USA > Illinois > History of Fourteenth Illinois cavalry and the brigades to which it belonged > Part 22
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Our flanks were well scouted to keep us informed of any such attempts. We reached Mount Pleasant early in the morning. Here were some army stores that were de- stroyed, to prevent their falling into the enemy's hands Schofield issued an order for Capron to hold this place, but it was not received in time, and had it been, the delay con- sequent would have permitted rebel forces to have flankec us by parallel roads on either side through that open coun- try, and Columbia would have been captured, and also our brigade. We fell back a mile or two, fortified and held one position after another ; retiring only when the move- ments of rebel forces on either of our flanks, through that open country compelled us. When within six miles of Columbia, a position was reached apparently more favora- ble. It was determined to make a more decided stand. The writer, with his company, was with the rear guard which was commanded by that resolute officer, Major Beers of the 16th Illinois cavalry. While at this position the enemy's columns were seen between our position and the Pulaski road, marching on a parallel road, until the head of a long column was in advance of our position. Scouts reported them also passing us on our right flank in like manner. We sent five different couriers to Colonel Capron, notifying him of this fact, and only received in reply a denial of the statement, and an imperative order to hold our position at all hazards. This conduct of our commander always seemed strange to us, until we found the following explanation by Captain Connelly. He says : "Our situation was critical, our left was entirely unpro- tected. We received no communication from General Hatch, who seemed to have all he could do to take care of himself. On the morning of the 24th I was with the rear guard under Major Beers. We were strongly pressed, but fell back with deliberation. Colonel Capron had his little army in line of battle when I came up. I rode up to him and asked him if he intended to make a stand there. He replied that Generals Schofield and Wilson were rain- ing dispatches on him, insisting that he must resist the enemy's advance if it destroyed his command. That the infantry had not yet reached Columbia, and that the 5th Iowa cavalry would be with us soon. I called his attention to the confederate lines moving on both our flanks, evi-
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dently intending to form a junction, and capture us. I said to Colonel Capron : "If we remain here we will be surrounded by an overwhelming force in a few minutes and captured." To this the captain might have added, even if they do not see fit to capture us, their columns pressing forward on parallel roads will soon be ahead of us, and capture Columbia and cut off Schofield. Connelly says : "Colonel Capron gave the order to fall back." Capron's memoirs describing the operations from Fouche's springs says : "Precautions were taken against a night attack. Major Beers, with a battalion of picked men, was sent to the rear to select a position, and to construct barri- cades. During the night of the 23d the enemy having been beaten off, ceased to annoy us about midnight, but it was fully known that a heavy force was concentrating for the capture of my force in the morning. I therefore quietly withdrew from this line of barricades, under cover of night, passing through Major Beer's position and in- structing him to join me at the proper time at our next posi- tion. I selected as good a position as possible and threw up defences, dismounted my command, and placed them be- hind them. Hourly couriers were sent to Generals Wil- son and Schofield notifying them of our desperate condi- tion, and the determined and resolute advance of the enemy." He then speaks of an order to hold his posi- tion, and a promise that the 5th Iowa would be sent to him. He then says that immediately after he received an order to hold Mount Pleasant at all hazards. This would have been impossible and useless. There were no defenses there, and no material to construct them of ; besides, the whole country was open, admitting the enemy to pass freely on either flank. Capron adds that his force at that time was reduced by deaths, disabilities, captures, and on detached duties, to not more than six hundred men, and of the horses, not one really fit for the service. Ammuni- tion nearly exhausted, and bread none. He says: "With this small force I was left to face what was probably one of the most thoroughly equipped forces of the war; ad- vancing full of confidence and enthusiasm, many of them actually in sight of their homes and their families. In- structions were rained upon me to check, to hold at all hazards, the advancing foe. At 7 a. m., still no appear-
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ance of the promised support. The advance of Hood's army now in sight, pressing forward with evident intent to capture my command. From an elevated position I could plainly see, with my field glass, their movements. Forrest's cavalry was developing their forces on both my flanks, while artillery was visible, approaching in the dis- tance."
