USA > Connecticut > History of Connecticut, Volume I > Part 37
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THE JEFFERSONIAN CHALLENGE
(Courtesy Conn. State Lib.)
GLASTONBURY-MAIN STREET
Thames and New London was threatened, Connecticut never became a willing partner in the war. When Saybrook was invaded, in April, 1814, Smith lamented the success of the enemy but asked "Who then but the authors of this most atrocious war must be charged with these deplorable results?"39 When it was implied that United States troops would be transferred from New London and be replaced by the state militia, compliance was not necessarily to be assumed from Governor Smith's reply that "when the militia of this state shall be required to
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HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
man the forts of the United States, in order that the regular troops there stationed may be employed in some other service, it will be time to make the proper reply."40
In addition to a concern for state sovereignty, and a self-interest in a loss of trade, the unwillingness to assume any financial responsibility is a factor in explaining the state's detachment from the war. When Fort Griswold was being put in a state of repair, the commander of a detachment of state militia reported to the Governor that he was lend- ing some assistance, but "without any assumption of responsibility on my part to pay anything."41 Again, in 1814, when the United States changed its district commander, a member of the Connecticut militia reported that the new appointee was "a Connecticut Man in every re- spect & of course is desirous that we should avoid as far as possible, the burdens of this war,-more especially that we should not advance our money for the national credit."42
From the time of the blockade of the United States Naval Squad- ron in New London in 1813 until the end of the war, the Connecticut coast was in a continual state of alarm. The harbor of Pettipauge at Saybrook was entered on April, 1814, and a number of merchant ves- sels were destroyed. On August 9, Stonington was bombarded.42ยช A letter from Matthew Griswold to the Governor serves as a summation of the petitions which poured in from the coast towns asking for aid. Griswold wrote: "Defence is what they desire and what they ask for, and what they are destitute of."43 Smith declared it was "impossible for the state to protect our maritime commerce by militia." And since the enemy had not indicated an intent to invade the land west of Saybrook, troops would not be stationed west of that place. He urged citizens "to draw their shipping of every kind as far from hostile approach as possible, and leave those who will adventure their property on the sound to incur the risque & hazard of their own presumption."44
The risk, it would seem was at most nominal, because during most of the war, New England trade continued uninterrupted. The British blockade exempted New England trade for the most part, and the order prohibiting American goods in the West Indies exempted New England products. It was common knowledge that the British forces in Canada were receiving supplies from New England contractors.45 When, in De-
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THE JEFFERSONIAN CHALLENGE
cember 1813, a more stringent embargo was passed on the recommenda- tion of Madison, the citizens of the Bridgeport area voiced their opposition to the war and called for a special session of the General As- sembly to consider the unfortunate conditions in the state and nation and, in unison with other willing states, "to devise and carry into execu-
(Courtesy Fairfield Historical Society)
FAIRFIELD-POWDER HOUSE, USED TO STORE MUNITIONS, WAR OF 1812
tion such constitutional measures as may afford relief .... "46 The Massachusetts General Court, which was in session at this time, was also flooded with petitions from all parts of the state, but especially from its towns located on the Connecticut River, the majority of which called for a convention. The intercession of moderate Federalists de- layed action in that state, and, when the Connecticut General Assembly convened for its May session, the embargo had already been repealed.47
Events of the summer, however, further strained the relations between the state and the national government. Banking was prosper- ing and real estate values were rising in Connecticut and she and other New England States possessed practically all of the specie in the coun-
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HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
try. Connecticut, however, refused to subscribe to the new war loans issued by the national government. At the same time, it has been sug- gested, New England "probably lent to the British government during the war more money than she lent to her own."48
The conclusion of the Napoleonic wars permitted England to in- tensify her efforts against the United States, attacks on the New England coasts increased, and the national capital was burned in August. Specie payments were discontinued at all banks outside New England and the fortunes of the union seemed at low ebb. It was at this point that Gov- ernor Smith withdrew the militia brigade which had been in national service and instructed it to obey no order except from state authori- ties.49
Meanwhile the move for a convention was rapidly taking form in Massachusetts. In October, the Governor of that state invited neighbor- ing states to a New England Convention.50 Connecticut was the first to respond. Proposals before Congress to introduce a forced draft and to authorize the enlistment of seventeen-year-olds was described as an "arbitrary attempt to destroy the moral character and welfare of ... children ... and place them ... in the midst of the contaminating at- mosphere of a regular army."51 The report of the committee to which the Massachusetts resolution had been referred, was milder in tone than that of the Bay state, but considered the proposal "an eligible method of combining the wisdom of New England," and recommended a resolution which carried that delegates be named to meet in Hartford to consider any objects which were consistent with the obligations of the state as a member of the union.52
Chauncey Goodrich, the Lieutenant Governor, headed the delega- tion from Connecticut, which also included James Hillhouse, Zepha- niah Swift, John Treadwell, Nathaniel Smith, Calvin Goddard, and Roger M. Sherman. Each had long years of service in public life and collectively they had held practically every office in the state, with four having served as United States Congressmen.53 These met with the other "Wise Men of the East" at the Old State House in Hartford on Decem- ber 15. The delegates continued in session until the Report of the Hart- ford Convention was adopted on January 5, 1815.54
The meetings of the convention were veiled in secrecy. In addition
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to the final report, a journal of proceedings was published in 1819 in a vain effort to still the critics of the convention. The rule of secrecy limited the knowledge to be gained from the correspondence of the time and the emotionalism of the subsequent debate limits its value. The convention was concerned with three major issues: the defense of New England, the grievances of New England and suggested means of relief, and proposed amendments to the constitution necessary to perpetuate the union.
