USA > Illinois > History of Fourteenth Illinois cavalry and the brigades to which it belonged > Part 3
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On page 296 April 30th, instructions from Burnside to General Boyle, show the great anxiety for the defense of Glasgow and the importance of the trust assigned to our brigade in its advanced position, in the presence of strong forces of the enemy and in their scattered condition, com- pelled to watch the enemy at points distant from each other and at the same time to defend the advanced post at Glas- gow, now far in our rear. The caution to Graham to "look out and not get caught," was hardly needed by that vigilant officer, with the 14th Illinois Cavalry and the 5th Indiana Cavalry as his scouts.
Page 297, April 28th, General Boyle says: "General Hobson dispatches me that detachments of the 5th Indiana and 14th Illinois Cavalry, on the 25th inst. near James- town and Scottsville, captured 23 rebels, 35 horses, 2 mules, I yoke of oxen, sundry small arms and some mer- chandise, and destroyed a mill grinding for General Mor- gan. Expedition last heard from at Celina." On same page Hobson says: "Colonel Graham in his expedition has captured 30 rebels, shelled the enemy at Celina and drove them from that place, attacked 600 at Bennett's ferry, shelling them at long range, killing one. * * I fear if he withdraws to Glasgow the scoundrels will come and desolate the country yet. A force should be kept in the works at Glasgow."
May 4th, in camp until 3 p. m. when we moved toward Tompkinsville ; hard rains had made the roads heavy and
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our progress was slow, as we dare not leave trains and artillery far behind. Marched through Tompkinsville and bivouacked a mile from town, about I a. m. of May 5th ; rained very hard through the night and we got soaking wet, as we had no shelter. At 9 a. m. ( May 5th) marched toward Glasgow, reached Camp Boyle at 9 p. m. ; pleasant day but bad roads. In the morning May 5th, 15 men of Company "I" were sent back to Camp Hills with ambu- lances for some sick left near there; they hear many rumors of forces of the enemy near. Citizens warn them to hasten away. They get the sick in the ambulances and return and when near Tompkinsville they are ordered back to Camp Hills for some beef cattle left there. Again they are earnestly warned to hasten; but they take their own time and procure a yoke for the cattle, the easier to drive them. When they reached Tompkinsville they got supper and captured five of John Morgan's men ; then marched 8 miles toward Glasgow, put out pickets and camped. The main command marched on the 5th 23 miles ; this detachment marched about 32 miles and on the 6th marched 16 miles to Glasgow. Our loss on this ex- pedition was light; that of the enemy only partly known. The main command captured 30. The various detach- ments full twice as many. A few were killed ; their known loss about 100. In part 2d, page 318 are instructions for Graham to keep his forces well in hand, and guard care- fully all the fords on the river. Detachments of the 14th and 5th were kept busy driving out raiding parties and scouting the river borders; while the remainder of the brigade was kept at Glasgow for its defense, and ready for any movement that might be needed. Through the remainder of May and June there was a great amount of sickness in Camp Boyle, which depleted our brigade by deaths and disabilities. May 15th the reported effective strength was 800; the 107th was 700, and the 5th 1,000, but soon after the strength of each was greatly diminished. Fortunately for us, our recent success on and near the Cumberland river, had tended to quiet the rebels in that region, or at the least, it rendered them more timid ; while standing orders to Generals Burnside and Rosecrans at the first opportunity to move simultaneously into upper and lower East Tennessee, kept Bragg's cavalry constantly
GENERAL HORACE CAPRON.
