USA > Connecticut > History of Connecticut, Volume I > Part 24
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The next year was to bring the complete capitulation of Canada, but the war spirit was already beginning to wane, and, thereafter, it was with great difficulty that Connecticut kept the requisite number of men in the field. Much to the consternation of Amherst, in 1760 the troops were later than ever in reaching Albany, and the number was 2,000 short of the authorized 5,000.28 When fighting ceased in September 1760, large numbers of British regulars were redeployed in other thea- ters of war, and it was hoped that the provincial forces would assume a major role in the duties of occupation. Connecticut refused Amherst's suggestion that men be enlisted for an indefinite term. Connecticut com- mitted herself to a quota of 2,300, which, it should be pointed out, was comparatively larger than that of the other colonies, as it had been throughout the war. The ranks were difficult to fill and morale had sunk to the point that the competent Whiting wrote bitterly to Fitch, com- plaining of Amherst and the disagreeable service.29 The war was over, in Connecticut's opinion, when Quebec fell. After the capitulation of Canada, there remained in the public mind no further reason for mili- tary service.30
The War Economy-Commerce
A new era of colonial commerce is said to have begun with the capture of Louisbourg.31 Connecticut failed to get any contract for the
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supply of British troops, but her economy was closely bound to that of Massachusetts and indirectly was stimulated by the war purchasing. Pro- visions were purchased locally in colonial currency, but were sold for sterling and as this was put into circulation the colonies generally bene-
(Courtesy Mills Coll., Conn. State Lib.)
BETHANY-TAN BARK MILL OF REVOLUTIONARY WAR PERIOD AND LATER. POSED IN 1935
fited.32 The confidence and feeling of independence which were derived from the success of the expedition against the French post seemed to be reflected in new commercial ventures.33 Regardless of treaty arrange- ments, colonial legislation, or acts of Parliament, New England mer- chants were ready to supply the demands of the French colonies, and, when Boston trade was under strict English control, Connecticut prospered.34
The export trade of Connecticut was small when compared to that of Massachusetts, but when measured against its own 17th century vol-
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ume, notable progress had been made. It is almost impossible to meas- ure the extent of the trade accurately, inasmuch as Connecticut gov- ernors consistently minimized it in official reports, lest the colony suffer from too much British interest. The commerce was dominated by the merchants of the coastal and river towns. New London was of greatest importance but still remained a small town with limited trade. The ports of Middletown and Hartford served as connecting links between the interior and the Atlantic. Direct trade with Europe remained in- consequential and the colony still depended almost entirely upon the ports of Boston and New York for European goods.35
This dependence on other American markets determined ulti- mately the fate of Connecticut's foreign commerce, and the end was foreshadowed by the 18th century effects. Connecticut residents, who engaged in intercolonial trade, continually found themselves indebted to the importers in other colonies. Despite determined efforts in the period after the Louisbourg campaign, Connecticut was not successful in attracting a flow of money into the colony for any sustained period.36 By virtue of their commercial advantage, neighboring colonies acquired a surplus capital from which accrued multifarious financial advantages over Connecticut. This is well illustrated by Connecticut's incipient steel manufacture. This was dependent upon the procurement of sup- plementary iron from New York, yet Aaron Eliot, the eldest son of Jared Eliot, and his group of undertakers, lacked sufficient capital for direct purchases. New York iron, therefore, was secured under a contract re- quiring the delivery of finished steel to New York for payment. When applied against the indebtedness, the steel was valued at £56 per ton. The steel was then marketed in Connecticut by New Yorkers and sold at £75 to £80 per ton. A loan of £500 to the steel manufacturers was made by the assembly in an attempt to eliminate this dependence upon New York.37
Connecticut, as a general effort to break this dependence and to en- courage direct trade with Ireland and Great Britain, introduced a system of duties and premiums. On two previous occasions since the century began, in 1717 and 1735, the colony had placed duties on im- ports from neighboring colonies. It is Clark's opinion that the retention of these import duties would have benefited colonial manufacturing.38
