USA > Illinois > History of Fourteenth Illinois cavalry and the brigades to which it belonged > Part 21
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via Waynesboro and Mount Pleasant. This route was longer, bending round in the direction of Savannah. Of course Hood's intended movements were unknown to Schofield, and when convinced that his army was moving, it was doubtless Schofield's expectations that Hood would move via the Lawrenceburg road, and that he would doubt- less attempt, either to attack him at Pulaski, or strike the railroad in his rear. This is indicated by his disposition of his troops. His infantry force is all held at Pulaski, while his main body of his slender force of cavalry, Hatch's 2,500 and Croxton's 1,000, making 3,500, are all operating near Lawrenceburg, 22 miles west of Pulaski, and Hatch is ordered with this force to keep between the enemy and the railroad. The only force placed on the Waynesboro road was Capron's slender force of 800 men, insufficiently armed and posted more than 50 miles from the main force, and 30 miles from any support ; even if Hatch could be deemed a support so distant and with the enemy's forces moving between them.
In serial 93, page 669, begins itinerary of Hood's move- ments, which shows that he had planned to outgeneral Schofield by pushing his army rapidly by an unexpected route, and seize Columbia and the railroad in Schofield's rear, and capture or disperse Schofield's army, little ex- ceeding one-third the strength of his own. This itinerary shows that Hood personally, with the whole of Cheatham's corps, moved from the start on the Waynesboro road, and that Stewart's corps moved first by the Lawrenceburg road, and passed into the Waynesboro road not far from Henryville, perhaps 20 miles S. W. of Mount Pleasant. Lee's corps moved first on a road between the Lawrence- burg and Waynesboro road, and entered the Waynesboro and Mount Pleasant road 12 miles south of Henryville, so that from Henryville to Columbia not only Hood person- ally, but his whole force of infantry, 40,000 or 50,000 strong, is on that road, where only our brigade of but 800 unsupported are between the impetuous Hood and his expected victory.
On page 751 begins General Forrest's report, which shows that he ordered Chalmer's division of his cavalry forward on the Waynesboro road via Henryville and Mt. Pleasant. The report also shows that he was personally
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present with this division. He sent Generals Buford's and Jackson's divisions on the military road to Lawrence- burg, and thence toward Pulaski. Hood was surely out- generaling Schofield in pushing forward and concentrat- ing his army on this unexpected route, while he sends some of his cavalry to make a feint on Pulaski, and to keep the main body of our cavalry from succoring our weak force on the route of Hood's triumphal march, the only impediment to Hood's advance. Instead of playing a card to oppose Hood's sharp game, Schofield plays a card in his favor, by ordering all the rest of his cavalry to isolate themselves from all possible opposition to Hood's advance, by ordering Hatch to move between the advancing cavalry and the railroad. Such was the perilous situation, and such the task assigned to our handful of men, insuffi- ciently armed. Had Schofield designed to effect the de- struction of our brigade he could scarcely have planned it better.
We have received a number of communications from comrades describing in part our operations in falling back to Columbia, all of them good, and we are sorry that we cannot give them all in full, but our limited space forbids. In the main operations, our notes and the official reports are given ; in detachment service we rely on comrades.
On the afternoon of November 21st Capron prepared to fall back, and none too soon, as the enemy's cavalry were in detachments all through that country. Captain H. C. Connelly of Company "L," 14th Illinois, was sent in com- mand of the advance guard, charged with ascertaining whether Forrest was in force in our rear. He moved out about dark, it was sleeting and the roads were a glare of ice.
November 22d. Reveille at 3:30 a. m. Marched before daylight. Capron had received a second dispatch to watch and delay Forrest's movements, in which Hatch said : "Hold on where you are until pressed back, scout well your right flank, endeavor to learn if the enemy are moving round your right toward Nashville. I will keep your left well scouted." (See page 989.) On this promise of Hatch to keep him informed of the enemy's movements on his left, Capron was led into what came near to being a fatal movement. Captain Connelly, with Lieutenant A.
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B. Capron, were ordered to scour well the country on the right toward the river.
