USA > Connecticut > History of Connecticut, Volume I > Part 23
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8 Ibid., pp. 136-37; Conn. Col. Rec., V, pp. 51-52.
9 Greene, Development of Religious Liberty, pp. 125-26; Miller, New England Mind, pp. 266-67.
10 Ibid., p. 218.
11 Ibid.
12 Greene, Development of Religious Liberty, pp. 142-45.
13 Ibid., pp. 150-52.
14 Ibid., pp. 160-64.
15 Ibid., pp. 158-59.
16 Ibid., pp. 165-70.
17 Ibid., pp. 171-76; William M. Hogue, "The Church of England in the Northern Colo- nies and the Great Awakening," (unpublished doctoral thesis, Catholic University of America, September, 1954), pp. 63-65.
18 Ibid., p. 29; Greene, Development of Religious Liberty, pp. 63-65, 178-80.
19 Ibid., pp. 174-78.
20 Conn. Col. Rec., V, p. 50.
21 Greene, Religious Development in America, pp. 187-90.
22 Ibid., p. 204.
23 Ibid., pp. 204-206; Conn. Col. Rec., VI, pp. 248-49.
24 William M. Hogue, "Church of England ... and the Great Awakening," pp. 54-62. Although English Bishops declared baptism to be valid no matter by whom admin- istered (the legitimacy of the Hanoverian succession depended on this interpreta- tion), even Congregational ministers who decided to conform wanted to be rebap- tized. See Hogue, pp. 61-62.
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RELIGIOUS DISSENT, 1730-1750
25 Ibid., pp. 30, 32; Greene, Development of Religious Liberty, pp. 177-78.
26 Ibid., pp. 192-93.
27 Hogue, "Church of England ... and the Great Awakening," pp. 30, 58. Especially after half-membership, which had been a means "to straddle the line between ex- clusive sect and inclusive church," as Hogue pointed out, was lost in the Great Awakening, protest against such variations from the original pure religion, this denial became especially important. Those who could not enact an enthusiastic conversion or who were repelled by enthusiasm, turned to the sacramental peace of the Church of England. See Hogue, pp. 171-72, 200-11, 245-46, 255.
28 Greene, Development of Religious Liberty, pp. 193-94.
29 Origen Storrs Seymour, "The Beginnings of the Episcopal Church in Connecticut," Conn. Ter. Comm. Publ., pp. 4, 5.
30 Hogue, "Church of England . .. and the Great Awakening," pp. 30-34.
31 Collections, Conn. Hist. Soc., IV, pp. 53-55; Greene, Development of Religious Liberty, pp. 198-99.
32 Ibid., pp. 200-03.
33 Ibid., pp. 216-17; and Conn. Col. Rec., VII, p. 257.
34 See above chs. VI and VII; Greene, Development of Religious Liberty, pp. 217-19.
35 Ibid., pp. 223-25; Mary Hewitt Mitchell, "The Great Awakening and Other Revivals in the Religious Life of Connecticut," Conn. Ter. Comm. Pam., pp. 10-11.
36 Miller, New England Mind, pp. 484-85.
37 Trumbull, History of Connecticut, II, p. 105.
38 Clarence H. Faust and Thomas H. Johnson, (New York, 1935), p. cxvii.
39 Miller, Edwards, pp. 14-15.
40 Ibid., pp. 24-27.
#1 Ibid., pp. 24-29; Hogue, "Church of England ... and the Great Awakening," p. 60. 42 Miller, Edwards, pp. 49, 54, 62, 72.
43 Ibid., p. 29.
++ Ibid., pp. 29-31; Herbert William Breckway, "The Significance of James Davenport to the Great Awakening" (unpublished doctoral thesis, Columbia University, 1951), pp. 2, 6.
45 Miller, Edwards, pp. 43-68.
16 Ibid., p. 73.
47 Ibid., pp. 75-76.
48 Ibid., p. 77. 49 Ibid. 50 Ibid.
51 Ibid., pp. 74, 75, 78. 52 Ibid., p. 81.
53 Ibid., p. 96.
54 Ibid., pp. 96-97.
55 Ibid., pp. 71-99.
56 See above ch. VII.
57 Miller, Edwards, pp. 133-35
58 Ibid., p. 136.
59 Ibid., p. 137. 60 Ibid., p. 139. 61 Ibid. 62 Ibid., p. 140.
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HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
63 Mitchell, Great Awakening, p. 9.
64 Hogue, "Church of England . .. and the Great Awakening," pp. 111-43.
65 Miller, Edwards, p. 142.
66 Ibid., pp. 141-44.
67 Ibid., pp. 144-55; Mitchell, Great Awakening, pp. 10-12.
68 Trumbull, History of Connecticut, II, pp. 114-26.
Breckway, "Significance of . . . Davenport," pp. 38-46.