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In 1747, when Connecticut continued to suffer from a lack of direct trade, a duty of five percent was placed on all goods valued at more than £15 which were imported from a neighboring colony by a Con- necticut resident. Products of potential value to the West Indies trade were exempted. Also to protect the barrel stave industry, which was important to the island trade, an export duty was placed on the lumber that was sent to the neighboring colonies. At the same time, any Connecticut resident who imported directly from Ireland or Great Britain goods to be used within the colony was to be granted a premium of £5 on the £100. Some took advantage of this offer, and it appeared to give an impetus to direct trade that was advantageous to the colony. Both acts were repealed after a year, however, perhaps be- cause of difficulties of administration or because of general economic conditions.39
The period of King George's War was one of apparent prosperity for Connecticut, and seemed particularly so after the duty on imports was imposed. It was felt that "legitimate profits were being made and much of the profit was staying at home." Money was more plentiful, long-due debts were paid, and an eagerness to share in the anticipated profits covered an illicit trade with the enemy. In general, businessmen were optimistic, but the more cautious warned against the dangers of inflation. There were soft spots in the economy, and in the post-war recession when prices fell, credit tightened, and debts were hard to collect, it was clear that manufacturing had not matured and that com- merce was still dependent upon capital and credit from outside the colony.40
However, although the interim years between King George's War and the French and Indian War necessitated readjustments, after a brief period the economy was carried along by the optimism of the times. Again, the cost of living increased, prices rose, and the volume of sales mounted. Credit continued to be extended and the relation of the price of Connecticut products to English manufactured goods was not unfavorable.41 Direct trade with London had been increased and plans were made for an extension of the Atlantic trade. Foodstuffs continued to constitute the chief articles of export. The value of marketable prod- ucts, however, was increased by flax and whale oil.42 A threat to plans
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was encountered as the merchants of the West Indies attempted to pre- vail upon Parliament to forbid the northern colonies from trading with the French West Indies. It was argued that the elimination of this trade would impair the French sugar industry which was dependent on the sale of rum. Connecticut objected because such a restriction would eliminate an important source of specie used to balance, partially, her trade with England. Restrictions were not imposed because the English merchants feared that such would contribute to the rising price of sugar.43
After the resumption of hostilities marked the beginning of the French and Indian War, wholesalers and retailers rushed into the market, buying up the goods for which it was believed there would be the greatest demand. Those with the capital and an understanding of the advantages of war to the mercantile interest placed additional orders for military supplies. Attempts were made to control the colony's ex- ternal trade. When war was declared in 1756, Britain made trade with the French illegal. In March 1755, Connecticut forbade the transporta- tion of foodstuffs out of the colony without the special permission of the Governor. The embargo was tightened in October, 1755, by the re- quirement that a bond of a 1,000 pounds be posted as security that beef, pork, wheat, rye, Indian corn, bread, and flour would not be sold out- side His Majesty's dominions. This was admittedly ineffectual, and it is doubtful that the imposition of a fine in the same amount a year later was sufficient to secure compliance with the prohibitions.44 Knowledge that beef was selling in Martinique at six pounds a barrel. three times its value in Connecticut, provided a strong temptation. The continuing efforts of the English secretaries to prevail upon Connecticut to provide effective prohibitory legislation would indicate that trade continued.45 A certain amount of trade proceeded by special permission. Trumbull, Connecticut's merchant prince and a "prudent man," was among those favored by these grants of special permission. As an indication of the extent of operations under these provisions, it should be noted that Trumbull's intercession secured the release of a vessel, owned by Joshua Mauger, which had run afoul Connecticut's embargo provisions. Mauger was an unscrupulous merchant from Hali- fax, who had long since mastered the art of smuggling. As to whether