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on the alert to guard against that movement, so that dur- ing this period of weakness the rebel raids were less in num- ber and in strength. Colonel Sanders' raid into eastern Tennessee with 1,500 cavalry begun June 14th and return- ing June 24th in which he boldly marched through upper East Tennessee, destroying much military property, rail- road and bridges, and strongly threatened Knoxville, caused the enemy to believe that the day of judgment was at hand ; and was doubtless the origin of the bold counter- movement made soon after by General John H. Morgan. Meanwhile the cavalry at Glasgow able for duty were out almost daily after raiding parties of the enemy, who sup- posed that the withdrawal of a strong force of cavalry under Colonel Sanders gave them increased opportunities for plunder. The following is from a letter to friends at home, written by one of the authors: "The 14th and the 5th send out scouting parties nearly every day. A short time ago a party of the 5th were out toward Columbia on scout ; they allowed themselves to be surprised by a stronger party of Hamilton's band, and a number were captured. Colonel Graham sent out a detachment of the 14th and the 5th, under Major Woolley, of the 5th, who pursued the rebels toward Jamestown. The enemy separated into two parties. Our command also separated ; the 5th, under Major Woolley, followed their party to the river where they abandoned pursuit. The 14th band pur- sued their party to the river and after the rebels crossed, our party also stealthily crossed and learning the location of the rebel camp, they determined to surprise them. They marched rapidly at night and succeeded in surround- ing the camp of the enemy, but owing to the premature attack by a portion of our band the rebels were enabled to escape through the gap not yet closed up. Major Hamil- ton barely escaped by mounting, barebacked, his superb iron gray charger, and riding through a volley of carbine shots, leaving his hat, sword and trunk, containing his private papers, the pay rolls of his command, $15,000 in stolen greenbacks, and $40,000 of Confederate money- worthless rags, except to pay rampant rebels in their own coin. Our band succeeded in killing a few and capturing 36, with two small cannon, and several hundred stand of arms, and some wagons, which, with the arms, were
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burned, and a lot of horses and mules which, with the can- non, were brought to Glasgow. Yesterday (says the let- ter) a party returned who had pursued a band of rebels that had intercepted a train loaded with broken down U. S. horses that were being sent to Louisville to be recruited up. Our party pursued, and when near Bowling Green, an- other Union party came out and 25 of the rebels were killed and 50 captured, with all their horses and the captured horses also. The details of such service, could all have been gathered, would, of itself, make an interesting his- tory. The few that are given are fair samples of the many unrecorded. These predatory parties were always driven to their hiding places ; but a few hours' rest, and they were ready for another venture. Their facilities for hiding when pursued closely were not only the hills and unsettled regions bordering the Cumberland river, but if very closely pursued, as they were dressed in citizen's clothing, they had only to disperse and hide their arms, when with im- punity they could, as they often did, stand in groups by the cabins at the road side, watching our columns as they passed; there being no way of recognizing them as the raiders. Woe to the small parties of Union men who en- countered strong parties of these banditti. On more than one occasion were these prisoners shot down in cold blood, with their own guns.
A party of these robbers attacked Scottsville, where was only a small hospital guard to protect our sick soldiers left there ; the guard was overpowered and the sick were mur- dered in their beds.
June 30th, our brigade reported some change in its or- ganization ; now composed of 14th Illinois Cavalry, 5th In- diana Cavalry, 107th Illinois Infantry, 23d Michigan In- fantry and IIIth Ohio Infantry, with the same batteries as before and the same brigade commander.
In Part Ist, page 367, is official report of Colonel Graham, June 12th, 1863, in which he reports the result of an expedition sent to the Cumberland river ; 250 of the 14th, 300 of the 5th, with the howitzers of the 14th, under Colonel Capron, left Glasgow June 8th, were joined by 100 men of 14th and 100 of the 5th and marched to Burks- ville and Rays crossroads ; learning of the whereabouts of the rebel camp on the other side of the river, they crossed.
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Colonel Graham tells of the attack on Hamilton's men three miles from their camp ; of the pursuit and capture of some prisoners ; and of the capture of their camp and can- non. The officers of the 14th that Colonel Graham espe- cially mentioned were, Colonel Capron, Major Quigg, Major Tompkins and Captain Sanford, of Company "K," 14th Illinois. Colonel Graham sums up the result of the expedition as the total rout of Hamilton's command, about 40 killed, 36 captured, 2 12-pound howitzers, 7 wagons, 40 horses and mules and 7 head of cattle and a large quantity of flour and corn, and about $10,000 in Confederate notes, and all their camp equipage. The wagons, ammunition and guns were burned, the remainder of the capture was brought to Glasgow. Colonel Graham adds: "I desire to thank all the officers and men of my command for good behavior and prompt obedience to orders." On page 369, Vol. 23, Part Ist, Series Ist, is the following from General Judah, division commander : "Glasgow, June 17th, 1863. Col. Graham and his officers and men are favorably com- mended to the notice of the Major General commanding the 23d Army Corps." On the same page is report of
rebel John H. Morgan : "June 12th, 1863. The enemy surprised Hamilton's battalion at Kettle creek on the 9th inst., capturing two pieces artillery, wagons and stores, and $25,000 public funds, and many men and horses ; scat- tering the entire command. Major Hamilton had been ordered to report to Colonel R. C. Morgan, but refused. There is now no force on the Cumberland river and the entire rear of this flank is exposed to raids, which no doubt the enemy will attempt, and if successful, with most dis- astrous results."
