitution was to be the fourth of the significant national documents he was to sign. Tall, awkward, and uncouth, he was yet extremely artful in accomplishing any particular objective. He was judged to be "as cunning as the Devil, a man of ability and great prac- tical wisdom."75 Together, Sherman, Ellsworth, and Johnson were a competent, well-balanced, and politically experienced delegation, equipped for the practical work of the convention. Even a casual read- ing of the record of the convention reveals the jockeying, trading, committal and recommittal which seem customary parliamentary tac- tics. Ellsworth articulated a realistic approach saying he "preferred doing half the good . .. , rather than to do nothing at all" and de-
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claring "If no compromise should take place, our meeting would be worse than vain."76 The decisions of the Constitutional Con- vention were the only ones which the realities of politics would per- mit.
Even the three Connecticut delegates were not in complete agree-
(Courtesy Mills Coll., Conn. State Lib.)
COLCHESTER-OLD VIEW OF BACON ACADEMY
ment among themselves as their divided votes on critical issues reveal. Before Johnson arrived, Ellsworth and Sherman divided on the ques- tions that the members of the House should be elected by the people, and that Congress should be empowered to legislate in all cases in which the separate states were incompetent. On these issues Sherman took an extreme states' rights view.78 Although an effective propaganda campaign had been launched in Connecticut in favor of a national government, Sherman continued to express support for the confed- erate form of government. "Congress carried us through the war, and
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perhaps as well as any Govt. could have done."79 With the arrival of Johnson, the balance within the Connecticut delegation was weighted in favor of federalism. Johnson had strong commercial ties in New York and spoke for the conservative order in Connecticut.80
From the opening of the convention until June 14, the delegates warred on the relative balance of power between the state and national governments. Then Patterson of New Jersey requested adjournment in order that a truly federal plan could be presented.81 The specific instructions to the Connecticut delegation are sufficient to explain their cooperation in committee with an effort to check the trend toward extreme nationalism.82 Nevertheless, the Connecticut delegation did not support the new plan and finally voted with the majority against the New Jersey plan.83 The Connecticut delegation was now free from its instructions to revise the confederation. The word "national," it was said, had been used inaccurately and delusively. It was explained that by "national government" was meant not one which would swallow up the states, but rather one which would exist on friendly terms with them.84 The next day, Oliver Ellsworth moved to drop the word "na- tional" and retain the proper title of "United States." That general agreement had been reached before the session had convened is indi- cated by the fact that the proposal was agreed to without vote.85 Many must have been of the same opinion as Madison, who observed almost half a century later, that the true nature of the government was deter- mined by the substance of the articles, not by the title.86
The critical issue in the struggle of the large and small states was the method of representation in Congress. Other issues, such as the length of the term of the members of each house were comparatively easily resolved. The proposition for two branches of the legislature and the election of the lower house by the people was included in the origi- nal plan submitted by Randolph and was never seriously challenged, al- though opposition stiffened as the small states closed ranks.87 Sherman had suggested as early as May 31 that members of the Senate should be elected by state legislatures. The Connecticut delegates consistently supported this idea.88 On a motion by Rutledge, the convention voted unanimously to take up "the most fundamental points; the rules of suffrage in the 2 branches" on June 27.89
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On the twenty-ninth, Johnson anticipated the day's events by an opening suggestion "that in one branch the people ought to be repre- sented; in the other the States. The state delegation voted with the minority on the proposition that the rule of suffrage in the House should not be according to state, but Ellsworth moved that the prin- ciple should be followed in the Senate. He "was not sorry on the whole," he said, "that the vote just passed, had determined against this rule in the first branch. He hoped that it would become a ground of com- promise with regard to the 2d branch." It was now that he warned "if no compromise should take place our meeting would not only be in vain, but worse than in vain." Of the eastern states, only Massachusetts would join the union if the states were denied an equal vote in both branches. Ellsworth "could never admit that there was no danger from the large states," but cajoled: "Let not too much be attempted; by which all may be lost .. . " and asserted that he preferred doing half the good, rather than to do nothing at all.90