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Mauger was carrying goods provided by Trumbull, his biographer could only say that after Trumbull "had explained the situation to the authorities," the vessel was allowed to proceed on its way to Halifax.46 Other external trade, such as that to supply Great Britain with grain after a crop failure in England, was encouraged.47
The sutlers, or traders, likewise made exorbitant profits during the war by selling to the troops those necessities, such as rum, which made army life bearable. To defend themselves against being gouged, some soldiers refused to pay their debts and many were brought into court or had cases pending for this failure. It was ordered that the traders of the 1760 campaign appear before the assembly to show why their accounts should not be examined to fix a just and reasonable price for each article in the accounts before payment was made. In the mean- time, all suits were to be continued or adjourned until the May session of the Court two months hence. There is no further record of action except that Fitch notified Amherst that the sutlers had been eliminated and thereafter the troops would be supplied with necessities by gentle- men of reputation and honor at certain rates. The affair thereafter escaped the attention of the assembly.48
In the next campaign, Trumbull and Hezekiah Huntingdon, one of the commissaries and an army provisioner par-excellence, secured the contract for clothing and refreshments and Amherst gave them exclu- sive rights to the trade. As evidence of their good faith, they agreed to make a full accounting of their transactions, and, in the event of complaints of their prices, they informed Amherst that they were willing to arbitrate the differences with the two chief officers of the Connecticut regiments. Arbitration was necessary. Whether because of personal grievances, or the price and quality of the products, dissatis- faction spread among the troops, and the officers met with Trumbull's nephew, Joseph Sluman. Sluman reported that after a "Vast Deal of Wrangling & Quarreling," the prices were fixed only slightly differently from those of the company.49
In view of the anticipated needs for war, the colony granted mo- nopolies to secure increased production and to encourage new indus- tries, such as glass. Special privileges were also extended to encourage the manufacture of steel and salt. A known or demonstrated skill was
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apparently a prerequisite to securing a grant. The length of the mo- nopoly and the date that production was to begin varied with the hazard or the novelty of the undertaking. Failure to submit evidence of per- formance or to meet the established production schedule could result in the forfeiture of the monopoly. The protection extended to the grantee was similar to that deriving from the modern patent laws. It is believed that these developed from the special monopolies granted by colonial legislatures.50
Credit played an important role in all phases of the economy. The consumer secured goods from a local shopkeeper, who, in turn, was de- pendent upon the local wholesaler for his supplies. Inland wholesalers (merchants) such as Jonathan Trumbull collected the local products which they took to importers in Boston or New York, where they ex- changed them for the European goods that were needed in the colony. At all levels, exchanges were made on the basis of cash, products, and credit. Whereas the period of credit extended by the English merchant to the importer was from nine to twelve months that of the wholesaler to the shopkeeper was seldom more than six. Although the time ex- tended to the consumer was shorter, most shopkeepers carried substan- tial charge accounts.51
Business organization and practices remained informal. Partner- ships were entered into without contract or legal advice and were often for a single adventure and of a temporary nature. Generally, a partner- ship was composed of a group of traders, each of whom was working separately in a common endeavor. There was little specialization in the commercial activities of Connecticut. Most of those engaged in trade sold everything that was required by the consumer, from farm neces- sities to table luxuries. The quality of goods was generally poor and standards of weights and measures were crude. Bargain sales were un- known in small towns, but the retailers of the larger towns used "loss leaders" to attract customers.52
Agriculture
A general shortage of foodstuffs developed during the wars, as the demand for products increased while their production decreased be- cause of the absence of men during the cultivating season. Supplies were
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further limited by the illicit trade with the enemy, both in Canada and in the West Indies, where beef, pork, wheat, and other provisions were shipped regularly.53 The price of hay and corn was high, and even that
(Courtesy Conn. State Lib.)