Hatch was at Lexington on the 20th, when he sent the above dispatch, but when Capron began to move back Hatch was at Lawrenceburg, 25 miles away. A force of the enemy's cavalry followed us, annoying our rear guard and threatening an attack. Lieutenant Boren of Com- pany "G," with a strong detachment, was sent to the left to endeavor to communicate with General Hatch ; he had proceeded a few miles when he encountered a rebel brigade which was moving round our left. The lieutenant's party was vigorously attacked, and were scattered in confusion. When the first fugitives reached our lines it was thought that the lieutenant and most of his party were lost, but they were not made of material so pliable. Lieutenant Boren and most of his men came in hours after, having cut their way around the rebel force. We passed through Henryville and went into camp in a wood four miles from Henryville, and within a mile of the point where the Lawrenceburg road intersected the Waynesboro road; having marched 18 miles.
About 2 p. m. our rear picket was attacked, but held the enemy until reinforced. The command was called out and built barricades. Scouting parties sent out reported the enemy to be attempting to flank us. Lieutenant San- ford, sent out on the left rear with a foraging party, nar- rowly escaped capture. Strong detachments under able commanders were sent to the various points that gave a chance for the enemy to flank us. These detachments were vigorously attacked; the enemy sometimes concen- trating their force at some one point, again attacking all the points at the same time. They were successfully re- pulsed at all points. Our men were learning to use their infantry guns to good effect in a dismounted fight.
Capron says in his memoirs, relative to Lieutenant Boren : "I became satisfied that Hood's army was ad- vancing upon us in force, and I determined that notwith- standing Hatch's assurances that he would protect my left and keep open our communications, I would have a thorough reconnoissance made of the country between me and Lawrenceburg. Before daylight I sent out a strong party (under Lieutenant Boren) bearing a message to
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General Hatch. They had been out probably one and a half hours, when two of their number came into camp under a full run, without their caps. They had run into a brigade of Forrest's cavalry ; the ballance of the party were either killed or captured." Fortunately it was not so bad as that. Capron continues : "Our situation was critical ; the emergency demanded prompt action to secure my com- mand from being captured. The first thing to be attended to was to bring in our scouts ; the one on my right, com- manded by my son, Albert B. Capron of Company "A," 14th, might have found it important under my instructions to scout to the Tennessee river, 20 miles distant. The next in importance was to arrange my command to hold this position, for these parties to fall back upon. Two miles in my rear was found a more suitable position, with a straight, open road for a small force left in the first barri- cade to fall back upon, if forced to retreat hurriedly. Two squadrons under the command of Major (then captain) Connelly of the 14th, were left in the first barricade, with instructions to hold them until our scouts came in if possi- ble ; or, if forced out, to fall back upon our second position. With the balance of my command I proceeded to erect a second line of barricades ; leaving open a space sufficient for the force left at the front to pass freely through if driven back. It was approaching night when all was in readiness. The troops were dismounted and placed be- hind the defences, with strict caution not to mistake a rapidly approaching body of our men for the enemy. In momentary expectation that something important would transpire, I waited the result at the opening in the line of our barricades. By my side was Major Buck and my Adjutant General, Captain Wells, both of the 8th Michigan cavalry, with a small sustaining force." Colonel Capron's choice of this position was a good one, both for the advan- tages of the ground and because it was a mile in the rear of the entrance of the Lawrenceburg road, as some of For- rest's forces were known to be on that road, from which they could have gotten in our rear had we remained at our first position.
