USA > Illinois > History of Fourteenth Illinois cavalry and the brigades to which it belonged > Part 11
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We have already given the preliminary of Longstreet's report. On page 463 (serial 54) he says : "The infantry column, however, reached Bean Station in good time and surprised the enemy completely. General W. E. Jones (with two brigades of cavalry) also got his position in good time, and captured a number of the enemy's wagons. (This was on the opposite side of Clinch mountain.) Brigadier General B. R. Johnson, commanding Buckner's division, advanced directly against the enemy and drove him steadily to the buildings at Bean Station, where he met with a strong resistance. General Kershaw, at the head of McLaw's division, was ordered in upon the right of Johnson to push forward and cut off the force that was occupying the (Bean Station) gap. Kershaw executed his orders literally, but we could not catch the enemy's cavalry ; the enemy escaped to a strong position three miles below (page 464). This was the second time during the campaign, when the enemy was completely in our power, and we allowed him to escape." We suppose the first time was December 2d, at Walker's ford, where, as here, they attempted to capture our command, using an over- whelming force and as signally failed as here. McLaw's division, commanded by General Kershaw, which Long- street says was thrown upon the right of Johnson, con- sisted of Kershaw's brigade, of 6 South Carolina regi- ments, and Wofford's brigade, 6 regiments ; Humphrey's brigade, 4 regiments ; Bryan's brigade, 4 regiments. A total of 4 brigades, or 20 regiments, who passed or formed in front of our one small regiment. Were we not justified
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in terming this a dark, portentous war cloud? We now go back to follow up the details of the battle as reported by the rebel officers who commanded. On page 531, Confed- erate General Bushrod R. Johnson says : "December 14th this (Buckner's) division moved on Bean Station at the head of the infantry. About 3 miles east of Bean Station at 2 p. m. the cavalry encountered and drove back the enemy's pickets, and sharply engaged the reserve. As the skirmishers ascended to the top of the hill east of the station, the enemy's artillery opened from three points on the elevation west of the station. Two of these points were on the north side (the 5th Indiana guns and the how- itzers of the 14th), and one (Colvin's battery), on the south side of the Knoxville road. Our skirmishers were now ordered to lie down until our artillery could be brought up. Taylor's battery, of 4 Napoleon guns, was now placed in position on the north side of the road. These batteries (Taylor's and others now brought up) opened mainly on the two batteries north of the road (the 5th and the 14th). Johnson's brigade was now advanced in line of battle with skirmishers in front, to the top of the hill east of the station, and on the left (south ) of the Knox- ville road, and became exposed to the fire of the federal battery on the south side of the road (Colvins), while skirmishing with the enemy's (dismounted) cavalry on an elevation just in its front (Wolford's line). Meantime McLaw's division (under Kershaw) was moved by the flank on to the ascent of the mountain on the north side of the road, intended to turn the enemy's left flank (our brigade). I ordered a section of Parker's battery to the left and front on the right of Johnson's brigade, where it opened on a well formed line of the enemy (Wolford's line), in its front and on the south side of the valley. The line of Gracie's brigade had been advanced and was ex- posed to the fire of the federals occupying the large hotel building at Bean Station, and firing through loopholes cut in the walls of the second and third stories. In this move- ment the 60th Alabama was exposed to the heavy fire of a line of federals west of the hotel (our brigade and our bat- teries ), and it consequently halted, and the men attempted to cover themselves by lying down on the ground." This precisely corroborates our description regarding the rebels
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lying down, although they conceal the fact of their de- sign to capture our batteries. They also seek to conceal the terrible destructiveness of the fire of our batteries, by attributing their losses to the fire of our men concealed in the brick hotel. This prevarication is made plain when we consider that two or three shots from any one of their guns, of which the chief of their artillery, Colonel Alexander, re- ports all his batteries (16 in number) as present, would have sent the material of that house flying in every direc- tion like so many fragments of shells. It must be an obtuse mind that can not comprehend that the hotel under such conditions could not be held for a moment. Except this error, Johnson's description is a true one and corrobo- rates our record. Again Johnson says: "The deliberate fire delivered with accuracy continually struck the men of the 60th Alabama regiment as they lay on the ground, and when that regiment subsequently arose. to advance again, its line was marked out by the dead and wounded. Johnson's brigade was now moving in a handsome line down the western slope of the hill, east of the station and south of the road (as Connelly described it). In this