USA > Illinois > History of Fourteenth Illinois cavalry and the brigades to which it belonged > Part 25
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desperate efforts of Hood : Killed, Major-General P. R. Cleaburne; Brigadier-Generals Gist, John Adams, Strahl and Granbury, and wounded, Major-General Brown ; Brigadier-Generals Carter, Manigault, Quarless, Cockrell. and Scott, and Brigadier-General Gordon, captured. Twelve (some reports say thirteen ) general officers lost on one side is such a disproportion to the numbers engaged as few if any battles of the world can show. Indeed few battles of the war can compare in severity with the battle of Franklin November 30th, 1864. The cavalry had be- fore won a high reputation, and now the infantry at their first real opportunity, show equal valor. Perhaps no army, and certainly none of the war of the rebellion, is entitled to greater honor than the little army led in that campaign by Major-General John M. Schofield. Scho- field's hastily constructed defenses were a feeble protec- tion, much of the hardest fighting was done with bayonet and clubbed muskets over the breastworks ; large masses of the rebel columns breaking through, but never again to fight in the rebel cause. The desperateness of the rebel efforts is attested by their loss, which was: Captured, 702 ; disabled, 3,800 ; buried on the field, 1,750; aggregate,
6,252. The Union loss was : Killed, 189; wounded,
1,033 ; missing, 1,104 ; aggregate, 2,326. The Confeder- ates, of course, claimed the victory, as they held the ground, but it was such a victory as they would not care to repeat, for a few such victories would soon destroy a much larger army than Hood commanded. We believe that the battle of Nashville was more than half fought at Franklin. After that discouragement many deserted from their ranks, and even General Hood in his after movements indicated little more intention than to go through the motions of besieging Thomas at Nashville. Not but what there was some desperate fighting done at Nashville, for even a cowardly dog will fight when he cannot help it. The fighting began about 3 :30 p. m. and lasted until after dark, skirmishing continuing until 10 o'clock at night. Under cover of darkness Schofield retired across the Har- peth river and began his retreat to Nashville, disposing his cavalry on the rear and flanks of the infantry. Decem- ber Ist our brigade moved early toward the Murphy pike. We sent out parties to gather in horses and cattle. Our
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rear guard was attacked, but the enemy were easily re- pulsed; their cavalry seemed to entertain a wholesome fear of blue coats when they themselves did not wear the blue. We camped after night within 5 miles of Nash- ville, having marched 20 miles. We were called into line at 10 p. m. and built barricades, remained a few hours, then leaving a strong rear guard, we returned to camp about 2 a. m. of December 2d. It rained last night. We marched at 3 a. m., December 2d, to the suburbs of Nashville, fed and breakfasted. Afternoon marched through the city, crossed the Cumberland river and camped in Edgefield, having marched 9 miles.
December 3d. Reveille at daylight ; slight skirmishing across the river.
Sunday, December 4th. Reveille at daylight ; quietly in camp. How sweet to rest under the protecting care of Hood, who, while he generously besieged Thomas at Nashville, where he was receiving full supplies for his men; Hood, with a self-sacrificing spirit, is content to camp under God's great wall tent, the sky, and fare on "corn in the ear," sparingly doled out to his men, as our men who escaped from captivity reported. We "fared sumptuously every day" upon rations obtained from our rear, while re-inforcements were constantly being gath- ered to Thomas' army. There were many desertions from Hood's army. Rebeldom had staked all on the boastful promises of Hood, while many a defeat of his cavalry, and the unwelcome victory at Franklin, had convinced many of his men that the cause of secession was hopeless. This was all known to all of Thomas' men, who could see through a ladder; some, however, were despondent at being constantly driven back, and the country at large were in a tremor of excitement, in which even General Grant participated. Our men began now to take heart. They saw that the edict had gone forth to Hood: "Thus far and no farther shalt thou come, and here shalt thy proud cohorts be stayed." While with the people across the Ohio, the old adage: " 'Tis distance lends enchant- ment to the view," seemed to be reversed in this case. The level-headed Grant, perhaps the only time in his military career, exhibited signs of being "panic stricken." His messages to General Thomas exhibited undue alarm. In
