USA > Illinois > History of Fourteenth Illinois cavalry and the brigades to which it belonged > Part 24
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possession of our headquarters and the pike in the rear, we could not tell how far ; and we had no doubt that our brigade was captured and we feared that Schofield's whole army was cut off. There seemed no chance for us, but to strive to reach Franklin, 22 miles in the rear, and to do this we must keep off from the pike, striking through the woods, and on byroads parallel to the pike. Pursuing parties of the enemy were thrown off the track by our call- ing at houses as we passed, and asking the course taken by the Yankees whom we said we had whipped at the river. We pressed guides, generally boys, each of whom guided us as far as they knew, until we were half way to Franklin, when for want of any road or path we were compelled to go on the pike, reaching Franklin at I a. m. of November 29th. Here we heard that Schofield was pressing back toward Franklin ; and early in the morning we retraced our steps to find our brigade if it were not captured.
We will now describe the operations of the rest of Cap- ron's command, beginning with Capron's report as made in his memoirs. He says: "Later in the day, perhaps at 4:30 p. m., amidst the greatest excitement, and in mo- mentary expectations of a more vigorous effort of the ene- my to force his way across the river, Lieutenant Miller, of the 14th cavalry, rode up to me and reported that, re- turning from a scout on our right rear, in the direction of Columbia, he had run upon a force of the enemy's cavalry, and had ascertained that Hood had effected the crossing of Duck river, and that General Schofield had actually abandoned his hold upon Columbia during the previous night, followed up closely by Hood's army, and that fight- ing was then progressing seven miles in our rear; that Hatch and the other commands along the river between us and Columbia, had been forced back ; and General Wil- son could not be heard from." This report of Lieutenant Miller is corroborated by the reports of Wilson and John- son, and was the last official report made to Colonel Capron by any officers of his brigade, as Colonel Harrison assumed command of the brigade immediately, as had been previ- ously arranged, and Colonel Capron returned home. We have no remembrance of seeing him again, and we never reported to him the operations of this day, and we believe no other officers reported to him, so that his further ac-
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count of these movements, as described in his memoirs, must have been mainly given from his own personal obser- vation, hastily made at a time of great excitement, and little wonder if some mistakes were made.
Up to the time of the attack upon headquarters, Capron's account of all these movements is perfectly corroborated by the official reports, but in his subsequent account, he makes a few errors, owing to his want of information that would have corrected them. Referring to Lieutenant Mil- ler's report, he truthfully says: "This, of course, con- firmed all the previous rumors of the day, reaching us through resident citizens, and was the first reliable in- formation I had received of the evacuation of Columbia by General Schofield, or of the retiring of General Hatch's command from our right. It was not in that direction we were expecting the enemy ; our attention at the time being fully taken up with him in front. It was soon ascertained that we had been left without a word of caution even, deep down in a bend of that river, confronted by one of Hood's best divisions, which had been successfully kept from crossing a man, up to this time, then close upon the night ; with Forrest's cavalry shoved in between us and the bal- ance of General Wilson's command, as far in our rear as Rally hill; in fact completely abandoned by General Wil- son ; cut off and surrounded."
