USA > Illinois > History of Fourteenth Illinois cavalry and the brigades to which it belonged > Part 23
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ments. Three of his regiments were sent below Columbia ; the rest of his division was assigned the river, from the position of Cox's division, up to near Huey's mills, where General Croxton's brigade, now temporarily assigned to Johnson's division, was posted. It was now well known that Forrest was seeking an opportunity to cross the river and fall in the rear of Schofield's army. All the cavalry were ordered to keep a close watch, and resist any attempt of the enemy to cross. Our brigade on the river bank was engaged almost constantly from the middle of the forenoon until night, with a strong cavalry force that strove hard to effect a crossing. Schofield had moved his forces from Columbia to the north bank of the river, on the night of November 27th (see pages 1086, 1088 and 1106) ; but this was all unknown to us. There were various estimates of the distance from our position on the Lewisburg pike to Columbia, but probably the most correct was 7 miles from the pike to Huey's mills, and 7 miles from that point to Columbia, or 14 miles from our position to Columbia.
Capron says : "I immediately commenced what I con- sidered the most judicious disposition of my troops to meet the requirements of my instructions, which comprehended not only the careful guarding of all these crossings, but the scouring of the country opposite my front. Also to watch and report any movement of the enemy."
Lieutenant Patten, 8th Michigan Cavalry, sent by Cap- ron with 15 men to scout on Shelbyville road three miles south of the river, found a heavy force of rebel cavalry (see page 1087). Schofield reported Hood moving east- ward with design of crossing. Capron says: "My force being too much scattered for any concentrated opposi- tion to so imposing a force, I dispatched a courier with full explanation of the condition of affairs in my front, and asked for reinforcements. On the morning of 28th Colo- nel Israel Garrard, of 7th Ohio Cavalry, reported with his regiment to me. Colonel Garrard being the senior officer, I proposed to him to take command. This he declined to do, as his orders were to support me. My disposition of troops was explained to him, which he approved." Capron says : "One company of the 7th Ohio was strung along the bank of the river from the crossing of the pike up to my headquarters. To the balance of the 7th Ohio,
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under Colonel Garrard, was assigned the protection of our headquarters and of our rear." There were rumors of parties of the enemy's cavalry prowling the country north of the river. The concentration of the enemy upon our front, both at the ford crossing and the one below, guarded by Major Young's command, became more apparent as the day progressed. At 2:30 p. m. Major Young dispatched to Colonel Capron: "The enemy have appeared on my front across the river in force equal to a brigade at least. A report this moment received of a heavy column moving up the river, marching by fours, bugles blowing." Shortly after this, Capron dispatched to General Wilson that a force sent across the river (referred to before) had been driven in, closely followed by the enemy, who charged spiritedly upon Major Young's position, and were hand- somely repulsed. This report General Wilson sent to Schofield carelessly worded so as to read: "Colonel Cap -- ron reports at II :20 a. m. his force driven back from south side of the river, by a heavy force of the enemy ( see page IIII) ). He is now fighting them across the river." And General Schofield in reporting to General Thomas, repeats the error in still more deceptive language. He says: "The enemy was crossing in force a short distance this side of the Lewisburg pike at noon today, and had driven our cavalry back across the river and the pike, at the same time." (See page 1107).
General Stanley also makes the same error, and that it was an error we need only quote from General Forrest's report (see page 753) : "At II o'clock at night, I received a dispatch from General Buford (who commanded the division which we fought across the river that day), in- forming me that the enemy had made such a stubborn resistance to his crossing that he could not join the com- mand until the morning of the 29th."
The truth is that none of Capron's brigade, except scout- ing detachments sent out, were across on the south side of the river that day, and as to our stubborn resistance to Buford's division that day, not only did the enemy acknowledge it, but Generals Johnson and Wilson and Schofield all acknowledge it in reports, as we shall show in proper time. At 3:30 Capron reported : "There is a heavy force of infantry and cavalry pressing us at the
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crossing of the Lewisburg pike. They are massing on our Will hold them if pos-
left, probably too strong for us. sible."