The convention advanced the principle of interposition of state authority to redress grievances suffered under the national government. It was argued that the effort to place the militias under the control of the national government and the suggested plans for conscription and enlistment would enable the government to destroy the liberties of the people and "erect a military despotism out of the ruins." The pre- sumed infractions of the constitution were regarded as so "deliberate, dangerous, and palpable" as to endanger the sovereignty of the state and the liberty of the people. Therefore, it became the "duty of each State to interpose its authority for their protection" and to "adopt all such measures as may be necessary effectually to protect the citizens of the state."55 In approving this principle, Connecticut renounced the principle of majority rule by which a minority would be coerced by law and the states protected from an usurpation of their rights by an independent judiciary, although this coercive principle, when pre- sented by Ellsworth at the constitutional convention, had persuaded them to join the union.56 Instead, they accepted the principle of inter- position which has been the recourse of sections throughout our na- tional history at times when the central government has attempted to impose practices or values from which the section dissented. The Con- necticut position was that of nullification, it was not secession. The moderate Federalists had carefully defined the limits beyond which they would not go. Their position, as expressed by Harrison Gray Otis of Massachusetts, was that "a severance of the Union by one or more States, against the will of the rest, ... can be justified only by absolute necessity" and that dissolution, in any case, should "if possible, be the work of peaceable times and deliberate consent."57 Connecticut's expres- sion of dissent was limited to her lack of cooperation during the war.
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The war's end avoided a test of the length to which she would have car- ried her principle.
There was ironic retribution in the defenseless state of Connecti- cut in the Fall and Winter of 1814-15, since the state had consistently refused to cooperate with the central government in its war effort. To provide for necessary defense and to remove the difficulties which ex- isted between the state and the central government, the delegates at the Hartford Convention had endorsed an arrangement whereby a state would be permitted to provide for its own defense and be reimbursed by the national government from the national taxes collected.58
The seven amendments proposed in the Report of the Hartford Convention and designed to protect the sectional minority revealed the disparate status and the narrow provincialism of the Federalists. The amendments included proposals to limit any embargoes to sixty days, and to require a concurrence of two-thirds of both houses for the pas- sage of a non-intercourse act. These and a provision that two successive Presidents could not be from the same state arose out of the immediate situation and were only of momentary interest. Proposals to require a two-thirds vote of both houses for the admission of new states and for the declaration of war would have severely restricted the growth of the nation and the strength of the national government. The suggestion that aliens not be permitted to hold either elective or appointive na- tional offices would have robbed the country of much of the human re- sources which have proved of value. Two of the proposals, however, dealt with issues which continued to receive the attention of the coun- try. Discontinuance of counting three-fifths of the negroes as a basis for determining representation which was suggested at the Hartford Con- vention continued an issue in American politics until, in theory, it was eliminated by the fourteenth amendment. The limitation of the term of the President, which the delegates at Hartford believed should be to one term, was still a matter for consideration in contemporary America.59
The most immediate issue among the subjects of the deliberations was that of local defense. This was at least partially resolved before the recommendations were presented. Not only was the war concluded by the signing of the Treaty of Ghent while the delegates were meeting in Hartford, but also on January 27, 1815, the President signed an Act of
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Congress authorizing him to accept and pay troops raised by a state and limiting the use of such troops to their own state and those ad- joining it except by specific consent of the Executive of their state.60
Nevertheless, on February 4, Governor Smith appointed Calvin Goddard and General Nathaniel Terry Commissioners to present for Connecticut the proposals of the Hartford Convention. Goddard and Terry arrived in Washington shortly thereafter, but in view of the new climate of opinion did not submit the proposals. Already, the populace was celebrating victory and was caught up in a spirit of nationalism which was to continue until the Federal Union was securely established a half century later.61
With the restoration of peace, the move to the west was resumed. The state was seized with "Ohio fever." Advertisements of the west flooded the state and the wisdom of moving to the western territory be- came subject of common conversation. The Indians were no longer a threat to prospective settlers; and the high price of agricultural prod- ucts, the possibilities of internal trade, and the easy acquisition of land were positive reasons for Connecticut residents to transplant their homesteads. Land was not only available in larger quantities, but better lands could be had at lower prices than in Connecticut. Moreover, it could be purchased on credit, usually extended over a period of seven years.62 In addition to the general appeal, Purcell considers that the west had one especially for Republicans who could hope to preserve their political principles in a "promised land where there were no Tories, few lawyers or doctors, no tithe gatherers, and where ministers were only ciphers."63