Colonel Capron's account here given is perfectly con- firmed by the official reports of our commanders. He further says: "In this critical condition of affairs, with night approaching, I deemed it prudent to confer with Colonel Garrard. I at once dispatched a messenger re- questing to see him without delay at the front. I made known to him the condition of affairs ; showed him my in- structions, which were to prevent, at all hazards, the cross- ing of Duck river on my front by the enemy. In the absence of any official order to retire, it was thought both by Colonel Garrard and myself, that although the safety of my whole command would be imperiled by remaining, to withdraw from our position and allow the heavy force already concentrated here to cross and fall upon Schofield's rear and flank, at that moment engaged with the enemy, would prove most disastrous to our army. It was there- fore determined to hold our position until forced from
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it, or until darkness would allow us to retire unobserved by the enemy. Shortly after this interview Colonel Garrard having had no more than time to reach his command, a courier was observed approaching me upon a full run, bearing the intelligence that our pickets had been driven in on the Columbia road, and that the enemy were closing in upon us from every direction. I at once ordered up a company of the 5th Iowa cavalry which had been held in reserve, and directed them to follow me. On reaching my. headquarters I found Colonel Garrard hotly engaged with a force of Forrest's cavalry. It was then in the dusk of the evening, and the flash of the weapons of the contending forces seemed to encircle the camp." This was the attack upon headquarters which we and General Ross have de- scribed as occurring immediately after the attack upon our picket post. The sun was just setting, and we could plainly see the gleam of saber flashes. Capron continues : "Not one moment was to be lost in dispatching couriers to the various commands along the river bank, notifying them to fall back upon headquarters, hoping at that moment of time to be able to hold that as a rallying point. Just at this stage of the excitement our ambulances, which had been started back on the Franklin pike at the first alarm, came down the turnpike on a full run, having been intercepted near Rally hill. The charge of Colonel Garrard, having forced back the enemy, opened the way for another trial, in which they were successful in slipping out safely." Now follows a description in which Capron was wholly misin- formed in relation to the command named. He says : "Immediately upon this a confused mass of our pickets from our left up the river were driven in upon us. Not one drew rein, but charged past us, overthrowing everything in their way, and with them out went every man with the exception of myself, staff officers, and a few order- lies." We absolutely and positively assert that not a man from our picket post went in any manner to headquarters at that time, nor did any leave our post except as we have described, after Capron's headquarters was in the hands of the enemy, and it would have been folly then to have gone there, yet our post is the one referred to. That Colonel Capron really saw such a disorderly retreat is true without doubt, but if it was not the company of the 7th
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Ohio cavalry that came to reinforce us, then it might have been the company guarding at the bend of the river, and if neither of these, all we positively know about it is, that it was none of our picket post, and this we could prove by every man of that number who is now living. The fol- lowing we think are now living: Lieutenant William H. Pucket, Nora, Ill .; William E. McCready, Mount Morris, Ill. ; David S. Clare, Ogden City, Utah. Capron con- tinues : "The force coming down the river on our left probably crossed the river at Shelbyville, and, charging down along the pike and river bank, followed up our re- treating pickets, until they struck the company of the 7th Ohio, when they held up long enough to capture the entire company." Colonel Capron evidently here attempted to describe what he could not possibly see from his position, and he got his description badly tangled up. The force that came down from the left was the 3d Texas, and they did not cross at Shelbyville, as Ross' report shows. They evidently swam the river, as Captain Wharton's condition showed, and as to following the pickets down in the direc- tion described by Capron, was impossible. "Charging
down along the pike and river bank," as Capron describes, could only be done by charging along the pike from Cap- ron's headquarters along the banks of the bend of the river, for in every other part of the river its course was from east to west, while the direction of the pike was north and south. We spend time in making these corrections, for any reflections unjustly cast upon that brave party of men makes us perfectly indignant; although we believe our Colonel made these errors through ignorance of the facts, being unadvised by any official reports, and the movements entirely beyond the power of his personal observations. General Ross says of the later operations : "It was now after night and very dark. The enemy had disappeared from our front in the direction of Franklin, but before establishing camp it was thought prudent to ascertain if any force had been cut off and yet remained between us and the river. Colonel Hawkins was therefore ordered up the pike with his regiment to reconnoiter, and had pro- ceeded but a short distance before he was met by a brigade of federal cavalry. An exciting fight ensued, lasting about half an hour, when the enemy, having much the
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larger force, succeeded in passing by us, receiving, as he did so, a severe fire into his flanks."
