USA > Connecticut > History of Connecticut, Volume I > Part 25
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Connecticut had not come to her decision without arousing the protest of various elements of her society. Although only the overtones of the discord are revealed, it is clear that all were not happy. Apparent, but not clearly measurable, are the differences between the Governor and the Council on the one hand and the Assembly on the other. Law hesitated to call the Assembly to consider the question of termination of the issues of bills of credit. In the single recorded vote of the Council on this issue, only one of the four favored calling the assembly. On the other hand, when Law believed that Wolcott was inclined to call the representatives into session, Law did not hesitate to disagree. The Rev- erend Samuel Johnson believed that sound currency could be achieved only if the Governor were given a negative voice, or veto power, and if the Council were made less dependent on the people.75
That differences of opinion existed, also, between the upper and lower houses of the Assembly is indicated by the controversy which arose in answer to a request from England for a complete accounting of paper money in Connecticut. Approval of a draft of a reply was delayed in 1750 from the May to the October session of the General Assembly on the motion of the lower house. In October, the lower house refused the draft presented to them and forced the question to be referred to a joint
CONNECTICUT IN FRENCH AND ENGLISH WARS 277
committee of the two houses. The pending action of the British parlia- ment to restrict the issues of paper currency restrained full play of the differences, but it seems clear that the upper and lower houses were not of one mind on paper money.76
The merchants summarized their position in 1751 by memorials to the assembly pleading for the discontinuance of the paper issues. A false and unstable currency was an "abomination to the Lord," they asserted, which must be corrected to protect the trade and to encourage "every honest Art, trade & manufacture." It was necessary that the just value of their outstanding debts be secured and that "the Medium of Trade may be rendrer'd Stable for time to come." The people, it was said, who did not duly consider the reason for a discount had become accustomed not to discount notes for any obligation. The people had been so generally in favor of paper currency that it was necessary to prohibit the passing or taking of paper money.77 The merchants protested that the accept- ance of Rhode Island bills, for example, "would soon sap the foundation of trade and commerce among us."78 As Connecticut returned to an orthodox money basis, she outlawed the currency of Rhode Island and New Hampshire from circulating within Connecticut as legal tender.79
The conflict over paper money in Connecticut, however, was not simply the conflict of the debtor and creditor classes. It was a complex issue characterized by the shifting positions of the participants in the argument. In the economic fluctuations of mid-eighteenth century Connecticut, many rose to new positions of wealth and their attitudes changed with their interests. As merchants were both creditors within the colony and debtors to those outside the colony, their attitudes varied somewhat because of the inherent conflict in their business needs and as the balance between their positions changed.80
Connecticut attempted to put her finances on a sound basis. Pro- visions were made for drawing in the old tenor bills and the assembly directed that all accounts of the colony after November 1, 1756 should be kept in lawful money. The currency of New Hampshire and Rhode Island had continued to circulate and Connecticut requested these colonies to call in their old bills.81 New York had eased somewhat Con- necticut's financial stress by advancing the colony £8,000 toward the expenses of the Crown Point campaign. The treasury was low, however,
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and the colony resorted to many methods in the attempt to replenish it. These included a revival of the intercolonial tariff of five percent on £100 and a tonnage tax of three pence on those vessels not going be- yond Philadelphia and Nova Scotia.82 Connecticut feared that addi- tional issues of paper currency would dangerously depreciate the cur- rency. By 1756, £49,500 had already been issued.83 In 1756, rather than issue more, Connecticut secured a loan from Massachusetts for £10,000, planning to repay it when reimbursement was received from England for the 1755 campaign.84 It was learned in May, 1756, that money had been granted for the relief of the colonies, but it was not until Fall that it was known that the money was to be considered as "a free gift" from the mother country. Connecticut's share of the £115,000 granted was to be £26,000 less commissions. In the end, the commissions were given up by those handling the account in England and America.85
