USA > Illinois > History of Fourteenth Illinois cavalry and the brigades to which it belonged > Part 20
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Illinois regiment ;" but he did not remember my name. I then reminded him of writing some vouchers for me for horses that I had sold to him. He then remembered that my name was Norris. The general now ordered the senti- nel to disperse the crowd, and he questioned me about comrade Welch. I informed him that he was the orderly sergeant of my company, "G," of the 14th Illinois Cavalry. He was now satisfied and we had passed a trying ordeal ; the danger of being hanged on the accusation of an old gray-haired sinner."
We omit a small portion of comrade Norris' narrative that relates only to personal reminiscence that is interest- ing, but we are crowded for space in our history, being limited to the number of pages, and must omit that which does not relate to real history. Suffice it to say comrades Norris and Welch succeeded, after some difficulty, in obtaining a furlough home-a merited boon for the faith- ful services they had rendered, the hardships endured, and the perils escaped and after the march of over 600 miles through rebel settlements and rebel armed forces. Theirs was a wonderful escape from perils and full of romance, and above all else, it was strictly true. They both rejoined their regiment and served faithfully to the muster out of the regiment July 31st, 1865. In distance traveled these comrades were far ahead of other fugitives, while their real privations were not so great as some, owing to the choice of a route that evaded the rebel lines.
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CHAPTER XIII.
REMOUNTING, AND SERVICE UNDER GENERAL SCHOFIELD AND GENERAL THOMAS.
The history from the remounting in Kentucky to the destruction of Hood's army, is in two chapters. Chapter Thirteen extends to the falling back to Columbia.
Colonel Capron had been promised a speedy remount and a full rearming as cavalry, including Spencer carbines, and that his command should rejoin Sherman at Atlanta. Capron says in his memoirs that he immediately made the proper requisition for horses and for cavalry arms, includ- ing Spencer carbines as promised. He says the command was inspired with the hope, and deemed this promise to be a recognition of their valuable services in East Tennessee and in Georgia.
October 14th. Reveille at daylight; marched in high spirits to the depot at Nicholasville, boarded a train and started for Louisville at 4 p. m. ; passed through Lexing- ton, reached Louisville at daylight, October 15th. Marched to soldiers' home, got breakfast, then marched to suburbs of the city and camped. Traveled 103 miles. The following officers captured are yet in captivity : Cap- tains Sanford, Perkins and Mayo, Majors Quigg and Davidson, and Adjutant Chauncey Miller.
Sunday, October 16th. Drew horses and horse equip- ments, but no cavalry arms. These were now promised to be given at Nashville, as we were now under orders to march to Pulaski, Tennessee, to aid in repelling Hood's invasion of Tennessee. In serial 93, page 566, General James H. Wilson, now chief of cavalry of this division, speaks of this order.
Capron says : "The order was peremptory, and I was compelled to march without arms, it being understood that our cavalry arms would be forwarded by rail to Nashville."
October 17th. Mounted and started at I p. m. for Nicholasville ; disappointed in both promises, to go home,
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and to be armed as cavalry and to rejoin Sherman. The latter was the great disappointment.
October 18th. Reveille at 3 a. m. Marched at day- light. Passed through Boston, Simpsonville, Hardins- ville, Bridgeport and Shelbyville, 36 miles. Camped with- in two miles of Frankfort.
October 19th. Marched through Frankfort at sunrise ; reached camp near Nicholasville at sundown, having marched 45 miles. Found our tents standing as we had left them. Sherman and Hood were playing a sharp game of war. Each was closely watching the other while con- cealing his own intentions. Hood had marched to Sher- man's rear, but whether only to cut Sherman's rear, or to strike for Nashville and the Ohio river was known only to himself and Beauregard, who was the rebel commander of that department. When Sherman had determined to cut loose from his communications and strike for the sea, he sent General Thomas to Nashville to gather up an army with which to oppose Hood's advance northward, if he attempted it, or to follow and harrass Hood should he at- tempt to follow Sherman. A portion of the 4th Corps, under General Stanley, was hurried to Pulaski on the rail- road in the southern part of middle Tennessee.
Hood's report (page 659, serial 93), shows that he left Palmetto Station, Georgia.
