USA > Connecticut > History of Connecticut, Volume I > Part 19
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that there were loyal subjects of His Majesty in Connecticut who opposed charter government and who would welcome his implementing his order to control the colony's military forces.6 Such an arrangement would have impaired the chances that charter government would be retained permanently. Phipps, however, did not encourage the malcon- tents nor present his commission in Hartford as a direct order. Phipps, who had made a public confession of conversion to the Puritan faith in 1690, was enjoying a hero's reception in Boston as a result of his sack of Port Royal. Previously he had been somewhat shunned by the polite elements of Boston society. Colonial approbation was, perhaps, more important to him than royal favor.7 He yielded to the Connecticut proposal that the command of the expedition be divided. On this basis, agreement. although not harmony, was achieved by placing Phipps in command of the naval operations and naming FitzJohn Winthrop of Connecticut to direct the land forces.8
The military operations ended in disaster. Phipps appeared before Quebec with a naval force in October, 1690, but an attempt to secure a foothold proved abortive and the expedition returned a miserable failure. The colonies had failed to provide in full the quotas assigned for the land forces, and the troops available were poorly equipped and badly organized. Winthrop, with his army, reached the southern tip of Lake Champlain, but, engaged only in minor forays. His Indian allies found reason to delay until a retreat was ordered.9
Leisler, the Governor of New York, was furious with the failure of the land expedition. He was aware that Winthrop included in his council certain "principal gentlemen in Albany," and suspected that their advice was not always based on strictly military considerations. As the expedition languished at Lake Champlain. Leisler was instrumental in having the Commissioners of the colonies direct that, in all matters of great importance, General Winthrop should be governed by a council consisting of himself and his officers. Such a council may have included Leisler's brother-in-law, who was Commissary of the army. After Winthrop ordered a retreat, he was arrested and arraigned for trial by court martial. Before the trial could proceed, Winthrop was rescued by friendly Indians. He was stoutly defended by the Connecticut General Assembly which expressed its faith in "his fidelity, valour, and pru-
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dence," and in "thankfulness for his Good service," gave him forty pounds.10
There is little doubt that reluctance to interfere with the trade of upper New York was an important factor in the failure of the expedi- tion. This would suffice to explain the interest and recommendations of the Albany merchants, who, throughout the war continued their lucrative trade with the fur traders of Montreal. It would seem to explain, too, the delay caused by those Iroquois who were allied with Winthrop. France traded directly with Indians further to the West. The English, however, were dependent upon the Iroquois as middle- men. The Iroquois, to protect their own prosperity, had to maintain amicable relations with the Indians with whom the French traded. Ironically, this trade invalidated the very premise of the Canadian campaign, for the French, to avoid interfering with their supply of cheap English goods, directed the major portion of their attacks against the New England frontiers rather than against New York. The New Englanders saw their own difficulties increase as the Albany merchants enjoyed immuity from war depredations and lined their pockets. Con- temporaneous complaints correlated the two.11
In conception, the attack on Canada was colonial, but, in execution, the colonies seemed to cooperate less fully than they had in King Philip's War. The colonies had always been hostile to the French. In this instance, however, colonial troubles were technically the result of an English declaration of War. Also England, preoccupied with the civil war in Ireland, had failed to comply with a request for arms and ammunition. There was little in the Canadian campaign to encourage England to support another similar expedition until the militia of the colonies were under a unified command. The control of the militia through a central commander was apparently the minimum amount of direction which England wished to exercise. Initially, the Connecticut troops had been included in Phipps' commission. Now, the Connecticut militia was transferred to the command of Benjamin Fletcher, the new Governor of New York. Fletcher was determined that this force would be surrendered to his command.12
On the basis of information furnished by Bulkeley of the condition and progress of affairs in Connecticut, Fletcher determined to come
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to Hartford and put his commission for the command of Connecticut troops into force. When he arrived in Hartford, however, on October 26, 1693, he was met with the polite Puritan sternness with which the Crown and its representatives had grown too familiar. Connecticut in- sisted that the command of the militia was vested by charter in the governor and company. Fletcher attempted to circumvent this by offering to commission Governor Treat to command the troops. The Governor declined the commission. Fletcher attempted to have his orders read to the troops, but was prevented by the insistent drumming ordered by the senior Connecticut officer. Connecticut retained control; Fletcher returned home; and Gershom Bulkeley wrote a pamphlet entitled "Some Seasonable considerations for the good people of Con- necticut," which was printed at New York in the Winter of 1693-94.13