Colonel Capron is mistaken in saying that Major Con- nelly was left in command of our first position when the main body fell back. The following is the account by
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Major Connelly : "With a portion of the 14th and the 16th Illinois cavalry, I scouted to our right front. Cap- tain Smith, a brave and capable officer of the 8th Michi- gan, held the enemy in check (at the first barricade) until my return from the scout on the evening of the 23d. Cap- tain Hanchett of the 16th, who was acting assistant Adju- tant-General to Colonel Capron, directed me to take a position and aid Captain Smith in holding Forrest, and so remain in that position until he returned. He left, to com- municate with Colonel Capron, and was never again seen in our lines. Forrest by this time had gotten between our command (the rear guard) and the main command, and was quietly picking up our men; moving between our forces." Forrest, with a force, had come in by the Law- renceburg road, which was between the rear guard and the main command. Connelly further says : "Hearing noth- ing from Captain Hanchett, I directed Lieutenant Moore of my Company "L" of 14th to take ten men and see if he could open communication with the brigade." The following is Lieutenant Moore's account. He says: "I was in command of the rear picket or skirmish line from the day before, and toward evening I received orders to draw in the pickets, as it was then thought we were sur- rounded ; or that old General Forrest was between us and our brigade. After relieving the pickets, Captain Con- nelly ordered me to take ten men and try and open com- munication with Colonel Capron. It was late in the even- ing when I got the ten men selected ; Joe Murry was the only one from my company. After riding some distance there filed into the road ahead of us to the right, perhaps one hundred yards off, a band of about 150 cavalry, going at a gallop. They looked like rebels. This made things look a little interesting, but we continued going all the same ; slacking up a little to let those fellows keep a little in advance, and just at this time Captain Hanchett and his orderly came up with us, and wanted to pass to the front. I told him of the cavalry that had just filed into the road, and that I thought they were rebels. He thought not, and said if I would lend him one of my guns, that he and his orderly would ride on ahead and risk the chances of being caught. We gave him a gun, and they galloped away. We kept him in sight all the while. He was not
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more than 100 yards in advance. Presently we saw him ride up to the cavalry ahead of us, and disappear ; and not a gun was fired. And when we came up to them they were in line on the right hand side of the road. Some of them were dismounted and in more or less confusion. Some had blue overcoats on, and others had gray blankets tied around their shoulders ; so that it was difficult to tell in the dark which side they belonged to. At this time our horses were doing their best, as we all saw the tight place we were in, as they had more than ten men to our one. When we came to the head of the column, I spoke, and the officer in command replied with one shot at short range with his revolver, and to this day I can see the flash of that shot in my face, but the bullet missed me, and struck a little fellow on my right, Joseph Murry of my company. The bullet struck him two or three inches above the right ear. He dropped forward on his horse's neck. I reached down and caught him by the cape of his overcoat, and kept him from falling off, until he came to. I finally got him straightened up, all covered with blood. This was the only shot fired by them, and we came out with the loss of two guns.
We found out afterward that it was General Forrest and his escort, who were quietly picking up our men and horses, and taking them back to the rear, and I am certain that Captain Hanchett was captured by these men, for I saw him ride into their ranks, and I am also sure that I was the last one of our men that spoke to him. He never came back. We could not report back to Captain Connelly, and the only alternative was to ride through, which we did. I have often wanted to hear from those ten men that were with me, but knew none of them except Joe Murry. Those were the times to try men's grit, and "the-stand-up-to-be- shot-at" qualities of the soldiers of 1861 to 1865, who are now, in some quarters, called "coffee coolers" and "pau- pers," and other offensive names. But let me say right here, that I would not exchange my experience of three years in the service in the army for the whole southern confederacy, with all their northern sympathizers to boot, "don't you forget it." Good for you, comrade Moore, for though you have but repeated the many-times uttered sentiment of truly patriotic comrades, yet there is
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in the heart-stirring ring of those sentiments so much of the patriotic fire of truly loyal Americanism which under- lies the safety of our country and its beloved institutions, it would ever be new, though repeated ten thousand times. Without doubt comrade Moore can congratulate himself on having received a military salute from the greatest cav- alry chieftain of the Southern confederacy, The Hero of Fort Pillow .. But we doubt somewhat whether poor Joe Murry very highly appreciated the salutation. Pressing duty just at that time prevented a return of the comple- ment. On page 75, serial 93, begins Forrest's report of campaign, in which he says : "My command consisted of three divisions, Chalmers', Buford's and Jackson's. I
