USA > Illinois > History of Fourteenth Illinois cavalry and the brigades to which it belonged > Part 18
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charging column of desperate men, each of whom pre- ferred death on the battlefield to incarceration in Ander- sonville, that hell presided over by the demon Wirz. The enemy's strong lines are broken, and woods and under- brush, usually great impediments to the passage of mounted men, are dashed through by these maddened troopers, as though they were dashing over a plain.
Captain Lord says: "We now marched rapidly in a northeasterly direction, and struck an old road called the "Hog mountain road," which favored us, as it led through a wooded and hilly country and was not much traveled. Twenty-four hours put 50 or 60 miles between us and our disastrous battlefield."
Capron says of the retreat after he heard of Stoneman's intended surrender : "So closely did the enemy press my command, many of the men were unable to mount their horses, the enemy capturing and mounting them, repeatedly charged my rear as I continued to retreat. I determined to extricate what I could of my command, and if possible reach our lines. I moved rapidly on, struck the Etonton road, and moved toward Etonton, the enemy still pursuing and harrassing my rear, wounding and killing a number of my men."
A few miles out we were joined by other detachments who had escaped through the lines broken by us. The forces were now reorganized, many of the men had lost their arms in charging the rebel lines, many more had exhausted their ammunition; the command numbered about 300. We crossed Murder creek and moved toward Madison, leaving Etonton on our right ; marched all night, bearing off to the left of Madison. About 6 p. m., while passing through a long, narrow lane, we were vigorously attacked in the rear by a strong detachment of the enemy. Many of the men who had no arms or ammunition were panic stricken. Major Quigg, taking Captains Sanford and Mayo and Lieutenant Balderston, collected the armed men of the command, threw themselves in the rear and fought the charging enemy back, and thus saved the com- mand from utter rout. The enemy, however, continued to harrass us till night.
August Ist, in the morning, were joined by Major Davidson and his command. We now marched rapidly
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through Columbus and Rutledge Station, and joined Colonel Adams' brigade at Powder's farm, 7 miles from Rutledge. We made our first halt between Madison and Yellow river, having marched 60 miles since the evening of July 3Ist to the evening of August Ist. Lieutenant- Colonel Matson, with a detachment, joined us about the time that we joined Colonel Adams. The united com- mands moved towards Watkinsville, arriving there the morning of August 2d.
Capron says : "After consultation with Colonel Adams it was thought best to attempt to cross the Oconee river at Athens. Colonel Adams (whose men were armed) was to make a demonstration on the town, with the under- standing that if he could not effect a crossing at the bridge, he was to send me a courier and guide and I was to join his command, and cross the river at a ford two and a half miles above the town. The courier reported after it was found impossible to cross the bridge, but the guide mistook the road and led me six miles away from the route agreed upon. After a delay of six hours in trying to com- municate with Colonel Adams, we learned that a heavy body of cavalry and infantry was approaching on the right. As we were not in a condition to make resistance we were compelled to move toward "Hog mountain," on the left, thus separating from Colonel Adams, who continued a northern course. We moved to "Jug Tavern," 18 miles, where we halted, fed and again moved forward until we passed the Jeffersonville and Lawrenceville road. The men and animals were now so completely exhausted that rest was absolutely necessary. Many of the men had fallen asleep on their horses on the night's march, and fell out of ranks and were picked up by the rebels."
We had made long and rapid marches and were almost constantly in the saddle since the 31st, and indeed almost without rest since the morning of 27th of July, 7 days be- fore.
Captain Lord says of the consultation with Colonel Adams : "Colonel Adams determined to attack that place (Athens) and cross the river, with a view of making a detour into the mountains of North Carolina if pursued. His view was not shared by Colonel Capron or the writer (Captain Lord), but his command being fully armed and
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having a supply of ammunition, was in shape to defend itself, while a large number of Capron's men were unarmed, and many who had arms had no ammunition, so a separation was not deemed prudent by Colonel Capron." Captain Lord confirms Capron's statement relative to the guide, and continues: "We continued the march after losing several hours of valuable time. The command marched as rapidly as possible until between 12 and I o'clock on the morning of August 3d, when the men, over- come by fatigue and want of sleep, were absolutely unable to move and fell asleep by the roadside without any order. Major Davidson's command (having their arms) was placed as rear guard, and Captain Lord was in command of the advance guard. Just before daylight we were at- tacked from the rear, and the negroes (who were sleeping between the rear guard and the main body) were panic stricken."