70 Ibid., pp. 35, 38, 50-60, 79-80; Miller, Edwards, pp. 145-172.
71 Breckway, "Significance of Davenport," p. 86.
72 Ibid., and ff.
73 Conn. Col. Rec., VIII, pp. 438, 454-55; Greene, Development of Religious Liberty, pp. 240-42; Breckway, "Significance of . . . Davenport," p. 91.
74 Conn. Col. Rec., VIII, pp. 454-57.
75 Ibid., pp. 35-37, 92-93, 482-84.
76 Miller, Edwards, p. 172.
77 Trumbull, History of Connecticut, II, pp. 130-31.
78 Greene, Development of Religious Liberty, pp. 244-45.
79 Ibid., p. 247.
80 Ibid., pp. 245-47.
81 Breckway, "Significance of . . . Davenport," p. 74.
82 Ibid., p. 75.
83 Greene, Development of Religious Liberty, pp. 233-37.
84 Breckway, "Significance of . . . Davenport," pp. 201-11.
85 Miller, Edwards, p. 175.
86 Gaustad, Great Awakening, pp. 43-44.
87 Oscar Zeichner, Connecticut's Years of Controversy (Williamsburg, Va., c. 1949) p. 25.
88 Conn. Col. Rec., VIII, pp. 500-504.
89 Greene, Development of Religious Liberty, pp. 255-61.
90 Miller, Edwards, pp. 172-73.
Chapter XI Connecticut in French and English Wars
N OT ONLY was the structure of Connecticut society threat- ened by divisive elements within the colony, but the colony itself was endangered by the resumption by European pow- ers of the contest for empire. Although in King George's War and in the French and Indian War Connecticut tended to follow her tradi- tional course of action, a greater degree of cooperation was extended to the Crown than ever before, especially after the war was evidenced in increased commercial activity. The difficulty of ending dependence upon commercial centers outside the state and of increasing agricul- tural production to provide surpluses for export was emphasized by the commercial experiences of these years. To protect its economic well- being, the colony, with practiced skill, followed an independent course of action in fiscal affairs.
Military Actions
The treaty of Utrecht, signed in 1713, had failed to solve the basic problems of the English and the French occupation of North America. When cumulative bitterness found an arena for open combat upon the outbreak of the War of Jenkins' Ear, England and Spain were cast as principals and France filled a supporting role as Spain's ally. In North America, both France and England were trying to achieve the final and complete expulsion of the other from the area.1
The land campaign against Jamaica was quickly concluded in 1742, but Connecticut troops had no sooner been ordered home than news was received that France had entered the contest, which now be- came King George's War. In the absence of an immediate threat, only
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routine defense of the frontier was provided until the summer of 1744,2 when alarm swept through the colonies with the news of the capture by the French of Canso, a small, but commercially important, post about fifty miles off the coast of Nova Scotia.3 The counter attack was directed toward Louisbourg, the base of the French attack. Connecticut troops, in cooperation with those from New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and England, made the first landing on Cape Breton Island on April 20, 1745. The attack continued for two months until the threat of a com- bined land and sea attack persuaded the French commander to propose terms which were concluded on June 28.4
In the occupation of Cape Breton, Connecticut departed from an established principle and permitted her forces to be used for garrison duty. Even as late as the expedition to Jamaica, Connecticut had abided by her practice of demanding that her troops be returned home as soon as the fighting was over. Similar provisions had been included in the orders for the Cape Breton expedition. Yet, Connecticut now pledged 350 men to the occupation. The evidence as to motivation is by no means conclusive. Wolcott forwarded to Law the information that three members of the Upper House, who were from Hartford, strongly sup- ported sending troops to hold the territory. Louisbourg, in the hands of the French, was a thorn in the side of New England fishermen. As a part of the propaganda to enlist the support of the other colonies, Massa- chusetts had painted glowing reports of the commercial benefits to be derived from possession of Louisbourg. Men such as Jonathan Trum- bull were in close contact with Boston merchants and, perhaps, did not completely divorce the possibilities of private gain from public welfare. Commerce was playing an increasingly important role in the economic life of the colony, and it is possible that the representatives of the trad- ing centers exerted an influence out of proportion to the numbers they represented.5
The success of the Cape Breton campaign reawakened the ambi- tion to conquer Canada. The initial enthusiasm dwindled when the ex- pected support from England failed to materialize. In October, 1745, the men collected for the expedition were furloughed, and eventually the supplies collected for the force were ordered to be sold. The indom- itable Governor Shirley of Massachusetts continued to speak of His
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Majesty's interests and pushed for an expedition against Crown Point, refusing to release the Connecticut men who had enlisted in his service for the Canadian campaign. Force was used to rescue the Connecticut men, and its use was condoned by the magistrates of the colony.6 Con-
(Courtesy New Haven Chamber of Commerce)
NEW HAVEN-SOLDIERS AND SAILORS MONUMENT ATOP EAST ROCK, HONORING THE MEN OF FOUR WARS