General Beauregard in report on page 647 says, on 19th of October, Hood was at Gadsden on his way toward middle Tennessee, with intention to cross the Tennessee river at Gunter's landing. A conference with Hood was held and Beauregard approved his plan of crossing the river and striking for middle Tennessee, and earnestly urged an immediate movement on that route. Both gen- erals deemed that Sherman could not provision his army in a march through Georgia to the sea, and that he would be compelled to fall back to Tennessee, if his communica- tions were cut in his rear. Serial 93, page 663, gives strength of Hood's army 6th of November, 1864: Aggre- gate infantry, 87,016 ; cavalry, 5,148 ; artillery, 4,203 ; total, 96,367 ; and on December 10th, infantry, 77,631 ; cavalry, 5,148 ; artillery, 4,283 ; total, 86,982. Of course his effec- tive present was much less. A note says : "Crossed Ten- nessee river November 21st, with 30,600." His army was
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composed of the following army corps : Lee's, Stewart's and Cheatham's infantry and Jackson's division of cavalry. On October 19th, at Gadsden, Hood was only 40 miles from Gunter's landing, where he designed to cross the river. At that time there was no force gathered to oppose him in a direct march to Nashville. Hood was a most impulsive commander, his tactics were sudden and unex- pected movements. General Beauregard strongly urged this course. Why Hood did not follow his usual tactics where everything favored it, seems to have been due to the fact that Providence was guiding him to his fate; that this cruel war might be ended, and the right brought to triumph.
Major-General James H. Wilson is now chief of cavalry corps, military division of the Mississippi. See his re- port beginning page 654, serial 93. On page 556 he says : "General Croxton's brigade of the first division, having been recently remounted at Louisville, Colonel Capron's brigade of the sixth division, and the fifth division (com- manded by General Edward Hatch, see page 575), while on the march to join Sherman, were halted by General Thomas, and directed to act in conjunction with the in- fantry forces assembling at Pulaski under General Stanley, to resist the march of Hood." Wilson in another report (see page 557), gives the strength of this cavalry on November 23d : "The fifth division (Hatch's) 2,500 men, Croxton's brigade, about 1,000, and Capron's, 800; in all about 4,300." This was the situation at this time, and these the reasons for the change of our field of operations. We remained in Nicholasville, busy in our preparation for our march, and with pleasant weather, until October 23d at 9 a. m., started on march for Nashville ; halted at noon at camp Nelson to have horses shod, then marched a few miles and camped. March 10 miles. Through some blunder we had no rations.
October 24th. Reveille at 5 a. m. Marched at 8 a. m. through Camp Dick Robinson at noon, and on Lebanon and Glasgow road, camped. March, 32 miles.
October 25th. Reveille at 5 a. m. March at 7; pass through Lebanon and on Glasgow road 32 miles and camped.
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October 26th. Reveille at 5, march at 7 a. m. 25 miles to Barren river and camp.
October 27th. Reveille at 5 ; march at 7 a. m .; pass through Glasgow, so long our headquarters while chasing guerrillas through Kentucky. The sight of this place re- calls many memories of our first service. Marched 23 miles and camped ; rained at night.
October 28th. Reveille at 5 ; march at 7 a. m. ; 25 miles and camp.
October 29th. Reveille at 5 ; march at 7 a. m .; pass through Gallatin, a nice town ; march 25 miles and camp.
October 30th. Reveille at 5 ; march at 8 a. m. to Nash- ville, a nice city ; crossed Cumberland river on railroad bridge ; passed through the city and camped 3 miles S. E., near Camp Smith. Marched 15 miles through fine, well
improved country. Capron's Memoirs say: "No cavalry arms could be obtained. The emergency of the service demanding that we should at once take the field, and as no other weapons were attainable, Springfield muskets were issued to the command ; a weapon with which these troops had no experience, and a more unsuitable weapon for the service before us could not be ; confronted as we were to be, with one of the best organized and equipped forces in the Confederate service, with Forrest's famous cavalry as its advance guard. This had a most damaging effect. These men had been much encouraged to expect that they would be properly armed, and they actually refused to re-
ceive the muskets. Many broke them around the trees and an open mutiny was the result, taxing the officers heavily to quell." Capron further says: "General Thomas' unguarded remark, that they would do to shoot guerrillas with, was not calculated to lessen the excite- ment, and I have since thought that he could not then have anticipated the heavy task before him. For this command it proved to be the most trying ordeal that cavalry could be subjected to." Cavalry in making, or resisting a cav- alry charge, might as well have been armed with clubs. The officers alone, down to orderly sergeants, were armed with sabers and revolvers.
October 3Ist. Reveille at daylight ; marched at II a. m. back through Nashville, then south on Franklin pike 15
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miles and camped. Marched 18 miles through fine coun- try.