On page 1122, General Wilson to General Johnson: "Direct Colonel Harrison to hold the crossings of Duck river in his front, as long as possible, and be ready to sup- port him with Croxton's and Garrard's brigades. You had better move Croxton's at once, who will assume com- mand until you arrive. Keep me fully advised." This order reveals another error. It appears that Colonel Har- rison had been ordered to take command of Capron's bri- gade, which he did a day or two after, when Colonel Cap- ron left, but on the 28th of November he did not, but Gen- ereral Wilson supposed he had. This order to Johnson was not obeyed, either by Johnson in taking command, or in the sending of Croxton's brigade. Johnson's report shows, that though he received this order shortly after I p. m., and he did move, and it took him until after dark to reach Rally hill, a number of miles in our rear. So far from supporting Capron in any manner, though both Gen- erals Johnson and Wilson knew that the enemy crossed the river below us in strong force soon after noon, neither one of them ever notified Colonel Capron of this movement of the enemy, but left his command to be annihilated, and hurriedly retreated with their own commands, without making any resistance of consequence. The official re- ports abundantly prove what we here declare.
General Johnson had asked Colonel Capron to send a detachment to guard a crossing ten miles below him. Colonel Capron replied that he could not possibly spare the men, and that the point was near General Hatch's posi- tion. At 3:40 p. m. Capron sent to headquarters the in- formation reported by Major Young, that "the enemy are engaging me across the river at Hardison's ford, and also at Morris' ford, a short distance below the Lewisburg pike, by at least a brigade. He also shows a column moving up." Capron also reported (see page 1124) : "4:20 p. m. Large columns of infantry can be seen on the opposite side of the river, moving toward Shelbyville. Heavy skirmishing still continues in my front." Again: "Just at this time the firing upon Major Young's position slack- ened to some extent, and increasing upon Major Beers, I
FIRST LIEUTENANT WM. H. PUCKETT, COMPANY I.
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ordered forward a company of the 5th Iowa, which had been held in reserve. It was Buford's division of For- rest's cavalry that now confronted us." Again Capron's memoirs say : "Up to this time nothing had been heard from General Hatch's command on our right toward Columbia, but rumors were rife that some disaster had be- fallen them, and they had been driven back, but as no heavy firing had been heard in that direction, these rumors were not heeded, as it was believed that the crossing of Hood's main army would have met such a vigorous resistance from General Hatch, and the other commands below, as would have made itself known without the aid of couriers."
In order to the better understanding of the very perilous position of our command at this time, we will now examine the position and movements of the various forces of Scho- field's army at this time, as well as the movements of Hood's army as shown by the official reports, all of which movements, except what occurred in our immediate pres- ence, were unknown to Colonel Capron or to any of his command. Schofield withdrew his whole force at Colum- bia to the north bank of the river, during the night of 27th (see Schofield's report, page 341). General Cox re- ports his making resistance to the crossing of the river at his position just above Columbia (see page 402). Gen- eral Hatch made no report that we know of, and being then under the direct command of General Wilson, all his movements were controlled by General Wilson, the cav- alry corps commander. His report (see pages 557 and 558), shows the positions of Hatch, Croxton and Cap- ron's commands, as we have given them ; and says that at noon, the pickets near Huey's mills gave notice of the concentration of rebel forces near there, with evident de- sign of crossing, but his report says nothing about any preparation to resist this crossing, nor is there in all the official reports any account of any such resistance having been made, nor even any statement that Colonel Capron, above that point was notified of the crossing of the enemy. though Wilson says : "The pickets at Huey's mills were soon driven in and the rebels immediately began crossing. At 2 p. m. I sent a dispatch to Major General Schofield, notifying him of the enemy's movements, informing him that I should endeavor to concentrate my force at Hurt's
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crossroads." This point was six or seven miles in the rear of Capron's position. Wilson adds : "Colonel T. J. Harrison, 8th Indiana Cavalry, had already been sent by General Johnson to the brigade at the Lewisburg crossing, with orders to hold the enemy as long as possible at the river." Again : "Colonel Harrison, however, had not reached his brigade, but having been posted by Colonel Capron, it held on as long as possible." The only recorded attempt of General Wilson to aid Capron's command was his order to Johnson to reinforce Capron's (or Harrison's) brigade, as before related. General Johnson in his report (see pages 597 and 598), is thus referred to, and de- scribed : "Croxton established a strong picket at Huey's mill, which lay directly south of his camp. On the morn- ing of that day it became apparent, from the reports of my pickets, that the enemy were making preparations to force the passage of the river at Huey's mills, at the Lewis- burg pike, and at many intermediate fords. At I p. m. of this day, under orders from General Wilson, I moved with Croxton's brigade for Hurt's house on the Lewisburg pike, at the same time sending word to Colonel Harrison, whom I then supposed to be in command of my first bri- gade (Capron's), to fall back to that point. The head of my column reached the Lewisburg turnpike just after nightfall."
