USA > Illinois > History of Fourteenth Illinois cavalry and the brigades to which it belonged > Part 16
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July 8th. Reveille at 3 a. m. March at 4 a. m. to Sweetwater bridge; crossed and camped ; marched 4 miles ; day hot. Company "I" again sent on picket at Miller's bridge. Two men of Company "I" capture six Confed- erate cavalrymen with their horses, arms and equipments.
July 9th. Reveille at daylight ; heavy showers. At 8 p. m. moved out and formed column and called in all the pickets ; remained in column several hours, then the regi- ment and each detachment returned to the positions they had just left.
July IIth. Reville at 3 a. m .; passed uncomfortable night, lying in rain and mud. We have had no tents for a long time. March at daylight S. E. 2 miles; halt, get breakfast and feed horses; then march through wilder- ness country to the Chattahoochee river opposite Camp- bellsville. The opposing forces are constantly skirinish- ing across the river. All our led horses and mules now sent back in charge of Lieutenant Huntoon.
July 12th. Reveille at daylight. We saddle horses and await orders. At 10 p. m. the division marched southward through thinly settled region 25 miles and camped.
July 13th. Reveille at 3 a. m. March early southward
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to Moore's bridge on the Chattahoochee river, charge upon and capture the rebel guards, who belonged to rebel Gen- eral Hume's command (see page 880). Stoneman says (page 133, serial 76) : "By taking a roundabout way by unfrequented roads we succeeded in capturing or cutting off every scout the enemy had out, and drove them from the bridge before they had time to set fire to the straw and pine knots prepared for its conflagration. The bridge had been partially destroyed by tearing up the sleepers and planks, but we will have it replaced during the night. It is a covered structure, well built and 480 feet long. New- nan, on the railroad, is 10 miles from here, and I under- stand the road leads through dense woods. There is an- other bridge at Franklin, 25 miles below." The bridge was completed the morning of the 15th. But the enemy had now gathered a strong force, with a number of bat- teries posted in sheltered positions in the woods from which they opened upon us. Stoneman's report says : "On attempting to cross the bridge the enemy opened upon us with four pieces of artillery and made an attempt to retake the rifle pits at the water's edge. We deemed it inexpedient to attempt to cross." On page 880, Rebel General Armstrong says: "July 14th reached Moore's bridge at 4 a. m., where Hume's pickets had been driven in." He says: "They (the Yankees) have an excellent position and have made breastworks. It is a division of cavalry with artillery." A lively skirmish was kept up sev- eral hours and several feints of crossing were made, which met with a vigorous resistance. The bridge was then burned by our men. We then went into camp near by. Our men had been told that we were to cross the river and attack and destroy the railroad beyond, and they were loud in their grumbling when, shortly afterward, we again moved northward. They did not then know that these movements were maneuvers in a "game of war." A scout- ing party was sent down the river early in the day to go to Franklin and destroy all means of crossing the river that they could find. In one of Sherman's orders to
Stoneman, he says : "Keep up the delusion of our cross- ing below Sand Town as long as possible, and I have rea- son to believe the enemy expect it. We have a nice game of war." On page 146 is an order from Sherman for
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Stoneman to fall back to Turner's ferry and the Nickajack. Our casualties had been light. At dark the division moved northward; the men grumbling that they were not led across the river as they had been promised; they at- tributed this failure to the cowardice of their officers. They did not realize that this was one of the many instances in which our mysterious movements were tricks in "the nice game of war," as Sherman expressed it. We arrived at our camp of 12th instant and bivouacked about 2 p. m. of July 15th, without rations. Marched 20 miles.