November Ist. Reveille at 5 ; march at 7 a. m .; pass through Franklin, a nice town on the Harpeth river, and through Spring Hill and camped. March 28 miles. Fine weather until today it rained hard.
November 2d. Reveille at 5 ; march at 8 a. m., through Columbia, a small town on Duck river and on the Nashville railroad. Marched on the Pulaski road 15 miles and camped in a wood. March, 25 miles; rained very hard last night and today.
November 3d. Reveille at 5; march at 8 a. m., to Pulaski, an antiquated town, unimportant except as a strategical military position, necessary to be held because it was a key to the occupation of the railroad over which supplies must come to our army. We camped in a rocky piece of woods, 3 miles S. E. of town. March, 18 miles; rained hard last night and today. We saw several divi- sions of the 4th Corps coming into Pulaski. Pulaski was selected as a base of operations for our rallying army, be- cause of its advantages as an advanced post of observation in watching Hood's movements, and as a good point to begin opposition to Hood's advance toward Nashville, should he attempt it. Hood was now at Florence, having changed his route, as he says, on account of the better pro- visioning his army, and to await the coming of Forrest's cavalry force, as he did not deem Jackson's division of cav- alry, about 5,000, as sufficient to make his advance with, yet it was more cavalry than we were able to get south of Columbia, and had Hood moved promptly as he had planned to do by way of Gunter's landing, he would then have found no cavalry to oppose him, and no other force of consequence. Hood was now at Florence, on the Ten- nessee river S. W. from Pulaski. His movements indi- cated an intention to advance upon Nashville. There were a number of wagon roads from Florence and vicinity northward toward Nashville; neither of them striking Pulaski, but all converging on Columbia, 30 miles in the rear of Pulaski. The most direct being by way of Law- renceburg, 22 miles west of Pulaski, another by way of Waynesboro, over 50 miles west of Pulaski. Other roads parallel to these entered each of them at various points.
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This formed a triangular tract of country to be watched by our cavalry that was more than 50 miles wide at the base, and converging to a point at Columbia. The in- fantry at Pulaski could do no more than guard well that point, leaving this immense belt of country to the west to be guarded by our small force of cavalry. Hatch and Croxton having been remounted before us, had arrived and had been sent forward toward the river to watch Hood's movements. We remained in our first camp until Novem- ber 8th, having much rain and cold.
November 8th. Reveille at daylight; marched at 8 a. m. back through Pulaski and up the Athens pike eastward 2 miles, and camped in a wood. Marched 5 miles.
November 9th. Reveille at daylight; rained all night and all day. A detachment from the brigade, under Major Beers, of the 16th Illinois, was sent on scout. They re- turned, having scouted four days without discovering the enemy in force.
November 10th. Reveille at 5 a. m. Scouting parties of 50 or 60 have been sent out daily. Today a party of 60 men, under Lieutenant Anderson, of Company "H," and Lieutenant W. L. Sanford, of Company "I," 14th Illinois Cavalry, marched to within a few miles of Columbia, then turned ona byroad westward toward Campbellsville, halted within six miles of that place and bivouacked till morning. Were in the saddle by break of day, and at sunrise entered Campbellsville. Halted to warm at the burning ruins of a dwelling, fired in the night by some Tennessee soldiers, in retaliation for homes burned by some of the rebel inhabi- tants of that village. While warming, our vidette in our rear were fired upon by a party of guerrillas, who were ap- proaching on the road we had just pasesd over. Lieuten- ant Anderson, with a part of the detachment, immediately dashed down the road to attack them, when they broke across the fields westward toward a wooded hill in the distance. Lieutenant Sanford, with the remainder of the detachment, gave pursuit across fences and through deep mud, pursuing the party for two miles, when they made their escape into a high rocky and wooded hill, so inacces- sible to mounted men as to be impossible to charge mounted, and posting themselves behind rocks at consider- able height, all attempt to capture them was abandoned.
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As we were under orders to report immediately back to camp, we had no time for maneuvering to capture them. This adventure is given, not for any especial merits of its own, but rather as a sample of the many others occurring almost every day, and which were never reported. We hastened back to camp, where we reported about 4 p. m. of November IIth ; having marched since the morning be- fore 70 miles.