necticut's indisposition to cooperate increased in proportion to Eng- land's disinclination to reimburse the colony for the full amount of the expenses of the Cape Breton campaign. Thereafter, jealousies and self- interest increased to widen the gulf between English objective and colonial support. In the American colonies, the last year of the war re- solved itself into typical frontier warfare. An indecisive peace was shaped in Europe by the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle which reestablished the status quo ante bellum. Louisbourg, "the people's darling con-
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HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
quest," was returned to France. The colonials had been convinced that its capture was essential. After its return, they were more acutely aware of their peril. By the capture, however, the colonies had measured something of their military potential.7
The tenuous nature of the peace was revealed when rumors of a French uprising in the western part of New England were con- firmed in Connecticut in the Spring of 1754. Since it appeared that the Northern colonies would be drawn into the conflict, England requested that they send representatives to Albany, June 14, 1754.8 The Connecti- cut Assembly hesitated while it sparred for position with England and with the other colonies. Years of success in eluding the management of the home government and in bickering with its neighbors had prac- ticed Connecticut in tactics to limit commitments. Its commissioners were given no plenary powers: any agreement on their part was to be strictly provisional until approved by the assembly. The Commissioners were instructed to oppose any payment to the Iroquois, to agree to as- sume no portion of expense except for the immediate action, and to take care that nothing could be interpreted as establishing a precedent.9
Connecticut, historically identified with support of an independent course of action, opposed the establishment of a formal union. As pro- posed, the union, if approved by Parliament, would have autonomous powers in matters of war and peace and have power to administer land purchased from the Indians. Connecticut voiced a concern about the potential dangers of the union, and declared the plan to be subversive to the just rights of government. When the colony ob- jected to a proposal that the council of the union be empowered to levy and collect taxes as being contrary to the rights of Englishmen, there was articulated a principle which was to resound in a few years with greater force. The Connecticut Assembly formally resolved in October of 1754 that Connecticut would not make application to the Parliament for an act "to form any such union as proposed."10
This opposition to a formal union did not mean that Connecticut would not cooperate in a war against the French. In fact, Connecticut was enthusiastic about this conflict and remained the most dependable of the colonies throughout the new French and Indian War. The same session of the General Assembly which rejected the Albany plan of union
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CONNECTICUT IN FRENCH AND ENGLISH WARS
revived the War Council and authorized it to furnish the necessary men and supplies for military action. Although England considered this a tardy reply to her request of the previous July, the action countered a. rebuke from Whitehall, dispatched before the colonial action, but re- ceived after it had been taken. The English attitude stemmed from a conviction that the war was of the colonies' own making.11
Early in the new hostilities, England decided to solve by force the dilemma of the Acadians in Nova Scotia who had refused to take an oath of allegiance to Britain and had actively fought against her even though Britain had formally owned the territory since 1715. In the summer of 1755, 300 regulars, supported by 2,000 New England troops, forced Acadians, supposedly British subjects, to swear allegiance to the British or to face expulsion from their land. Those who refused allegiance were evacuated in October and November. It was believed that New England offered the greatest possibility for assimilation. More than four hundred arrived in New London in January 1756 and another contingent of 200 or more arrived in May. The General Assembly authorized the Gov- ernor to disperse the exiles among the Connecticut settlements. Each of fifty towns was to accept a proportionate number. Norwich and New Haven received the greatest number, nineteen. Care was to be taken to keep families intact, although many had already been separated before leaving their homeland. The selectmen were to care for the Acadians as if they were inhabitants of the town in accordance with the laws of the colony. The Acadians who traveled outside an assigned town without permission ran the risk of confinement and of cancellation of privileges. It is apparent that the towns regarded the duty as burdensome. Guil- ford, to lessen the expense to the town, "put out to service" as many Acadians as possible. When additional numbers were sent to Woodbury, the town petitioned the Assembly for relief.12
Some of the Acadians, it appears, became permanent residents of Connecticut. A petition in 1763, however, was signed by practically all of them, and appealed, unsuccessfully, for return to France. Gradually, small numbers made their way to French provinces, and, in 1767, 240, with their priest, left for Canada. Whereas a French author is cited as saying that the most unhappy of all the exiles were those in New Eng- land, Gipson is of the opinion that Connecticut, which "came to an
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HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
early determination to cooperate fully . . . hit upon a plan that was, all in all, just to all parties-including the Acadians themselves-and carried it out with a good deal of consistency and firmness."13 This problem of absorption, it must be remembered, was faced during the years of active participation in military actions against France.