Relative to our last position described by Captain Con- nelly, Capron continues : "There was now no time left for further deliberation. The simple question was, whether by sacrificing my command, I should gain more time for Schofield, than I would by withdrawing them, and trusting to chance to be able to still oppose their advance. The question of our capture was reduced to a certainty if we remained. I resolved to draw off my command with as little show of intention to retire as possi- ble. Leaving a small force behind the barricades to keep up appearances of still further opposing them, the column was drawn out under orders to "walk march." Our re- treat was protected from view of the enemy by the forma- tion of the land and some timber, in which were placed small detachments partially withdrawn, to deceive the enemy as far as possible in regard to our intentions, and to mislead them in regard to our strength. The column was fairly in motion with no apparent excitement, more than a consciousness on the part of the men of the critical situation, and their utter helplessness when mounted and encumbered by the clumsy Springfield rifle. Every cav- alryman can easily understand that. I had congratulated myself on a successful movement, when suddenly my rear guard was overwhelmed, and driven in upon us, with For- rest's command sabering them at their discretion."
As our men below the rank of orderly sergeants pos- sessed no cavalry arms of any kind, it was utterly impos- sible to resist an impetuous cavalry charge. With their muskets empty and no time to reload, they were as really disarmed as if holding in their hands only clubs. To have attempted to fight on foot, would not only result in being surrounded by an overwhelming force and captured, but would have permitted the flanking columns of the enemy to have pressed on into Columbia unopposed. Nothing could be done by the rear guard unarmed but
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o mount and get out of the way. Those who possessed cavalry arms, the officers and orderly sergeants, threw themselves in the rear, and did the best they could to keep back the furiously charging rebel cavalry. To main- tain an orderly rapid retreat under the circumstances was beyond the power of any officers. Anything short of a rapid retreat, would have permitted the enemy to enter Columbia ahead of them. To dismount and form line, even had they possessed plenty of ammunition, which they did not, would have given only a temporary check at best, with the chances of forces of the enemy beating us into Columbia, and when again compelled to move, the same results would have followed. It would have been vastly different had we possessed cavalry arms, for even the few who did possess them did excellent service. Not a few of the more impetuous Johnnies were made to bite the dust. General Chalmers in his report (see page 763), speaking of this affair : "I regret to say that in this pur- suit Lieutenant-Colonel Dawson, commanding 15th Ten- nessee Cavalry, was killed while gallantly leading his regi- ment in a charge. He had discharged all the loads from his revolver, and was endeavoring to wrest one of the enemy's flags from its bearer, when he was shot."
The writer, with a number of others, saw him go down. As Captain Connelly describes it : "It was a wild ride." A portion of the way was through a lane, in which there was a perfect jam of running horses, and ever and anon as a trooper came to some obstruction, a fallen tree, a large stump, or a ditch, that could not be passed around by reason of the jam, the steed, in attempting to clear the obstruction, would go down, to be trampled to death or to be captured, horse and rider.
Disorderly as was this hasty retreat, we sincerely be- lieve, that under the same circumstances, General Sheri- dan himself could have done no better, as the following description, authenticated by the official reports, will show : When at Henryville, Colonel Capron had sent forward a courier of Company "K" witli a message to Columbia, to give information of the situation, and to ask for the much needed aid. When he reached Columbia no possible aid could be sent from there, and mounting a fresh horse, he dashed down the Pulaski road until he met General
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Schofield, with his main command. General Schofield at once dispatched a message to Brigadier General Jacob D. Cox, commanding a division of infantry, ordering him to move rapidly to Columbia.
Capron's memoirs speak of a temporary check of the enemy, at a wooded ravine, and then adds: "Not a man had come out from Columbia to our support, and all was given up as lost, when at the very last moment of time, the head of a column of infantry was seen approaching across a field from the direction of Pulaski. They were on the double quick."
It proved to be General Cox's division of the 23d Army Corps of Schofield's army. In serial 93, page 400, is Gen- eral Cox's report. He says : "November 24th, at 4 a. m., received orders to move at once with my division to Colum- bia, and to cover that place during the concentration of the army there; the enemy being reported to be pushing our cavalry rapidly back on the Mount Pleasant and Co- lumbia pike. The division was immediately put in mo- tion, Reilly's brigade in advance, followed by Henderson's and Casement's brigade bringing up the rear, covering the train. At a point two miles from Columbia, I determined to take a crossroad, intersecting the Mount Pleasant pike one mile and a half from Columbia, and marching the head of the column rapidly, reached the last named turnpike just as the cavalry brigade, commanded by Colonel Capron, reached the same point in hasty retreat, before a very superior force of the enemy's cavalry, under Forrest, who had been pressing them hard for several miles. This was at 7 a. m. I ordered Reilly's brigade into position on the right, (west) of the turnpike ; throwing forward the 100th Ohio Volunteers to the bank of the Bigby creek, to support a strong line of skirmishers, and check the enemy's ad vance, during the formation of the division. Henderson', brigade was put in position on the left of the turnpike.' Again : "Capron's cavalry, by my order, rallied at the rear, and then took position on Reilly's right, covering that flank of the whole line."