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serial 94, page 70, Grant says, December 6th: "Attack Hood at once and wait no longer for a remount of your cavalry. There is great danger of delay, resulting in a campaign back to the Ohio river." On page 84, December 7th, Grant said to Stanton : "You probably saw my order to Thomas to attack. If he does not do it immediately I would recommend superseding him by Schofield, leaving Thomas subordinate." Page 97, December 8th, he says to Thomas: "It looks to me evident the enemy are trying to cross the Cumberland river, and are scattered. Why not attack at once? By all means avoid the contingency of a foot race, to see which, you or Hood, can beat to the Ohio river." To these urgent appeals Thomas, who knew that every day was strengthening his army and weakening Hood's, and that there was not the least danger of a foot race to the Ohio river, always replied that as soon as he could remount six thousand cavalry to cover his flanks he would move out against Hood. He made every exertion to obtain horses, but so many of his cavalry had been dismounted, and so few horses could be secured, that the work was slow, and as long as every day added strength to us, while it weakened Hood, he saw no cause for worry. On page 114 Grant says to Stanton : "Please telegraph orders relieving him (Thomas) at once and placing General Schofield in command." This was December 9th. On the same page ( 114), Thomas said to Halleck, December 9th: "I regret that General Grant should feel dissatisfaction at my delay in attacking the enemy. I feel conscious that I have done everything in my power to prepare, and that the troops could not have been gotten ready before this, and if he should order me to be relieved, I will submit without a murmur. A terrible storm of freezing rain has come on, which will make it impossible to attack until it breaks." On page 115 he repeats the same to Grant. General Thomas proved himself to be perfectly submissive to his superior. and though deemed slow in his movements, he always knew his own business. The order to relieve him was actually signed by the secretary as recorded on page 114. On page 115 is this reply of Grant to Thomas, December 9th : "Receiving your dispatch of 2 p. m. from Halleck, before I did the one to me, I telegraphed to suspend the order re-
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lieving you until we should hear further. I most sincerely hope that there will be no necessity to repeat it, and that the facts will show that you have been right all the time." Such was the unselfishness of Grant, ever ready to yield honor wherever due, without regard to self-desires.
December 5th. In camp and on picket.
December 6th. With a prospect of being soon re- mounted, we are now furnished with sabers and carbines In serial 93, page 598, General Johnson says: "In spite of the proverbial inefficiency of the ordnance department, Colonel Harrison, by untiring efforts, succeeded in pro- curing for all of his regiments Burnsides' carbines for the' 14th and 16th Illinois regiments, and revolvers for the 8th Michigan regiment. In the matter of horses we were
not quite so fortunate." It would have been wiser in Colo- nel Harrison and General Johnson to have expended their "untiring efforts" in first preparing their commands for the use of cavalry arms, or at least to have awaited for their remount before again placing them in the predicament of being supplied with arms entirely unsuited to their service.
December 7th and 8th. In camp ; nothing of note.
December 9th. Turned very cold last night ; sleeting and snowing today.
December 10th. Very cold.
December IIth, Sunday. Severely cold; snow and sleet. On page 151, serial 94, December IIth, is an order from General Wilson to General Johnson, and from John- son to Colonel Harrison, to take instant measures to mount partly mounted regiments, by taking the horses of other partly mounted regiments, so that as far as this distribu- tion of horses would go, there might be some fully mounted regiments. This order was a necessity under the circumstances, but it did not fit in well with the premature "untiring efforts" of Johnson and Harrison in furnishing cavalry arms to regiments, to whom they proved to be a nuisance. On the same page and date Johnson says: "I have had the 8th Michigan and 14th Illinois dismounted, and with their horses fully mounted the 16th Illinois and the 7th Ohio. These arrangements will leave about 750 mounted men in the first (now assigned to Harrison) brigade. In the second (Biddel's brigade, to which we were now assigned) the 5th Iowa alone is mounted, about
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590 men." This arrangement was very unsatisfactory to the men, as well it might be with the bungling arrange- ment in just having them armed as cavalry. But we do not suppose that any preference in regard to the dismount- ing was given. We suppose that those regiments who were nearest fully mounted, were chosen as the ones to be fully mounted, and for that reason the 5th Iowa and 7th Ohio, which had seen the least service in this hard campaign, were mounted. The order in effect really hon- ored the 8th Michigan and the 14th Illinois, for their severe service, which had so nearly dismounted them. The 16th Illinois were few in number, and so could be fully mounted with less horses. The sixth Indiana cavalry, Colonel James Biddel's own regiment, also dismounted, was also assigned to his brigade, but during the battle of Nashville the 8th Michigan, having nothing but revolvers, were left in the defenses at Nashville.