REDDING-PUTNAM MONUMENT IN PUTNAM MEMORIAL CAMP GROUND (1935 PHOTO)
of inferior quality was shipped from Connecticut. This resulted in the withdrawal of corn from the family's food supply for use in the feeding of corn to the livestock in the winter. Production was limited in any case because of the colony's antiquated agricultural practices which had changed little since the seventeenth century. The clearing of the land of trees had impoverished the land.54 Once the natural nutrients were
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removed from the soil, the ignorance of such improved agricultural practices as rotation of crops, use of fertilizers, and the lack of interest in improved methods resulted in further depletion and in eventual ex- haustion of the soil. The wooden tools were inadequate for effective cultivation of the rocky terrain, the shallow soil, and the hard pan. The unfavorable agricultural conditions were intensified by the existent combination of cheap land, high labor cost, and inadequate markets, which motivated most persons to move to new lands rather than to im- prove their old.55
Jared Eliot, however, reacted differently and pointed the way to- ward the improvement of agricultural practices. "Since . .. he was to an unusual degree part of all that he had met," he has been charac- terized by a recent biographer as the one most truly representative of Connecticut in the eighteenth century. After Eliot graduated from Yale in the class of 1706, he returned to his birthplace, Guilford, where he served for one year as schoolmaster. In 1707, he became pastor of the church in Killingworth, a position which he held until his death. It is customary to speak of him as the "father of regular medical practice." He was the most prominent physician of his day in Connecticut, and probably the last eminent, clerical physician in New England. As min- ister, physician, and as trustee of Yale after 1730, Jared Eliot observed Connecticut and his attention was caught by the crucial weaknesses in its agricultural base. He stands out as the "first great American agricul- tural investigator and writer." His influence extended far beyond the borders of Connecticut, even beyond the American colonies. He main- tained an extensive correspondence with European authors, although he believed that, in general, their findings were unsuitable for Connect- icut.56 Eliot's Essays upon Field Husbandry in New England appeared irregularly over a period of fourteen years from 1748 to 1761. In these, Eliot gave especial attention to the drainage of swamps, the redemption of exhausted land, the use of fertilizers, the improvement of agricultural machinery. He considered both the diversification of crops and the de- velopment of a staple crop.57
The major problem of Connecticut agriculture, aside from that of providing necessary subsistence, was the establishment of a staple crop. In the absence of manufactured products, agriculture still had to pro-
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vide the surplus necessary for foreign commerce. Tobacco had become a staple in Windsor's trade with the West Indies by 1745, and, at the same time, some tobacco was being sent to Boston. A bounty of 4d per pound on hemp, which had been voted by the Assembly in 1734, was extended in 1746.58 Hemp, however, required very good land. Eliot was of the opinion that to produce it in any great quantity "would require all of our dung" and necessitate the drainage of swamp lands to make a sufficient amount of good land available.59 Flax seed, too, was believed to be of potential value to the European trade. By the middle of the 18th century, the amount exported reached a value of £80,000 annu- ally.60 It was in great demand in Ireland and brought a good price. The colony possessed oil mills which Eliot estimated to be worth £16,000 (old tenor) which were idle because of a lack of flax seed. Eliot sug- gested that Connecticut might devote its attention to the planting of rape seed as a substitute for flax in home consumption and for sale to the West Indies.61 This attempt to develop a staple crop resulted in the beginning of a differentiation of frontier agriculture from that of the more settled communities.62
In the new settlements, the extensive agriculture, which had been the early pattern of the older communities, was practiced. The older regions began to turn their attention to those crops which would bring a higher yield per acre. The trend that agriculture would take in the valley in the following generations was indicated by the emphasis in Windsor on growing tobacco for export. By the middle of the 18th cen- tury the older towns were already depending on the western areas for wheat. Jared Eliot asked what they were to do when the new towns be- came old, "unless some better way can be found to manage our old lands . . . ? ''63
Currency
When the wars began in 1739, Connecticut resumed the issue of paper money. She continued this practice, despite the objections of Great Britain and the neighboring colonies, during King George's War. She followed it, although reluctantly, during the French and Indian War. When Connecticut responded to the request to assist in the early expedition against Jamaica, she issued bills of credit in the amount of
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30,000 pounds in new tenor bills and 10,000 in old tenor bills. The old tenor bills, issued during Queen Anne's War, had been gradually re- duced from 24,875 pounds in 1715 to 4,380 pounds by 1730. The addi- tional 30,000 pounds, placed in circulation in the settlement of the affairs of the New London Society, were supposed to be retired gradu- ally, but it is clear that during wartime all bills received in payment were promptly reissued.64 As the paper money of the colonies began to circulate promiscuously, England suggested that it be brought under control.65 At the war's end, she was to state her demands more per- suasively.