On page 604, serial 93, begins the report of Major J. Morris Young, commanding 5th Iowa cavalry, describing the movements of Capron's brigade, after Capron himself had been cut off, as he himself has described. Major Young says: "I have the honor to report the following action of my regiment and others temporarily under my command during the evening and night of November 28th, 1864. The 5th Iowa, under my command, was dis- posed by order of Colonel Capron commanding the first brigade of the sixth division, cavalry command, in differ- ent positions on the north side of Duck river, above and below the crossing of the turnpike, running from Franklin to Lewisburg, to guard the fords and prevent the enemy from crossing to this side, which was successfully per- formed in my command and front. At 5 p. m. my patrols and pickets reported the enemy in force, and Colonel Cap- ron, commanding the brigade gone. Hastily withdrawing my regiment, except Company "A," which was posted four miles above, with the enemy between us, I formed the 5th Iowa in charging column on the pike, and was in the act of giving the command "Forward" when the other regiments of the brigade, consisting of the 8th Michigan, 14th and 16th Illinois, came in successively, much to my surprise, for I had supposed them gone out with Colonel Capron, and (they) reported the enemy closing in from every direction. I made the following disposition of my forces as hastily as possible. The 8th Michigan in line dismounted to the left of, and perpendicular to the head of the 5th Iowa column; the 16th Illinois, disposed in like manner on the right; the led horses of both regiments to follow up at a safe distance in their respective rears. The 14th Illinois was placed (mounted) in column of fours, to the left and rear of the 8th Michigan, and parallel to the 5th Iowa, which was in column on the pike. The left was most exposed to a countercharge of the enemy, who were known to be in heavy force on that flank. As soon as the enemy's fire was drawn, the dismounted men were to im- mediately fall back, mount and follow out the 5th Iowa cavalry, which was to go through with sabers. In fifteen minutes these dispositions being completed, the command
2
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was given "Forward." In fifteen minutes more we struck the enemy in line, barricaded and posted in the outhouses and buildings just evacuated by Colonel Capron. We received their fire, and instantly sounded the "charge," riding them down and scattering them in all directions. At 10 p. m. I reported the brigade entire to Major-General Wilson. In this charge, which was most gallantly exe- cuted, reflecting great credit on all the troops engaged, I do not think our entire loss out of fifteen hundred brought through safe, was more than thirty killed, wounded, and missing. Having been superseded immediately by Colo- nel Capron, who had preceded me some two hours, I have no means of ascertaining definitely our loss. The injury inflicted on the enemy must have been considerable. The groans and the cries of the wounded as we rode, cut or shot them down, could be heard distinctly above the noise and din of the charge. Permit me to add in closing, the fact of the growing confidence amongst our troops, that good cavalry never can be captured." This is doubtless an accurate report of these operations, except in the esti- mate of the force brought through. We do not know the strength of the 7th Ohio present that day, but as they went out with Colonel Capron they were not a part of the force brought through by Major Young. We have be- fore shown that the official reports show the strength of the 5th Iowa when it joined Capron's brigade three days before was five hundred. Capron's brigade two weeks before was eight hundred, but when we reached Columbia on the retreat was reduced to six hundred or less. At least two companies of the 14th, and one of the 5th Iowa, were on detached duty, so that Major Young's force that charged through could not have exceeded one thousand. On page 1182 is shown report of November 30th, which confirms our estimate.
Major Young was a gallant and skillful officer. and deserves great credit, and his command that night showed the greatest gallantry and implicit faith in their com- mander, and perfect obedience to orders. His report is brief, precise, and truthful, as is shown by official reports and by accounts of associate officers and other comrades.
We make a few extracts from communications pub- lished in the National Tribune by Major H. C. Connelly
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and Lieutenant William M. Moore of Company "L," 14th Illinois Cavalry, concerning this affair. Connelly, after describing the situation as recorded, says: "The left (where the 14th was posted) was the most exposed (Major Young also says so). When all was ready, it now being dark, the command moved off. The shrill notes of the bugle sounded the charge; the enemy was attacked and cut to pieces at all points. I shall always remember the groans and moans of the wounded and dying. With the 14th, I was on the left flank. In the charge some hitch or break occurred in the 5th Iowa column. An officer of the 8th Michigan sang out : "Why don't the 5th Jowa advance? If it is not going to advance let it make room for those who will." The 5th, however, moved off, when the whole brigade came up to the work gallantly and charged out successfully. The confederates broke and fled precipitately, taking cover in a ravine on our left flank ; they poured a terrible volley at us. In the darkness their aim was inaccurate; they fired too high, and we es- caped, what, to us of the 14th, might have been a fearful slaughter. But few of our men were wounded. From the terrific noise made by their officers in trying to rally their men, it seemed as though the Confederates had two to our one. In leading and conducting this charge Major Young showed fine generalship."
Colonel Capron in his memoirs calls this "a gallant charge," and speaks in high praise of the officers and men.