Although the numbers who moved into the Ohio Territory cannot be measured exactly, there is no doubt that the migration drained the state's population for a number of years.64 Although a few towns in areas where manufacturing had begun showed population increases in the period from 1810 to 1820, in most towns population either de- creased or remained stationary. The overall population of the state showed a slight increase, but that of the United States as a whole was in- creasing seven times faster.65 Immigrants, who could hold Connecticut land only with special permission of the legislature, followed the ex- ample of Connecticut's own residents and moved into Ohio.66
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By 1815, the tendency to move west had become so great that at- tempts were made to encourage would-be immigrants to remain in Connecticut. Newspapers cast suspicion upon the enthusiastic reports of speculators, gave much attention to stories of storms and floods in the western areas, and emphasized the barrenness of a land without churches, schools and roads. The question "Is the West an Eden" and the advice "to tarry at Jericho" did not stem the rush to Ohio, which continued throughout the decade.67 Improvement of agriculture and encouragement of manufacturing were necessary to remove the eco- nomic motivation for leaving and could not be accomplished at once. Also, a more tolerable political and religious situation had to be achieved.
Within the state, the Republicans, whose fortunes had continually declined during the war (when the Federalist Governor John Cotton Smith stood as the protector of the state's sovereignty), had been quick to attack the Hartford Convention when it was called in 1814. When the delegates pulled the veil of secrecy over their deliberations they opened themselves to charges of evil deeds. The Republicans displayed the American flag at half mast during the proceedings and a band marched through the streets playing funeral marches. In view of the Treaty of Ghent and the Battle of New Orleans, the commission ap- pointed to carry the protest to Washington looked ridiculous and de- cided not to communicate the protest. Although Smith was reelected in 1815, Federalism as a political ideology was a lost cause; it remained for it only to prepare a defense for the record for it lacked a program for the future.68
The new nationalism was evidenced in the political alignment which developed within the state under the name of the American party. At a Republican-Episcopalian meeting in New Haven, on Febru- ary 21, 1816, an attempt was made to conciliate various factions and reconcile denominational intolerance. In itself, the choice of Oliver Wolcott, a life-long Federalist who had broken with his party because of its opposition to the war, as their candidate for Governor was a sym- bol of broadening principles. The choice of Jonathan Ingersoll, as can- didate for Lieutenant-Governor, cemented the bond with the Episco- palians. This American Toleration and Reform Ticket came out boldly
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in 1816 for a new constitution, ecclesiastical reform, changed suffrage requirements, and changes in the method of electing councilors and congressmen, and in the method of taxation. The Federalists merely continued to condemn the extravagance of the Federal Government and to admonish the voters to uphold the holy institutions of their fathers.69 The electorate responded in favor of Smith one more time, but Ingersoll defeated Calvin Goddard in the race for Lieutenant-Gov- ernor and 85 Tolerationists were returned to the legislature, the highest number yet elected by an opposition party. An analysis of the vote re- vealed that the shipping centers and the large cities supported the new party. The county votes revealed that there was definitely a shift toward the Tolerationists.70
The Federalists made a last effort to placate the opposition by the passage of the Bonus Act in the October session of the Assembly. The Tolerationists had given them further cause for concern, when, in the Fall election they had endorsed the last of the candidates on the Fed- eralist list for United States Congress, and were successful in electing five new Congressmen who were at most only nominally Federalists. The Federalists could no longer stand alone, and, in an attempt to win back some of the defected elements, the Bonus Act was passed. There was $14,500 due from the national government for disbursements made by the state during the war. The Bonus Act provided that one-third of this would be distributed to the Congregationalist, one-seventh to the Episcopalians, one-eighth to the Baptists, one-twelth to the Methodists, one-seventh to Yale, and about one-sixth to the Treasury. Only Yale was satisfied. None of the religious groups believed the share granted it revealed the true proportion of its influence in the state. Far from mollifying the groups, the distribution was attacked as a political bribe indicating the corruption of the party in power.71
The crisis in Connecticut politics was reached in 1817. The Toler- ationists named Wolcott and Ingersoll again while the Federalists hoped to hold some of the Episcopalian vote by naming Ingersoll to run as Lieutenant-Governor with Smith. The Tolerationists accused the Fed- eralists of "reposing in confident security-not dreaming of change." The old arguments for preparing a constitution were restated, the pub- lic was reminded of the Hartford Convention, the judiciary system was
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HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
(Courtesy Conn. State Lib.)
