USA > Illinois > History of Fourteenth Illinois cavalry and the brigades to which it belonged > Part 9
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Graham says, however, that Colvin's battery and the 14th Illinois Cavalry continued the fight longer. He
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highly praises the conduct of his officers and men, and speaks well of Colonel Jackson's men. Of the 14th Illi- nois Cavalry he says: "I respectfully refer you to the report of Colonel Capron, herewith attached, for an ac- count of the part the 14th Illinois Cavalry took in repel- ling the attack and advance of the enemy. I am glad to state that the officers and men of the 14th Illinois Cav- alry acted nobly their part. On their efforts depended much of the success of the day." Graham estimated the loss of the command with him at 53, and the loss of the enemy at very much more. He continues : "I now come to speak of the enemy, his designs and expectations. After hearing reports of citizens along the line of the enemy's march, I am confident that there were five bri- gades of cavalry and mounted infantry brought against my little force, the whole under command of Major Gen- eral Martin. The design was to keep my force engaged at the gap, four miles below Maynardsville, until a por- tion of their forces could be moved from Blain's Cross- roads into the road between me and Walker's ford, and at the same time a sufficient force had been sent around my front. At daylight on the morning of the 2d my entire command was to have been surrounded. The enemy moved on to a consummation of the object so devoutly wished for, only to find that he had surrounded a camp barren of everything save the fires my men had left in good order. In surrounding my camp he did, however, capture a portion of 'M' Company of 5th Indi- ana Cavalry, which had been left to patrol the road back to Maynardsville, and were not able to cut their way out. Finding themselves foiled in their first attempt, they next tried to cut my command off at Walker's ford, and that, too, proved a failure, and at the same time cost them a considerable loss in killed, wounded and prisoners."
In this closing language Graham refers to the move- inent of Jones' division down the blind road to Irwin's ford to get in Graham's rear, which the 14th Illinois Cavalry met and held in check. Colonel Graham's report was made soon after the fight, and only from such sources as one enemy in the field might be able to obtain regard- ing the movements of his foe, who kept his plans con- cealed. But to show how accurately he estimated, as
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well as to prove from undeniable sources the cunning plans and tremendous odds he had to meet, we now quote from the published reports of the rebel commanders them- selves. Referring to Longstreet's report of campaign (serial 54, page 462), we find that Longstreet was pre- paring to abandon the siege of Knoxville and to move his army by way of Blain's Crossroads up toward Virginia. Serial 56, page 769, Longstreet to General W. E. Jones, November 30th: "Move your command out on May- nardsville road toward the river and scout in the vicinity and endeavor to annoy and distress the enemy as much as possible. You will probably find parties of the enemy on this road, which you will be able to capture." In serial 54, page 546, Major General Will T Martin reports : "By order of Lieutenant General Longstreet, I moved with part of my force toward Tazewell to meet a supposed advance of the enemy from that direction. Reaching the vicinity of Maynardsville in the afternoon of the 30th, I found General Jones' division skirmishing with the enemy. It was too late to attack. General Armstrong, with his division, was sent around to the right, to reach the rear of the enemy before daylight. The remainder of my force moved at daylight on Maynardsville, but the enemy had rapidly retreated soon after daylight, leav- ing a small picket, which was captured." General Martin had just spoken of Morgan's division rejoining him when he made this march, so that when he spoke of sending Armstrong's division to our rear and moving with the rest of his force upon our front, he meant Morgan's divi- sion, as Jones' division, near by and also engaged, be- longed, not to General Martin's force, but to General Ransom's army, and had only just arrived. We thus have proved from the rebel reports not only their object to capture our brigade, but the precise plan to accomplish it as outlined by Colonel Graham in his report. Graham's information was obtained through the activity and intel- ligence of the scouts of the 14th Illinois Cavalry which were sent out on every road. In serial 54, page 453, is given Martin's command ; Morgan's division ; Morgan's bri- gade, 5 regiments ; Morrison's brigade, 6 regiments ; Arm- strong's division; Hume's brigade, 4 regiments ; Tyler's brigade, 4 regiments; total of these two divisions, 4 bri-
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gades, or 19 regiments. Wharton's division also belonged to Martin's command, but as it is not mentioned here we omit it. The numerical strength is not given here, but a month later, when its ranks were thinned (see page 889, serial 56, December 31st), Armstrong's division is 1,804 and Morgan's 2,190; total, 3,994, and doubtless at this time exceeding 4,000. Fortunately we have report of Jones' division, November 30th, just two days before. Effective present, officers and men, Jones' brigade, 2,046 ; Williams' (or Giltner's) brigade, 1,322; total Jones' di- vision, 3,368 ; grand total employed to capture our brigade of only 1,088 was 7,362. These figures are taken from
