USA > Illinois > History of Fourteenth Illinois cavalry and the brigades to which it belonged > Part 17
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The division, except Adams' brigade, moved forward, passing through Clinton and on to within 10 miles of Macon. A picket, under command of Lieutenant Wm. M. Moore, of Company "L," 14th Illinois Cavalry, left at the forks of important roads, succeeded in capturing a number of prisoners and had an exciting little adventure in being mistaken for rebels and were attacked by a de- tachment of our own forces. No great injury was suf- fered on either side, the mistake being soon discovered.
Colonel Capron was now ordered to move with his com- mand to the left, to strike the Georgia Central railroad and follow it up to Macon, destroying it as he went, as well as all other public property, and join Stoneman in front of the city. Within four miles of Macon we met the enemy in force and pressed forward, driving him rapidly before us. Capron's brigade moved on the railroad fight- ing back the enemy. This brigade alone ruined most of the railroad track for seven miles, destroying two pas- senger trains, one stock train, loaded with horses and hogs, three locomotives, burned one large machine shop, used for manufacturing gun carriages, and in conjunction with Biddle's brigade, burned a railroad bridge near the city. The following furnished by a comrade, is not authenticated by official reports, but we presume it to be correct :
One party, under Lieutenant Albert B. Capron, of Com- pany "A," 14th Illinois Cavalry, while engaged in destroy-
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ing the railroad, captured a train, and seeing another train approaching, loaded with Confederate soldiers, the Lieutenant sprang upon an engine, standing on the track all fired up, and uncoupling it from its train, he seized the lever, opened the valve, and sent the engine with terrible speed to meet the incoming Johnnies ; there was a terrible crash, but the amount of damage inflicted we never knew, as we moved with alacrity from that position. Lieutenant Capron (since captain) never mentioned this adventure to us.
Capron's brigade now joined in the assault upon the city. Captain Lord, after alluding to Major Davidson's expedition and Colonel Capron's work on the railroad, says: "With the balance of his command Stoneman pushed on to Macon. The enemy were encountered in small force north of Clinton, but offered no considerable opposition ; they were steadily driven, even under the pro- tection of Fort Hawkins, an old U. S. fort standing on the east side of the Ocmulgee river on a hill command- ing both the bridge crossing and the city. This fort was found to be fully garrisoned and strengthened by abattis, so as to make it invincible against attacks of cavalry. It was further ascertained that there was a large force of Infantry in Macon; and that there was no means of crossing the river below Macon as far S. E. as the mouth of the Oconee."
The Confederate reports show that there was then in Macon a force of 3,000 militia (see page 928, serial 76) ; report to General Wheeler, July 29th, 1864, 6:20 p. m. This also speaks of rebel infantry sent. A force of rebel cavalry, 1,000 to 1,500, was seen to enter the city. After fighting across the river for several hours and scouting the river above and below to find some possible crossing place, General Stoneman received a message informing him that General Wheeler, with a force of 10,000 cavalry and mounted infantry, was coming down in his rear. Here then was a strong probability of being caught be- tween the upper and the nether millstone. It had been the intention to proceed to Andersonville and if necessary then to strike south or southeast, to the gulf or to the Atlantic, but scouts sent to a bridge below, returned with information that the bridge was held by a strong force well
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fortified. Captain Lord's narrative says : "An attack was made on the fort and the ground held for several hours. It was then hoped that Colonel Adams' command moving on the road near the river would make a sharp attack on the other side of the fort, which might result in a withdrawal of the enemy's force across the river or in the capture of the fort. But after several hours of anxious waiting no attack was made by Adams, and it was pre- sumed that he had met with opposition. About this time information came that there was an enemy in our rear and that a number of our men were captured in and near Clin- ton. To describe our situation at this time: An en- trenched enemy of superior force in our front, holding the only crossing of the river available to join General Mc- Cook; the Oconee river 20 miles east of us impassable. To the south, the west and the east, the gates of progress barred. We must go north in the face of pursuers. With heavy heart General Stoneman ordered the movement to the rear. We reached Clinton at dark on the evening of July 30th, recaptured the place and liberated about 35 of our men who were confined in the town jail. Here we learned that we were pursued by Wheeler's cavalry, esti- mated at from 8,000 to 10,000 men."