ordered Chalmers to advance via West Point, Kelly's forge, Henryville, and Mount Pleasant. Brigadier-Gen- erals Buford and Jackson were ordered to move up the military road to Lawrenceburg, and thence southeastward in the direction of Lawrenceburg." Relative to Henry- ville, he says : "At Henryville Chalmers developed the enemy's cavalry and captured forty-five prisoners. At Fouche's springs the enemy made another stand. I ordered Chalmers to throw forward Rucker's brigade and . to keep up a slight skirmish with the enemy until I could gain his rear. I ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly to move by the left flank and join me in rear of the enemy. Taking my escort with me, I moved rapidly to the rear. Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly being prevented from joining me as I expected, I made the charge upon the enemy with my escort alone, producing a perfect stampede, capturing about 50 prisoners, 20 horses and I ambulance. It was now near night, and I placed my escort in ambush. Colo- nel Rucker pressed upon the enemy, and as they rushed into the ambuscade my escort fired into them, producing the wildest confusion." Regarding Forrest's statement that he fell in our rear, there is no doubt that this was his plan, and that he moved to our right and on the Lawrence- burg road with his escort with that intent, sending Lieu- tenant-Colonel Kelly by his left, our right, to join him in our rear. But Capron's timely falling back with his main command, and posting strong detachments on our flanks, not only prevented Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly from joining in our rear as Forrest says, but although Forrest reached
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the Lawrenceburg road and entered the Waynesboro road as Lieutenant Moore saw him do, though Forrest may have thought he was in the rear of our main command, he certainly knew better soon after, as our accounts show, and the only reason that he could have in not reporting his after repulse when, in following up Lieutenant Moore's party he charged upon our main command and was repulsed, is this, that the full report would have spoiled his fine, boast- ful account. Relative to his placing his men in ambush, if there was anything more in this line than the shameful violation of the recognized rules of modern warfare, by concealing the identity of his men in the uniform of union men, it will be found in the truthful account of Captain Connelly, of the heroic charge made by our rear guard through the lines of Forrest's veterans. We will now give Colonel Capron's account of Forrest's attack. He says : "Just as darkness was settling upon us, and it became too obscure to distinguish troops by their dress at any distance, a column of dust raised by a rapidly approaching cavalry force appeared advancing from the direction of our first position. Orders were repeated to withhold the command to fire until assured that this was not a part of our own men. In an instant of time a force of Forrest's cavalry charged in upon us, and delivered their fire directly in the faces of our men. They had flanked our first position, as it was conjectured they would. Their fire was promptly returned, and a rapid interchange followed. In the midst of the noise and confusion of the battle a shout and firing were heard in the rear of this attacking force, and in the next moment their line was rent asunder, and our men from the front dashed into our lines. It appeared that the scouts had been brought in, and were mounted for a leis- urely retreat to our second position. The uproar and fir- ing were heard and their precarious position fully realized. In an instant the resolution was formed to make the at- tempt to cut their way through the attacking forces. The columns were immediately put in motion, headed by Major (then captain) Connelly, and Lieutenant Capron of the 14th Illinois cavalry, and Captain Smith of the 8th Michi- gan cavalry, with the result as stated. Our casualties were: Major Buck, severely wounded; Captain Wells, mistaking the attacking force for our men, dashed out
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through the gap to meet and guide them through, and was captured ; Sergeant-Major (now lieutenant) Allen, with 15 men, was captured, and others wounded ; Captain Han- chett, assistant Adjutant-General, captured; Lieutenant Boren, with 25 men out on scout, cut off, but subsequently reported having lost several of his men and most of his horses." Captain Wells and Lieutenant Allen both es- caped soon after.
We now give the account of the charge of the rear guard, as related by participants. Captain Connelly says : "Hearing nothing from Lieutenant Moore, I requested Captain Hattery of the 16th Illinois cavalry to take 25 men and see what was wrong in our rear. He had gone but a few hundred yards when the enemy poured a volley into his ranks. This was the signal for active work with us. Captain Smith, being the ranking officer, took the advance. When he struck the enemy with the head of his column they fired a volley into his band. The captain and a few others cut their way through. The main part of his com- mand came back pell-mell, throwing my column into con- fusion. By this time it was dark. I saw the importance of promptly charging out and calling upon comrades to follow, the whole column followed. The men set up a terrific yell, and, dashing on to the rebel lines, fired their Springfield guns. The confederate line broke and ran like sheep, and we brought out safely every man we had with us."
This bold charge of Captain Connelly, through the select of Forrest's famous command, his body guard, was loudly applauded by our command. General Forrest's claim that at Henryville they captured 45 prisoners, and that he cap- tured at Fouche's springs 50 prisoners, may be correct, nor is it a wonderful result, when we remember that scouting parties were liable to be cut off while coming in, and we know that detachments on our flanks fighting on foot, had their horses captured, and in moving on foot portions of these detachments were cut off and captured.