By the aid of this wooded creek, which was then deep Cox's division and Capron's brigade were able to checl the enemy's advance for three hours, until at 10 a. m. th head of the column of the 4th corps reached Columbia, an
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formed on the left, and thus was Columbia and Schofield's army saved, by the most heroic efforts of Capron's brigade. in fighting back the enemy's main force on the Waynesboro road ; and when no longer they could, in the open country, prevent the enemy from reaching Columbia before them without they rapidly fell back, they performed this move- ment successfully, though necessarily in some confusion. Though some critics, who know nothing of such service, have criticised this movement of Capron's brigade as a "disorderly panic," yet not one of our commanders speak of it in other than respectful terms, nor do even the rebel commanders, in their reports, speak of it in boastful terms ; they do not even claim it as a victory. The fact was, it was to them a shameful defeat, inasmuch as it defeated the sanguine expectation of Hood to reach Columbia by the Waynesboro road, on which only so small a force opposed him.
General Schofield, in his report (see page 341), says : "My advance (General Cox's division ) reached that place (Columbia), on the morning of the 24th, just in time to beat back a large rebel force, which was driving in General Capron's cavalry from Mount Pleasant."
General D. S. Stanley (page 112, report), referring to these movements says: "It was believed that the enemy could make but little speed, and the evacuation of Pulaski was made the afternoon of the 23d. The corps (4th) marched to Lynnville that night. During the night it was learned that the enemy had made good use of his time. notwithstanding the bad roads, and that Colonel Capron's brigade had been driven out of Mount Pleasant, it was believed, by an infantry force. General Cox's division was ten miles nearer Columbia, and marched at the same time as ourselves; he arrived in time to save Capron's brigade of cavalry from annihilation, and perhaps the town of Columbia from capture."
Although General Hatch had under his command 3.500 cavalry, well armed, a force nearly five times as great as Capron possessed, and had but two of Forrest's divisions to face, and no infantry, while we had less than one-fourth as many and had to face half as much cavalry, and all of Hood's infantry in their rear ; yet they do not boast of any victory over us, while on page 768, rebel General Ross re-
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ports the attack made by his command and General Arm- strong, on General Hatch's command, and describes it as a famous victory for the rebels. General Hatch makes no report of the affair. The enemy were vastly his superior in numbers, but in much les's proportion than to us, vet we succeeded in reaching and saving Columbia, while General Hatch was cut off, and could not reach Columbia until long after.
On page 1026 is an order from General Wilson to Gen- eral Johnson, November 24th, 2 p. m .: "Please send a squadron under a good active officer, out on the Lynnville pike, with orders to go till he passes the rear of Water's brigade, or to the neighborhood of the Campbellsville road, and endeavor to find General Hatch. He was, at 9 p. m. last night, four miles beyond Campbellsville, on the road toward Lawrenceburg, and trying to reach the military road, passing through Campbellsville this morning."
At Campbellsville is where General Ross says he de- feated General Hatch.
Colonel Capron, in his memoirs, speaks of having re- ceived from General Johnson the above order. Relative to General Schofield's estimate of the services of our brigade in that campaign Major H. C. Connelly relates a conversa- tion which he held with the General at Rock Island in the year 1889, in which General Schofield said: "When I wrote my first dispatch at Pulaski, and started it by courier to Waynesboro, I had no doubt that Capron's brigade was captured." Connelly then spoke of being at headquarters when the dispatch was received and in a few minutes moved out with the advance guard, to cover the roads and prevent the enemy from flanking us. Prompt action, after receiving the order, saved the brigade. Referring espe- cially to the morning of the 24th of November, General Schofield said: "Your command did great service in holding Hood back until General Cox had formed his lines ; your good work saved the army from disaster." And with much emphasis he said: "Major! every man in your command that morning was a hero."