The supply of money was not only an issue in the relation of the colony to England, but also a central issue in Connecticut's relations with other colonies, especially Massachusetts. Through the inflated cur- rency, the agricultural colonies had offset, to a degree, the favorable balance that Massachusetts enjoyed as a commercial center. The ex- change value of the bills for silver continued to decrease after Massa- chusetts failed to secure Connecticut's cooperation in stabilizing the currency. A group of Boston merchants were successful in 1744 in having a petition introduced in Parliament in which there was re- quested a bill to prevent the further emission of paper money. During the elation that followed the victory at Louisbourg and while planning the invasion of Canada, however, the idea was dropped-temporarily.66
There were merchants in England whose interests were compatible with those of merchants in Massachusetts. After Parliament voted reim- bursement to the colonies and authorized the treasury to supervise its distribution, the English merchants petitioned that the treasury with- hold the funds until the exchange rate of the paper currency was ad- justed and a method for paying off the bills of credit evolved. With this reenforcement of the Massachusetts position, Governor Shirley pressed Connecticut to join with Massachusetts to bring the bills to an end. Governor Law, however, was confident that Connecticut could call in all of her bills once she received the reimbursement, and, as he wrote to Palmer, Connecticut's London agent, on much easier terms than if the colony had to retire them with silver which would have to be borrowed in Great Britain and repaid in twelve years. There was sound reason for his belief that the silver could never be recovered. Connecticut was an
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agricultural colony lacking Massachusetts' commerce. Connecticut re- fused to accept the Boston scheme, asserting that it was dangerous, but "well calculated to defeat all views we have had for setting up a differ- ence in our trade from them and making a distinction between their bills and ours."67
Speculators, who from the beginning of the war had complicated the paper money question, now stood to gain more if reimbursements were granted by England. On occasion, public men had advanced money to the colony for the soldiers' pay, and, on other occasions, had engaged in the nefarious operation of purchasing soldiers' pay vouchers. Jonathan Trumbull, for example, borrowed money in Boston for the purchase, at a considerable discount, of soldiers' pay orders. The specu- lators expected to double their money.68
By the Fall of 1748, the Treasury of Britain had agreed to disburse the money granted as compensation for the Cape Breton campaign if the colonial agents would give security that it would be applied to the retirement of the paper issues. Even when Connecticut belatedly agreed to this, the British Treasury still delayed. In the meantime, Massachu- setts had acted independently and had passed legislation drawing in its bills of credit, fixing the rate of exchange at 45 shillings, and prohibit- ing the currency of other colonies to circulate in Massachusetts. For this, Massachusetts rushed off apologies to Connecticut and urged that a similar course be followed in Connecticut. Only one member of the Connecticut Council for Defense favored calling the Assembly to con- sider the issue and Governor Law remained confident that it would not be difficult for Connecticut to retire the bills "if those who take benefit by the depreciation be not too numerous for those more honestly inclined."69
The economy of the colony would be greatly affected by the method of redeeming the paper currency and by the speed with which it was done. If it were redeemed at nominal rather than at the current rate and if the payment were made promptly the speculators' profits would be assured. In fact, however, the notes were redeemed at a rate only slightly higher than the current rate.70 It was decided, also, to re- deem the notes gradually. The threat of a Parliamentary act to prohibit new issues of paper currency, finally passed in 1751, made Connecticut
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agree to apply any money granted her by England to the sinking of the bills of credit and to retire the remainder by taxes to be collected in 1751, 1752. and 1753.71 In August. 1750, Connecticut was advised that £28,863 on deposit in the Bank of England could be drawn on by the colony. The money granted by England was permitted to remain there, which saved the expense of transfer, and instead bills were drawn on their agent.72 The money which was not immediately needed was in- vested in public stocks. Collection of a rate of threepence on the pound in 1750 was so successful that it could be reduced in 1751 and 1752 to one penny on the pound new tenor currency, with the privilege of pay- ing in old tenor currency at the rate of three and one-half to one of the new tenor or in Spanish milled dollars valued at thirteen shillings and ninepence in the new tenor.73 There was just reason for Douglass' saying in A Summary . . . of the British Settlements in North-America that Connecticut was a government of "sagacious husbandmen" and managed by "men of wisdom and probity."74
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