Knowledge from Lake George in October, 1755, indicated that the anticipated Crown Point expedition, for which Connecticut had raised troops, would be postponed until the following spring. The ex- pedition, along with a drive to Niagara, had been intended to relieve the pressure on the western settlements of Virginia and Pennsylvania. The plan was militarily sound, but its execution was hindered almost from the beginning by jealousies, late arrival of troops, difficulties of transportation, and effective French intelligence.14 When the campaign was undertaken the following summer, it was thrown into utter con- fusion by frequent changes in command. When an attempt was made to incorporate the colonial forces into the regular British army there were further difficulties. A plan which would result in the displacement of provisional officers was bound to breed dissatisfaction. The Connecticut Assembly had commissioned John Winslow as a Major General and had placed him in charge of the troops raised by the colony. In effect, they were bound to obey only the orders of Winslow and were committed only to the Crown Point campaign. Winslow started to move his forces into position, and on July 28, arrived at Lake George. Loudoun, how- ever, ordered the troops to delay and to assume a defensive position. The French under the brilliant direction of Montcalm had occupied Oswego. Although Loudoun was of the opinion that Winslow's forces constituted the only remaining obstacle to the French occupation of the whole country, it was decided to disband them since the troops con- tinued to hold to the terms of their enlistment and would not come under the command of the regular forces.15
When preparations were being made for the next campaign, Lou- doun did little to assuage the grievances which had characterized the cam- paign of 1756. He was disdainful of colonial efforts; told the colonies bluntly that the previous failure was to a great extent their responsi- bility; and refused, under the guise of necessary military secrecy, to divulge the military plans. The colonial assemblies tended to view their
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CONNECTICUT IN FRENCH AND ENGLISH WARS
relationship with England as an opportunity to improve their economic status by such devices as the padding of their accounts. Although they looked to England to finance the war, the colonies, in plan- ning campaigns, continued their particularistic ideas by seeking to re- strict the areas in which their forces would operate, demanding that the provincial forces retain their identity. Meanwhile, the confidence and the aggressiveness of the French increased as indicated by their burning of the exterior establishments of Fort George in January, 1757. Loudoun was convinced that the only way to defeat the French was by naval operation in the North Atlantic. The campaign on the frontier was placed in the hands of the irresolute Brigadier General Webb, who ar- rived rather tardily at Fort Edward in the latter part of June, remained abysmally unaware of the French plans, and proceeded leisurely about his business. Finally, after inspecting Fort William Henry, he planned to abandon his position. It was not until Israel Putnam discovered, while on a reconnoitering trip, a concentration of the enemy only six- teen miles away, that Webb became alarmed and hastily sent appeals to the Governors of the northern colonies for reinforcements. It was too late. The French attacked the fort on August 3, and, on the 9th, the English capitulated. Loudoun, who in mid-August was on his way to New York "to drive the Enemy back," had appealed to Governor Fitch for further aid. He soon realized the hopelessness of aggressive action, how- ever, and notified Governor Fitch on the seventh of September that the Connecticut troops should be dismissed as early as was consistent with the safety of the provinces. Loudoun requested that the colony provide 280 men to serve as rangers during the winter.16
The military achievements of these rangers is difficult to evaluate. They had been formed first by General Shirley in 1755, and had per- formed such valuable service in reconnaissance, raiding, and bringing in prisoners that Loudoun had determined to increase their number for winter scouting. Yet, they were hard-drinking, undisciplined, and in- subordinate. They scouted only when they felt like it, and, too fre- quently, turned their rifles on game only to reveal themselves to the enemy. Their conduct became so bad that the force seemed about to disintegrate, and their leader, Robert Rogers, who had been in ill health, had to return to restore their reputation. Their unreliability led
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to the establishment of corps of rangers with the status and responsi- bilities of regular troops.17