rebel sources. We now continue General Martin's report. He says : "Being joined by General Armstrong's division (that is, after our brigade had retired past the junction of the roads), his division was pushed toward Clinch river, while General Jones' command (3,368) was sent to the right to endeavor to effect a lodgment between the enemy and the river. A force of the enemy prevented his success." We will now show what force it was that pre- vented his success, and how they did it. Graham says in his report: "Finding themselves foiled in their first at- tempt, they next tried to cut my command off at Walker's ford, and that, too, proved a failure." Graham in the beginning of his report speaks of this attempt to flank him on his left, and says: "I immediately sent the 14th Illinois Cavalry, under Colonel Capron, to the river and down the road leading from Walker's ford to Rutledge." We now give Colonel Capron's report, found in serial 54, page 429, to Colonel Graham. He says: "Sir-I would respectfully report that on the morning of the 2d instant, being ordered to move down the right bank of Clinch river to the forks of the road five miles from Walker's ford, I moved my command, the 14th Illinois Cavalry, down the river two miles, until I came to a ford and road leading to Maynardsville, intersecting the main road from Maynardsville to Walker's ford, in the rear of the enemy at that time engaging the remainder of your brigade. Hesitating to proceed farther, I halted my regi- ment and awaited your orders, sending scouting parties on the Marnardsville and (on) the river roads (Company 'M' on Maynardsville road and Companies 'A,' under
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Lieutenant H. Capron, and part of 'I,' under Lieuten- ant Kilbourne, on the river road). I had hardly received your orders to hold the Maynardsville road and river crossing before our advance (Company 'M') on the May- nardsville road was attacked by the enemy two miles from the main body. My regiment was then posted on the river crossing. I immediately sent the third battalion (under Major Tompkins), to reinforce the advance, which, after advancing one-half mile, engaged the enemy. Our forces taking position in the center of the road running through a narrow gorge, the rebel cavalry advancing in column down the road and charging our center, but were re- pulsed. The rebels then moved a column on our right and center, and were again repulsed at both points. They then deployed skirmishers on both our flanks on the hills, and again charged our right. The remainder of my regi- ment having been placed in position, the third battalion was ordered to the rear and reform, which they did, the rebels advancing on our line, attacking our whole line with skirmishers. Two companies were sent to the hills to dislodge their sharpshooters, who were annoying our lines, and a rapid and heavy firing was continued through our while line. At I p. m. the third battalion, with how- itzers, were withdrawn to the left bank of the river, the first and second battalions still fighting the rebels, but com- pelled to gradually fall back, overpowered by superior numbers and flanked by sharpshooters. The third bat- talion was immediately deployed on the left bank of the river, and the howitzer battery placed in position. At this moment our position became critical, as their sharp- shooters occupied the heights in good range of our posi- tion, but were fortunately held in check by our howitzers, until the fire of the rebels gradually slackened and our ammunition was nearly exhausted. The main part of my regiment was withdrawn to your command at Walk- er's ford, leaving two companies with the small amount of ammunition necessary to hold the ford, which they did until relieved by a regiment of infantry. The whole command fought with coolness and bravery, and our loss must have been much greater had not the natural position of the ground been greatly advantageous to us. Twenty- four officers and 300 men, with a loss of 18. The en-
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gagement commenced at 10 a. m., continuing until 3 p. m. From information obtained from prisoners, the force at- tacking us was General (W. E.) Jones' cavalry division, containing two brigades. I would also report the capture of 18 prisoners on the 2d and 3d instant." We had from our notes written a description of this battle, which, though couched in different language, was yet in sub- stance the same as Colonel Capron's report. As the offi- cial report of commanding officers is properly esteemed better authority than the notes of any subordinate, for the reason that commanding officers have better and more sources of correct information relative to all mili- tary movements, and as Colonel Capron's report is a very correct outline of the fight, we will merely use the in- formation in our notes to more fully explain the various movements and positions. Colonel Capron's statement : "Our loss must have been very much greater had not the natural position of the ground been greatly in our favor." Then he adds the number of our regiment officers and men, "324." Had he then known, as we now know, that Jones' division, which we there fought, numbered 3,368, or more than ten times our force, he would have realized that we must have great compensating advantages to have withstood such a host for even a short time, not to say five or six hours. Capron described our position in a road running down a narrow gorge between two