The opposition formed with Madison, Wilson and King in the lead. "The Connecticut motion," charged King, "contains all the vices of the old confederation. It supposes an imaginary evil-the slavery of state governments. . Should this Convention adopt the motion, our business here is at an end."91 Wilson entertained more favorable hopes of Connecticut and the northern states, trusting "the alarm ex- ceeded their cause," but stating "if a separation must take place, it could never happen on better grounds." To his objection that the minority would rule the majority, Ellsworth asked if it were novel that power should be given to the few to save them from being destroyed by the many.92 Madison's reply seems to have been tactical, he chided Ellsworth for trivial inconsistencies and criticized Connecticut for positively refusing to pass a law for compliance with the requisition of Congress. This drew a defense from Ellsworth and roused Sherman from his chair. Madison's attack was coupled with an offer to compro- mise on the question if it could be done "on correct principles, other- wise not-if the old fabric of the confederation must be the ground- work of the new, we must fail."93 Madison indicated that he believed that the real division between the states was not between the large and the small, but between the Northern and Southern based on the effects
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of their having or not having slaves. He advanced the idea that repre- sentation in one branch might be based on free inhabitants and in the other on all, including slaves.94
Sunday provided a day for introspection and negotiation before the Convention resumed and the matter was brought to a vote on a motion by Ellsworth that each state be allowed one vote in the Senate. There was one interesting switch in the usual voting alignment. Abra- ham Baldwin of Georgia, who, according to one record of the conven- tion wanted clarification, and according to the other announced op- position, deadlocked the vote at five and five and sent the proposal to committee.95 Baldwin was a native of Connecticut, a graduate of and a former tutor at Yale, who had recently moved to Georgia. He still re- tained strong ties in Connecticut and was to be a guest of Ezra Stiles before returning to Georgia after the convention. Baldwin had con- sistently supported proportional representation until this time. Far- rand suggests that "a temporary sacrifice of opinion for the sake of har- mony was quite in keeping with his character."96 Luther Martin stated that "Baldwin did not change his vote because of any change in his opinions, but because he was convinced that the small states would withdraw from the convention.97 Ellsworth's biographer suggests that "it is ten to one, Ellsworth managed" Baldwin.98 By his vote, Baldwin forced a compromise acceptable to small states and to slave states.
In 1787, slavery was not the moral issue it was to become later. Ellsworth stated that the "morality and wisdom of slavery were matters for the states to decide." Roger Sherman, in the voice of practical poli- tics, observed that "it was better to let the southern states import slaves than to part with those states." Georgia was the last of the Southern states to admit slavery and during the Revolution was the most adamant for its retention. Madison's suggestion was not based upon a desire to retain the institution, but upon considerations of strength. By counting the slaves, the political balance would be thrown to the South. For both the small states and the slave states, then, the question was not one of morals but of political power.
The Connecticut delegation had made its contribution to the compromise designed to protect the essential rights of any individual state against the tyranny of a majority of others. For three days Ells-
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worth had carried the attack for the small states and it was to him that rejoinders had been directed. Now he never attended the compromise committee to which he had been named and after it reported on July 5 the discussion was dominated by others.100 The compromise was finally resolved with the proviso that representation in the House should be on the basis of population. The whole report was then approved on the 16th by a vote of five to four.101
The results of these negotiations are so frequently referred to as the "Connecticut Compromise," it seems proper to inquire into the justness of such claims. The propositions for the establishment of two branches of the legislature and for the election of the lower house by the people was included in the plan originally submitted by Randolph. These proposals were never seriously challenged, although, as the small states closed ranks, opposition stiffened.102 The important feature of the compromise, then, was the basis of representation in the Senate.103 Sherman had suggested as early as May 31, that the members of the Senate should be elected by the state legislatures and the Connecticut delegation consistently supported this view.104 Ellsworth made the mo- tion that "in the second branch . . . each state shall have an equal vote," and in the debate the plan was referred to at least once as the "Connecticut motion."105 Although the records of the convention leave most of the machinations which transpired to inference, it appears that the Connecticut delegation was as astute as any, but in the debate on the floor the members of the Connecticut delegation did not emerge as leaders except during a brief three-day period. It is important to note in this connection that Farrand states that the compromise did not originate with Connecticut nor was the appellation "Connecticut Com- promise" used during the convention.105a The Philadelphia Conven- tion was a meeting of political giants. The appraisal that the "Con- necticut delegation played a small, but significant part"106 in the deliberations seems a fair estimate. Connecticut is as deserving, perhaps, of the appellation "the Constitution State" as any other state, but no more.