Reveille at daylight (15th). About 8 a. m. several companies including "L," of 14th, under Lieutenant Moore, and "I," under Captain Boeke; were sent on dif- ferent roads, southward to Carrollton, 30 miles below, to capture horses and mules. They, succeeded in getting a fine lot of stock and getting safely into camp on the Sweet- water, though they came near running into a force of three rebel regiments at Vilarica. The writer, with five men of Company "I," was separated from the main command in searching for horses, and after scouring the country started at dusk to return to camp; by mistake took the road to Moore's bridge, but learned the mistake when near, and also learned that a strong rebel command had crossed that day and were now scattered all over the country. When our squad reached our morning camp the brigade was gone, and they could not learn where to; by great caution moving on by roads they traveled northward all night without meeting the enemy, though they passed within two hundred yards of a rebel camp without know- ing it until next morning. Once they left the road and dismounted in a thicket to rest and while there a large rebel party passed on the road. Soon after they mounted and having been told that the brigade had fallen back to Vil- arica they moved to within two miles, when they changed their course for Sand Town on the river. Conflicting re- ports of citizens were bewildering, but they determined to go to Sand Town, which they reached at sundown, just as "Boots and saddles" was blowing and in half an hour the whole command was marching northward and marched till I a. m. of July 17th, then bivouacked. In going to Sand Town we were diverted from the straight road by a false report as to where our brigade had gone and a short
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time afterward a large rebel party passed on that road, who would have met us had we continued on that road. If we had reached Sand Town an hour or two later we would again have been left to work our way as best we could, by the help of rebel citizens, whose contradictory statements seemed intentional to deceive the Yankees and confuse them. This adventure is given, not as having anything unusual, but as fairly illustrating the many un- recorded adventures of small parties of our men, who were sent out on various duties. Some of them being captured and some were never again heard from.
Our regimental record July 16th. Out of rations ; marched at 4 p. m. Crossed Sweetwater bridge and within 7 miles of Marietta and camped with brigade train ; no forage; heavy rains.
Sunday, July 17. Marched at I p. m. 4 miles and camped on an eminence in sight of Atlanta; forage and rations scarce. About 10 p. m. "Boots and saddles" aroused the sleeping troopers. Marched 2 miles down the river ; dismounted and lay on our arms. The cause of the movement was a rumor that the enemy in force were recrossing the river.
July 19th. Go into camp on a rough piece of ground ; water scarce; no forage.
July 20th. In camp. Lieutenant Allen, with Company "D," of 14th, sent to open a road to the river opposite the rebel fortifications below us. A small squad of the 14th sent out to get coal for the blacksmiths was captured to- day by prowling rebel parties on our side of the river.
July 21st. At 5 p. m. marched to Sweetwater bridge and camped in the woods at 10 p. m. ; marched 5 miles.
July 22d. Companies "D" and "K," of 14th, under Captain Sanford sent on scout. "Boots and saddles," at 4p. m. ; marched toward Sand Town, camped near the river at 2 a. m., July 23d ; march 7 miles. A pontoon train passed us at daylight, going to the river. The 14th was sent for- ward dismounted to protect the working party while laying it across the river. In several hours the work ceased and the boats were taken up and the 14th retired to camp. The cause of the change was an order from General Sherman to withdraw Stoneman's division to Decatur, near At- lanta, on the left wing, and the replacing our division with
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General Rousseau's cavalry command to guard Turner's ferry. (See page 236, serial 76). The 14th marched back to Sweetwater bridge and at 9 p. m. marched toward Vining Station 12 miles; halt and lay on our arms till morning ; having marched 19 miles ; cool night. On page 75, of serial 72, Sherman explains the movement to be to prepare for a blow at the Macon railroad simultaneous with the movements of the Army of the Tennessee toward East Point. This closes this chapter, and is the end of our mounted service north of the Chattahoochee river.
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CHAPTER XI.
STONEMAN RAID TO MACON, GEORGIA, IN JULY, 1864.