Loudoun, by the end of 1757, was pleased with the contribution of Connecticut to the war. Although the independence of the assembly was always a mystery to him, he had confidence in Governor Fitch. The colony not only had met the levies cheerfully, but at times had exceeded the request and had assisted other colonies in meeting their responsi- bilities. Loudoun had observed at first hand the capabilities of Connecti- cut officers and the willingness of the colony to go beyond the strict limits of its responsibility. When New Hampshire refused to protect Settlement Number Four on the upper Connecticut River, Connecticut had raised 500 troops and had sent them, under the command of Colo- nel Nathan Whiting, to protect a frontier that was within the bounds of New Hampshire. The colony had responded unselfishly to calls for as- sistance at Fort William Henry and Major General Phineas Lyman had performed meritoriously in upper New York.18 Then, too, Connecticut extended a welcome to the troops whom Loudon wished quartered in the colony for the winter. This contrasted to certain of the other colo- nies. Massachusetts, for example, acquiesced only under the threat of a military order.19
Although the British forces made substantial overall gains in 1758, disappointment came in the Lake George area in which Connecticut was most directly concerned, and this despite the fact that Connecticut made her "greatest effort yet" against the enemy. When Loudoun was re- placed by Abercrombie as Commander of the American Army, the home government assumed more specific direction of the war. Louisbourg was given preference over the Canadian invasion in the allocation of British regulars, an attempt was made to settle the difficulties of regular and provincial troops, and England officially assumed a direct responsibility for financing the campaign. At the same time, the French in Canada were suffering from a shortage of food and from the difficulties which had developed between the Governor General and Montcalm. When Abercrombie received news of his appointment, he immediately called for greater efforts on the part of the colonies. Connecticut agreed to raise 5,000 men.20 By May, however, the quota had not been filled, and the colony resorted to impressment. On the eve of conflict, only 1,500 of the
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required 5,000 were in the field. One thousand had been sent up the Mohawk to Schenectady and 500 to Lake George on the eve of the battle of Ticonderoga.21 On the morning of the sixth of July, the British forces made a successful landing on the west bank of Lake George and moved in the direction of the fort. The provincials, led by Lord Howe, unex- pectedly fell upon and routed a French detachment. Abercrombie began the frontal attack on the fort on July 8. Although outnumbered almost five to one, the French, after more than six hours of fighting, forced the English to retreat. The battle concluded a campaign which had in- volved "a greater number of errors in judgment on the part of those in positions of responsibility" than any launched on American soil.22 In the opinion of the historian who has studied the battle most closely, Generals Lyman and Putnam had performed meritorious service, in contrast to the generally bad showing of the provincials.23 Affairs were going better elsewhere. A successful expedition against Fort Frontenac, launched immediately after the fiasco at Ticonderoga, had cost the French their stronghold on the lower St. Lawrence. Louisbourg had fallen to the British, and far away at the forks of the Ohio, later in the year, the French under pressure from the British had destroyed Fort Duquesne.24
When Abercrombie's troops went into quarters in the Fall of 1758, he appealed to Connecticut to quarter a number of the British regulars. Unlike other colonies where persistent grumblings were heard that such a request encroached upon colonial liberties, Connecticut again ex- tended a welcome to the British troops. For billeting and quartering the troops, Connecticut residents were permitted by the assembly to charge six pence per diem rather than the four allowed by the pay- master. The two pence difference was to be paid out of the treasury of the colony on account of the crown, which, of course, would be repaid in sterling. There is no certain measure of the degree to which Con- necticut's economy benefited from the presence of these troops, but it does seem that they enlivened the winter-to the extent that the Com- mander-in-Chief issued orders that soldiers were to carry their arms only when they were on duty.25
Although 1759 was a critical year for the war in the West, Connect- icut assumed her responsibilities cautiously. The assembly authorized
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only 3,600 of the 5,000 troops requested, with an additional 400 to be raised by volunteers. When Amherst threatened that failure to provide the desired quotas might prejudice the possibilities of generous reim- bursement by the Crown, the colony recognized "the very great im- portance of exerting ourselves in the present critical and decisive mo- ment for the security of our country, and from a deep sense of our duty."26 It was agreed to raise the extra 1,000 troops. The enlistments were slow, however, and by the last of May, Fitch could but hope that they would be ready soon. Almost certainly the whole force had not reached the field when Niagara fell early in July cutting the French off from the Ohio. The French evacuated Fort Ticonderoga on July 23. and, a week later, withdrew from Crown Point. Although a report that all was going well with Wolfe was a little premature, Quebec fell Sep- tember 12th. The end was near.27
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