We will close this chapter with an account of the sad fate of that highly esteemed and valuable officer, Captain Han- chett ; captured, as narrated, by Forrest's cowardly min- ions, who dared not meet on equal grounds even
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a foe vastly inferior in numbers, but concealed their bodies under the uniform of friends. Major Connelly says (and the records confirm it) : Captain Hanchett was confined in the rebel prison at Cahaba, Alabama. Here he organized a company of about 50, who planned their escape. They succeeded in getting out, but after being pursued two days, he was recaptured.
Dr. Eddy, in his "Patriotism of Illinois," says: "A sad fate awaited Captain Hanchett. He was enclosed in a wooden box eight feet square, with one aperture through which his food was passed. Here he remained until the rebels heard that General Wilson was coming, and deemed it best to shift their quarters. Poor Hanchett, after over a month of such confinement, was reduced to too feeble a state to move, and they blew out his brains when they left."
The same account is found in the Illinois adjutant gen- eral's report. Comrades, let us not refrain the sympathiz- ing tear, for the sad fate of one of our bravest and best comrades. Peace to his memory.
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CHAPTER XIV.
DEFENSE OF COLUMBIA AND DUCK RIVER .- RETREAT TO
FRANKLIN .- BATTLE OF FRANKLIN .- RETREAT TO NASHVILLE .- SIEGE OF NASHVILLE .- BATTLE OF NASH . VILLE .- REPULSE, PURSUIT AND FINAL DESTRUCTION OF HOOD'S ARMY.
November 24th, evening. Drew small quantity of hard bread and bacon, having had little to eat since leaving Waynesboro. We passed through Columbia, crossed Duck river on the bridge, and camped a mile from town at 4 p. m. Capron's memoirs say : "So great was the exigencies of the service at the time of our arrival at Columbia, on the morning of November 24th, 1864, from that terrible retreat of 56 miles before Hood's advancing army from Waynesboro, that not one moment was allowed for the reorganization of the command. Time was not even given for the worn-out horses to be shod. From that time to the afternoon of the 26th no less than 25 orders were received, calling for details of men." We have only room to note the purport of several of them. One was for a detachment to search for General Hatch's command, as stated in previous chapter. Also a detachment to bear a message to the command at Hamilton's ford below Co- lumbia. The command of 50 men there posted, was a detachment from Capron's brigade, commanded by Lieu- tenant I. H. Allen, of Company "D," 14th Illinois Cav- alry. To send out all these details, scattered the brigade now reduced to less than 600 men. On the 24th Brigadier General R. M. Johnson assumed command of the 6th divi- sion of cavalry, to which Capron's brigade belonged. (See page 1026.) General Johnson's report (see page 597), shows that on the 24th of November the 5th Iowa Cavalry (armed with sabers and Spencer carbines), 500 strong and commanded by Major J. Morris Young, were temporarily added to Capron's brigade, and General Crox- ton's brigade was also temporarily added to Johnson's (6th) division.
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November 25th. In camp; send our dismounted men to Columbia, to be sent to Nashville, to be remounted as soon as General Thomas could gather horses, which was slow work. Hood attacked the front this morning, but gained no advantage. Johnson's division was called out ; marched down the river several miles, dismounted, re- mained several hours, remounted, countermarched to Co- lumbia and Franklin pike, then on that pike north a few miles to Shelbyville road, then eastward (up the river) on Shelbyville road 7 miles and camped. Road rough and muddy ; rained much. Marched 14 miles. Pickets have been sent to various crossings of Duck river above Colum- bia.
On the 26th Capron receives orders to prepare at once to move his brigade to the crossing of Duck river, by the Lewisburg and Franklin pike, and to find the whereabouts of the battalion sent out last night, and send a strong party to support it. This movement extended into the very dark and rainy night, over very rough and muddy roads, resulting in men dropped from the ranks, horses crippled, guns capsized, and wagons and ambulances over- turned and wrecked. On this march Colonel Capron re- ceived an order from General Johnson to call in his pickets from the river above Columbia, and to have the fords from Lewisburg pike, down to Huey's mills, well watched and guarded, and was promised that Lieutenant Allen's party of 50 men, below Columbia, should be returned to his bri- gade. This order instructed, not only to guard well the crossings from Lewisburg pike down to where the pickets of Croxton's brigade began above Huey's mills, but to spare no pains to learn the condition of all crossings of the river on his beat, and watch carefully and report promptly every movement of the enemy. A dispatch from General Schofield to General Wilson, asserted that there was no doubt that Hood was working eastward (up the river). with a view to crossing the river above Columbia, and that all of Forrest's cavalry were in the advance. And again, November 27th, 4:10 p. m., this order: "Send a strong party on the Lewisburg road, with orders to satisfy you of the movements of the enemy in that direction."