movement it was exposed to the fire of the enemy's cavalry in line of battle (Wolford's line), and to a battery of artillery (Connelly's howitzers), and on passing the creek at the foot of the slope its line was enfiladed from the loop- holes of the hotel in its prolongation to the right. This brigade sought, by lying down, the shelter afforded by the undulations of the ground, while the companies on the right fired on the hotel." That phantom hotel troubled them much, but it need not when they had on the field 16 batteries. (See our description "Nature seldom makes valleys without occasional hills"). Johnson continues : "The enemy's battery in front of Johnson's brigade (our howitzers), retired as soon as that brigade descended be- low its range." The cavalry retired a little from the brow of the hill, but maintained their line. Johnson in describing another advance, says : "In this advance Colonel Sanford (of the 60th Alabama), was knocked down by a shot, but afterward joined the regiment at the stable. I immediately requested General Jenkins to move one or two brigades by the flank through the woods on the slope of the mountains on the south side of the valley, with
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a view to turn the enemy's right flank." This was the force described as charging from the woods just as Wol- ford's men were retiring. Rebel General Jenkins reports moving on our right. His force was Jenkins' brigade, Anderson's brigade, and Benning's brigade, in all 15 regi- ments. On page 536 Johnson describes Jenkins' move- ment on our right, and Kershaw's movement on our left and adds : "The federal forces had resisted our attack per- sistently and gallantly, no doubt with a view to save their little camp equipage, trains, etc." On page 537 Johnson says, truthfully : "The enemy's forces are said to be three
brigades of cavalry." Rebel Colonel Alexander, chief of artillery, on page 480, speaks of the movement of his bat- talion of artillery (23 guns ) to Bean Station. In McLaw's division, which attacked our brigade of much less than 1,000 men, there was not less than 5,000 of the enemy. On page 524, Rebel Colonel Ball, commanding Bryan's brigade, acknowledges being present and supporting Gen- eral Kershaw in passing our left flank. The advance of the 14th was the first attacked by Kershaw's brigade, com- posed of the following, all South Carolina regiments, viz. : the 2d, the 3d, the 7th, the 8th, the 15th, and the 3d South Carolina battalion, all infantry commands (see page 451). Major Wm. Wallace, C. S., commanding second S. C. of Kershaw's brigade, says (page 708) : "December 14tl we marched to Bean Station and took part in the skirmish at that place, and lost 22 men in the fight." Colonel James D. Vance, commanding 3d South Carolina, says (page 509) : "My regiment belonged to Kershaw's brigade." And on page 511: "On the 14th (December) we re- turned as far as Bean Station, where in the afternoon the brigade, as well as other portions of the corps, became en- gaged with the enemy's mounted infantry." Portions of our forces were mounted infantry. He fails to report any loss. Captain E. J. Goggins, 7th South Carolina, on page 513 reports being present and engaged and lost 3 men. Cap- tain Duncan McIntire, of the 8th South Carolina, on pages 514and 515, says : "On the morning of December 14th, with the brigade, we came back to near Bean Station, and com- ing up with the enemy, the brigade was formed in line of battle ; the 8th occupying second position, the 15th being on the right, and to the right of the main road, and rear
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of Captain Parker's battery. The brigade was moved by the right flank three-fourths of a mile." This brought them in front of the 14th Illinois, the extreme left of our brigade; the right of the brigade resting near the road. Captain McIntire continues : "The 15th, being fronted, was ordered to move forward; the 8th was fronted and moved forward. Here I received orders to advance on an eminence occupied by the enemy." The enemy was the advance of the 14th Illinois, the extreme advance of our brigade. The captain speaks of moving slowly at first ; and driving him (the 14th) from the church (see page 515). This description identifies the enemy whom we fought, and confirms our record, which also details our retreat to, and abandonment of this church. As the cap- tain says, the 8th occupied second place and the 15th the first place, it is evident that these two regiments were to- gether and this makes plain what two were referred to when a short time afterward our boys challenged them and they answered "15th and - South Carolina," meant 15th and 8th South Carolina. All these reports consid- ered together prove that it was Kershaw's brigade of 6 South Carolina infantry regiments, that attacked the 14th Illinois in its advanced position. The captain continues : "After passing the church and advancing about 200 yards, we came upon the enemy under a heavy fire. Darkness prevented any farther advance." Thus is our record, made at the time and more than 30 years before the rebel reports were published, confirmed, not only in the general details and plans of operations, but even in much of the minor details, such as the enemy falling prostrate when ad- vancing on our batteries, as well as in the terrible slaughter of their men at those points. Captain McIntire reports 22 men lost by his regiment. On page 517 is report of Captain S. H. Sheldon, commanding 15th South Carolina ; he says : "On December 14th, accompanied by the rest of the brigade, the command marched in the direction of Bean Station. Finding the enemy at this place, measures were taken to attack and, if possible, capture him. We occupied the extreme right (of the brigade) and after the brigade had been put in position along the slope of the Clinch mountains, we advanced upon the enemy at a charge, and drove him back from his position. We were then moved