General Chalmers in his report, see page 763, says : "On the 23d Rucker's brigade met Capron's brigade near Hen- ryville and captured 45 prisoners." He also says that Forrest soon after captured 20 prisoners. Though these rebel commanders do not agree in the number captured
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by Forrest, it would not be strange, considering Forrest's method of clothing his men in union uniform, and riding between our forces as he did, he possibly succeeded in picking up that number of unsuspecting men, who, be- cause of being deceived by a trick that no honorable mili- tary officer would be guilty of, these unsuspecting men had no chance of defending themselves. But regarding For- rest's boastful charge as he pictures it, the reports of Colo- nel Capron and Captain Connelly agree in showing, while there was a confusion and rout, it was in Forrest's ranks, instead of in the Union lines. Forrest forgot to mention his brave exploit in shooting the boy, poor Joe Murry, when there were but ten men to face one hundred and fifty. These reports show that Capron's small brigade faced Chalmer's division of Forrest's command, with both Chal- mers and Forrest present. They also disprove the claims of some of General Hatch's men, that Forrest pursued Hatch's command. On the Lawrenceburg road General Hatch, with 3,500, was attacked by Buford's and Jackson's divisions of Forrest's cavalry, perhaps 10,000. This was fearful odds to meet, but nothing to compare with the task imposed upon Capron's 800, compelled to combat 5,000 of Forrest's famous cavalry, with the whole force of Hood's infantry, headed by himself, now making a deter- mined effort to destroy Schofield's army by capturing Columbia, and thus getting in Schofield's rear, a feat that he most surely would have accomplished had not Capron "wandered off to Waynesboro," where he was not only able to keep Schofield thoroughly informed of Hood's unexpected movements on the Waynesboro road, but by the most heroic and skillful conduct, he was able to fight back this immense host, until a division of Schofield's in- fantry, sent forward by Schofield because of information furnished by Capron, succeeded in throwing themselves upon the Waynesboro road, until our worn out and shat- tered brigade could reach them, when their united forces could barely, with superhuman effort, hold Hood's ad- vance in check, until Schofield, hours after, could bring up his main force. Hood did not have the "walk away" he anticipated, merely because he found a tough customer in his way, who should undoubtedly be pardoned for mis- understanding the orders of his superior; if indeed, he
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did misunderstand them. It was surely a very fortunate mistake.
Information now reached us at Fouche's springs that General Hatch's force had been cut to pieces. This only added to the before almost hopelessness of our situation. An order now came to Capron that he must check Hood's advance, if it sacrificed his whole command. Up to this point we had been favored with woods and hills, which pre- vented the enemy from easily flanking us. But we are now approaching a more open country, having many paral- lel roads, with crossroads to reach them. Capron had re- peatedly notified General Schofield of his precarious situa- tion, and of the impossibility of preventing Hood's advance when the more open country was reached. To these dis- patches repeatedly came the promise of re-enforcements, and orders similar to the foregoing, but no re-enforce- ments ever came. It appeared to us that General Schofield was slow in beginning his movements back, and if possible still slower in executing the movement. Capron adopted the plan of holding every favorable point as long as pos- sible, and for this purpose kept a portion of his brigade in the rear, to build barricades at favorable points, whilst detachments of resolute men defended the flanks as well as the rear. From Fouche's springs we continued falling back from one fortified position to another through the night, as Forrest's eager forces pressed vigorously, and sought to flank us on parallel roads. Thus the battle con- tinued all night. Capron realized that if he succeeded in holding all of Forrest's force in check for any length of time, it would only give opportunity for Hood to throw forward portions of his infantry on parallel roads to cut off Schofield, or capture Columbia. Ours was a task such as was seldom expected of so small a force, and there- fore Schofield, realizing this, accompanied his orders to hold the enemy with, "If it sacrifices every man of your command." But of what avail would be the sacrifice of the command, if it did not accomplish the desired end, the holding of Hood until Schofield could reach Columbia by way of the Pulaski road? It was evident that Capron must not only retard Hood's advance on this road, but it was as important that he must not permit any portion of Hood's forces to beat him into Columbia on any parallel road.
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