Perhaps a measure of the favorable state of money in Connecticut is indicated by the provision that produce presented in payment for rates could be sold for gold and silver to avoid the inconvenience of using paper money exclusively as had been provided in the act of 1755. The bills, themselves, were in short supply. The treasurer of the colony was urged in October, 1756, to have on hand, for the expenses of the assembly, specie sufficient to make up for the lack of bills of credit.86 The determination to avoid paper currency seems almost fanatical. To secure the funds necessary for the next campaign, a public lottery was authorized to raise £8,000. Too, the ministers were urged to instruct their congregations, especially the rich and wealthy, as to the impor- tance of contributing to the treasury, in the hope that £5,000 or £6,000 would be received.87
Despite Connecticut's efforts to avoid issuing paper money, she re- sumed the practice in 1758, and, by the end of 1761 had obligated the colony to the extent of £327,200, including five per cent interest. By further issues between 1761 and 1765, the colony was obligated to an additional £100,650, including interest, or to a total of £427,850.88
The significance to Connecticut of the wars with the French was to be measured in the subsequent relation of the colonies to the empire and in changes in the internal situation in Connecticut. There is evi- dence to suggest that the war years were prosperous years in which the
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state and groups among the populace benefited financially. In the quarter century of warfare, although Connecticut had established limits to cooperation, she had contributed her fair share as compared to the other colonies. The victory, which eliminated the French threat to Con- necticut and the other colonies reduced the dependence of the colonies on British forces and made the colonies less willing to subscribe to an imperial control which Britain believed to be justified and necessary. The difference between colonial and British attitude as to the require- ments of the victory was a basic factor in the controversies leading to the American Revolution.
NOTES-CHAPTER XI
1 Wrong, Rise and Fall of New France, II, pp. 661-69.
2 Law Papers, Correspondence and Documents during Jonathan Law's Governorship, 1741-1750, in Collections, Conn. Hist. Soc., XI (Hartford, Conn., 1907), pp. 60-61, 132- 33. The responsibility for the conduct of the war rested, as previously, with the Gover- nor and the War Council. All powers not specifically granted to them were reserved by the General Assembly and its favorable vote was required for the use of the troops for other than frontier purposes. On matters of frontier defense, the council could act independently of the Governor, who was irritated at times because of the Council's autonomous position and his own anomalous position in relation to the General Assembly. Jonathan Law contrasted his impotence as Governor of Connecticut to the authority of the Governor of New York in a letter to the latter: "Where a more abso- lute Authority will not answer, what can a lesser body do? The greater the privileges of the people, the lesser the Prerogative." Conn. Col. Rec., X, p. 42; XI, p. 10; Fitch Papers, Correspondence and Documents during Thomas Fitch's Governorship of the Colony of Connecticut, 1754-1766, in Collections, Conn. Hist. Soc., Vol. XVII (Hartford, 1918), pp. 178, 304.
3 Wrong, New France, II, pp. 609-11; 669-71. By virtue of supplying 1,000 men for the effort, Connecticut secured the appointment of one of its residents, Oliver Wolcott, as second in command of the provincial forces under William Pepperell. Law Papers, pp. 125-29; Conn. Col. Rec., XI, pp. 83, 128, 148.
4 Ibid., pp. 67-75, 676-80; Conn. Col. Rec., IX, pp. 31, 71-77; "Roger Wolcott's Journal at the Siege of Louisbourg, 1745," in Collections, Conn. Hist. Soc., I, pp. 131-62.
5 Law Papers, XI, p. 60.
6 Ibid., XIII, pp. 277, 285, 350; Conn. Col. Rec., IX, pp. 257-58, 263; Wrong, New France, II, p. 681.
7 Ibid .; Law Papers, XIII, pp. 288-92; XV, pp. 1-12, 26-33, 39-40, 187, 200, 218; Conn. Col. Rec., IX, pp. 341-42.
8 Wrong, New France, II, pp. 742-58; Papers of Governor Wolcott, 1750-54, in Collections, Conn. Hist. Soc., XVI, pp. 426, 435-438.
9 Fitch Papers, XVII, pp. xxvii-xxix, 3, 15-17; Conn. Col. Rec., X, pp. 267-68.
10 Ibid., 267-93, Wolcott Papers, pp. xvi, 435-38; Fitch Papers, LXVI, pp. xxviii-xxix, 3, 15-29.
11 Conn. Col. Rec., X, pp. 214, 319-44; Fitch Papers, pp. 48-55, 65-75, 95-107.
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12 Wrong, New France, II, pp. 761-83; Conn. Col. Rec., X, pp. 425, 461-62, 625.