WEST AVON-RURAL SCHOOL
attacked as inequitable, and the Bonus Act severely criticized as "an expiring struggle to retain power, and to appease opposition."73 The method of choosing Assistants was described as "an ingenious and com- plicated piece of mechanism designed, by the multiplicity of its wheels and springs, of its clogs and checks, to divert from the instrument of government, a direct application of the popular power."74 It was con- tended, too, that the "adulterous intercourse between religion and politics" had resulted in "polluting the chastity of the former by the
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debauchery of the latter."75 A vigorous attack upon a taxing system which failed to tax new sources of wealth and saddled the farmer with three times his rightful share attracted the farmer to the Republican cause. Connecticut cast her largest vote to elect Wolcott by a majority of 600 which constituted a plurality of slightly more than two percent of the total vote. The ardent Federalists regarded John Cotton Smith as "the last of the Puritan Governors," and his defeat as "the end of Connecticut's golden age." The Tolerationists were vibrant with vic- tory and the national press echoed their confidence. The Boston Pa- triot caught the true significance of Wolcott's victory as achieving the "destruction of the sheet anchor of Federalism's last hope."76
NOTES-CHAPTER XVI
1 Purcell, Connecticut in Transition, pp. 232-37.
2 Ibid., p. 238.
3 Ibid., p. 239.
4 Carl Russell Fish, The Civil Service and Patronage (New York: 1905); p. 33.
5 Ibid., pp. 33-34.
6 Ibid., p. 34.
7 Ibid., pp. 32-33.
8 Purcell, Connecticut in Transition, p. 240.
9 Fish, Civil Service and Patronage, p. 33, note.
10 Ibid., p. 32.
11 Ibid., pp. 32-34.
12 Ibid., pp. 35-36; Purcell, Connecticut in Transition, p. 240.
13 Fish, Civil Service and Patronage, P. 37.
14 Purcell, Connecticut in Transition, pp. 240-41.
15 Ibid., pp. 241-42.
16 Ibid., p. 236.
17 Ibid., pp. 253-63.
18 Ibid., pp. 263-77.
19 Louis Martin Sears, Jefferson and the Embargo (Durham, N. C .: 1927), pp. 51-60; Hall, Talmadge, pp. 196-98.
20 Purcell, Connecticut in Transition, p. 116.
21 Ibid .; Sears, Jefferson and the Embargo, p. 151.
22 Ibid., pp. 124, 128, 144, 145; Purcell, Connecticut in Transition, p. 151; Clark, History of Manufacturing, Vol. I, p. 273.
23 Statute Laws of the State of Connecticut, Book II (Hartford, 1808), pp. 28-31, 41-43. 24 Purcell, Connecticut in Transition, pp. 122-25.
25 Sears, Jefferson and the Embargo, p. 175.
26 Purcell, Connecticut in Transition, p. 279; Hall, Talmadge, p. 200.
27 Sears, Jefferson and the Embargo, p. 185.
28 Ibid., pp. 185-87.
29 Purcell, Connecticut in Transition, pp. 281-83.
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HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
30 Sears, Jefferson and the Embargo, p. 141.
31 Purcell, Connecticut in Transition, pp. 285-88.
32 Samuel Eliot Morison, Life and Letters of Harrison Gray Otis, Federalist, 1765-1848, Vol. II (Boston, 1913), pp. 17-31; Frank Updyke, The Diplomacy of the War of 1812 (Baltimore, 1915), pp. 108-31.
33 Hall, Talmadge, p. 207.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid., pp. 216-17; Updyke, Diplomacy of War of 1812, p. 131.