The raid of Colonel Sanders, before referred to, now occurred. In consequence of Sanders' raid and the rout- ing of Hamilton's force, we had a short period of rest, but it was only the calm that preceded the storm of General Morgan's great raid, the motive of which was doubtless the revival of sinking courage in the rebel ranks, by a bold counter movement. Nothing more of note occurred until the Morgain raid, and we close this, the first chapter of our history, which to us, though disagreeable in the nature of the service, was the very best possible training which led to our future extraordinary success.
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CHAPTER II.
THE GREAT MORGAN RAID ACROSS THE OHIO RIVER.
In recording this interesting campaign, in addition to the original notes of Sanford, West and Featherson, we are indebted for important contributons to the following : Lieutenant H. C. Connelly, of Company "L" (afterward promoted ) ; Captain Wm. R. Sanford, of Company "K," and Acting Adjutant Isaac H. Allen. Each of these have contributed much. The government published records, Series One, Volume Twenty-three. Part first, contains nearly 400 reports, references and dispatches pertaining to this important campaign. These have all been carefully examined and the important part relative to our service is embodied. Some fine descriptions and reminiscences have been crowded out for want of room, but not to the exclusion of any historical facts. Morgan never made any report and all that can be gathered from Confederate re- ports is found in General Wheeler's report, pages 817 and 818. In reporting to Confederate headquarters Novem- ber 7th, 1863, Wheeler says : "Morgan asked privilege June 14th to take a cavalry force and attack Louisville, Ky., where he said the enemy had but 300 men." Wheeler consulted Bragg, who consented, providing Morgan would take but 1,500 men, and all the artillery he wanted. Mor- gan said he could accomplish all with 2,000; his object be- ing to destroy the transportation, shipping and U. S. gov- ernment property at Louisville. Morgan says: "Can I go?" Wheeler and Bragg consented and Wheeler adds : "Not one word was said about his crossing the Ohio river ; on the contrary he was urged to observe the importance of his return to our army as rapidly as possible." The real reason for his finally crossing the Ohio river will be dis- closed as we proceed, and the number of men with which he crossed will be satisfactorily estimated in the close. Brigadier General Henry M. Judah, commanded third division of the 23d Army Corps, of which our brigade, the
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first, was posted at Glasgow. The second brigade was commanded by Brigadier General Edward H. Hobson. Brigadier General James M. Shackelford commanded the first brigade of the second division posted at Russellville, about 30 miles south of west from Glasgow. June 22d reports had reached us that Morgan, at the head of a large mounted force, was about to invade Kentucky, and indica- tions pointed to the probability that he would strike Scotts- ville or Gallatin, west of Glasgow, in penetrating our lines. Page 441 Judah says to Shackelford: "I have Carthage, and shall occupy La Fayette, Tompkinsville and Marrow- bone." And he asks Shackelford to throw forward scouts via Franklin, to watch between Scottsville and the railroad. The effective force of our brigade marched at 8 a. m. June 22d, toward Scottsville 12 miles and camped ; weather very warm. June 23d marched at 6 a. m., 14th in advance. Camped at 5 p. m. at Scottsville, a small town south of west from Glasgow 25 miles. Most of its citizens were rebels. (See also General Judah's report, page 655.) From 24th to 26th in camp with much rain and small rations. Mor- gan is now reported to be approaching Carthage, Tennes- see. June 26th, marched at 9 a. m. 3 miles ( and camped near Barren river. June 28th in camp. June 29th, forded Barren river and marched toward Tompkinsville and camped near Jamestown. June 30th, marched to Tomp- kinsville, 25 miles, camped near ; mustered for pay. July Ist to July 4th in camp. For days the weather has been excessively warm, with many showers. July 2d Major Quigg and Captain Dent, with 150 men of the 14th Illinois, were sent on reconnoissance on the lower Burksville road to Turkeyneck bend. July 4th, marched to Glasgow, 25 miles, and camped on the old ground ; our camp there was called "Camp Boyles." Our scout to Turkeyneck bend reported the enemy's pickets in sight at that point, but learned that his main force had moved toward Burkeville farther east. General Judah, page 655, says: "On 3d instant a portion of his forces attempted to force the posi- tion at Marrowbone held by my second brigade under Gen- eral Hobson, and were handsomely repulsed. I deter- mined to attack the enemy at Burksville, moving up my first brigade under General Manson during the night for that purpose. Before the necessary orders could be given
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word was received from the front that the enemy had dis- appeared. Although I had every reason to apprehend re- sistance to his advance at Columbia from the U. S. forces from Jamestown or other points, I dispatched General Shackelford with his brigade, within half an hour in the direction of Columbia, having previously reinforced him by the 12th Kentucky Cavalry from my division. On the ensuing morning I started General Hobson's brigade in the same direction, with orders to move according to cir- cumstances."