13 Lawrence Henry Gipson, The British Empire Before The American Revolution, (Caldwell, Idaho and New York, 1936), VI, pp. 321-24, 323 note.
14 Ibid., VI, pp. 175-76; Fitch Papers, XVII, pp. 154-62; Conn. Col. Rec., X, pp. 422-23. 15 Ibid., pp. 458, 545; Gipson, British Empire, VI, pp. 162-211; Weaver, Jonathan Trum- bull, pp. 76-77; Fitch Papers, XVII, pp. 183-266.
16 Conn. Col. Rec., XI, p. 61; Gipson, British Empire, VII, pp. 62-89; Fitch Papers, X. VII, pp. 275-314.
17 Gipson, British Empire, VII, pp. 155-56.
18 Ibid., pp. 156-67.
19 Ibid., pp. 160-61.
20 Conn. Col. Rec., XI, pp. 100, 104-105.
21 Fitch Papers, VII, p. 350; Gipson, British Empire, VII, p. 217 and note.
22 Ibid., pp. 222-33.
23 Ibid., p. 233.
24 Fitch Papers, XVII, pp. 350-51.
25 Gipson, British Empire, VII, p. 160; Weaver, Jonathan Trumbull, pp. 83-84; Conn. Col. Rec., XI, pp. 176-80.
26 Ibid., pp. 222-23, 251-53; Fitch Papers, XVIII, pp. 1, 12-15, 21; Gipson, British Empire, VII, pp. 310-13.
27 Fitch Papers, XVIII, pp. 21-32.
28 Ibid., pp. 52-75.
29 Ibid., pp. 78-81, 91, 99-110, 117-19.
30 Ibid., pp. 206-207.
31 Weeden, Economic and Social History, II, p. 67.
32 Weaver, Jonathan Trumbull, p. 34.
33 Weeden, Economic and Social History, II, pp. 667-68.
34 Ibid., p. 653; Weaver, Jonathan Trumbull, pp. 32-33.
35 Margaret E. Martin, Merchants and Trade of the Connecticut River, 1750-1820 (Smith College Studies in History, V, no. 4) (Northampton, 1920), pp. 1-3, 19; Bailey, Influences in Radicalism, pp. 188-89; Weaver, Jonathan Trumbull, p. 33: Gipson, British Empire, III, p. 76.
36 Weaver, Jonathan Trumbull, pp. 20-21; Bailey, Influences toward Radicalism, pp. 188-89.
37 Jared Eliot, Essays Upon Field Husbandry in New England 1748-61, Henry J. Carman and Rexford Tugwell, eds., (New York, 1936), pp. LIV ff.
38 Clark, History of Manufacturing, I, p. 59.
39 Ibid .; Weaver, Jonathan Trumbull, p. 39; Weeden, Economic and Social History. II, p. 647; Conn. Col. Rec., IX, pp. 283-86, 393-95.
40 Weaver, Jonathan Trumbull, pp. 40-41.
41 Ibid., p. 62.
42 Ibid., p. 42, passim.
43 "Wolcott Papers," pp. 35, 96-99, 195-97.
44 Conn. Col. Rec., X, pp. 350, 424, 550; Weaver, Jonathan Trumbull, pp. 68-74.
45 Ibid., pp. 78-79.
46 Ibid., pp. 68-74.
47 Fitch Papers, XVII, p. 304.
48 Ibid., XVIII, pp. 108, 110; Weaver, Jonathan Trumbull, pp. 85-88; Conn. Col. Rec., XI, p. 488.
49 Ibid
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50 Clark, History of Manufacturing, I, pp. 47-51; Conn. Col. Rec., V, p. 46; VI, pp. 79-80, 572; VIII, pp. 338, 395-96, 574; IX, p. 58.