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farther to the right and advanced, capturing a few pris- oners and killing and wounding a few. Night coming on soon after we were ordered to halt, stack arms and rest for the night ; the regiment lost 7 men." On page 518 is re- port of Lieutenant Wm. C. Harris, adjutant of James S. C. battalion ; he says : "December 14th retraced our steps to Bean Station ; coming up with the enemy, made an attack on him, drove him from his position, losing 3 men." Some of their commands, like ours, reported no loss, although doubtless they did lose. The total reported loss of Kershaw's brigade was 56. The officers of our brigade made no report of the battle nor of losses, except a tabu- lated statement made on page 293, giving the losses in each command, aggregating 115 of the whole force. Either this is incorrect or Colonel Wolford's report of 130 for his
division alone was far wrong. It is much more probable that our whole loss was not less than 175. As to the loss of the enemy, their loss must have been very much greater. General Johnson reported the loss of his division at 222. Considering the report of the destructiveness of our fire as made by his own officers, this report does not appear cor- rect. Citizens informed us next day that they lost in killed 800, while the aggregate of their report gives total re- ported 278. If all their commands had reported it would have shown much more. General Shackelford com- manded our forces in this battle. It was the last of his service in East Tennessee, as, like Burnside, at his own request he had been relieved, and his successor appointed, who had not yet arrived to take command. Shackelford's career as a commander was one of continued successes. Nor was this, his last, in any way inferior to all of his victories, for victory it surely was, in this, that it completely thwarted the enemy's design and so completely demoral- ized Longstreet's forces as to render them harmless the next day, when they possessed such superior advantages.
Colonel Graham, in command of our brigade, and Colonel Capron, in command of our regiment, each performed their duty with the same skill, courage and coolness that characterized all their service. Their coolness inspired their men to intrepid daring.
Captain Dent, in command of the advanced skirmishers of the 14th, which bore the brunt of the attack of McLaw's
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division, at first alone, exhibited the capability of a skillful commander. Every officer and every man was worthy of the highest honor ; but what shall we say of the bold and skillful manner in which the men and officers of our battery performed their duties? Colvin was the same brave and skillful officer as usual; his battery did great execution. The guns of the 5th Indiana also were served effectively; but the howitzer guns of the 14th, occupying an advanced position and having a close range, were fired with such rapidity and skill and effectiveness, that it must be con- ceded that it was one of our principal elements of salvation on that hotly contested field. Lieutenant Connelly won such honors that day as advanced him immediately to a captaincy. The absence of Major David Quigg on other duty deprived us of the services of one of our bravest and most skillful officers. The major was absent attending a court martial. We were furnished the following ac- count of an adventure that day, which was not related for publication, but it so well illustrates the heroism of that splendid officer that we publish it : He related in a private letter to a friend that being absent attending a court mar- tial, he learned of the battle, and though compelled to pass within the range of the enemy's batteries to get to his com- mand, he ran the fiery gauntlet, which he describes as the hottest place he was ever in, expecting, as he said, to have his head shot off.
Having completely checked the advance of the enemy at dusk, we held our lines until midnight, having extended our picket lines across the valley. We then fell back, but it was near 2 a. m. of December 15th before the last of our forces withdrew. We retired down the Richland valley four miles, to a position already occupied by General Has- call's division of the 23d Army Corps. They had already built a strong rail barricade across the road, and extending out on our right flank. This infantry force occupied this barricade. Our cavalry forces were thrown into line on the right of the infantry, Wolford's division first, and to their right was our brigade, the 14th extreme right, except the guns of the 5th, and of the 14th. The 14th fortunately occupied ground having many large rocks and large trees, which formed a fairly good protection. The enemy formed line across the valley nearly one mile in our ad-
CAPTAIN NEWTON N HURPEL, CO. L.