December 12th. Though the earth was covered with a glare of ice that made walking difficult, we marched at 9 a. m., crossed the bridge, passed through the city, and camped near Fort Negley, southwest of the city. Marched 4 miles. It was quite cold and we "toted" Lincoln rails quite a distance over icy hills, to build fires for cooking.
December 13th. Reveille at daylight ; remains cold.
December 14th. Reveille at daylight ; rain and fog, and ice all gone.
December 15th. Reveille at 3 a. m. We were called into line at 5 a. m. Now is to begin the grand struggle. The following formation and movements of Thomas' lines are found in his report (see serial 93, page 37) : Major- General Steedman to make a sharp attack on the enemy's right, to attract attention. Then Major-General A. J. Smith, with a part of the army of the Tennessee, formed on and near the Hardin pike, to make a vigorous assault on the enemy's left ; Major-General Wilson, with his cav- alry to support General Smith's right, sending Johnson's division of his cavalry on the Charlotte pike to clear that road of the enemy, and observe in the direction of "Bell's Landing," to protect our right rear, until the enemy's posi- tion is fairly turned, when it will rejoin the main force. Brigadier-General T. J. Wood, with the fourth corps, on the Hillsborough pike, to support Smith's left. As the
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roads upon which these commands on the right advanced diverged greatly, Major-General Schofield, who, with the 23d corps, remained in the defenses, was to march out, and form on the right of Smith, to fill the gap between Smith and Wilson caused by the divergence of the roads. Two gunboats on the Cumberland were to aid Johnson on the Charlotte pike. The formation of our troops was partly concealed from the enemy by the broken nature of the ground, but more by a dense fog which providentially hung over the landscape until late in the morning. Johnson's division was much hindered in get- ting their position on the pike by McArthur's division of infantry, which was thrown across our road. When this obstruction was cleared we moved rapidly, but had not gone far until we found that our sabers, swinging around our legs, was a great impediment to our advancing on foot, and most of the men unbuckled them from their sides and threw them in a pile by the roadside. Others, how- ever, said : "What right have we, without orders, to dis- arm ourselves in time of battle?" and so they retained their sabers. How our men longed to be mounted, that they might charge forward into the midst of the fight. Our division was pressed forward as rapidly as possible, for our dismounted men, unused to foot service, and greatly impeded by the mud, which was now deep. General Knipe's seventh and Hatch's fifth divisions, were the first of the cavalry to strike the enemy on the right of Smith, and drove them back rapidly, capturing a number of pris- oners and a redoubt of four guns, McArthur's infantry aid- ing in this capture, the dismounted cavalry vieing with the infantry in the charge. The sixth cavalry division pressed forward on the pike and encountered the old enemy of our brigade, General Chalmers' division of Forrest's cavalry. To our division was assigned Battery "I" of the 4th United States artillery, Lieutenant Frank G. Smith com- manding. The dismounted regiments, 14th Illinois and 6th Indiana cavalry were used as supports to the battery. Four miles from the city we struck Chalmers' division posted in strong position on the heights beyond Richland creek. General Johnson's account of this affair strongly convicts him of want of generalship. He says that he first ordered Biddel's brigade of dismounted men (the
FIRST SERGEANT GEO. W. NORRIS, COMPANY G.