The advance picket of the rear guard was commanded by Lieutenant Isaac H. Allen, of Company "D." He in- formed the writer that when first attacked by the vanguard of the enemy, his men were all asleep, but rallied and drove back the attacking party, and again dropped to sleep and in this condition were charged upon by the main body of the enemy, who killed or captured all his men ; he also was captured. The charging column of yelling rebels swept down through the mass of sleeping negroes, who suddenly wakened, to be cut down; those who escaped this fate rushed in mass before the relentless rebels into Capron's column of sleeping men, who, suddenly wakened from sound sleep by the howling negroes and yelling rebels, found themselves in a mingled mass of confused soldiers, panic-stricken negroes, and relentless yelling rebels, who were indiscriminately cutting down all that were not of their command. Had our men been well armed, it would have been impossible in that confused and excited mass to have formed line and made a successful resistance, but un- ·armed as they were, there was no resort but flight. In- deed, so rapid was the rebel charge that as each successive soldier was reached and wakened, he had only time to be cut down or to escape that fate by dodging into the fields or woods or by rapid flight on the road. Captain Lord's men, in the advance, formed line to resist the attack, but
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were soon thrown into confusion by the fleeing mass, many of whom met their doom in Mulberry river a short distance ahead, as the bridge gave way with its overload, precipitat- ing all into the river and drowning many. Most of those who succeeded in escaping did so by dodging into the woods singly, or in small squads, afterward making their way as best they could through fields and woods by night, concealing themselves by day, and subsisting on green corn, unroasted, and roots and berries, avoiding main roads and slipping round rebel pickets. They were hunted by rebel soldiers, and by guerrillas, and rebel citizens with dogs, and many of the captured were murdered on the spot, and others taken to Andersonville had a worse fate than sudden death. Colonel Capron, Lieutenant-Colonel Jenkins, Captain Lord, and Captain Mayo were amongst the number of fugitives who came in on foot ; some of them coatless and hatless, and one of the commanders without boots. Many were captured; Wirz was made to rejoice at the number of new victims brought to him for torture. What a sad ending was the fate of these noble men, who, to release from that southern hell their comrades who were rotting and dying by inches, were themselves doomed to the same horrid fate. But not all who fell into their hands were sent to that horrid prison ; many were butchered as they were overtaken, and many more captured made their escape before reaching prison, for it was difficult to hold bold, skillful, resolute men who well knew what their fate would be once confined within those horrid walls. While our records show the names of those confined in southern prisons and those who died there, they do not show the names of the many who were captured and made their escape. Seldom did one military undertaking fur- nish as many and as exciting individual adventures as did this raid to Macon, Georgia. We have gathered a few sketches, which may be taken as only fair samples of many scores of which we have not been furnished narratives.
Andersonville-no, Andersonhell. Oh! the everlasting infamy that crowns that monument of secession with a halo glowing with the fires of the infernal regions. Fit- tingly execrated by all the world. Even Turkey and Spain would be ashamed of it. What in the world's his- tory can compare to it ? Many of our fugitive comrades
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fleeing on foot and unarmed from worse than the jaws of death, traveling through swamps and thorns and briers, that they might avoid their bloodthirsty, relentless pur- suers. With nothing but berries and roots and occasion- ally raw green corn to eat, they were so emaeciated and foot-sore with hundreds of miles of tortuous paths trav- ersed, that when they reached our lines they could scarcely stand; indeed some were prostrated for days. We will now give the operations of Major Davidson's command, which left the main command 7 miles north of Clinton, moved rapidly toward Milledgeville to make a feint on that place; turned suddenly toward Gordon; struck the railroad 7 miles east of Gordon, burned a bridge and all the trestlework, and cattle-guards; sent a small detach- ment under Sergeant Aganew, who cut the telegraph ; then the command pressed forward to Gordon, the junction of the Etonton and Georgia Central railroad; captured the operator and the town ; burned a large brick depot filled with army supplies; destroyed II locomotives and II trains of cars, of which 40 were passenger cars; 80 box cars filled with army stores, and 20 open cars loaded with machinery, belonging to railroad company ; also one cot- ton factory. One account says, 150 freight and passenger cars, and 275 flat and box cars