November 12th. Reveille at 2 a. m. At 4 a. m. a large detachment of our brigade, under Major Tompkins, marched westward to reconnoiter. It was reported by General Hatch that the enemy were moving toward Waynesboro. Halted and fed at I p. m., after having passed through Lawrenceburg, a dilapidated town on the direct road from Florence to Columbia, and 22 miles west of Pulaski. We then continued to march rapidly until sundown, when we halted within a mile of Waynesboro; having marched over 50 miles. We sent forward scouts, who soon returned with intelligence that a considerable force had been in Waynesboro, and that the enemy were moving that way. Lieutenants Anderson and Sanford were selected to take a battalion and hasten back to Pulaski with dispatches, and were instructed to hasten to pass through Lawrenceburg, as it was reported that a force of the enemy was moving rapidly on that road. This bat- talion marched double quick, reaching Pulaski at I a. m. of November 13th, having marched since 4 a. m. of the morning before, 100 miles in 21 hours, or a continuous march averaging 5 miles an hour, not deducting the halt, the last half being at the rate of 7 miles an hour for 7 hours. Major Tompkins camped his men between Waynesboro and Lawrenceburg, where he remained a number of days scouting between those two places. The rebel force at Waynesboro, was three rebel regiments under Colonel Rucker.
November 13th. In camp. General Schofield arrived at Pulaski today.
November 14th. General Schofield took command of all the forces at the front today. (See his report, page 909, serial 93.) He reports his infantry force at 18,000, with four brigades of cavalry (Hatch 2, Croxton I, Capron I, 4,300 in all) ; he estimates Hood's infantry at 40,000,
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and his cavalry at from 10,000 to 20,000, under Forrest, who had now joined him. Scouts and captured prisoners afterward gave Forrest's cavalry at 15,000.
General Schofield, on the 14th, ordered Capron with his brigade to move to Mt. Pleasant, with orders to camp as far in front of that place as he could find forage, and scout well toward Waynesboro. (See page 885. )
On the 15th Hatch reports (see page 899) : "I have not cavalry enough to close in on my right to the Tennes- see river. If you could spare me Capron's brigade, think we could close them in so effectually not a forage party could get out of Florence without a fight for it."
On the same page is Schofield's prompt reply: "Yes- terday I sent Colonel Capron with his brigade to Mt. Pleasant, with orders to scout toward Waynesboro, and have now sent him your dispatch, with orders to communi- cate with you, and act under your orders when your forces ineet."
As Hatch was on the left of Waynesboro, to form a line between Hatch and the river as he suggested, it was necessary for Capron to advance as far as Waynesboro. In obedience to the first order, we marched at 9 a. m. on the 14th, on the Columbia pike 17 miles, then turned nearly west a few miles and camped. March, 20 miles.
November 15th. Reveille at 3 a. m. ; rained ; march at 7 a. m. northwesterly, through rough country, 12 miles to Mt. Pleasant. Camped at 3 p. m. Whole march through rain and mud.
November 16th. Rainy night. A detachment of the 14th, under Captain Connelly, of Company "L," was sent on scout toward Waynesboro.
November 17th. We are now ordered to Waynesboro, 40 miles in advance of this point, toward the river, to watch the movements of Forrest and Hood. March at 8 a. m .; passed through Henryville, a small town, and through a wilderness country. Camped on a rough piece of ground, water inconvenient ; march, 27 miles.
November 18th. At I a. m. our camp was alarmed and command called out. One of our ambulances approach- ing our rear picket was challenged and failed to respond ; was fired upon and a sick man was wounded. The com- mand was ordered to bivouack. At 8 a. m. November
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18th, when within a few miles of Waynesboro, our ad- vance, under Lieutenant Boren, of Company "G," 14th, encountered a rebel scouting party and charged upon them, killing, wounding and capturing a number of them, and having one man wounded. Our party pursued the rebels through and beyond Waynesboro. We camped in the town about 3 p. m., having marched 21 miles. Rainy day.
On page 936 Capron reports from Waynesboro, Novem- ber 18th : "I occupied this place this evening with a loss of one killed, one mortally, and one severely wounded ; and captured two of Forrest's scouts. Major Beers joined us from a scout today."
On the 19th it rained.
November 20th. Lieutenant Allen, Company "D," 14th, with 50 men, sent on scout toward Florence. They drove a party of rebels many miles, when the rebel party was so strongly reinforced that they in turn retreated. In this camp we suffered much for lack of rations and horse feed. On page 937 Capron reports : "I can hear nothing of General Hatch. Forage very scarce ; none on the road to Mt. Pleasant, and none on Lawrenceburg and Mt. Pleasant road. I have four days' rations for the com- mand, and my only base of supplies is either Columbia via Mt. Pleasant, 56 miles, or Pulaski via Lawrenceburg, 52 miles distant. A rebel force, under Colonel Biffle, is 15 miles west. Another at Linden, 28 miles north." On page 965, November 20th, Capron reports : "Impossible to procure forage for stock or rations for the men, either beyond, or to the rear of this place. I have sent out scouts on every road to obtain intelligence, and gather supplies. The country in every direction is destitute of everything for man or beast. The roads impassable for teams. It is impossible to advance my main force. I can obtain for- age a few days longer at this place, but no rations of con- sequence. I can hear nothing of General Hatch. My scouts will penetrate farther today in hopes of finding him."