The official records do not show a report such as Gen- eral Johnson here describes, but they do show an order from General Wilson (see page II22), sent at 1 :10 p. m., and received at 2:10 p. m., to reinforce Capron's brigade immediately with Croxton's brigade, and to go himself and take command. Relative to the order from Johnson to Capron referred to above, Capron in his memoirs speaks of receiving this order after 7 p. m., long after he had fallen back, and states that it was dated after 3 p. m. As to any explanations of the inefficient management of the cavalry forces under Generals Wilson and Johnson, on the 28th day of November, 1864, when the cavalry were under such explicit orders to oppose the crossing of the river by any portion of Hood's army, and when the safety of our army so much depended upon the heroic resistance by our cavalry, I am thankful that I am not appointed to defend the course of our cavalry commanders, for I can find no
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justification of their course, in any of the official records, not even in their own reports. Having given the relative positions of Schofield's various forces, showing the ex- treme peril to which our brigade was exposed by the with- drawal of all our forces on our right, and the equal ex- posure on our unprotected left, all of which, except the left flank exposure, we were then entirely ignorant of, we will describe the operations on the north side of the river in rotation as they occurred. We, at the picket post on the Shelbyville road above Capron's headquarters, were in position to know positively of the rotation of the important events in relation to fighting on the north side of the river, being the first command attacked, and being in position to plainly see all the succeeding events as they occurred in our rear, until dusk. The ground between our post and headquarters, and in the front of headquarters to the river, being open ground, and as our observations are perfectly corroborated by the official reports of the rebel command- ers, we have no hesitancy in saying, that as far as we de- scribe our observations, we positively know, that we are correct. We have said that our post was in a concealed position in a grove, and that a timbered tract lay above the post. Near our post there were two tracks, probably five rods apart, the farthest north being an old, and now, unused track. Both of these tracks were defended by strong rail barricades. Just to the north of the old track lay a mass of high rocks, covering several acres ; impass- able except through a narrow and winding cow path, which led through it. As stated, we were ordered to reconnoiter the road above regularly, and as we were en- tirely unprotected on the left, and the enemy were known to be moving in strong force in that direction, the im- portance of this order, which was faithfully executed, can easily be seen. Both myself and Lieutenant Puckett, whom I consulted, were convinced that our army would soon be compelled to fall back, and were apprehensive, from various causes, that the army below us was moving, and knowing that the wings of an army, in such move- ments, were very liable to disaster, we were awake to the necessity for great caution and prompt action when needed. About 4 p. m. a squad of our foragers came dashing through our post, saying that they had been pursued on the
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Shelbyville road above us, by about 40 rebel cavalry. This was the first positive information that we had that any of Forrest's cavalry were on our side of the river. Colonel Capron was immediately informed, and soon a force of 50 men of the 7th Ohio Cavalry, passed through our post, and up the Shelbyville road to reconnoiter. Consulting with Lieutenant Puckett, we both deemed it prudent to be personally better informed of the true situation above, and leaving the post in command of a faithful and vigilant officer, Sergeant David S. Clare, of Company "I," we mounted our horses and proceeded up the road some dis- tance in rear of the 7th Ohio detachment, making it an especial point to examine carefully for roads or any pas- sages that led to the river by which the enemy might cross the river, and into the Shelbyville road.