From necessity Shackelford's brigade and Hobson's were merged into one command under the command of General Hobson, and so remained until the capture of Morgan's command. Judah says : "Before leaving Mar- rowbone I ordered my first brigade from Tompkinsville to Glasgow, under General Manson; proceeding there my- self." Again: "Upon arriving there I took command in person of its cavalry, consisting of the 5th Indiana Cavalry, under Lieutenant Colonel Butler, the 14th Illinois Cavalry, under Colonel Horace Capron, and the IIth Kentucky, under Major - , including two 3-inch Rod- man guns (of the 5th Indiana), and four mountain how- itzers (of the 14th Illinois), in all 1,200 men, and marched for Greensburg."
July 5th, severe sickness at Glasgow had disabled many of the brigade, both infantry and cavalry, so that from these, and from other commands a large number of convales- cents there were organized into a convalescent corps, un- der the command of Major David Quigg, of the 14th Illi- nois Cavalry. These were to be used, as far as they were able, in defending Glasgow and all southern Kentucky, against rebel raids through that country, in the absence of so much of our effective cavalry now in pursuit of Morgan.
The troops under Burnside then in Kentucky, were a portion of the 23d Army Corps, about 20,000 in all, in- fantry and mounted forces. These were scattered over the state. At Somerset, Ky., 3,524, being 3 infantry and 4 mounted regiments. At Mount Vernon a brigade, 3,042, being 3 infantry and 3 mounted regiments. At Jamestown, 1,304, 3 mounted regiments. At Russellville, Shackelford's brigade, 2,254, 2 infantry, 22 mounted. At Glasgow, one brigade, 2,591, 3 infantry, 2 cavalry. At
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309171
Marrowbone, 2,435, 3 infantry, 3 mounted. At Carthage, 1,563, 3 infantry, I mounted. Of these General Judah had at the front, 3 brigades, aggregating 7,280, more than half of which was infantry, incapable of being moved quick enough to head off a mounted force, so that he had avail- able for this purpose not more than 3,640, and these scat- tered all along southern Kentucky, as Morgan's maneuver- ing left Judah in doubt where he would attempt to cross into Kentucky. Considering the secretness and swiftness of Morgan's movements, it was remarkable that General Judah was able to maneuver as well as he did, and as Mor- gan finally crossed above or farther east than his assigned limits it was but reasonable that he should expect the United States forces farther east to meet him. It was not then anticipated that Morgan would be able to baffle the Union forces as he did. Kentucky was filled with rebel sympathizers that furnished hundreds of young men mounted on good horses, as recruits to his army. And in addition, these rebel sympathizers aided in spreading false rumors, and in tearing down telegraph lines, and in send- ing false dispatches, and for this last purpose Morgan had with him an expert telegrapher, with all needed appliances by which Union dispatches were intercepted, and bogus messages sent in their stead. By these means he so far succeeded that none but Judah's forces attempted to inter- cept him; and these he flanked by passing beyond their reach. He then turned westward, passed near the forces at Jamestown and Somerset, and attacked the slender force at Columbia. On July 4th he attacked a small force at Tebbs bend, commanded by Colonel Orlando Moore, and got whipped. He then hastened to Lebanon, and after a hard fight of hours with the small force there, he got pos- session by a trick, and compelled his captives to keep pace on foot with his mounted forces on double quick for 9 miles, on that extremely hot July day. Three or four of the captives died of over-exertion, or were knocked in the head because they could not keep up. But for a timely shower doubtless all would have died. See pages 647 and 649, Series 1, Volume 23, Part Ist.
Shackelford and Hobson were now pressing up, and other forces were gathering to their support. Because one of our officers reproved them for their inhuman treat-
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ment of prisoners, Captain Morgan, a brother of the gen- eral, seized him and threatened to shoot him. This was the gallant John Morgan, who, though a coward by nature, was enabled through the greatest amount of cunning ever displayed by a military leader, and through the greatest exercise of barbarity, to accomplish one of the greatest raids ever recorded, but which ended in the destruction of his army and in landing himself in the Ohio penitentiary.
We will now leave our pursuing forces in eastern Ken- tucky, who have turned Morgan toward the west, and will return to our command under General Judah.