loaded with supplies ; de- stroyed the telegraph office and instruments ; tore up half a mile of railroad track; then moved down Central rail- road track eastward to Emmet Station, 16 miles, burning all the cattle-guards on the road; destroying much of the road as we went. At Emmet burned a large depot filled with supplies, and tore up quarter of a mile of track, then moved 8 miles farther to Toomsboro, burned a large brick depot filled with supplies, a flouring mill and a saw mill, and some trains, and tore up railroad track, and burned a railroad bridge 300 feet long. Reached McIntyre Station at daylight July 30th ; captured a party of Confederate soldiers, whom we paroled ; destroyed the depot and a large amount of army supplies. We then moved toward the Oconee river, burning thousands of cords of wood, de- stroyed cattle-guardsand burned a mile and a half of trestle work, halted near the river, built barricades. Lieutenant L. W. Boren, of Company "G," 14th Illinois, with Com- panies "A" and "G," marched to the river, drove the rebel
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guards, 150 men, with two pieces of artillery, from the bridge. Sergeant Aganew, with a squad, was sent for- ward, who soon had this, the finest bridge in the south, and having 700 yards of trestlework, all in flames. In 15 minutes the mighty bridge swayed and tumbled into the flood, a total wreck. Although the rebels had a duplicate bridge prepared, it took them one month to get it in place. Sergeant Aganew needed not to send a courier to the main command to notify them that he had succeeded, the heavy column of smoke sent up by such a mass of burning dry pine was a sufficient message. Lieutenant Boren and party now fell back to the main command, which moved back, and just as they entered the main road they discov- ered a large rebel force that had just passed down to guard the bridge (but now to mourn over its ashes). Our party struck in between the main force and its rear guard, and charging down on the latter, drove them in utter confusion, never stopping to gather up the arms and hats that strewed the road. They drove them several miles, capturing some, whom they paroled; and at the first favorable diverging road they dashed off in a direction to baffle pursuit if it were attempted. When within five miles of Milledgeville we turned abruptly to the right, reaching the Oconee river 12 miles from Milledgeville at 8 p. m. A small flatboat was discovered on the opposite side. It now grew very dark. Lieutenant Anderson, of Company "H," volun- teered to swim the river and get the boat. Although a thunderstorm prevailed and it grew pitch dark, except as flashes of lightning revealed objects, the Lieutenant suc- ceeded, and with the use of this boat, the whole command was safely across by I o'clock a. m. of July 31st. At day- light we passed around Milledgeville, driving in their pickets. They had here a large rebel force. We pushed rapidly up the river, destroying large banks of wood, trav- eling mostly on byroads ; halted at noon to take a corn- bread lunch, recrossed the Oconee river on a small flat- boat at "Walker's ford," 27 miles above Milledgeville. Marched on the Sparta and Macon road near to Eatonton ; then northwest on the Madison and Eatonton road, calling at a boot and shoe factory, where our command was thor- oughly supplied with footgear. An order to burn the factory was withdrawn when it was learned that a church,
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a schoolhouse and some dwellings would be endangered. The night was dark and rainy, but we pushed on, halting at 2 a. m. of August Ist, and slept about three hours, the first sleep enjoyed since starting on this raid the 27th of July, five days before. Some of our men had been lost by drop- ping to sleep in their saddles and being left behind. At daylight marched three miles, halted, fed and breakfasted, then pressed forward toward Madison. About IO a. m. we came up with Capron's fugitive command, and was thenceforward a part of that force and involved in its fate. The Major had designed to cross the railroad west of the circle, pass out west of Monroe and Lawrenceville, into our lines ; but being better armed than Capron's men, we were called upon to protect their rear. An agreement was made for all to go out on Davidson's route, but for some reason this intended route was abandoned for the one toward Athens." This small command had been handled with consummate skill, and had accomplished an immense amount of work. They had marched and worked five days and nights, marched 200 miles, burned 5 large depots filled with army supplies, destroyed 13 engines, 15 trains of cars, numbering not less than 400 cars, most of them loaded with supplies, and destroyed and crippled fully five miles of railroad track and trestlework ; burned the largest bridge in the south, and not less than 12 bridges of various sizes, nearly all the cattle-guards on their route; 2 large flouring mills, 2 saw mills, 3 manufactories, many banks of wood, and much other public property, including miles of telegraph wire, and one telegraph office and instru- ments.