51 Weaver, Jonathan Trumbull, pp. 11-12, 22, notes 1 and 3.
52 Ibid., pp. 12ff. and passim.
53 Eliot, Essays, p. 29.
54 Ibid., pp. xiv, 7-8.
55 Boyd, Susquehannah Company Papers, I, pp. xlv-xlvii.
56 Eliot, Essays, pp. xxv-xxxii, liii.
57 See, Eliot, Essays.
58 Weaver, Jonathan Trumbull, p. 31.
59 Eliot, Essays, p. 15.
60 Clark, History of Manufacturing, I, p. 82.
61 Eliot, Essays, pp. 59-60.
62 Bidwell and Falconer, History of Agriculture, p. 69.
63 Ibid., pp. 69, 91-92.
64 Conn. Col. Rec., VII, pp. 419-23, 449-56; VIII, pp. 318-21, 327; Henry Bronson, A Historical Account of Connecticut Currency, Continental Money, and the Finances of the American Revolution (New Haven Historical Society Collection) (New Haven, 1865), p. 41.
65 Conn. Col. Rec., VIII, pp. 357-60. Although her war needs broadened the English tolerance of colonial issues, Connecticut was careful to appear to stay within the limits which England established. When England objected to making the new issues legal tender, Connecticut repealed that part of the act of issue which made it obligatory for persons to accept the bills in payment but they were to be accepted by the treasury as lawful money. Conn. Col. Rec., X, pp. 214, 319, 328-31, 344, 350, 424, 550; Weaver, Jonathan Trumbull, pp. 68-74.
66 Weaver, Jonathan Trumbull, pp. 11-21; Law Papers, XI, pp. 99-100, 143-44, 269.
67 Ibid., XV, pp. 183-219, 223, 226, 230, 232.
68 Ibid., pp. 183-86; Weaver, Jonathan Trumbull, pp. 32-39.
69 Ibid., pp. 41-42; Law Papers, XV, pp. 264, 268, 279-80, 286-87, 290-95, 310, 337, 340, 363, 435-36, 465; Conn. Col. Rec., IX, pp. 447-49.
70 Dorfman, Economic Mind, I, pp. 160-61.
71 Conn. Col. Rec., IX, pp. 447-49.
72 Ibid., p. 161.
73 Lawrence Gipson, "Connecticut Taxation, 1750-75," Conn. Ter. Comm. Publ., pp. 3-5
74 Quoted in Dorfman, Economic Mind, I, p. 162.
75 Dorfman, Economic Mind, p. 161.
76 Wolcott Papers, XVI, pp. 60-64.
77 Bronson, Connecticut Currency, pp. 57-66.
78 Ibid., pp. 374-94.
79 Gipson, "Connecticut Taxation," p. 6.
80 Dorfman, Economic Mind, I, p. 141; Zeichner, Connecticut's Years of Controversy, p 39.
81 Ibid., p. 178; Conn. Col. Rec., X, p. 42.
82 Ibid., XI, p. 10.
83 Fitch Papers, XVII, p. 161; Gipson, "Connecticut Taxation," pp. 18-19.
84 Conn. Col. Rec., X, p. 476.
85 Fitch Papers, XVII, pp. 198, 201, 205, 251-52.
86 Conn. Col. Rec., X, p. 569.
87 Ibid., pp. 604-605.
88 Gipson, "Connecticut Taxation," pp. 18-24.
Chapter XII The Period of Protest and Petition
B Y 1765, THERE HAD EVOLVED, in Connecticut, an attitude of separatism. The settlement and defense of the frontier, the struggle to gain a basis for economic independence from the thin soil, the efforts of the established order to withstand the elements of dissent from within, the eternal vigilance exercised against the en- croachments from abroad upon charter rights-all these had contributed to a common ideal to be left alone. The New England Confederation had proved ineffective long before it had formally ceased to exist and arrangements with neighboring colonies remained formal and guarded. Whereas Connecticut desired the liberty to work out her own destiny, apparently there was, in 1765, no general desire to be free from the mother country. However, Connecticut interpreted, as inimical to her interests, the laws enacted by Great Britain, after the French and Indian War, to meet the administrative and financial difficulties of her empire. Connecticut reaction enabled the radicals to gain control and the at- titude of separatism was translated into cooperative action with other colonies and into the demand for independence from Great Britain.