(Tompkins says) : "Scouts reporting a large force of rebel cavalry moving on the west side of the river towards Macon and that all the ferries were destroyed above and below; he withdrew his main forces with intention to move toward Milledgeville. Information soon came that the demonstration east had drawn the enemy in that direc- tion, and that but a small force was on the Covington road. He desired to press hard on that road and reach Hillsboro if possible, at which point he could take choice of three roads at daylight. But the enemy were too strongly posted and he could not reach Hillsboro by two miles."
Smith, in his report, speaks of the intended movement southward, and that the movement actually began, when information obtained turned the movement northward. Smith also speaks of the design to move eastward and that he was at a loss to know why this route was not chosen. Though our notes give good description of the movements, preference is given to the reports of staff officers, as being more satisfactory because official. (Smith says) : "The
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general ordered the column to advance north along our old route, and about 9 p. m. (30th) the advance began to skirmish with the enemy which was kept up, we advancing very slowly until about I o'clock, when the skirmishing became so heavy in our front as to prevent any farther advance. We had now got some six miles north of Clin- ton and a halt was ordered."
(Captain Lord says) : "We continued to advance driving the enemy before us until nearly midnight, hav- ing gained six or eight miles, and developed the enemy in such force as to bar farther progress at night. The troops bivouacked, but skirmishing continued until day- light, when the battle was renewed. Our troops were dis- posed as follows: Colonel Capron's brigade, which led the advance during the night, now occupied the right; Colonel Biddle's brigade in reserve in the center ; Colonel Adams on the left."
Our notes say : "We began to fall back about 3 p. m. July 30th, Capron's brigade in advance. Halted, formed line and rested an hour, near the forks of the Milledgeville road, then moved forward on the Clinton road."
Here is where Stoneman made his great mistake, caused by heeding unreliable information. We encountered the enemy's picket near Clinton, charged and drove them through the town, liberating 33 of our men, who had been captured on the way down. We captured the guards and burned the jail; day's march, 30 miles. We then moved forward on the Hillsboro road, driving the enemy before us wherever we found them. Some three miles from Clinton we found a strong advance guard of the enemy, charged and drove them half a mile, when we encountered a heavy force posted behind barricades. The 8th Mich- igan being in the advance, charged and drove them from their position. We continued to drive them until near Hillsboro, where we found their main force about 3:30 a. m., of July 3Ist. Capron had been attacked in front and on the left flank. Heavy skirmishing had been kept up all night. We now found them in strong force on ground of their own choosing and well fortified with strong log and rail defences, built in the form of a semi- circle with points circling round our lines, and extending far out on each flank. At daybreak Capron's command
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had met a strong force behind defenses, charged and drove them back to this, their main position, from which Stone- man now resolved to drive them.
There seemed to Stoneman to be but two ways: one through the enemy's fortified lines with nearly five times his own force, with liberty to the survivors; the other through Andersonville prison, perhaps with final liberty to the few shattered frames that chanced to survive its cruelty. All chose death on the field rather than Ander- sonville. The nature of the ground as well as their strong defenses made it necessary to fight dismounted, which required one fourth of the men to hold and guard the horses in the rear, liable to attack and capture by a rebel force coming up in the rear. Our condition was perilous in the extreme. The rebel force at Macon exceeded ours in number, and many of the enemy were armed with long ranged rifles ; whilst our guns were short range carbines and navy revolvers, effective weapons in a cavalry charge, but inferior in fighting dismounted. Besides the enemy had on the field, several batteries, whilst we had but one third of a battery (two guns). The situation, however, admitted of no delay, for when the pursuing enemy from Macon came up we would be enveloped by a force six times our number and having no place in our rear for our horses, and the ground unsuited to fighting mounted. Wheeler could not well have chosen a position giving him greater advantages. Could we have fought mounted at least the 14th and the 5th Indiana and the 8th Michigan would have faced great odds against us. Of the rest of our force we can only presume the same. Perhaps none in the service were better trained in the use of the saber than the 14th Illinois Cavalry. Our men were in poor condition for a fatiguing fight. Since the morning of the 27th, four days before, they had scarcely halted for rest. Only about two hours at Yellow river and a few hours the night before reaching Macon ; and having eaten but little, as it was necessary to move with speed. Colonel Capron says: "At daybreak the 3Ist General Stoneman ordered me to advance with my brigade and drive the enemy from their position, which I did for one mile and a half, when I found them drawn up in line of battle in my front and on my left, with two pieces of artillery in position,
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which they opened on us as we advanced. General Stoneman now came up and formed his whole command in line of battle. Colonel Adams' brigade, and the 8th Mich- igan Cavalry of my brigade on the left, and the balance of my brigade on the right, with Biddle's brigade and one piece of artillery in reserve, the other piece of artillery taking position in the center."