There was destroyed by Stoneman's main command, principally by the 14th Illinois Cavalry, 2 depots, 8 engines, 6 trains of cars, not less than 90 cars, and 5 miles of rail- road track crippled or destroyed, 2 factories, 2 grist mills, 2 saw mills, large amounts of military stores and 5 or 6 bridges. Making a total for Stoneman's command, 7 large depots, with stores, 10 miles of railroad track and trestlework, 18 engines and trains, principally loaded with army supplies and war material, about 600 cars; and this with 2,200 men, marching round the rebel army, having that army and one large unbridged river intervening be- tween him and any support. McCook, with 4,000 men,
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with no intervening river, cut his way through to Lovejoy Station, destroyed some railroad and some other property, but scarcely worth mentioning compared with that de- stroyed by Stoneman's command, while he met with nearly equal disaster, losing a large part of his command, all his captured property and prisoners. Sherman seemed some- what disappointed at the results of Stoneman's and Mc- Cook's raids, but never complained of either. He con- cluded that General Kilpatrick could succeed better, so he takes a more favorable opportunity, when Wheeler had left with a strong force, estimated at from 6,000 to 20,000, to raid our rear. Sherman says, August 16th, in a mes- sage to General Thomas : "I do think our cavalry should now break the Macon road good. What say you to letting General Kilpatrick have two of General Gar- rard's brigades, to strike across to the Macon road and tear it up good."
(See serial 76, page 525.) Again, same page: "If Wheeler took out 6,000 with him I don't be- lieve 4,000 good cavalry remains to the enemy in our front." Sherman is sanguine of success and Kilpatrick replies that he is sure of success. With 4,500 good cav- alry he makes the attempt, starting August 18th. He suc- ceeds in reaching the railroad. See his report (serial 73, page 858) : "Left Sand Town August 18th, with force of
4,500 men." Again: "We effectually destroyed 4 miles of railroad." He also succeeded in destroying some other property, but insignificant as compared to that destroyed by Stoneman with less than half the force and in the face of all of Wheeler's cavalry before he had gone, as Sher- man thought, with the greater part of his effective cavalry. It is now well known that Wheeler had not less than 25,000 good cavalry. Sherman was again disappointed, but his eyes were opened as to the difficulty of capturing the Macon road. In serial 76, page 628, August 22d, he says to General Hallack, after enumerating Kilpatrick's work, 3 miles of road destroyed, 3 flags and 70 prisoners brought in, he says : "I expect I will have to swing across to that road in force to make the matter certain." This he did soon after, using his whole large army in a determined attempt to capture that road, and after days of hard fight- ing he succeeded. A number of our fugitive comrades, in making their way to our lines, learned the force of Wheel-
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er's cavalry to be very large. On page 495, serial 76, is a report of a deserter from Hood, a Captain J. B. Jordan. He says Wheeler's command numbered 25,000. From Sherman's Memoirs, as published in the National Tribune, we give the following facts: Sherman had striven, with the cavalry divisions of Garrard, McCook and Stoneman, to destroy the communications of Hood, and had succeeded except upon the Atlanta and Macon Railroad, to which the enemy clung with such tenacity that although great damage had been done, it was soon repaired. Sherman says: "Luckily I learned just then (August 13th) that the enemy's cavalry under General Wheeler, had made a wide circuit around our left flank and had actually reached our railroad above Resaca and captured a drove of 1,000 beef cattle, and was strong enough to appear before Dalton and demand its surrender." Again: "I became fully convinced that Hood had sent all of his cavalry to raid upon our railroads." Sherman then sent Kilpatrick, in whom he had great confidence, giving him a strong cavalry force, to break up the Macon road about Jonesboro. Sher- man says : "Kilpatrick got off the night of the 18th and returned the 22d (August) having made the complete cir- cuit of Atlanta with these results: Destroyed three miles of railroad, captured a battery and destroyed three guns, bringing one in; captured three battle flags and 70 pris- oners." Sherman again complained of the failure of Gen- eral Garrard on the left. Sherman says, on the 23d the enemy were again using the Macon road and he says: "I became more than ever convinced that the cavalry could not or would not work hard enough to destroy a road properly, and therefore resolved to proceed with my orig- inal plan." This was to use his whole army to do what he had expected a few cavalry to do.