Although Connecticut based its actions upon the charter, the continuance of charter government was uncertain. On September 12th or 13th, 1693, a few days before Fletcher's arrival, there had been re- ceived a first letter from King William which had been written March 3, 1692-3. This was not addressed to the Governor but "To such as for the time being take care for preserving the peace and administering the laws in our Colony of Connecticut, in our Territory and Dominion of New England." The implications of this, plus the threat of the loss of the milita, intensified the need to secure a clarification of charter rights. Already, in August, the towns had been asked if they desired that their Majesties be addressed concerning the continuance of their militia and charter privileges and if the towns would bear a propor- tionate charge to finance such a mission. Apparently this had been sub- mitted to the inhabitants rather than to the freemen, for there were more affirmative votes than there were freemen in the colony. In all. there were 2,182 affirmative votes which constituted, it has been esti- mated, almost a two-thirds vote.14 This would not necessarily establish a statistical figure measuring either opposition to or support of charter government in the colony, however, for it seems possible that some who might not have wished the continuance of the government might have felt that this would have secured its quickest demise.
Major-General FitzJohn Winthrop was directed to go to England to present the colony's petition. After arriving in England, Winthrop
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became confident, apparently, that charter government would be re- tained. Otherwise, it does not seem that the continuation of the inde- pendent command of the militia would have been tied so definitely to the continuation of the independent civil authority. It was argued that the command of the militia was expressly granted in the charter: he, who commanded the militia, would govern the colony; Fletcher's com- mission should be restricted by the laws of Connecticut, as was the King's power in England by the provision which permitted him to draw a militia only in proportion to the population and wealth of the country; and finally, Fletcher could not be as well qualified for the local and ordinary command of the militia as someone who lived in Connecticut.15
These arguments were reinforced by events transpiring in the con- stitutional struggle in England. The opinion of April, 1694, favored Connecticut's retention of the command of her militia. A quota of 120 was established as fulfilling her responsibilities to Governor Fletcher. Winthrop obtained from Queen Mary a letter dated June 21, 1694, which restricted Fletcher's Commission. This letter recognized colonial government to the extent of being addressed to the Governor & Magis- trates of the colony and of indicating that Winthrop was authorized to inform them of their Majesties "glorious intention to continue our royal protection to you and to all our subjects of that our Colony, and particularly in what may relate to the preservation of the peace, welfare, or security of the same, and maintaining your just rights and privi- leges." In 1696, the quota was filled in accordance with the "desire of Govern" Fletcher," and the following year "the council apprehending themselves obliged by the royall mandate to comply with the motion of Colon1 Fletcher" voted to send troops to Albany.16
When Winthrop returned from his agency in England in 1697 a fellow voyager was Lord Bellomont, who brought with him a commis- sion as Governor of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and New York. He was also charged with the control of the militia of Connecticut, Rhode Island, and New Jersey. Winthrop assured the colony, however, that "the government of Connecticut is well in the King's favor, and under a good opinion with the Lords' Commissioners of Trade and Plantations." Upon Winthrop's advice, a special committee was named to welcome Bellomont when he arrived in New York.17 The British
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desire for a unified control of the militia continued, but, apparently, an understanding prevailed between the colony and Bellomont. At least on one occasion, at Bellomont's suggestion the colony advanced a sum to one John Sabin for services he had rendered the English in his work with the Indians, and there is no record that Bellomont demanded sub- mission of the Connecticut militia.18
The New England phase of King William's war degenerated into frontier raids which were hardly interrupted by the formal end of the war marked by the Treaty of Ryswick in 1697. This was based on the status quo ante bellum in America, except that commissioners were to be appointed to determine ownership of the posts in Hudson Bay.19
War of the Spanish Succession (Queen Anne's War)
The unreal peace was broken five years later when England looked to her colonies for assistance in securing the British Empire in North America. For England and her ally, Holland, the War of Spanish Succession was a war to block the ambitions of France in America. To forestall French inheritance of the Spanish empire, the balance of power principle which had previously operated in Europe was to be applied to America.20 The military situation and the security of the empire seemed to demand unified control. A Parliamentary bill was introduced in 1701 "for reuniting to the crown the government of several Colonies and Plantations in America;" the Governors of New York and of Massachusetts vied for the control of Connecticut; and, after the accession of Queen Anne, several vigorous attacks were made upon Connecticut's charter.21 Connecticut, however, resisted every attempt to infringe upon her autonomy.