ranges or ridges of high hills. This is correct, and we add that these high ridges began several miles back in moderate hills, which increased in height until near the river. Espe- cially on our right, toward Walker's ford, they might be termed mountains, and all the way these ridges were covered with heavy timber. This itself gave a slight com- pensating advantage to our men in this, that it compelled the enemy, contrary to their choice, with long range guns, to seek a close range, as the woods prevented effective firing at a distance. Close range was what we desired, as our short range carbines could be loaded and fired much more rapidly than could their guns. Besides, each of our men possessed at least one large navy revolver with six loads, and this more nearly balanced the effective- ness of our forces. But the greatest element of strength with us, and without which we could not have long with-
1
CAPTAIN WM. R. SANFORD, COMPANY K.
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stood their overwhelming numbers, was our howitzer battery, commanded by Lieutenant H. C. Connelly and manned by his company "L." This was placed on a slight elevation commanding the road between the ridges. When the enemy first struck our advance, Company "M," it was of necessity forced rapidly back by the enemy, who were pressing forward to get into the river road that led up to Walker's ford, where they expected to plant them- selves in Graham's rear. When Company "M" was rein- forced by Major Tompkins with the third battalion, they tied their horses in their rear, that every man could be in the line. This force succeeded in giving a momentary check, but it was only momentary. They saved their horses by hastily sending back a squad, who cut them loose and drove them to the river. Major Tompkins fell back fighting, having divided his command to the right and left of the road on the sides of the ridges. Our main command was similarly divided, leaving the road itself clear for the use of the battery. As Capron says. "The rebel column advanced down this road and charged our center," when they received from our battery a sweep- ing, destructive fire, and at the same time our lines on right and left poured into their charging column an enfilading fire, and their proud column was driven back in confusion. They next moved a force on the ridge on our right. To meet this movement Company "D," under Lieutenant Miller, was posted on the right, and when the enemy again attacked the center and the right, they succeeded no better in the center. But though Lieu- tenant Miller and his command fought manfully, they would have been overpowered but for the timely arrival of Captain Dent, who had been sent to Walker's ford with the trains. With his Company "C," and Company "G," he was hurried to the support of Lieutenant Miller, and took command. These three companies, by the most heroic efforts, aided by a few shells which Lieutenant Connelly found opoprtunity to send into the rebel col- umns on the hill, while he did not neglect their column advancing on the center. His quick eye saw where the enemy needed most attention, and there they received it. They were again repulsed. Meantime Captain Crandle. of Company "E," with several companies was posted on
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the left hand ridge, but as that was not in the direction of their objective point, Walker's ford, they did not make as much effort there. They now, however, attacked with skirmishers our whole lines, flanks and center, where, besides, the battery, was now posted Company "I," at first mounted, but soon after dismounting and sending their horses to the rear. While their skirmishers at- tacked our whole line, they fiercely charged our right with a heavy column. The battle there became terrific, our battery aiding much by shelling their advancing col- umn. At this time the third battalion was temporarily thrown in the rear to reorganize. After this repulse there was a temporary lull, which augured mischief, so, at least, thought Captain Dent, when he sent Martin West and a companion over the crest of the right hand ridge to reconnoiter. These men soon returned with information that a body of the enemy on the other side of the ridge was advancing to flank our position. Two companies were immediately sent to head off this move. They were successful only in part, as several parties of sharpshooters had succeeded in passing our right and in gaining the heights on our right rear, from where they greatly annoyed our lines. The battle now raged in fury along the whole line. Seeing the inevitable necessity of falling back across the river, the third battalion and the battery were crossed over the river, taking position to aid the two other battalions to cross when compelled to. As Capron says, this was indeed a critical time. Com- pelled, in the face of an exultant enemy of ten times our number, and with their sharpshooters in our rear to mow us down, and in the face of this powerful force not only to retreat, but actually to retreat across an im- portant river. Here again our battery saved us, not only by holding in check their heavy columns, eager to charge upon us and crush us, but their sharpshooters, perched upon their lofty elevation, poured down on the colume which was crossing a shower of bullets that sounded in the water like a heavy shower of hail- stones. The two battalions were, however, in no haste to cross. One company at a time crossed and took posi- tion to repel a charge. Company "I," from the right, and Company "E," from the left, were the last to cross.