On pages 308 and 320, serial 76, Sherman several times alludes to Stoneman's venture in language indicating great concern for him, but not one word of blame. On page 526 Sherman uses language relative to General Garrard, plainly indicating an intended rebuke for his failure to more effectually support Stoneman in that movement.
Our scattered fugitive comrades were days in reaching our lines. No inspection or attempted reorganization was made until August 17th. We then had but 14 men
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mounted, and under command of Lieutenant L. W. Boren, of Company "G."
August 19th. Ordered to turn over all Government property and draw five days' rations. (Page 608, Gen- eral Order No. 3), assigned Colonel Capron to the com- mand of the first brigade, cavalry division, Army of the Ohio, composed of 14th Illinois Cavalry, 8th Michigan Cavalry, 5th Indiana Cavalry and 6th Indiana Cavalry. Nothing of note occurred until August 23d, when a party of foragers were attacked by guerrillas, one of the men wounded and five were captured.
August 24th. Very warm, especially in our camp, when Enfield rifles were issued to us and we were ordered to do infantry duty.
August 25th. Drew six days' rations, and under orders, marched on foot at II a. m. India rubber could not stretch as our marching column did that day, in its plod- ding toward Sweetwater bridge. At dusk the head of the column was halted and ordered to get supper, but the men were too tired to obey this agreeable order. It was IO p. m. before the column was closed up, when it was again ordered to march; proceeded to the mouth of Nickojack creek on the Chattahoochee river, and went into camp on a bluff, having tramped 17 miles.
August 26th. Our column still closing up. On page 642 is shown that the nature of our service is the guarding of that point, and of army property sent there.
August 29th. Lieutenant Boren and his mounted squad is sent on scout. The order for arming us with rifles is found in serial 76, page 628. Lieutenant Colonel Jenkins is in hospital, and Captain Crandle, of Company "'E," is in command of 14th.
August 31st. Mustered for pay and inspection. Lieutenant Boren and his party, now numbering 25 men, were sent across the river toward Atlanta to reconnoiter. Five miles out they were attacked and a skirmish ensued.
September Ist. Lieutenant Boren and party sent on scout to Powder Springs.
September 2d. Lieutenant Boren and party sent as a vanguard of a command of infantry, sent to reconnoiter toward Atlanta. In serial 73, pages 331 and 332, Captain Scott reports, favorably mentioning the efficient services of
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Lieutenant Boren and party, who were the first Yankee troops to enter Atlanta, and to successfully aid in driving the last remnant of Hood's army from Atlanta. The in- fantry, numbering 900, were commanded by Colonel John Coburn. On page 782 of serial 76, is an official order of September 3d: "The bridge at Turner's ferry is to be taken up and the dismounted cavalry, under Colonel Cap- ron, posted on the north side, are to hold the ford." This was our post and this our duty, for nearly two weeks, with nothing occurring out of the daily routine of camp life and picket duty.
September 8th. Procured some sweet potatoes to add to our half rations that we have enjoyed for some time past.
September IIth. Dress parade and inspection.
September 12th. Under orders to move.
September 13th. March at 8 a. m. up the river to rail- road bridge, then file left on the railroad track to within one mile of Marietta ; camped 4 p. m. Marched 17 miles in good spirits. It was wonderful how the marching qual- ities of our men were improved by the news that we are to go to Kentucky to be remounted and rearmed with sabers, revolvers and Spencer carbines. The men are happy.
September 14th. Engaged in turning over quarter- master property, then marched one mile to Marietta, and boarded a northern bound train, filling it so that many take the upper deck, as the boys called the roof of the cars. Any position is agreeable that promises a glimpse of God's country, and a renewal of real cavalry service. Train started at 4 p. m. ; ran all night.
September 15th. An hour after sunrise reached Chat- tanooga, 125 miles from Marietta. Started again at 10 a. m., got breakfast at soldiers' home at Stephenson ; ran all night.
September 16th. Reached Nashville at 2 p. m., 288 miles from Marietta.
September 17th. At sundown started for Louisville ; ran all night, reached Louisville I a. m. September 18th ; distant from Marietta, 471 miles. Embarked on cattle cars and started for Lexington about dark ; passed Frank- fort and reached Lexington about 3 a. m. of September 19th. A train behind ours was fired into by bushwhackers.
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