Capron says: "It is perhaps needless to say that these and all other orders were promptly executed, and their re-
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sults, with all other gathered information, were promptly sent to headquarters. It was ascertained that from Huey's mills up to the Lewisburg pike there were no less than six passable fords. Indeed for 15 or 20 miles above Co- lumbia, there were many good fords, and many more pos- sible crossings, some of them having mere bridle paths leading to them, yet possible of crossing by cavalry unen- cumbered by anything on wheels.
The two most practicable crossings for a large force, were the one at the crossing of the Lewisburg pike, and one a mile and a quarter below the pike. There was also a bridge at Shelbyville, a number of miles above the pike.
Sunday, November 27th. Had rainy night. Marched afternoon and night up the Shelbyville road, which ran on the north side of the river parallel to its general course, but owing to bends in the river, sometimes close to it, and at other points, miles from it. This road was a poor one, rough and rocky in many places, and passing through much land that was uncleared forest. We camped near the Lewisburg pike. Marched 7 miles. Lieutenant Allen of the 14th, with his command, has been relieved from duty at the ford below Columbia, and assigned to duty as a courier line between Columbia and Franklin (see page 1095).
November 28th. Reveille at daylight; march up the Shelbyville road two miles to its crossing of the Lewisburg pike, which is about one mile and a quarter north of the river crossing by the Lewisburg pike. Colonel Capron established his headquarters at the crossing of these two roads, retaining as headquarter guards a few companies of the 7th Ohio Cavalry, who, under their Colonel, Israel Garrard, had just joined him. The remainder of Capron's brigade was posted as follows: At the crossing of the river was posted Major Beers, with his regiment, the 16th Illinois Cavalry, and a portion of the 8th Michigan Cav- alry ; and at the ford next below was posted Major Young, with his regiment, the 5th Iowa Cavalry, and a portion of the 14th Illinois Cavalry, under Captain H. C. Connelly. The remainder of the 14th Illinois Cavalry, commanded by Captain Thomas K. Jenkins, was divided into detachments and posted at various crossings lower down. Just above the crossing of the pike the river makes a great bend to
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the northward, until it approaches near to the Shelbyville road, over a half mile above (east of) headquarters. Along this bend of the river were many shallow places, and a company of the 7th Ohio Cavalry was posted along the banks on this bend to watch, guard and report. Near where the river approached nearest to the Shelbyville road on that road, was a grove of timber with thick underbrush, while the land below that, including headquarters, was all open land. Above this grove was timber and brush for nearly a mile, and then an occasional small clearing, with two dwelling houses a mile above the grove, both being between the road and the river. In this grove on the road, was established a picket post, guarded by a company of the 5th Iowa. As soon as headquarters were fixed, Colonel Capron ordered the writer (Lieutenant W. L. Sanford ) to select 25 picked men from his company, "I," and from Company "C," and relieve the Iowa company at the picket post in the grove, east of headquarters, and hold the post against any attack that might be made, and to scout well and regularly the road above the post. The importance of this post will be understood when it is known that this post now was the extreme left of Schofield's whole army, as Capron's brigade was the left flank command ; and above this post the river could be forded in many places, besides the bridge crossing at Shelbyville above. And it was now well known that Forrest's cavalry was pressing eastward to find a crossing. The men selected by the writer to guard this all-important post were, from Company "I." the following: Lieutenant Wm. H. Puckett, Sergeant David Clare, Sergeant Thomas Featherson, Wm. B. Clair, Ed. Patterson, Wm. E. McCready, David E. Rice, Richard Fouke, Thomas Perrine, James Fair, Benjamin F. Puckett, George Klassy, Wm. C. Hibbs, George Burger, and Ho- bart Martin ; and from Company "C" the following : John Bresner, Simeon Graves, John Weller, Thomas K. Moore, Andrew McCormick, Thomas J. Patterson, Robert Rus- sell, Wm. B. Shields, Patrick Tway, and Wm. Wayman. This small band of men performed a service that day that entitles them to a bright page in history. The infantry were all posted near Columbia. Cox's division holding the fords just above and near to Columbia. Hatch's divi- sion had just been reinforced by a number of cavalry regi-
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