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14th Illinois and the 6th Indiana ) to lead the advance and charge their stronghold, after which he acknowledges his mistake in the following language: "But the movements of the dismounted cavalry were so slow, owing I suppose partly to their being unused to maneuvering as infantry, partly to the difficulty in crossing the creek, and partly to their sabers, which the commanding officer of the 14th Illinois cavalry had, with a singular shortsightedness, per- mitted his men to bring with them, that I finally ordered Harrison (with the mounted brigade) to pass the dis- mounted brigade, and attack the enemy with all possible energy." Just the thing that an able commander would have ordered in the first place, for while the impediments named by Johnson were a good excuse for the failure of the dismounted men to perform impossibilities, they were no excuse for General Johnson, who knew, or should have known, of all these impediments, and the last one men- tioned, though he blames the commander of the 14th with it. General Johnson, through Colonel Harrison, was directly to blame, for, had they not "by untiring efforts" procured and distributed these sabers? Nor did his re- sponsibility stop here, for it was his especial province to see that all his men were appropriately armed for this especial conflict, and he had ample time before the battle to find out that these men had not been mounted, so that sabers would not be a nuisance instead of a good weapon, and the commander of a regiment dared not take the responsi- bility without the orders of his superior, to change or dis- card the weapons with which he had been supplied, not knowing but what, for his men, some, to him unforseen emergency, might demand the use of these weapons. Some of the men, however, showed better judgment than their commanders, by taking upon themselves the re- sponsibility to discard these nuisances. Relative to the first engagement, Colonel Biddel, our brigade commander. says (see page 606) : "Four miles from the city we were met by the enemy in force; with artillery posted on the west side of -- creek. Here the brigade was deployed. covering the road and closely supporting the first ( Harri- son's) brigade. The battery attached to this division took position on the east side of the creek ; the second brigade ( 14th Illinois and 6th Indiana ) was brought up to support
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the battery. The enemy being dislodged from his pos tion, the brigade moved forward about four miles, whe the enemy again made a stand." This account so far it goes accords with our notes, neither of which say an thing about any order for the dismounted of our brigar to take the advance as described by Johnson, and bo agree in stating that we were used as support to our ba tery, and our notes ascribe to the skillful use of the batte: the success in driving the enemy. Our notes say th Company "I" and one other company of the 14th were d ployed on the right, to prevent an attempted movement flank us in that direction. We well remember the atte tion we received from the enemy's battery in this mov ment. They were vigorously shelled by one of the en my's batteries, while their other batteries poured a consta stream of shells at the remainder of the line, especially our battery. Lieutenant Smith gave them their own, wi compound interest, not in the number of shots fired, but their telling effect. This artillery duel lasted an hour ( more. Our dismounted cavalry patiently taking their fi without power to return it. Harrison's mounted briga( was then thrown forward on the left to attempt the caj ture of their artillery. A charge led by that intrepid ofi cer, Major Beers of the 16th Illinois, would have succeede but for the intervention of a stone wall, which so in peded his charging column that the enemy were enable to save their battery. The enemy fell back, making for more stands where the formation of the ground permitte The 14th and 6th were used as battery supports, and tl first brigade was deployed dismounted on our left, bi on each occasion the planting of our battery and a sho exercise of skillful gunnery soon drove them. Thus w pursued them all day, our division capturing 50 horse some prisoners, and a battery of six guns. Late in tl afternoon the enemy took a strong position on a woode ridge beyond a little creek that emptied into the Cumbe land opposite "Bell's Landing," his left resting on the rive where they had a battery planted to control the river, the lines dismounted and behind strong barricades, extendin from the river across the pike and far to our left. Harr son's brigade made an untimely though impetuous charg. and were roughly handled, losing one company of the 7t
captured. nd, while th Teen the co and gradu this the as sh and timb their batter ed in line a of a furi ect. Infantr ved a better ped to the line and a Faited the ex e battery. Ito within th Ated just as t r guns. W Ipated charg following Is that he he 's brigade my's right. Is cutting the two gunbod cavalry. I gthening of pads upon wi arated John wled co-oper ört that h led to perior plan as ic direct vigor acient for the ets on the ri eir monster Zy, would at captured ovements of escribes, in zen to attack
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Dhio captured. The 6th Indiana were retained as battery guard, while the 14th was deployed on the left in line. Between the contending forces lay an open field, with an even and gradual descent until the creek was reached; be- rond this the ascent was rapid, and the ridge covered with brush and timber. There the enemy's lines were formed, and their batteries planted. The 14th, under orders, ad- anced in line as infantry down this inclined plain in the ace of a furious fire of conical percussion shells, fired lirect. Infantry never, under similar circumstances, pre- served a better line, though at the flash of every gun they dropped to the ground, quickly springing up and dressing he line and advancing as before. With eagerness they iwaited the expected order to charge and capture the ebel battery. They marched to the foot of the inclination und to within three hundred yards of the enemy, and were halted just as the enemy were abandoning the position of heir guns. Why our men were withheld from their an- icipated charge was never clearly known to us, unless he following plan of General Johnson explains it. He ays that he here formed the plan of uniting with Crox- on's brigade (on our left) and by swinging round the nemy's right, double them up and force them to the river, hus cutting them off from Hood's army, and by the aid of he two gunboats he hoped to be able to capture this force of cavalry. This plan failed in execution because of the engthening of our lines caused by the divergence of the oads upon which both armies moved. This divergence eparated Johnson and Croxton's commands, so that the needed co-operation could not be had. Johnson says in his report that he considered his division too weak un- ided to perform that work. Doubtless it was, to carry out he plan as formulated, but we always have believed that . direct vigorous attack by his division, which. im- patient for the order, aided as they now were by the gun- boats on the river which sent into the masses of the enemy heir monster shells that cut off trees that happened in their vay, would at least have routed them from their positions nd captured their batteries. We have no record of such novements of our dismounted cavalry as General Johnson lescribes, in which he says he ordered these dismounted nen to attack the stronghold of the enemy, and continuing,
cni
.