In this account we give the substance of our notes and the notes of Captain Sanford, Lieutenant Thomas and others, without crediting to them. Captain Wm. A. Lord, of Company "H," 14th Illinois Cavalry, who was then on General Stoneman's staff, has given a full and authentic account. We are sorry that limited space forbids giving this in full; quotations from this account will be given by preceding the quotations by "Captain Lord" in brackets Frequent quotations will be given from the official records Series I, volume 38, part 2d, Atlanta Campaign, serial No. 73. General Stoneman's Report (page 914), is credited by (Stoneman) in parenthesis preceding the quotation. In like manner we credit each of the following: Colonel Horace Capron's Report (page 925) ; Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Smith's report (page 915) Assistant In- spector General on Stoneman's staff ; and Major Haviland Thompson's Report (page 919), Provost Marshal on Stoneman's staff. Quotations from General Sherman's Reports will be preceded by "Sherman" and the page where found in parenthesis. Quotations from General Sherman's reports will be from different serials, the num- ber and page of which will be given. (Sherman's general report, serial 72, page 75.) "The next day (July 23d, '64), General Garrard returned from Covington," (hav- ing destroyed the rebel railroads and bridges). "I then addressed myself to the task of reaching the Macon road, over which of necessity came the stores and ammunition that maintained the rebel army in Atlanta. * -X About the same time General Rousseau had arrived from his expedition to Opelika, bringing me about 2,000 excel- lent cavalry and ordering it to relieve General Stoneman at the river about Sand Town, I shifted General Stoneman to our left flank, and ordered all my cavalry to prepare for a blow at the Macon road simultaneous with
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the movement of the Army of the Tennessee toward East Point. To accomplish this, I gave General Stoneman the command of his own, and General Garrard's cavalry, mak- ing an effective force of 5,000 men, and to General Mc- Cook, I gave his own and the new cavalry brought by Gen- eral Rousseau, which was commanded by Colonel Harri- son, of the 8th Indiana Cavalry, in the aggregate about 4,000. These two well appointed bodies were to move in concert, the former by the left around Atlanta to Mc- Donough, and the latter by the right on Fayetteville, and on a certain night, viz .: July 28th, they were to meet on the Macon road near Lovejoy's, and destroy it in the most effectual manner. I estimated this joint cavalry could whip all of Wheeler's cavalry, and could otherwise accon- plish its task, and I think so still." We have a few com- ments to make upon General Sherman's estimate of the ability of his cavalry as here referred to, being able to whip all of Wheeler's cavalry. First he says he gave Stoneman command of General Garrard's cavalry and counted this force with Stoneman's as 5,000, while not only our notes, but also the official reports show that Garrard's force only accompanied Stoneman to Flat Rock ; even Sherman in the above report shows this. This change of the former plan eft Stoneman with not exceeding 2,200 cavalry to join with General McCook in whipping Wheeler. All we can gather of the reasons for this change of plan is found in official reports, (see serial 76, on page 251), communica- ion from Stoneman to Garrard, giving directions to pre- bare for the movement as ordered by Sherman. On page 252 is Garrard's report to Sherman in which he says : 'Of course I do not recognize General Stoneman, but wish this matter settled in some way." This was dated July 25th. General Sherman then ordered Garrard to oper- ate as a support to Stoneman in preventing Wheeler from pursuing Stoneman. By this change of plan not only was Stoneman left with only 2,200 men to help McCook to whip Wheeler, but subsequent events show that Garrard otally failed in his appointed task of preventing Wheeler rom pursuing Stoneman. Again future events show that General Sherman had been greatly mistaken in his esti- nate of the strength of Wheeler's forces. This is shown by Sherman's own reports and other official statistics, as
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we shall prove hereafter. In the initial correspondence between Generals Sherman and Stoneman (page 75, serial 72), Sherman says : "At the moment almost of starting General Stoneman addressed me a letter asking permission, after fulfilling his orders and breaking the road, to be allowed, with his command proper, to proceed to Macon and Andersonville and release our prisoners of war con- fined at those points. There was something most cap- tivating in the idea, and the execution was within the bounds of probable success." Sherman consented to the undertaking.
In serial 76, page 264, is Stoneman's letter referred to, in which he says: "I would like to try it and can vouch for my little command.
* If we accomplish the desired object, it will compensate for the loss, as prisoners, of us all, and I shall feel compensated for almost any sacrifice." Sherman replied (see page 265) : "I see many difficulties, but as you say even a chance of success will warrant the effort and I consent to it. If * you can bring back to the army any or all of those prisoners of war, it will be an achievement that will entitle you, and the men of your command, to the love and admiration of the whole country." On page 260 Sherman says: "This is probably more than he can accomplish, but it is worthy of a determined effort." The language of these com- munications indicate that the difficulties and danger of this perilous undertaking were well understood by the com- manding officers and the anxiety of these commanders to release our suffering comrades from those prison hells was no greater than that of the rank and file; there was a frenzied desire to try it.
(Capron). "On the 26th (July) I received orders from General Stoneman to prepare my command with ten days' rations, and in light marching order to be ready to move on the morning of the 27th at 3 a. m."