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We will here mention an individual incident out of re- spect for one of the bravest and best comrades, as well as one of the most skillful gunners, who that day fought his last battle. Guy Niles, of Company "I," was one of the best gunners in the service. At Buffington Island he had charge of one section of our guns that did such admirable service. In this fight Guy was wounded in the foot, and as Company "I" was falling back the writer observed Guy limping slowly in the rear and hastened to his assistance and aided him to reach the horses. Guy crossed the river and rode up to the battery boys. He pointed to a large party of rebel sharpshooters col- lected in a recess of rocks on the overhanging cliff and engaged in the pleasant pastime of sending as many balls as they could at our crossing column, without danger to themselves. Guy said: "I believe those are the rascals that shot me, and I would like to give them one shot in return." The battery boys gladly consented. Guy alighted, measured the distance and elevation with his eye, cut the fuse accordingly, loaded the gun, sighted it and fired. More than one who knew Guy's skill watched that shell with interest as it sped on its journey, landing precisely in the nest and exploding just at it reached the recess. A better shot never could have been made, and we could easily believe citizens when the next day they told us that that one shot killed twenty rebels. But, alas, it was Guy's last shot. His foot grew much inflamed, and in spite of his protestations he wa's soon com- pelled to go to the Knoxville hospital, where he soon after took the smallpox and died. Peace to his memory.
An incident that occurred just as we were preparing to fall back doubtless had something to do in checking the enemy from crushing us, when we attempted the dangerous movement of retiring across the river in the face of such overwhelming odds. Major Davidson came riding down at a full speed on the opposite bank of the river, and in his stentorian voice called: "Hold your position, boys, for fifteen minutes, and you will be rein- forced by 40,000 infantry." The only foundation for this was the fact that two regiments of infantry had already marched to Walker's ford, and one was march- ing for our ford. They came from Wilcox's forces at
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Tazewell. As the enemy anticipated a column of rein- forcements from Kentucky through the gap, under com- mand of Major General John G. Foster, the ruse was sufficient to cool their ardor somewhat.
Two companies, "I" and "C," were left to guard the ford, which they had but little trouble to do, until the arrival about sunset of an infantry regiment to relieve us. The enemy had found themselves completely foiled in their attempt to cut off any of our forces at the river, and having no further object in pressing forward, they gradually retired. Companies "I" and "C" now marched to Walker's ford and rejoined their comrades. There were mutual congratulations between the comrades of the different regiments. Each felt proud of all their comrades and felt an increased faith in them, a condi- tion essential to the best success of any military organi- zation. We will now give the reports and official state- ments made by others of this affair. General Martin in his report bestows the highest praise on the 14th, where, speaking of sending General Jones' division to cut Gra- ham off at Walker's ford, he says : "A force of the enemy prevented." Yes; 324 brave officers and men of the 14th Illinois Cavalry prevented Jones' division of cavalry, 3,368 strong. Our corps commander, General Wilcox, noticed this affair in several reports, from page 394 to 397, serial 54. We make short extracts: "Graham thinks Wheeler is present with his whole force, 6,000." Again: "They are pressing his left wing (14th Illinois Cavalry)." Again : "After quite a struggle to-day (December 2d) our troops remain in possession of Walker's ford." Again: "Colo- nel Graham's brigade have expended all their ammuni- tion, and will require to be replenished by morning."
Foster refers to the battle and says: "Three divisions of Wheeler's cavalry and Jones' division came out and drove Graham's brigade back from Maynardville to Walker's ford, on Clinch river.
After dark our brigade was withdrawn, leaving the infantry to guard the fords. Marched two miles and camped. Small rations and horse feed. Day's march, IO miles.