Western Lands
As the French and Indian War was nearing its conclusion, the Susquehanna and Delaware companies resumed their interest in west- ern lands. These proposed settlements faced the hostility of the Indians, the ire of Pennsylvania, and the opposition of the British government. Pennsylvania regarded the areas claimed by both companies as falling properly within her province and protested vehemently against this alleged intrusion into her territory. Also, Sir Jeffrey Amherst, the Commander-in-Chief of British forces in America, warned the Governor
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THE PERIOD OF PROTEST AND PETITION
of Connecticut against laying the foundation for another Indian War. Yet, warnings were not prohibitions, and the first Connecticut settle- ment on the Delaware was made late in 1760 and the Susquehanna Company made plans to move into the Wyoming River territory the following Spring.1
When an attempt was made to secure from the Indians a confirma- tion of its claims, an armed force of over one hundred picked men was sent late in the Summer of 1762 to settle, forcibly if necessary, the Wy- oming River territory. When Pennsylvania's Governor Hamilton in- quired as to their intentions, the settlers informed him that the force would be increased by a thousand the next Spring. As the threats of the Indian became ominous, however, the settlers were forced to withdraw to Connecticut for the winter. Before the settlers could again start for the Wyoming Valley, a deputation of Indians arrived in Hartford to protest the encroachment upon their territory. In response to Governor Fitch's persuasiveness, however, they assured him that if the lands were ever sold they would be sold to Connecticut-similar assurances had been made to Pennsylvania for years.2
Notwithstanding the protest of the Indians and despite a decision of the British government favoring the Pennsylvania claim, Connecticut settlers persisted in moving into the area. Sir William Johnson, the Indian Commissioner for the Northwest, informed the Board of Trade of the dangers of Indian uprisings if the Susquehanna Company per- sisted in attempting a settlement. A determination of governmental pol- icy concerning the American West was of immediate importance as Britain emerged victorious in the French and Indian War. As long as the French occupied the territory, the British had permitted colonial expansion, for it served as a barrier against the enemy. After the French were removed, it was believed any policy adopted should reconcile the many commercial and financial factions in Britain and be eminently fair to the Indians in order to avoid future difficulties. Until the matter could be determined by the King in Council, Governor Fitch was or- dered by the Board of Trade to stop western settlement immediately.3 In accordance with this directive, the Delaware Company ordered an immediate cessation of its plans and recalled the settlers from the west. The Susquehanna, too, voted to stop further settlement. Under earlier
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(Courtesy Conn. State Lib.)
STORRS-CONGREGATIONAL CHURCH
orders of the Company, in May of 1762, as many as one hundred and fifty settlers moved into the territory, probably departing after the pro- hibition was known. The Privy Council had recommended, also, that both Pennsylvania and Connecticut name commissioners to go to the Wyoming River area to acquaint the settlers there with the King's proclamation that the Connecticut settlers be removed from the terri- tory. In the Fall, the General Assembly named Major David Baldwin of Milford to represent Connecticut.4
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THE PERIOD OF PROTEST AND PETITION
In the meantime, in June 1763, a comprehensive plan was submit- ted to the King for the administration of the western lands. This would have provided temporary relief to the Indians by preventing settlement west of the crest of the Appalachians. The plan caused a ministerial crisis; and before a final decision could be reached, news came that Pontiac had united the Indians of the Northwest in an effort to push the English across the mountains. This made it impossible to work out a permanent western policy until the Indians were subdued. To meet the existing situation, trade in the western area was immediately re- stricted to those who obtained a license from colonial governors or the military commander; all private land purchase from the Indians was forbidden; Quebec, West Florida, and East Florida were opened at once to settlement; and the western limit for white settlement was to follow the Appalachian highlands. Raiders of Pontiac's forces extended to the Wyoming River valley, and there, on October 15, annihilated the Con- necticut settlers, thus effectuating the King's proclamation and render- ing the mission of the Commissioners unnecessary.5
Pontiac's forces were quickly subdued. Under a truce arranged by the French, he was permitted to escape into Illinois territory. It was hoped by the French that he would there organize a new army. The following Spring, the Connecticut General Assembly provided 265 men and necessary provisions to meet the expected attack. Peace was ar- ranged with nearly all of the western tribes by the Treaty of Niagara in the Summer of 1764. Those who refused the treaty were quickly brought under control. The west was quiet, but the Indian threat had emphasized to Britain the necessity of strengthening her administrative ties with the colonies and the need for the colonies to assume a larger share of the financial burden of defense of the empire.6
The Tax Controversy
Connecticut was not unaware of this sentiment. The ever-alert Connecticut agent in England, Richard Jackson, forwarded to Governor Fitch materials indicating that Lord Grenville was determined to en- force the Molasses Act.7 The threat threw Boston merchants into a panic and those in Connecticut soon reacted similarly. Before any effec- tive opposition could be organized, the Sugar Act was passed in 1764.