On Sunday, 24th, we had marched early to the bridge across the Chattahoochee, crossed and camped two miles north of Decatur; marched 25 miles. Saw 1,000 rebel prisoners on their way north for the benefit of their health. Night cool.
July 25th. In camp until 3 p. m., then move to a camp 2 miles farther from Decatur.
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July 26th. In camp near a mill 8 miles from Atlanta. Morning cool. All disabled men and horses, not able to go through fire and water, are sent with the teams back across the river, and all preparations are made for a perilous raid.
On Wednesday, July 27th, we left camp about 4 miles north of Decatur, at 3 a. m., passed through Decatur at daylight. Rumor said the enemy's cavalry in strong force was in our front. We formed line of battle, but on scout- ing well to our right and right front, found no enemy in force. The federal batteries along the line opened up fiercely to create a diversion from Stoneman's movements. We moved around Atlanta on the north and east, striking an eastward course. We soon noted a striking contrast between the country hitherto passed over and that portion in the rebel rear carefully husbanded for the supply of the rebel army. Astonishing abundance filled the country. In the afternoon we passed to the right of the romantic "Stone mountain," standing as a lone sentinel keeping watch over a surrounding lovely country. Marched all day and all night, except a short halt at 6 p. m. at Lithonia, 35 miles from our morning camp.
(Captain Lord) : "Stoneman was escorted by General Garrard's cavalry as far as the bridge across Yellow river, where he was to remain three days, if possible, to prevent the enemy from following in General Stoneman's rear."
Morning of July 28th. Passed through and halted near Covington two hours and breakfasted. It was designed that these movements should be secret from the enemy, but in this we were disappointed. On page 912, serial 76, Hood says. "Last night the enemy (Sherman) drew back his left and extended his right somewhat. A raid has started in the direction of Covington ; our cavalry in pur- suit." On page 913, he says, July 27th : "There is a raid moving towards Covington ; considerable force, ten pieces of artillery, Wheeler in pursuit; destination unknown." On page 916 Hood says to Winder at Andersonville:
"The raid toward Covington is stronger than at first re- ported ; destination still unknown. We have a heavy force in pursuit." Our night's march was 18 miles, making 53 miles without feed or rations, for lack of time to feed from the abundance in the country. Crossed the Ulco-
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fouhachee river at 9 a. m., then through Stearnville to within 3 miles of Monticello. We had gathered up large numbers of fine horses and mules and contrabands to lead them. General Wheeler said in one of his reports that his cavalry was superior to Sherman's cavalry. This was doubtless true so far as numbers were concerned. It was equally true so far as good horses were concerned, as here in their rear they had a great number of the best and fresh- est horses from which they not only kept their cavalrymen well mounted, while we were compelled to use our worn- out horses, but in addition they were able at any time to mount bodies of infantry when necessary to move speedily from one point to another, or to reinforce their cavalry when needed ; but that they were not superior in fighting qualities was well demonstrated in many a sharp conflict, nor were they equal in enduring long and arduous service. Capron occupied Monticello and kept his men mounted. (Captain Lord says) : General Stoneman took the main road via Covington, Monticello, Hillsboro and Clinton to Macon, and pushed forward as rapidly as possible, only stopping to feed just south of Covington. He sent Colonel Adams and his command (from Monticello) westward toward Mechanicsville to scout down the Ocmulgee river to rejoin his command before reaching Macon. He was to gain definite information as to crossings between the mouth of Yellow river and Macon, and to oppose any movement of the enemy on his flank, reporting as often as possible. Colonel Adams' failure to report as expected caused some delay in the movement of General Stone- man's command, and a loss of nearly six hours at one time. It was ascertained, however from this command that there were no bridges or fords between the points mentioned and it became apparent that the river must be crossed at Macon if at all."
(Major Tompkins, page 919) says: "On morning of 28th Colonel Adams, with his brigade, was sent to Me- chanicsville on the Ocmulgee river to watch movements of the enemy and to communicate with the general at Monti- cello in the evening at dark. No communication from Colonel Adams at 12 o'clock (midnight) ; became im- patient ; sent party to communicate, and ordered his com- mand to join main column on the road to Macon. At
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Monticello in the evening, the general received the first information that there were no bridges over the Ocmulgee river. His information, on which his movements were based, was that there were three bridges north of Macon over this river. His plan was now changed to destroy the Savannah and Macon road."