Lieutenant Moore, referring to Connelly's published report says : "I was in command of Company 'L,' 14th Illinois, and I believe Captain Connelly of my company (since major) was in command of a battalion. Some one reported that Captain Jenkins, commanding the 14th, was shot. Captain Connelly rode along the regiment encour- aging the men to do their duty. When the bugle sounded the 'charge' he was in the thickest of the fight at the head of the regiment. Courage like he exhibited deserves to be recognized."
General Johnson, on page 598, says : "The 5th Iowa and the greater part of the 14th and 16th Illinois cavalry, from whom Colonel Capron had been cut off by the enemy, came into camp, having charged through the su- perior force of the enemy, which had interposed itself be-
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tween them and the rest of the command." General Wil- son also speaks of this affair, page 558. A close study of all the Union and Confederate reports, with a full under- standing of the relative positions and forces of the two opposing armies on the night of November 28th, 1864, lends to the following statements and premises of Colonel Capron in his memoirs, not only a strong probability, but almost a certainty. He says : "There is little doubt that General Schofield's fears, expressed in his general report, of the enemy endeavoring to reach Spring Hill in advance of him, and thus cut off his retreat, or strike him in the flank at Duck river, or both, as he had already forced his cavalry between General Wilson and his command, and cut off all communication between them, might have been fully realized had this brigade withdrawn all opposition to Buford's division at the crossing of Duck river (as all the rest of Wilson's cavalry did) when Hatch and Croxton withdrew from our right, as there would have been ample time for him to have joined his force with Forrest's com- mand already in position, and accomplished exactly what General Schofield feared." See General Schofield's report of campaign, page 341, in which he says: "Wilson re- ported to him that the enemy's cavalry had forced a cross- ing at Huey's mill, 5 miles above Columbia, from which a road leads into the Franklin pike at Spring Hill." The crossing by the enemy was about I p. m., November 28th ; this is what both Wilson and Johnson report. For- rest says (page 752) that he crossed with part of a regi- ment on the morning of the 28th ; Chalmers' division also crossed, but at II o'clock at night he received a dispatch from General Buford (whom we kept from crossing) in- forming him that the enemy had made such a stubborn resistance to his crossing that he could not join the com- mand until the morning of the 29th. Nor is this all. Brigadier-General Lawrence S. Ross, commanding a bri- gade of Jackson's division, says that his command crossed on the morning of 28th, and Jackson's division fell in our rear as recorded. We not only prevented Buford from crossing, but detained Jackson's division as well. Forrest says (page 753) : "I ordered Jackson's division to move along the Lewisburg pike toward Franklin until
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he developed the enemy." This shows the presence of Jackson's whole division in our rear. Again he says : "After waiting a short time for my troops to close up, I moved rapidly toward Spring Hill." This referred to Chalmers' division, of which just before he said : "Brig- adier-General Armstrong notified me that he had struck the enemy, when I ordered him not to press too vigorously until I reached his flank with Chalmers' division." This shows that Forrest, with Chalmers' division, after waiting many hours for his other two divisions to join him, pressed on to the Franklin pike. The hours he had to wait would have enabled him to have reached Spring Hill on the night of the 28th, if not before. Both Schofield and Stanley in their reports say that Stanley, with two divisions, was on the morning of the 29th pushed forward to Spring Hill, where he arrived at II :30 a. m. (see page 113), where the enemy's cavalry was then collecting. Hood says (page 652), after speaking of Forrest's crossing : "Early on the morning of the 29th, with Stewart's and Cheatham's corps, and Johnson's division of Lee's corps (nearly his whole infantry force) the troops moved in light marching order. My object being to turn the enemy's flank by marching rapidly on roads parallel to the Colum- bia and Franklin pike, at or near Spring Hill, and to cut off that portion of the enemy at or near Columbia." Again : "The cavalry became engaged near Spring Hill about mid- day." With Hood marching rapidly with nearly his whole force on a road parallel to the Franklin pike, on which General Schofield was moving, and nearly abreast of Schofield, so near at least that the advance of his in- fantry joined with Chalmers' division of cavalry in the battle at Spring Hill, it is not difficult to surmise what would have been the result had Forrest's whole force of cavalry reached Spring Hill hours before, as they might easily have done had not our brigade held Buford's at bay at the crossing of Lewisburg pike, at the same time also detaining Jackson's division in their vain attempt to capture our brigade. We will now give other proofs that we fought these divisions at that point until the night of the 28th.