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HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
Merchants of New London had already petitioned the General As- sembly to oppose the bill. It was argued that the bill would cause "very much distress" and that some of the merchants faced ruin. Certain per- sons had taken practical steps to foil the British attempts by vowing to make their own wines and in sufficient quantity to provide for the "gentlemen of the college" who had sacrificially sworn "to confine themselves to domestic liquirs," Jared Ingersoll believed that the British "had overshot their mark" in the Sugar Act, and, a few months later it was questioned in the Connecticut press whether or not independence might not result from America's opposition to the acts. There were those, such as Eliphalet Dyer, who had returned only recently from England where he had attempted to get the Crown to consider favor- ably the claims of the Susquehanna Company, who believed that now was the time for the colonies to exert themselves if they were to preserve their favorable position. Efforts were to be of no avail in securing repeal, for the taxes were immediately necessary to help replenish the badly depleted British treasury.8
The extent to which Connecticut reaction to the imposition of the taxes by Britain was conditioned by the general economic conditions of the colony and the ability of its residents to pay the duties does not seem to have been determined conclusively. Zeichner, in a brilliant mono- graph on Connecticut's Years of Controversy, advances the thesis that "economic adjustments made necessary by the peace were frequently disastrous."9 Whereas Zeichner presents evidence to indicate a difficult plight of the farmers, it does seem that the complaints of the commercial classes are more clearly demonstrated. Gipson, in an equally incisive study of Connecticut Taxation, points out that Connecticut had prac- tically freed herself from debt by the year of 1765 and concludes that a general well-being existed in the colony. Gipson suggests that during the French and Indian War, Connecticut "floated on the crest of a wave of prosperity" and that "from 1755 to 1764 money was plentiful and easy to find for taxes." He considers the decade of the sixties as the pe- riod in which Connecticut made her first appearance as a center of wealth, and cites a traveler, who observed in 1769, that "parents were sufficiently wealthy to provide farms and equipment for their numerous children as soon as the latter were ready to marry."10 There seems no
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doubt that post-war conditions affected the various classes of people differently and it seems that a more exhaustive examination is necessary to determine their relative wealth producing abilities. It does appear that Connecticut residents were comparatively in a better position to assume their portion of the taxes than were residents in England. It is more important, however, that on the eve of the Stamp Act, Connecti- cut had adopted as public policy the declaration that additional taxes would be ruinous for an already overburdened colony.
Reaction was immediate when the Stamp Act was proposed. Eliphalet Dyer viewed the act as an attempt "to fix upon us a large number of regular troops under pretense of our defense; but rather designed as a rod and check over us."11 Trumbull saw the danger as resulting in a government of Kings and councils without representative government. Jared Ingersoll, a known Connecticut conservative, who, it may be assumed, represented the greatest concessions the colonies would willingly make, was of the opinion that if the King should fix a proportional duty the colony would do its part for the common cause, yet he asked "if parliament once interposes to lay a tax, tho it may be very moderate, & the Crown appoint officers of its own to collect such tax & apply the same without acct. what consequences may or may not follow?"12 He pointed out that "the people's minds not only here but in neighboring Provinces are filled with the most dreadful apprehen- sions" and made it clear that any suggestion that he might make "would go down with the people like chopt hay."13 It was against this back- ground of opinion, that the Assembly had taken formal action on the information furnished it concerning the new taxes by its agent in Lon- don, Richard Jackson, and had appointed its committee of three New London merchants, Gordon Saltonstall, Nathaniel Shaw, and Thomas Mumford, "to collect and set in the most advantageous light all such arguments and objections as may justly and reasonably be advanced against creating and collecting a revenue in America, more particularly in this Colony, and especially against effecting the same by Stamp Duties &c."14
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