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vance. Strong skirmish lines were thrown forward and occupied temporary breastworks, perhaps 300 yards apart ; the rebel skirmishers being about 80 rods from our line. The rebel skirmish line was strong, and our own was very light, so that our main line was engaged with the enemy, but not vigorously. Colvin's guns were posted on the road and opened on the enemy's distant line ; but without eliciting a reply. Our battle flags were waved defiantly towards the enemy, as a signal that we dared them to at- tack, but, with the exception of a slight skirmish, we could not provoke an engagement.
In the afternoon the enemy succeeded in dragging in position several batteries on the high hills or mountains precisely on our right flank, so that their fire could rake our whole line. This fire became very annoying, and as our trees could protect us only on one side, and the enemy's fire came from front and flank, there was some dodging to avoid the enemy's fire from both directions. They again used both shells and railroad iron, which made much frightening noise, and would hurt where it struck; yet, barring its frightful noise, it was little feared. Our small batteries attempted to reply, but owing to the height of the hills, as well as the distance, our shots could not reach them, and our batteries were withdrawn, as they were ex- posed to damage without being useful. We will give ex- tract from Rebel General Martin's report. On page 546, after detailing his movements of the previous day, in which he did not succeed in engaging us, he says. "Early next morning I was ordered to move on the enemy's flank, on the Knoxville road, 4 miles from Bean Station. This was done immediately, and a high hill gained, from which my artillery could enfilade the enemy's breastworks. With great labor the guns were placed in position, and rapidly and effectively served. My guns were in sight of. and within 500 yards of our infantry skirmishers, who, it was expected, would attack in front. With concert of action great damage could have been done the enemy this day. Colonel Giltner was on the side of Clinch mountain, on the enemy's left flank, and prepared to second any movement of our infantry. As no movement was made I held my position. My fire continued for one hour and a half, and the enemy began to retire, but was able to detach
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a large force to hold my men in check, as he was not pressed in front." That we were not more vigorously at- tacked on this day, was due to the fact that Longstreet's veterans had received such rough handling the day before that they had no appetite for fight.
True, on the 15th we had the aid of one small infantry di- vision, but that was offset by the complete co-operation of all the enemy's cavalry on this day. Those who may think that we have drawn on our imagination for our description are invited to examine the reports of the rebel officers in the published reports. Why this battle has not received its proper notice in history is due to the fact that our com- manding officer had been superseded, and perhaps did not think it incumbent on him to report, while his successor had not yet arrived, and could not therefore report. On page 468, under date of December 30th, General Longstreet gives vent to his disappointment in the following language : "I regret to say that a combination of circumstances has so operated, during the campaign in East Tennessee, as to prevent the complete destruction of the enemy's forces in this part of the state. It is fair to infer that the fault is entirely with me, and I desire therefore that some other commander be tried."
This was a humiliating confession for one of the very best commanders in the southern army to make. The com- bination of circumstances alluded to was his defeat at Knox- ville-a very unfortunate circumstance. Then his failure to capture our one little brigade with his whole cavalry force at Walker's ford was another hard circumstance, and now again at Bean Station, when he used his whole army of five divisions, he again attempted to capture our small force and failed. This again was an unlucky cir- cumstance, and the whole such a combination of circum- stances as plainly showed that not Longstreet, but the fact that Longstreet's veterans now found a class of American soldiers to oppose who differed materially from those hehad previously encountered, was the real cause of his failure.
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CHAPTER VII.
SERVICE UNDER BRIGADIER GENERAL SAMUEL D. STURGIS.
Important changes have been made in the army in East Tennessee. At his own request Major General Ambrose E. Burnside has been relieved of the command of the army in East Tennessee, and Major General John G. Foster took command December IIth, but made no changes in General Burnside's plans until after the battle of Bean Station. There had been much difference of opinion between Gen- eral Halleck and General Burnside as to the best disposi- tion to be made of General Burnside's forces. At length Assistant Secretary of War Charles A. Dana was sent to upper East Tennessee to investigate, and after a care- ful study of the situation and plans of Burnside, he per- fectly approved of Burnside's course, and when General Grant took command of the army near Chattanooga he too approved of Burnside's course. After General Long- street was sent by General Bragg to capture or drive out Burnside's forces, thus opening the way by weakening Bragg's army for the great victory over it soon after, and the final victory over Longstreet, perfectly demonstrated the wisdom of his plans. East Tennessee was now made safe. It was the opportune moment for him to surrender the command, as he had long desired to do because of failing health. General Shackelford had also asked to be relieved, and after the battle of Bean Station he, too, surrendered the command of the cavalry to Brigadier Gen- eral Samuel D. Sturgis.