July 5th the choice, able-bodied cavalry of the brigade, I,200 strong, marched at 7 a. m. on the Louisburg pike a few miles, then turned on a byroad eastward; marched 20 miles and camped near Barren river ; no rations for man or horse.
July 6th. All day occupied in crossing Green river, which was very high. Companies "I" and "K" crossed by swimming, and the rest of the brigade by means of a ferry. Marched one mile and camped. Captain Sanford, with 150 men of 14th, advance pickets.
July 7th. Learning that Morgan is turning westward with evident intent to destroy the Louisville & Nashville Railroad, and make his way back to the rebel lines, at 4 a. m. we marched rapidly toward Elizabethtown, avoiding all towns, and camped after dark, having marched 35 miles.
July 8th. Reveille at 4 a. m .; marched early ; passed . through Hudsonville. A part of Morgan's force had been here the night previous. Arrived at Elizabethtown at 3 p. m. ; marched 25 miles. Here we were ordered to leave all clothing not absolutely needed in that extremely hot weather ; it was boxed up, but eventually ruined by much rain, and we believe that through some mismanagement the men never received compensation. In Part 2d, page 517, is an order of General Judah dated Elizabethtown, July 6th, assigning Colonel Horace Capron, of the 14th Illinois Cavalry, to the command temporarily of the cav- alry brigade composed of 14th Illinois, 5th Indiana, and IIth Kentucky Cavalry. Page 656, Judah says: "Deem- ing it useless after crossing (Green river) to attempt to join the pursuing forces, I directed my march upon the
LIEUTENANT COLONEL DAVID P. JENKINS.
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left flank of the enemy, for the purpose of intercepting him upon his attempt to return, after crossing the Louisville & Nashville Railroad. We remained at Elizabethtown until 9 p. m., then marched in the night toward Litchfield; reached Litchfield much fatigued at 7 a. m. of July Ioth. Here learned that Morgan had passed through, and was now near the Ohio river, with the undoubted intention of crossing into Indiana. Camped near the village, having marched 31 miles. All day in camp cleaning arms and washing clothes.
July IIth, 6 a. m. Marched to Elizabethtown ; arrived after night after a fatiguing march of 31 miles through deep mud. Hobson and Shackelford are in close pursuit of Morgan. Morgan was so keenly pursued by our cav- alry, which gathered strength as it proceeded, that he for- got all about Louisville and its 300, and the nice plunder he expected to pilfer, and began to think of "Home, Sweet Home ;" and turning in that direction he found 1,200 reso- lute men pressing up to give him battle ; and though he had nearly four times that force, he had no appetite for a fight unless he could attack a much weaker force than ours. There was now no alternative but to fight or cross the Ohio river; he chose the latter as promising the least amount of fight. On July 8th, at Bradenburg, Morgan captured two steamboats and crossed into Indiana. The United States steamer "Springfield" engaged Morgan, but could not prevent his crossing. The whole country was now in a flutter of excitement, especially the people of In- diana. Messages flew over the wires from the President, and from Governors, and by the hundreds from all grades of army officers. Governor Morton feared Morgan would attack Indianapolis, 120 miles distant; but he attacked Corydon, and then Salem, and then made his way eastward where he supposed he had many sympathizing friends ; but the barbarity of his treatment of the people left few sym- pathizers in his rear. Stores, mills and dwellings were robbed and burned with impunity. Hobson and Shackel- ford crossed as soon as boats could be procured, and fol- lowed as rapidly as the exhausted condition of their men and horses would permit ; but now is again displayed the cunning of Morgan that never forsook him. He kept out men five miles on each flank, collecting all the horses fit
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for service; so that while keeping his men splendidly mounted for rapid and constant marching, he left no horses in his rear by which Hobson and Shackelford could remount their men, while the condition of their horses not only prevented rapid marches, but they were constantly dropping on the route, and could not be replaced except by horses never fit for the service. Nor was this all. He dressed some of his men in citizen's clothes, with instruc- tions where important roads met, to come rushing up breathlessly and, imitating excited citizens, to implore the Union cavalry to hasten to defend certain points upon which they stated that Morgan was marching; thus endeavoring, and often successfully, to deviate from the direct course of pursuit. But on the other hand, not only were many forces of militia called out, but these inexperi- enced men Morgan swept from his path with ease; but another method of obstruction was more successful. Citi- zens turned out by scores and hundreds and leveled forests in his path. These of course also somewhat impeded the Union cavalry, but by the aid of citizens this obstructed the Union cavalry much less than it did Morgan's forces.
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