The irregularity and injustice of the courts was one charge made against the colony as a basis for justifying royal control. A formal challenge grew out of a legacy made by one John Levin which conferred £40 annually to the ministry of New London. Nicholas Hallam, his step- son, sought to break the will and had the support of Edward Palmes. Palmes was an executor of the estate, as was his brother-in-law Fitz John Winthrop. Palmes presented the will to probate only after being threatened with contempt. The will was upheld by the county court, and four years later sustained in England.22 Shortly thereafter, Palmes,
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in his own right, since his wife was deceased, sought to bring FitzJohn Winthrop to an accounting of his father's estate. The colonial court disallowed the petition, and again the decision was sustained in England by the King's council.23 Even though the colonial decisions were sus- tained in these cases, the right of appeal was a matter of concern and a threat to the colony's independence.
The Mohegan land controversy arose out of the attempt of the heirs of John Mason to lay claim to the Mohegan territory, which, according to the claim of the colony, had been transferred to it. The claim of Mason's descendants was based upon a legal technicality of sufficient merit, in point of law, to cause the colony to attempt to secure its claim by a second purchase. The Masons were successful in gaining, in England, considerable sympathy and some financial assistance for the prosecution of the case. In 1705, the Privy Council directed that Governor Dudley should head a commission to "do justice to the Indian." Whether this stemmed primarily from English humanitarian- ism, as one author suggests, or illustrated a policy of maintaining friend- ship with the Mohegans while engaged in war with the French, or constituted a stratagem by which to bring Connecticut under royal con- trol, it was followed by an ex parte decision in favor of the Masons.24
When Dudley had returned in 1702 as Governor of Massachusetts and New Hampshire, he was, also, given nominal control over the Rhode Island and the Connecticut militia in time of war, but not the force to make his management a reality. At the end of the year, he had proposed that the entire administration of Connecticut be placed under his control. Dudley charged that Connecticut had refused to assist Mas- sachusetts in time of war and this was used as an argument for Her Majesty's appointing a Governor for the colony. Connecticut was in- vited to have Sir Henry Ashurst, a member of Parliament and Connecti- cut's London agent, present Connecticut's objections as a point of law against the Queen's appointing a Governor for the colony.25
The familiar mode of denying all charges and relying on the legality of the charter was followed. The defenselessness of the colony was denied. Since it was concluded that evidence was contradictory, the Board of Trade was directed to extract the principal arguments and present them to the accuser and to the colony for further corroboration.