December 3d. Reveille at 4 a. m. Weather cold. Marched at sunrise. The 14th was sent across at Walk-
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er's ford to reconnoiter. Marched 3 miles and camped. Day's march, 7 miles.
December 4th. Reveille at 4 a. m. At 2 a. m. Lieu- tenant Boeke, with a dozen men of Company "I," 14th, was sent with dispatches to General Granger at Kings- ton. At 4 p. m. regiment marched to a crossroads within three miles of Maynardville, where we found our first battalion on picket. Built strong barricades, then bivou- acked. Marched 3 miles.
December 5th. Reveille at 4 a. m. At noon report came that the enemy were advancing. Formed line, but no enemy appeared. Then returned to camp in Hog- skin valley. March, 6 miles.
December 6. Reveille at 5 a. m. At 9 a. m. march toward Knoxville. Passed through Hogskin gap; camped near it in a grove. Found our road blockaded. Work- ing parties sent out to clear obstructions. We are almost entirely destitute of rations and horse feed. Marched at 2 p. m. through Bull's gap into Bull Run valley, then around by Emery's ford, into Hickory valley, where we rejoined the 5th and 65th, who had encountered and whipped a rebel command. We bivouacked after night in a heavy piece of timber. Marched 20 miles.
December 7th. Reveille at 2 p. m. Called out, formed line and remained till morning. At daylight Colvin's bat- tery shelled the enemy's camp. The first battalion was ad- vanced, but the rebels did not reply to their fire. The brigade moved up at 7 a. m. The rebels had retired. We followed through Emery's gap, into Emery's valley, skir- mishing with his rear, until he took position in Powder Spring gap, in Clinch mountain. We sent forward skirmishers, who engaged them for a few hours. The roughness of surrounding mountains prevented a flank movement. The road was blockaded with fallen timber, and the enemy were intrenched behind rocks, fallen timber and barricades, and their batteries planted to sweep all possible approaches. Our forces withdrew, retiring to Emery's gap, fed and dined, then marched into Hickory valley. The 14th went on picket down the valley ; marched 12 miles. Major-General John G. Foster, in serial 56, page 351, says of this affair : "I expected to join a brigade of infantry (with the cavalry), and drive the enemy from
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the summit of Clinch mountain, * but the troops were so weakened by the one-quarter rations that they have had for some months, that they did not get to the position in time. The cavalry had skirmished with the enemy all day." General Foster, in some of his reports, pictures the want of food and clothing with the troops as extreme. He says of his small force of cavalry: "They are splendid men, but almost destitute." He says, December 2d: "I have kept the small force under my command skirmishing with the enemy continually. Their forces being larger than mine, we have not been able to make much progress."
December 8th. Reveille at 5 a. m. At 9 a. m. marched down Bull Run valley. Reached Blaine's crossroads at noon, and joined General Shackelford, now in command of all of Burnside's cavalry. He had orders to pursue Gen- eral Longstreet, who was compelled to raise the siege of Knoxville by heavy reinforcements from Grant's army. Longstreet is now retiring towards Virginia. The roads are one continued mud hole, and every succeeding com- mand that passes over them leaves them worse. We moved up the valley two miles above Rutledge. Marched 20 miles. We now get no government rations and depend entirely upon the country, and the rebels have cleaned Richland Valley of everything except mud.
December 9th. Reveille at 5 a. m. March at 10 a. m. up the valley ; camped in a wood on the right of the road, a half mile below Bean Station. March 15 miles.
December Ioth. Reveille at 4:30 a. m. We have had only quarter rations for the last five days. Today we had general review, and a splendid speech by General Shackel- ford, in which he regretted the retirement of General Burnside from East Tennessee. Citizens and soldiers all regretted his withdrawal. Wm. G. Brownlow, in a peti- tion to President Lincoln, said: "We beg you not to let East Tennessee be abandoned by our troops. Burnside, whether he holds or has been defeated, is a glorious moral and military hero, and deserves everlasting honor." Gen- eral Foster says (page 281 ) : "I arrived here (Knoxville) on the evening of the IIth, and received the command from General Burnside the 12th. General Parke was now above Blaine's crossroads, with about 10,000 infantry, be- ing the number of the 9th corps, and the 23d corps, capable
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