36 Statutes, Book II, pp. 93-94.
37 Purcell, Connecticut in Transition, p. 289; Hall, Talmadge, pp. 218-19.
38 Edward Payson Powell, Nullification and Secession in the United States: A History of Six Attempts During the First Century of the Republic (New York: 1897), p. 212.
39 "John Cotton Smith Papers," Vol. III, in Collections, Conn. Hist. Soc., Vol. XXVII (Hartford, 1952), p. 3.
40 Ibid., pp. 134-35.
41 Ibid., Vol. I, in Collections, Conn. Hist. Soc., Vol. XXV (Hartford, 1948), pp. 204-205.
42 Ibid., Vol. III, pp. 62-63.
42a Ibid., Vol. II, in Collections, Conn. Hist. Soc., Vol. XXVI (Hartford, 1949), pp. 150-52, 225-35; Vol. III, p. 195.
43 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 181.
44 Ibid., Vol. II, p. 51.
45 William Edward Buckley, The Hartford Convention, Tercentenary Commission of the State of Connecticut (New Haven, n. d.), pp. 5-6.
46 Ibid .; "Smith Papers," Vol. II, pp. 169-70; 208-11.
47 Morison, Harrison Gray Otis, Vol. II, pp. 85-90.
48 Hall, Talmadge, pp. 226-27.
49 "Smith Papers," Vol. IV, in Collections, Conn. Hist. Soc., Vol. XXVIII (Hartford, 1954), p. 44; Buckley, Hartford Convention, p. 7.
50 Morison, Harrison Gray Otis, Vol. II, pp. 99-105.
51 Ibid., pp. 105-106.
52 Buckley, Hartford Convention, p. 9.
53 Morison, Harrison Gray Otis, Vol. II, pp. 134-35, notes.
54 Ibid., p. 146.
55 Ibid., p. 151.
56 See State Rec., Vol. VI, pp. 563-64.
57 Morison, Harrison Gray Otis, Vol. II, pp. 149-50.
58 Ibid., p. 161.
59 Ibid., pp. 152-56.
60 Ibid., pp. 161-62.
61 Ibid., pp. 167-71; Purcell, Connecticut in Transition, p. 295.
62 Purcell, Connecticut in Transition, pp. 146-49.
63 Ibid., p. 149.
64 Louis Kimball Mathews Rosenberry, Migrations from Connecticut after 1800, Tercen- tenary Commission of the State of Connecticut (New Haven, n.d.), p. 3.
65 Purcell, Connecticut in Transition, pp. 151-52.
66 Ibid., p. 156.
67 Ibid., pp. 154-55.
68 Ibid., pp. 291-98, 332; Buckley, Hartford Convention, pp. 14-15; Morison, Harrison Gray Otis, Vol. II, pp. 165-67.
69 Purcell, Connecticut in Transition, PP. 332-38.
70 Ibid., pp. 39-40.
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71 Ibid., pp. 343-46; George Hallam Richards, "The Politics of Connecticut, or, A Statement of Facts, Addressed to Honest Men of All Parties, Religious and Political, in the State: Particularly to the Mass of Community, A Bold and Hardy Yeomanry, who compose the Flesh and Muscle, the Blood and Bone of the Body Politic" (Hart- ford, 1817), p. 25.
73 Richards, "Politics of Connecticut," p. 25.
74 Ibid., p. 10.
75 Ibid., p. 15.
76 Purcell, Connecticut in Transition, pp. 346-51.
Chapter XVII An Era of Political Transition, 1817-27
O LIVER WOLCOTT was an ideal choice to bridge the gap between a political community which was essentially colonial in its practice and one which was basically modern in its theory. As the son and grandson of a Governor, Wolcott had moved naturally to a position of influence within the Federalist party. He refused a Continental commission in order to serve as a minuteman. He emerged from the Revolution as a friend of Washington and of Alexander Hamilton. Hamilton appointed him Comptroller of the Currency and later he became Secretary of Treasury. Here he was bitterly, although perhaps unfairly criticized, for alleged misappropria- tion of funds. After serving as Judge of the United States Circuit Court of Connecticut, Vermont, and New York, to which he had been named by John Adams, he retired to private business in 1803. He served as President of the Bank of America, incorporated woolen mills at Wol- cottville with his brother, and devoted attention to agriculture. His broad experience made him appealing to the major economic groups. He was reared as a Congregationalist, but his experiences had promoted a tolerance that made his orthodoxy at least dubious. He was a friend of Yale. He had broken with the Federalists because of their opposition to the War of 1812. After this, he aligned himself politically with those who were calling for change, yet he was moderately conservative. In a very real sense, Wolcott symbolized both the old and new Connecticut and provided a compromise between the two.1
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