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The charges were not supported, and Ashurst, in his further defense of the military potential of the colony, defined the grounds upon which the colony would support Queen Anne's war: Connecticut would re- gard as a request any plea of a Governor of a neighboring colony, but would act on a command issued directly by the Crown.26
In the first years of the new war, Connecticut assumed no responsi- bility beyond the defense of her own borders, and this in the most desultory manner. The enlistment of Indians was encouraged for they were the better scouts and their use permitted equivalent numbers of English settlers to remain at home. It was realized, too, that frontier settlements were of value as outposts of defense. Whereas on previous occasions, inhabitants of sparsely settled areas were encouraged to move to more populous and protected areas, now, settlers were forbidden to leave frontier settlements without specific permission of the Court.27 The War Council, empowered to manage affairs between sessions of the General Assemblies, was specificially forbidden to raise men to send out of the colony "unlesse in case of exigence." Some indication of the manner in which exigency was defined is seen in the reaction to the request for 100 men to march with Massachusetts against the eastern Indians. Notwithstanding the Indian depredations of 1703, it was judged that October was not a suitable season of the year for sending their troops into such a remote part of the country. Connecticut's contribu- tion to the general defense was grudging and hedged by an outcropping of limitations.28
In conformity to Ashurst's statement of their position, the Court did not find it their duty "under the present circumstances" to comply with Dudley's request in 1707 for troops for an expedition against Acadia. Among the qualifying circumstances they pointed out that they had not "counciled" in the plans for the expedition and so had not had the opportunity for consent. However, when Queen Anne de- manded the conquest of Acadia, the colony acted with dispatch to pro- vide troops. Yet the use of the troops was conditioned by certain specific requirements: a large share of the economic burden was to be shifted from the colony; the troops should be under the command of someone from the colony; and the troops, in no circumstances, were to be used for occupation of the territory. Also, the employment of the troops was
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contingent upon the sending of English troops. By mid-summer, 1,500 troops from Connecticut and the other colonies had been collected at Lake Champlain. When it was learned that expected English forces had been sent to Portugal and because pestilence had broken out in camp, Connecticut decided to transport the sick home by water and to march the others overland.29
When, at New York's plea, the contest was resumed in 1710, there were superficial indications that the colonies and England had learned to cooperate. The commander of the expedition was appointed by the crown and Connecticut was represented at the council of war. The Gen- eral Court of Connecticut seemed enthusiastic about preparations. Accord was short-lived, and, when the combined forces easily overran the French, the colonial forces refused to assume any responsibility for occupation of the territory.30
Yet, on the eve of the ill fated campaign of 1711, Connecticut had come to give verbal expression to the idea that her security was bound to that of the empire and had pledged herself to execute Her Majesty's desires with all possible vigor.31 The aftermath of this enthusiasm was ironical. In the English election of 1711, the Tories had unseated the Whigs and were anxious to win prestige. They sent a large fleet to Boston under the command of "blundering incompetents,"32 as was said. Difficulties began almost at once, and soon both the imperial and colonial troops were casting aspersions on the merits of the other. Among the Englishmen, it was soon said that "if the British government did its duty, it would cancel all the charters of the colonies and place them under a single government."33 The departure of the fleet for Quebec eased the tension, and its abject failure contributed to the sus- pension of hostilities.
Despite the lack of success in America, the treaty of Utrecht, 1713, placed all the areas in America where friction had occurred between the French and English under the control of Great Britain, as well as assign- ing her the lion's share of imperial spoils elsewhere. Britain had failed, however, to persuade the colonies to accept what England regarded as their responsibility for the defense of the Empire. Especially when the immediate threat of the French danger was removed, there was little inclination to meet England's demands on this point. The success of
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the war, instead of increasing rapport, left the question of colonial responsibility for imperial defense to rankle and become a factor in the discontent leading to the American Revolution.34 During the course of the two wars, Connecticut had maintained with considerable difficulty, a surprising degree of independence.