After agreement had been reached on the issue of representation, the convention moved to an orderly conclusion. The remaining ten days were devoted to further consideration of the proposals of the Vir-
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ginia Plan submitted by Randolph. There were wide differences of opinion on the method of selection and the tenure of both the execu- tive and the judiciary. The differences, however, did not follow geo- graphical lines. The delegates seemed more inclined to present their personal views.107 Since the matters were not regarded as vital to the protection of a state's interest, the delegates were willing for the remain- ing questions to be decided and a final detailed constitution drawn in committee. On July 26, the proceedings of the convention were referred to a committee of five, the Committee of Detail, of whom Ellsworth was one.108 The committee was instructed to report on August 6. Its recommendations were considered from that date until September 10th, with a spirit of compromise governing the settlement of various ques- tions.109 On September 8th, the articles were referred to a committee of style under the chairmanship of William Samuel Johnson. Contem- porary evidence, however, credits Gouverneur Morris with having done the major work of the committee.110 That the committee, or more par- ticularly, Morris, took liberties in the final draft is illustrated by the general welfare clause. In the report of the committee, this clause was separated from the other clauses by semicolons. This would have made it a separate power of Congress to do in addition whatever was neces- sary for defense and welfare rather than an explanation of purposes of taxation and a limitation of taxation to this purpose. The former in- terpretation was more in accord with Morris' views, but the latter had been accepted by the convention. As the constitution was finally en- grossed, the clause was changed to its original form. Roger Sherman, who had gone as far as he would go in the formation of a government with coercive powers, insisted on the alteration.111 The constitution was printed and signed, and the Convention met for a last time on Sep- tember 17th.112
Even while the Convention was meeting in Philadelphia, certain men in Connecticut, who had been consistently strong nationalists, had supported the reconstitution of the federal government. Outstanding among these was Jeremiah Wadsworth, who had served as Commissary General during the Revolution, and who had engaged in a brisk com- mercial activity after the Revolution, supported a strong central govern- ment as necessary to the prosperity of economic ventures. Although in
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Assembly he had advocated a stronger support of Congress by the state, after business reversals he finally felt impelled by material circum- stances to advocate the termination of the Confederation. He supported the sending of delegates to Philadelphia, and as the Convention opened in May he addressed the Connecticut Assembly in support of its work. The unpublished researches of John David Ronalds Platt indicate that subsequently he sampled opinion, managed a propaganda campaign, mapped strategy, and kept in communication with important nation- alists in other states.113
After the convention numerous pamphlets were published in the state and many of these were reprinted in the Hartford Courant, in- cluding those by Richard Henry Lee and other anti-federalists and El- bridge Gerry's famous letter and rejoinders. A special series addressed to Connecticut farmers was printed in the Courant in November and December. These articles were signed "Landholder," and attempted to demonstrate that the welfare of the agriculturists depended on the kind of harmonious relations between this class and commercial interests which the constitution alone could cement.114 By the latter part of September, when Sherman and Ellsworth returned to add their in- formation to that in circulation, it was reported that the merchants, the military, and the professional classes would be favorable to the new constitution. At this time, Wadsworth was still guarded but by Decem- ber, he, too, was openly optimistic. Ezra Stiles reported in his diary, after spending Christmas Eve with Abraham Baldwin, that the pro- posed Constitution was not perfect but that it was advisable to adopt it. Stiles must have come close to expressing the attitude of the informed element of the populace which had earlier opposed the convention. The power of government in Connecticut rested with the legislature, and Stiles believed that the proposed constitution did not give Congress sufficient power for a firm government. He expressed concern over the powers granted the executive and the central government, but, as had been true of the delegates at Philadelphia, he and other Connecticut residents had become ready to accept the proposed form of government as the best possible expedient and to commit its perfection to the fu- ture.115