Our notes say our artillery in the center, supported by a portion of the 14th Illinois, commanded by Major Quigg. Our notes say their strong log and rail defenses in the form of half circle encircled our front extending far out and overlapping our flanks. Colonel Smith says : "A line of battle was at once formed and the enemy strongly felt, which resulted in the development that the enemy was there in force upon ground of his own selection, with strong works and barricades, on an elevation in the road in our front, with his lines of battle extending out from this point in the shape of a V (inverted) completely covering and enfilading our right and left flanks. General Stoneman at once prepared his command for a vigorous attack upon the enemy, advancing himself with the skirmish line."
Tompkins describes the situation thus: "The enemy had now concentrated their forces in front, covering the roads. And being now between two rivers only about 20 miles apart, with an enemy in his front and rear, he de- cided that he must break their lines in the direction in which he must move out."
Our notes agree with Colonel Capron's description of the formation of the line. A lot of negroes, who had fol- lowed us were now strongly urged to escape while they could, as their fate would be severe if captured with us and unarmed they could not aid us. Some followed this advice, but many others chose to remain with their Yankee friends at the risk of any fate. Everything being ready, nerved with the energy of despair, our whole line moved impetuously forward and engaged the enemy, rapidly driving in their advance and pressing up to the enemy's works, when a destructive sheet of fire from their protected front and enfilading columns, with a murderous fire at close range from batteries in front and on the left, mowed down our men as they advanced. This caused Adams' brigade and the 8th Michigan to swing half round. The
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14th and the Ohio Squadron, supported by Biddle's bri- gade, not only for a time held their position, but actually dislodged the enemy from a portion of his works, but the superior numbers of the enemy enabled them to maintain a heavy reserve to throw into their weaker points, and be- ing heavily pressed with these overwhelming reinforce- ments to the enemy, and being unsupported by the left, our right was compelled to retire. Capron says: "Between 9 and 10 a. m., in compliance with General Stoneman's orders, the whole line moved forward and engaged the enemy. They met us in superior numbers and with a yell charged our lines ; causing the left of the 8th Michigan cavalry to swing one fourth way round. The right of the regiment (with the 14th) holding its position. A mounted force of the enemy, coming up a road to the right and rear charged my extreme right, but were repulsed. I then or- dered two companies of the 14th Illinois Cavalry to charge them, which they did, driving them two miles and a half, when they (the enemy) took position behind barricades. The enemy now rallied in strong force and drove my men back. I immediately brought up four companies of the same regiment, checked them, charged and drove them a second time to their barricades."
Captain Lord confirms the description of line formation and the results of first attack, and alluding to the attack on our right rear he says: "The 14th maintained its position and four companies, which were in line mounted, repelled a cavalry charge from a road leading from our right in very gallant style, taking almost a regiment of rebel cav- alry prisoners, which in being sent to rear under guard, found themselves in their own lines."