Post-war Development
The overall expansion of New England had been seriously retarded by the Indian Wars (1676-1713). There had not been a single new town planted in Maine during the period, and there were actually fewer people in this frontier colony at the close of the period than at the be- ginning. In Massachusetts, Worcester county illustrates the effect of the Indian depredations. The record there is one of a series of settlements and abandonments until only one family remained in 1701, when the last outpost was abandoned and permanent settlement postponed until 1713. Rhode Island rebuilt the towns destroyed during King Philip's war, but expanded little after the 17th century except through the sub-division of old towns. Settlement in these New England colonies had become more constricted.35
Connecticut settlement, however, was less affected by these wars than the other colonies. Towns which suffered during King Philip's war were quickly rebuilt, as settlers who had fled the frontier returned soon after the war. Connecticut frontiers had been preserved and few men lost in the first of the wars with the French, and, in Queen Anne's War, "Connecticut had not been less fortunate than in former years," as Trumbull phrased it.36 There was a slackening of the pace of settle- ment as compared to the first forty years of colonial development,37 yet between 1676 and 1713 as many as twenty towns had been settled in spite of the Indian wars.
Settlement entered into a new phase after the treaty of Utrecht. The danger from the French had been lessened, and, although there were some sporadic Indian raids, the fear of the Indians had been diminished by the Iroquois' recognition of the sovereignty of the English in the region immediately to the west of Connecticut. Earlier settlement had accomplished the occupation of the Connecticut River valley and of the coast line in its first period. The establishment of
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THE FRONTIER, 1690-1739
settlements 20 or 30 miles up the smaller rivers from the original settle- ments had constituted a second phase. Now the 18th century was marked by the filling in of this back country, the lessening of the homogenous characteristics of the settlers, and the increase of specula- tion.38
The engrossment of land began earlier in Connecticut than as- signed dates would indicate to be true for other New England colonies, possibly because of the relative security of Connecticut during the frontier conflicts. Fitch's acquisition and the Mohegan land controversy can be understood only in terms of the possibility of gains.39 Professor Labaree's study of the distribution of lands in Milford suggests that, despite the many grants made for the welfare of the community, some seemed not clearly to be for the recipient's occupation or agricultural developments.40
With the conclusion of war, this fever for expansion increased and included representatives of various elements of society. That a number of ministers were included lent an aura of respectability, and the reports of large profits stirred the imagination of the public. One D. Samuel Hall, for example, was reported to have bought some 1500 acres in Cold Springs for £34 in 1718 and later to have sold this tract for £1,000. This was only one of many such reports of profits from speculation in public lands.41
Speculators benefited from an inflation caused, in part, by the issue of paper money during Queen Anne's war. Private promissory notes, bills of exchange, and bills of credit had been used, and land bank notes had been suggested to supplement the supply of coin in the colony.42 In 1709, when Connecticut was preparing for the Canadian expedition, the colony began to issue paper currency.43 The aggregate amount in circulation increased each year from this first issue of £19,000 to a total of £26,500 in 1715. These notes bore five percent interest and were secured by a general property tax. The due date of these taxes varied from one year, when one-half of the first issue was to be re- deemed, to twelve years, when the fifth issue was to be redeemed. Of the £26,500 in circulation in 1715, a proportionate amount was to be re- deemed annually for the next ten years.44 So long as there were demands for wartime goods, paper money proved stable and convenient. There
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had been relatively little depreciation in the currency by the end of the war. Once the war was over, however, money became cheap.
The long-term commitment of income created something of a frozen-in inflation, inasmuch as there was no possibility of immediate public redemption at face value.45 Also, there were further emissions after 1713, purportedly for the purpose of taking up earlier impressions which had been defaced or counterfeited. The new issues, however. contributed to the easy money mentality. In actual practice, of the total of £47,000 bills issued from 1713 to 1732, only approximately £30.000 were actually appropriated for the payment of colonial debts, and the remainder became a part of the circulating medium of the colony.46
To the state's easy money policy was added a bolder scheme pro- posed by a group of New London merchants, who sought to increase their capitalization by using land as collateral against which bills of credit would be issued. The legislature had refused such a request in 1729. Within three years, however, the company had gained political friends and acquired political skills. The company was represented as planning to engage in the fishing industry. To promote trade with the West Indies, then, the Assembly, in 1732, approved the proposal and incorporated the New London Society for Trade and Commerce. Within three months, the Society began issuing bills of credit against real estate mortgages deposited as security for the loans.47
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