The reports of these two staff officers of General Stone- man's staff, ought to satisfactorily settle the question of the failure of General Stoneman to join and co-operate with General McCook at Lovejoy Station the night of July 28th, 1864.
The question may be asked why General Stoneman did not himself report these reasons. It must be remem- bered that General Stoneman was captured, and made but one, and that a short report under the surveillance of the enemy, and that it would have been imprudent to have revealed to them plans of movement. All that we find in his report is the following :
(Stoneman, page 914) : "In regard to the operations of my command from the time I left the army up to the time I turned back from near this place (Macon, where he was then in prison), I will only say now that I feel as- sured, when you know what was done, and why it was done, you will be satisfied with reasons and results."
Why General Stoneman, after his release, did not after- ward explain was probably owing to the fact that Major Tompkins' report to General Schofield was a sufficient explanation. And so it would have been had this informa- tion ever reached General Sherman officially ; but there is no record in the published reports that this information was ever reported to General Sherman ; hence in his gen- eral report made up from reports and statistics before him, he says, relative to the ability of Stoneman's and McCook's commands to whip all of Wheeler's cavalry, "and I think so still." Sherman seems also to have forgotten that instead of General Garrard joining with Stoneman to help to whip Wheeler with a combined force of 5,000 men, that the changed plan relative to Garrard, left Stoneman with only 2,200. The same was true also of McCook's com- mand; it was afterward planned that Rousseau should be a support to McCook.
When we reached Monticello a portion of Capron's bri-
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gade occupied the town and all remained mounted. It is proper here to give the commands that were in General Stoneman's division on this raid. The proper source of correct information upon this point is the report of General Stoneman's Inspector General, Colonel Robert W. Smith, found on page 915, serial 73. He says: "The force un- der General Stoneman consisted of three brigades, one composed of the mounted portions of the 5th and the 6th regiments of Indiana cavalry, commanded by Colonel James Biddle, amounting to about 700 men ; another of the Ist and the IIth Kentucky cavalry, commanded by Colonel Silas Adams, numbering 550 men ; the other brigade was composed of the 14th Illinois Cavalry, the 8th Michigan Cavalry and a part of the Ist Ohio Squadron (McLaugh- lin's), numbering 800 men, commanded by Colonel Horace Capron ; a detachment of the 24th Indiana Battery, under command of Captain Hardy, with two 3-inch regulation guns and 54 men, in all about 2,104 officers and men, the General and seven members of his staff."
On page 923 is report of Colonel Israel Garrard, of the 7th Ohio Cavalry; this report shows that his command arrived too late to join this expedition under General Stoneman, though we are informed through other sources that one company of the 7th Ohio was body guard to Gen- eral Stoneman. In official reports the number of Stone- man's command on this expedition is given at 2,100 men and never exceeding 2,200.
The exact number of the 14th on this raid we can not give. At the battle of Walker's ford, over seven months before, the number engaged were 324 officers and men. Several hard fights and much severe service must have re- duced them materially. On the way to Georgia we were reinforced by perhaps 200 new recruits ; subsequent serv- ice in Georgia and most of all, the close sifting from the command of every man and horse that, as the order read, "was not able to go through fire and water," the regiment doubtless numbered little more, if any, than 300 men ; estimating the squadron at 100 men and the 14th and the 8th each 350 men, make up the number in the brigade.
(Capron) : "At Stearnville Captain Samuel Wells, act- ing assistant adjutant-general on my staff, was detached by order of General Stoneman, with 80 men of the Ohio
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Squadron, with instructions to destroy the bridge and a large flouring mill at Henderson's Mills, and the bridge and Newton cotton factory on the Ulcofouhachee river. The captain joined the command at 4 a. m. the 29th after accomplishing the object of the expedition."
At Monticello some prisoners were captured and six rebel pickets taken. From Monticello marched rapidly to Hillsboro, where we destroyed a large amount of rebel property, then marched to Clinton where, by General Stoneman's order, Major Davidson (of the 14th), with his battalion and company "H," of the 14th Illinois Cavalry, in all 125 men, was ordered to move to Gordon, the junc- tion of the Etonton and Georgia railroad and, using his own discretion, to destroy all public property on either railroad, and do all damage he could to the enemy and bring his command out safely."
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