The 14th and the Ohio Squadron reformed on their first line, and the whole line was rallied and reformed and thrown with all possible force upon the rebel center, and by superhuman effort again succeeded in gaining control of a portion of the rebel fortifications, but again were met by an overwhelming attack from their reserves as well as a murderous enfilading fire, in which their batteries did great execution. Again were our lines hurled back. Charge after charge was thus made, sometimes concen- trated upon one point, and sometimes an advance of the whole line, but always meeting the same overwhelming
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force wherever a temporary advantage was gained. Our perilous situation inspired more than mortal courage. We must succeed in breaking their lines speedily. The enemy could well afford to wait ; we could not, as the rebel force from Macon was hastening on our rear. Now couriers inform us that their advance had attacked our horse guards in the rear; they were repulsed, but soon the main body of the Macon force will have our horses. Another advance of the whole line was attempted ; but now comes word that the enemy were capturing our horses, at the same time the whole rebel force in front, knowing their advantage, charge en masse with terrific yells. A cavalryman without a horse is like a fish out of water; little wonder that our feeble lines gave way, secing the enemy closing in on our left wing, separating our right wing from our main body. A rush was made for our horses. Tompkins says: " Desperate efforts were made from sunrise of 31st until 12 o'clock to break their lines, but at every assault our lines were driven back except the right. (the 14th). We had now lost many valuable offi- cers and men. The men were nearly out of ammunition, and fatigued almost beyond endurance." Smith says : "The enemy charged upon the left and were in turn temporarily checked, but still kept gaining ground upon us, and using his battery with wonderful effect and accuracy. The fight thus continued with doubtful results until about 2 p. m., when it became apparent that the enemy was being reinforced directly in our rear by the force that we had fought the day before at Macon. The fight thus became general all along the line, and from that time until the sur- render, we lost heavily in killed and wounded; but the enemy suffered none the less." Continuing Capron's re- port after the mounted charge he says: "During this time (the mounted charge) the balance of the 14th Illi- nois and the Ohio Squadron held the enemy in check in my front. I then fell back a short distance from my original position, and held the ground until 12:30 p. m. I was then ordered to strengthen my lines and prepare to make a heavy charge dismounted. 'I brought every available man to the front, including my provost guard. At I p. m. Gen- eral Stoneman ordered an advance, he holding one regi- ment of Colonel Adams' brigade in reserve. As wc
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red forwar ah a yell cha with Gen was forced to fusion amo n us. So any of the emy, captur Irged my re fort to com If officers ce learned f cho escaped fort to comn lieutenant-Co uw came up urrendered. Tompkins the right a e could not m wered. He could have t pursue. His murdered as esfiuse any fr saulted and sfor him, he e respected cly as a last d leave had ates a cound escribes as i is staff and : Itation, and fort to cut be the wes eneral had e respectiv enemy op continued th general ch was ordere
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moved forward the enemy rose up in heavy force and with a yell charged our lines, cutting off my communica- tion with General Stoneman. When nearly surrounded I was forced to fall back to the horses, which created some confusion among my men, as the enemy followed close upon us. So closely did the enemy press my command many of the men were unable to mount their horses ; the enemy, capturing and mounting the horses, repeatedly charged my rear as I continued to retreat. I made every effort to communicate with General Stoneman, but my staff officers were cut off and unable to report. I have since learned from one of General Stoneman's staff officers (who escaped) that General Stoneman made a strong effort to communicate with me but was unable to do so. Lieutenant-Colonel E. Mix, of the 8th Michigan Cavalry, low came up and reported that General Stoneman had urrendered."