The Constitution was ratified at a special convention which as-
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sembled at Hartford on January 3 and met until January 9, 1788. The delegates were characterized by Stiles as "the grandest assemblage of sensible and worthy characters that ever met together in this state." After the credentials of the members were checked they moved from the State House to the north meeting house. On the second day of the convention, Ellsworth opened the debate.117
The coercive power of the proposed government was the aspect upon which its proponents chose to base their appeal. "Without this, government is ineffectual, or rather there is no government at all," said Ellsworth. He claimed union was necessary for national defense, "to preserve peace among ourselves," and "to preserve commutative justice between the states." He appealed to history for support of his views, including the idea that the confederations of the world exercised coer- cive power.118 Johnson portrayed a melancholy picture: "Our commerce is annihilated; our national honour, once in so high esteem, is no more. We have got to the very brink of ruin; we must turn back, and adopt a new system . .. a principle of coercion is absolutely necessary." It was emphasized that the coercion involved would be a legal one: "The power, which is to enforce these Laws, is to be a legal power. . . . The force, which is to be employed, is the energy of Law. . . . " He contin- ued "We address ourselves, not to your passions, but to your reason; we speak as to wise men. Judge ye what we say."1
A Connecticut assemblage would not fail to notice provisions relative to taxes, imposts, and excises. To the argument that the provi- sions of the constitution extended to all phases of taxation, Ellsworth pointed out that except for customs the power to tax was a concurrent power. To the objection that imposts were not a proper form of taxa- tion, he argued that an indirect tax was much preferable to a direct tax. The amount of the latter which the people would bear was limited. Further, Connecticut was already paying heavy customs on goods im- ported through New York and in the relative balance between the northern and southern states, the latter would pay a much larger portion. To meet the fundamental issue that the power of the purse should not be centered with the power of the sword, Ellsworth pointed to the representative nature of the proposed government. "Congress . . . is your parliament," it is made up of "men appointed by yourselves and
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dependent upon yourselves." Finally, to the assertion that two legisla- tive powers cannot exist together in the same place, Ellsworth asked: "Why can they not?" He pointed out that cities existed within states
(Courtesy Fairfield Historical Society)
FAIRFIELD-OLD ACADEMY-USED BY EUNICE DENNIE BURR CHAPTER, D.A.R.
without the destruction of either, and concluded "We must lift up the standard of justice, we must establish a national government."1
The debate was over on the ninth. On the last day, Governor Sam- uel Huntington, in addition to giving the document his official blessing, spoke of the virtues of a legislative branch with two houses. Oliver Wolcott, the Lieutenant Governor, felt so strongly that he could not
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content himself "without giving his opinion more explicitly than by a silent vote." By this time, however, a controversy had developed in the press over a proposal by William Williams to require a religious test oath for federal office holding and to acknowledge explicitly in the preamble God as the Supreme Governor. Wolcott held that the exist- ent provision of the oath for all office holders was in effect a "direct appeal to that God who is the avenger of perjury." It was Richard Law, however, Chief Judge of the Superior Court of the state, who ar- ticulated the idea that further changes should be committed to the future through the power of election and the provision for amendment. The convention was ready to vote. It was 128 yeas and 40 nays.121
The result was expected but for a state which came to be the citadel of federalism, the forty votes cast in the negative must be sur- prising. True to prophecy, the military men were squarely on the side of ratification, 45 out of 51 voted for the constitution. Three of the counties voted unanimously for ratification: New London, Fairfield, and Middlesex. Only New Haven cast a majority in the negative, by a vote of 9 to 13. The northern tier of towns also voted in the negative.122 Knowledge of the convention will necessarily remain imperfect. Its records, such as they are, are those reported by the press and collated by Professor Labaree. It is to be feared that the strongly federalist press failed to report the opposition fully. The vote of New Haven remains something of a mystery. An explanation for the vote of the northern towns might lie in their proximity to Massachusetts.
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