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says : "Their movements were so slow, owing as he thought, partly to the fact of their being unused to man- euvering on foot, and partly to the difficulty of crossing the creek, and partly to their sabers, which, hanging around their legs, impeded their movements." Now these reasons were all sufficient to explain slow movements, but not sufficient to excuse himself as the commander of the division, either to have permitted his men to go into battle on foot with such impediments, neither did it excuse him from the folly of pressing forward men in that condition to do a work requiring a speedy charge, when he had present a well mounted and well equipped command, so much better suited to the work. This is an attempt to throw the blame upon the commander of the regiment (Captain Jen- kins), when he himself, with Colonel Harrison, "by untir- ing energy," procured and distributed these same weapons, and afterward dismounted them and left them in that con- dition. Captain Jenkins had no option but to fight with the weapons provided by his superior officers "with un- tiring efforts." Neither our notes nor the report of our brigade commander, Colonel Biddel, alludes to this affair, hence we doubt its correctness. Johnson's division now bivouacked in line, throwing out a strong picket line to prevent a night surprise. We had driven Chalmers' divi- sion of cavalry much further than Hood's infantry were driven. We were eight miles from the city, while our in- fantry bivouacked within five miles of Nashville. Gen- eral Thomas, in his report (see page 39, serial 93), says : "The total result of the day's operation (the 15th) was the capture of sixteen pieces of artillery and 1,200 prisoners, besides several hundred stand of small arms, and about forty wagons. The enemy had been forced back at all points with heavy loss ; our casualties were unusually light. The behavior of the troops was unsurpassed for steadiness and alacrity in every movement, and the original plan of battle, with few alterations, strictly adhered to."
December 16th. Daylight disclosed the fact that the enemy were gone from our front. They had moved across to the Hillsboro pike. Colonel Biddel says (page 601) : "At break of day the following morning (the 16th) the brigade moved from the Charlotte pike to the Hardin pike."
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Our notes say : "We marched down the Charlotte pike a mile, then following the enemy's trail we diverged by a dirt road to the left, crossing the Hardin pike at the brick church nine miles from Nashville. From there, follow- ing the valley of the Little Harpeth, reached the Hillsboro pike about 2 p. m., where, posted on a ridge north of Mur- ry's house, we found the enemy in some force, and with artillery, which they opened on us. The first rounds, how- ever, from Lieutenant Smith's guns silenced them, and on our advancing they retired, exchanging only a few shots with our skirmishers. Their main force retired by the road. east, toward the Franklin pike, and a few down the Hills- boro pike, toward the Harpeth river." So rapidly was Hood's left wing doubled up on his main body by the rapid and vigorous movements of our cavalry, that even Johnson's mounted men could scarce move fast enough to engage in a healthy bout with the rebels, and so deep was the interminable mud that Biddel's dismounted men could only get a skirmish out of them by striking across the country to head them off and lay for them. There was little fighting in this quarter, for the enemy avoided us. The early and rapid advance of our cavalry had driven Hood's left wing to the rear of his main body, and we hoped to cut off his retreat, but by concentrating his main forces on the Franklin pike, he was enabled to move on that road. Thomas in his report of the 16th speaks of vigorous assaults of his infantry, but the enemy made but feeble resistance. He speaks of the movements of Wilson's cav- alry by which they gained the enemy's rear and cut off their retreat by the Granny White pike. He says of the two days' operations, 4,462 prisoners captured, including 287 officers, of all grades, from major-general ; 53 pieces of artillery and thousands of small arms. Brigadier- General E. W. Rucker, one of their best cavalry officers, was captured. The enemy abandoned all his dead and wounded on the field. Johnson's division of cavalry was sent to the Harpeth river." On the 15th and 16th besides fighting we had tramped on foot through deep mud 18 miles. On both nights it had rained hard.
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