About this time Colonel Felix Graham also resigned, and Colonel Horace Capron was placed in command of our brigade-the second of the second division of the cavalry corps. The regiments of the brigade were com- manded as follows: The 14th Illinois by Major F. M. Davidson, in the absence of Lieutenant Colonel D. P. Jenkins ; the 5th Indiana Cavalry by Colonel Thomas H. Butler ; the 65th Indiana by Captain Walter G. Hodge.
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Other important changes were made in the composition of the army. Many of the former regiments had been sent home to veteranize, and not a few had returned to Kentucky. On the other hand, Major General Gordon Granger, with a part of the 4th corps (infantry) of General Sherman's forces had been retained. General Washington L. Elliott also came with his cavalry divi- sion. For the organization of General Foster's army at this time, see serial 56, page 559. Present for duty, 9th A. C., 4,875 ; 23d A. C., total, 7,672. (Hascall's division, 4,212.) Left wing forces (General Wilcox), 4,768; cav- alry corps, 5,360; grand total Foster's army, 22,678. four companies of the 9th Ohio Cavalry were now joined to our brigade. This battalion was commanded by Major William D. Hamilton.
December 15th. We remained in line until after night, then fell back to near Rutledge, having marched 16 miles.
December 16th. Reveille at daylight. Drew a small amount of rations. Marched at 8 p. m. Martin's cavalry pursued and skirmished with our rear guard. At I p. m. a detachment composed of details from the various com- mands-about 500-was sent across the ridge southeast of our road toward the Holston river to reconnoiter, as it was rumored that the enemy designed to interpose a force to cut us off. The main command proceeded to Blaine's crossroads. The reconnoitering party crossed the ridge, but found no force of the enemy. Company "I," of the 14th, was sent to the river, where it was reported that the enemy were crossing. They learned that they· designed crossing in a few hours. On return- ing they heard volleys a few hundred yards east of the road. On hastening to the spot they found two small parties of the gray and the blue engaged in a leaden argu- ment concerning the right of possession of some supplies in an old mill. The blues won the case. We then re- joined the detachment, and with them marched to Blaine's crossroads, arriving at 9 p. m., and found there General Granger's infantry, and General Elliott's cavalry not far off. The 14th was sent up the valley on picket. Posted videttes, then bivouacked, with horses saddled. No sup- per ; had no dinner, and a slim breakfast. March of regi- ment, 10 miles ; march of detachment, 23 miles.
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December 17th. Rained hard last night. At daylight "to horse" sounded. Marched up the valley a short distance, dismounted and advanced as skirmishers. Re- mained engaged with the enemy until 3 p. m .; were then retired behind the infantry and went into camp on the Maynardville road. When ordered to fall back the picket lines were ordered to leave the road and fall back along the foot of two high ranges of hills between which the road ran. When we reached our lines we found a masked battery posted to sweep the road. It was supposed that the enemy would make a cavalry dash to cut off our pickets retiring on foot, in which case the masked battery would sweep the road. This scheme was defeated by the obtuse- ness or contrariness of the commander of the detachment on the road, who disobeyed the order and retired on the road. Our camp was near a creek three miles from Blaine's crossroads. Fed our horses, but had no rations. Marched 5 miles. Rations in the evening one-quarter, and that what the boys called "dried beef"-that is, flesh of the living animals dried on the bones by poverty ; not a smidgen of anything else, not even salt. What emphasized the hard- ship of this fare was an order issued at this time threat- ening the death penalty upon any soldier caught foraging without belonging to a detail of foragers acting under orders. The condition of the country and the interest of soldiers and citizens required that a proper disposi- tion by proper authority should be made of the little that was left in the country. The infantry, who had a better opportunity of getting their share of the rations, had lit- tle to complain of, but the cavalry were so often separated from all chance of sharing in the rations gathered by details, that they were restive under the order, and with very good reason. Lest some who read these pages might think that we have somewhat colored the descrip- tion of our hardships and privations, I will give some official information from the published reports, after giv- ing statements from our own records for the past few days.
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