Tompkins says: "The proposition was made to move o the right and pass the enemy. He (Stoneman) said he could not move the whole command without being dis- covered. He could make no resistance when pursued ; he vould have the outside track, with an enemy fresh, to bursue. His men would be broken up in detachments and nurdered as some had been on the 29th; he would not efuse any from going, nor order them. If the enemy ssaulted and broke our lines, do the best we could, but s for him, he saw no other way for the lives of the men to be respected but for him to surrender, which he would do only as a last resort. By this means all the detachments that lid leave had five hours the start." This description indi- ates a council of war which Colonel Smith more fully escribes as follows : "About 4 p. m. General Stoneman. is staff and most of his brigade commanders held a con- ultation, and it was thought best to make a desperate ffort to cut cur way out to our right rear, as this seemed o be the weakest part of the enemy's lines. Just as the eneral had given his directions for this movement, and he respective officers were starting to their commands, he enemy opened a battery on our right and left flank and ontinued their fire from the one in front, followed by general charge. Our lines gave way and fell back. was ordered to a certain point to rally a line. Whilst
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doing this I became separated from the general. The line soon gave way again, the enemy then being within 50 yards, both in front and on the left flank I at that moment met Colonel Adams, who had just come from General Stoneman with permission to cut out if he could, stating, moreover, that the General was about to sur- render, but that he desired all to get out who could, and he would remain in person and engage the enemy as long as possible, so as to give those making their escape as much start as possible. This we knew he did, for we could still hear cannonading when we were out some two or three miles from the battle field. I came out with Colonel Adams and his brigade. Colonel Capron had escaped a few minutes before with a part of the 14th Illinois Cavalry, 8th Michigan Cavalry and the Ist Ohio Squadron. Lieutenant-Colonel Matson came out with most of the 6th Indiana Cavalry, all striking out in a north- easterly direction. There thus escaped about 1,200 or 1,300 men, at least two-thirds of the command (perhaps three-fourths) that was left at the time the battle closed."
The following is from General Stoneman's report : "Without entering now into particulars, we were whipped, and this principally on account of the bad conduct of the Kentucky brigade in the attack during the morning, and, in fact, throughout the day." In Captain Lord's account we have the following: "While the council was in session the enemy began a heavy artillery fire, followed immediately by a general advance of their lines. Our left and center, Colonel Adams' brigade and the 8th Michigan, gave way. From General Stoneman's report it would seem that the Kentucky brigade did not do as directed. They certainly did not develop much resist- ance, as the heaviest fire of the enemy was directed on the center and right flank. The 14th maintained its po- sition." And regarding the final escape he says: "These events broke up the formation of Capron's brigade, and a hasty rally of all available men was made, and com- panies formed without regard to regiments, and officers available placed over them. We were now cut off from General Stoneman and surrounded by the enemy. The column was put in motion along the woods about one- eighth of a mile from the road leading to our right rear.
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Within a mile we encountered the enemy, the first line being on foot and behind barricades. A cavalry charge (led by Captain Lord) made an opening, but within a short distance we encountered a force of cavalry, who fought bravely and gave us a running fight several miles that cost us dearly in men. A recount showed nearly one-half missing. Our ranks, however, were hourly augmented by squads of our men who availed them- selves of the opening made by our charges." Our notes in the main correspond to the above reports and accounts of officers relative to the movements at the last. Now word reaches us that the Macon force has nearly reached our horses. With victory in our front almost grasped, we are compelled to turn back to save our horses. The enemy had weakened their front, thus giving us the hope to break their center, but they had rushed heavy col- umns down our flanks and soon closed in, cutting Col- onel Capron, with the 14th and the Ohio squadron, off from General Stoneman and the rest of his command. Our men now rushed for their horses with desperation Some were cut down in the act of mounting, while some of the horses were captured by rebel soldiers, who mounted them and turned them upon our forces. One of Capron's brigade officers succeeded in making his way from Gen- eral Stoneman and notified Capron of Stoneman's propo- sition. It required no time to decide that this was the only way open, and as Capron was on the right wing and in the direction of the intended movement, it was only proper that he should lead the charge. Again mounted, our brave men were ready for the fray. Lieu- tenant-Colonel Jenkins had been in command of the 14th thus far, but now this portion of the brigade is reorganized and divided into detachments, with able leaders for each, thus Colonel Capron, Lieutenant-Colonel Jenkins, Major Quigg, Captain Sanford, Captain Lord, and Captain Mayo each have their separate detachment. With a yell and with sabers flashing, they dash down upon the enemy's left flank, led by as brave and skillful officers as ever drew sabers. The enemy fought fiercely, carbines, revolvers and musket reports of the contending forces mingled in a loud roar ; while flashing sabers crossed blades in the sharp conflict ; but nothing could long impede the force of a
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