About a mile above our post were two dwellings not far apart, both being between our road and the river with lanes from these dwellings to our road, and perhaps roads from the dwellings to the river and across. Intending to investigate more thoroughly on our return, we passed above, about a mile, and then returned, and when within a hundred yards of one of these lanes two troopers with blue overcoats rode out of the lane, and passed toward our post. I supposed them to be some of our foragers; but Lieutenant Puckett declared that they were rebels. This seemed improbable to me, not alone from the blue over- coats they wore, but mainly for the readiness with which they went toward our post .. They kept about the same distance ahead, and began acting suspiciously ; at one time turning in their saddles and preparing to fire upon us. As I then had on a faded officer's blouse, something the color of a rebel coat, I supposed that they mistook us for rebels and called upon them not to fire. They then continued on, but still acted strangely, until they finally wheeled and fired, and then dashed down the road. But we determined whether friends or foes, we would give them a chase, and drawing our revolvers, wepursued at breakneck speed down that rocky road. All doubts regarding their identity was solved when within a half mile of our post, they suddenly dashed into the woods at the point where the two tracks came together. Not only did we now know that they were rebels, but we also knew that a force of them were in those
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FOURTEENTH ILLINOIS CAVALRY.
woods ; doubtless intending the capture of our post. With these impressions we were not inclined to lessen our speed down the road, as the danger of the capture of our post was imminent, and the thoughts of imprisonment in An- dersonville-a fate more dreaded than death on the battle- field-was as much a factor in the impulse of our move- ment as was the duty of warning and protecting our post. We had passed but a short distance beyond the point where these troopers had left our road, when we were fired upon from seemingly every tree and rock, until we neared our picket post. How many shots were fired at us we could only imagine, as we did not stop to count noses, having just then more important business on hand. We then sup- posed that we had run the gauntlet of a rebel battalion, and deemed ourselves fortunate that with singing bullets be- fore us and behind us as we swiftly passed them, that neither ourselves nor our horses had received a scratch, and no injury except a slight retarding of the flow of blood to our faces, which our comrades declared were as pale as our mother's dish cloths. We never knew whether this compliment was intended for ourselves, or for our mother's dish cloths, and indeed we had no time to ask. Our com- rades having heard the firing above the post, had no doubt of either the death or capture of their lieutenants, but the brave Sergeant Clare had his men in position and ready for the charge the enemy immediately made on the post, by dashing down the old track. A ready and well aimed vol- ley from the boys at the post killed their leader, a Captain Wharton, of the 3d Texas Cavalry, as papers in his pockets showed. There is no doubt but many of their number were wounded, for they were driven back in disorder, and there were a number of our command who were crack marksmen. Captain Wharton was immediately brought in, still breathing mechanically, but unconscious. Sur- geon Wilson was summoned, but nothing could be done. Colonel Capron sent up a company of the 7th Ohio Cav- alry to strengthen the post, as we anticipated another at- tack from above. The following is the rebel account of this attack, which corroborates our statement that it was the first attack on the north side :
Brigadier-General Lawrence S. Ross, C. S. Army, com- manding one of General Hood's brigades of Forrest's
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FOURTEENTH ILLINOIS CAVALRY.
ed forward the enemy rose up in heavy force and a yell charged our lines, cutting off my communica- with General Stoneman. When nearly surrounded s forced to fall back to the horses, which created some usion among my men, as the enemy followed close 1 us. So closely did the enemy press my command y of the men were unable to mount their horses ; the ny, capturing and mounting the horses, repeatedly ged my rear as I continued to retreat. I made every t to communicate with General Stoneman, but my officers were cut off and unable to report. I have learned from one of General Stoneman's staff officers o escaped) that General Stoneman made a strong 't to communicate with me but was unable to do so. tenant-Colonel E. Mix, of the 8th Michigan Cavalry, came up and reported that General Stoneman had endered."
ompkins says: "The proposition was made to move ne right and pass the enemy. He (Stoneman) said ould not move the whole command without being dis- red. He could make no resistance when pursued ; he Id have the outside track, with an enemy fresh, to ue. His men would be broken up in detachments and dered as some had been on the 29th; he would not se any from going, nor order them. If the enemy ulted and broke our lines, do the best we could, but r him, he saw no other way for the lives of the men to spected but for him to surrender, which he would do as a last resort. By this means all the detachments that eave had five hours the start." This description indi- ; a council of war which Colonel Smith more fully ribes as follows : "About 4 p. m. General Stoneman. taff and most of his brigade commanders held a con- tion, and it was thought best to make a desperate 't to cut cur way out to our right rear, as this seemed the weakest part of the enemy's lines. Just as the ral had given his directions for this movement, and respective officers were starting to their commands, nemy opened a battery on our right and left flank and inued their fire from the one in front, followed by neral charge. Our lines gave way and fell back. is ordered to a certain point to rally a line. Whilst
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cavalry, in his report says (on page 769, serial 93) : Af recounting his previous movements, he speaks of cro ing the river on the morning of November 28th, and mc- ing on to the Shelbyville road, and says : "When near 1 Lewisburg and Franklin pike again encountered t: federal cavalry. A spirited engagement ensued, beg by the 3d Texas regiment, which, being dispatched to : tack a train of wagons moving in direction of Frankl succeeded in reaching the pike, but was there met by superior force of Yankees and driven back."