General Wilson, in his report (see page 145) says : "The cavalry (rebel) began crossing about noon at Davis ford,
LIEUTENANT WM. M. MOORE COMPANY L, 14TH ILLINOIS CAVALRY
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near Huey's mill, but could not get over at Hardison's on the pike till Capron and Garrard's brigades were struck in flank and rear by the rebels at Rally Hill." Gen- eral Johnson (on page 598) says the same thing, and highly praises the charge made by our brigade that night, when surrounded at the post they had defended all day. Colonel Capron in his memoirs quotes from a history by General Cox as follows : "General Cox in his history of the Nash- ville campaign (page 72) was led into some errors when describing the occurrences on Duck river. He says : 'The National cavalry were broken into smaller detachments, part of them well out toward Shelbyville (that was cor- rect). The nearest to the infantry being part of Capron's brigade at Rally Hill on the Lewisburg pike, where a branch turnpike turns off to Spring Hill.' Instead of this being the nearest to the infantry it was the farthest from it, with all the rest of the cavalry between those points. But again : 'The resistance made to Buford was so vigorous that he could not get over the river, but Jack- son and Chalmers forced a crossing after a sharp skirmish, and Forrest himself does not seem to have found any re- sistance. He was confronted by Hatch and Croxton.' " He speaks of turning Chalmers and Jacksons divisions to the east (toward Capron's position). This would all have been correct had he stated that it was Capron's bri- gade that made such a vigorous resistance to Buford.
November 29th. All the cavalry fell back slowly on the Lewisburg pike, covering Schofield's right flank. After- noon our division was sent forward, crossing the Harpeth river, two miles east of Franklin at Hugh's ford, and camped, having marched 17 miles.
November 30th. Reveille at 2 a. m. We were early in line and built barricades. Colonel Capron has now left, and was never again with us. He finally received his well- earned promotion to Brigadier-General. Colonel Thomas Harrison of the 8th Indiana cavalry is now in command of the brigade. Schofield's infantry reached Franklin, formed line, and built hastily-constructed defenses. Such disposition of the cavalry was made as would serve to pre- vent the flanking of Schofield, should Hood attempt to continue that movement. The disposition of cavalry was : The 5th Iowa with some other cavalry on the right, and
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on the left in the following rotation : Next to the infan- try, first Croxton, next Hatch, and at the danger point, in case of attempted flank movement, was again placed on the extreme left Harrison's (our) brigade. Hood says in his report (see page 653), that he learned from dispatches to Schofield, captured at Spring Hill, that Schofield was instructed to hold Franklin until Thomas could fortify Nashville. So Hood determined to abandon the slower process of the flanking movement, as hitherto practiced, and concentrate his forces, and by a sudden and deter- mined attack on Schofield's center, he hoped to crush the Union forces at Franklin, and capture all of Thomas' forces south of the Harpeth river. Forrest was ordered to attack our left, and Hood says : "If successful he was to cross the river and attack and destroy our trains, and our broken columns."
Why he made no more vigorous and determined effort to attack our cavalry must have been due to the fact that he had learned throughout this campaign, in which, up to this time the fighting had nearly all been done by the cavalry, that our cavalry was entitled to proper respect ; at least his efforts were feeble, and a few charges which were easily resisted and their cavalry finally forced back, comprehended the cavalry fighting. But it was different with the infantry, who, through this campaign, with the exception of a little fighting at Columbia and at Spring Hill, had enjoyed a play spell, with only an occa- sional tremor, lest our cavalry would not be able to prevent their being flanked by Hood; for now, by the change in Hood's tactics, they were given sufficient fighting to satisfy the most ardent desire for glory and for gore in one cam- paign. 3 Such was Hood's determined effort to break Schofield's center that column after column, led by their generals in person, was dashed with fury upon his cen- ter. As each advancing column was driven back an- other fresh column was sent forward, charging, if pos- sible, with increased fury. Pat Cleaburne, their best gen- eral, though a perfect gentleman in peace, was inspired in this battle with the spirit of a fury. Not satisfied with the failure of his own column, he threw himself at the head of other advancing columns, until cut down in his frenzied efforts to break our lines. The loss to Hood of the following disproportion of general officers, attests the
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