On same page to General Wilson, Capron alludes to the inefficient arms of his men, and adds : "We are in an iso- lated position, 55 miles from supplies in any direction. The country around us is completely swept of everything, and the roads are next to impassable. I was ordered to advance
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to this position, and if possible open communication with General Hatch. Yesterday my scouts entered Clifton, and penetrated within 3 miles of West Point, and 20 miles out on Florence road. I am at a loss to know what to do, in the absence of any further instructions from any source. I have reported regularly to General Schofield at Pulaski, but up to this time ( November 20th) my couriers have not returned. I shall be able to eke out our subsistence for a day or two longer, by gathering in, for 20 miles around, everything eatable for man or beast. The impassable roads, incessant rains, heavy scouting, and the necessity for bringing in their forage on the horses on which they ride, our horses are fast being made unserviceable and useless."
On page 964, November 20th, Colonel Strickland, at Columbia, said to Capron : "The enclosed dispatch is from General Schofield, and he instructs me to say to you, to watch and delay Forrest's movements, and try and unite with General Hatch ; who will move between Forrest and the railroad." The following is the enclosed dispatch from Schofield : "I have just received your note of 18th. You seem to have entirely misunderstood your instructions, and I expect to hear of the capture of your brigade. Move back at once toward Mount Pleasant as far as the inter- section of the Lawrenceburg and Waynesboro roads, on the latter road. General Hatch reports Forrest advancing toward Lawrenceburg yesterday noon. Perhaps you may get this in time." This message indicates the great peril to which Capron's brigade was exposed, so great that Gen- eral Schofield despaired of Capron being able to prevent his capture ; but his declaration that Capron had misunder- stood his instructions in going to Waynesboro, seems strange when those instructions were to comply with Gen- eral Hatch's request, to form on his right a line extending to the river in order to pen Hood's foragers in Florence. The language "keep in the presence of the enemy ;" a thing impossible to do unless he went to where the enemy were. Any one acquainted with the country, with the position of Waynesboro and the relative position of the contending forces, who would carefully study Scho- field's instructions to Capron, must conclude that nothing short of Capron's advance to Waynesboro, would be obedi-
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ence to those instructions. Even Schofield's present in- structions through Colonel Strickland say: "Watch and delay Forrest's movements and try and unite with General Hatch." How Schofield expected Capron to unite with General Hatch, when he says in the same dispatch : "Who (Hatch) will move between Forrest and the rail- road," thus placing Forrest between the commands of Capron and Hatch, is hard to understand. Capron could only do this by abandoning the Waynesboro road, which even the present dispatch commanded Capron to operate on, and "delay Forrest's movements.", Viewed in any light, Schofield's language considered in connection with his instructions, sounds very strangely.
On page 963, November 20th, Schofield said to Hatch : "I ordered Capron to feel for the enemy from Mount Pleasant, and to open communication with you, and he has wandered off to Waynesboro. I am trying to get him back."
One thing was plainly demonstrated by subsequent events, that if Capron really misunderstood instructions, his wandering off to Waynesboro was the most fortunate misunderstanding of instructions that a military man ever made. Nothing short of this ever could have saved Scho- field's army. We will here quote from official records, showing the situation. Schofield, with all his infantry, is at Pulaski on the railroad. The next important post on the railroad is Columbia, 30 miles in rear of Pulaski. Hood and Forrest are at Florence on the Tennessee river. Hood's object is known to be to reach Nashville, and if pos- sible to destroy Schofield's army. To do this if he could reach Columbia with a sufficient force before Schofield could reach that point, he could cut off and destroy Scho- field's army when no other force would interfere with his seizure of Nashville, nor with his march to the Ohio river. The most direct road to Columbia from Florence is via Lawrenceburg, near where General Hatch, with his divi- sion, 2,500, and General Croxton, with his brigade, 1,000, are posted to watch and oppose Forrest's advance. The incessant rains had rendered all the roads so nearly im- passable, as to cause both General Thomas and General Schofield to believe that Hood could not possibly advance. There was another route for Hood's forces to Columbia
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