As Captain Wharton, whom we killed, belonged to t 3d Texas, and as his force did make the first attack a was driven back, as General Ross describes, we have cc clusive proof that the 3d Texas Cavalry cut us off and : tacked our post, and that this was the first attack north the river ; but if any doubts remained they were remov by the perfect agreement of what we soon after saw wi the continued account of General Ross. Although1 were still expecting another attack from above, immer ately after the arrival of the Ohio company spoken of al before they had dismounted, we heard in the rear of Ca ron's headquarters, on the pike toward Franklin, first light volley, then a second much heavier, then loud ar continued reports of fire arms as if in a fierce engagemer. which was soon followed by the sweeping in of a mass gray coats, as if the whole southern confederacy were co centrating at our headquarters and moving toward ti river. To us it appeared that not only were Colonel Capr and headquarters captured, but doubtless our whole bi gade, and we even feared that all of Schofield's army w gone. The following is General Ross' continued accoun "Seeing this (the repulse of the 3d Texas), I had Colon Hawkins to bring up his regiment-the Legion-to tl assistance of the 3d, and ordered a charge, which was mar in gallant style and resulted in forcing the Yankees fro the field in confusion, and with the loss of several prison ers and the colors of the 7th Ohio Cavalry." This was tl attack on headquarters that we saw and have describe General Ross continues : "In the meanwhile Colon Wharton, with the 6th Texas, charged into the pike to tl right of where the 3d and the Legion were engaged, caj turing an entire company of the 7th Ohio Cavalry, thre
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ds af onlors siderable À considera zet, as it w . movements ezers I was ad of the cor es to the be se of the p e. While rot headq sultation Tu &dashed tow ning through xserved a p when soon was the ene ngh surrour course was -movements Laty for our e ans momen geral Ross : ach came da ut in pursui and orderi hugh the ma Forded, and ing dusk and our pas of our ho ended, and am our com ribed as c
company @ sent to pored, Wi aped soon a to Colur es after. passing t. Franklin
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stands of colors, several wagons loaded with ordnance, and a considerable number of horses, with their equipments."
A considerable portion of this account we know to be correct, as it was closely connected with our observations and movements. When the attack was made on head- quarters I was in consultation with the lieutenant in com- mand of the company of the 7th Ohio, sent up to reinforce us, as to the best disposition of his company to aid in de- fense of the post against another expected attack from above. While so engaged we heard the clash of arms in rear of headquarters, and without waiting for a word of consultation further, the lieutenant wheeled his company and dashed toward headquarters, with apparent design of cutting through the enemy's lines. As long as our picket post served a purpose as such, it was our duty to remain, and when soon after it was no longer useful as a picket post as the enemy in strong force were in our rear, still, though surrounded, we were so well concealed that our saf- est course was to remain where we were, in the hope that the movements of the enemy might open up a better oppor- tunity for our escape, as the enemy were now all around us. At this moment occurred the movement just described by General Ross ; the pursuit of this company of the 7th Ohio, which came dashing back upon our post with a whole regi- ment in pursuit. Concealment was now no longer possi- ble, and ordering my men to mount I pointed out the path through the mass of rocks, the only avenue that seemed un- guarded, and we dashed into the woods, just as it was growing dusk. The pursuing rebels were so close behind is, and our passage through the mass of rocks so slow, that two of our horses were killed, and several more were wounded, and four of our men were captured, and with them our company flag, which was doubtless one of those described as captured by General Ross. Without doubt he company described by Ross as captured was the com- Dany sent to reinforce us. Two of our men who were captured, William E. McCready and Hobart Martin, escaped soon after, and Wm. Clair and Ed. Patterson were aken to Columbia and escaped from them in less than two weeks after. As to my command, after entering the woods und passing the enemy's lines, we did not dare approach he Franklin pike, as we knew that the enemy were in
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