USA > South Carolina > The history of South Carolina in the Revolution, 1780-1783 > Part 10
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to Marion and to Lee.1 He made, however, no move to join Morgan, or to cover his retreat with his prisoners. Five days after he was still on the Pee Dee, urging Marion to cross the Santee.2
It was not yet noon when the battle of Cowpens was ended. Morgan, knowing of the proximity of Cornwallis, halted no longer on the field of battle than to refresh his men and prisoners, and make the provision which human- ity required of him. He boldly moved across the Broad that evening, leaving Colonel Pickens with a detachment of his partisans to bury the dead, and provide as far as possible for the wants and comforts of the wounded of both armies. After making such provision as he could for their care and attendance, the wounded of both armies were left upon the field of battle under a safeguard and a flag, and the next day Pickens rejoined his commander. Early in the morning Morgan had resumed his march, anxiously expecting and fearing the return of his patrols with intelli- gence that the enemy was at hand; but, strange to say, though, encumbered with his prisoners, he was then mov- ing directly across the enemy's front, none appeared to assail his flank and arrest his progress. To his great sur- prise and relief authentic intelligence was received, not only that the enemy had not moved, but that he showed no intention to move that day. Morgan, however, still pressed on, and reached the fords of the Catawba, which he crossed. Two rivers which had separated him from his commander-in-chief had thus been safely passed.
While Leslie was leisurely crossing the Catawba to join Cornwallis, Morgan was at Gilbertown - the present Lincoln- ton in North Carolina. Here Morgan detached the greater part of his militia, as he called them, and a part of Colonel
1 Greene's letter to Marion, James's Life of Marion, Appendix, 18.
2 General Huger's letter to Marion, January 28, ibid., 20.
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Washington's cavalry, as a guard, with the prisoners. At Island Ford, on the north fork of the Catawba, Washing- ton left the prisoners with the volunteers under Pickens, and rejoined Morgan, who remained between them and the enemy. Major Hyrne, the commissary of prisoners, now relieved Colonel Pickens of his charge, and marched with the six hundred prisoners to the prisoner camp established at Charlottesville, Virginia.
Upon the diversion of the force sent under Leslie from the invasion of Virginia to the reenforcement of Cornwallis in South Carolina, Sir Henry Clinton had despatched another body to the Chesapeake to renew that movement, and the advance of this force under the traitor Arnold had, on the 4th of January, ascended the James River and debarked seven hundred men about twenty-five miles below Rich- mond. Cornwallis, learning of this and that a further embarkation of troops destined for Virginia under General Philips was about to take place, determined to renew his invasion of North Carolina to cooperate with this movement against Virginia. On the 19th of January, that is, three days after Tarleton's defeat at Cowpens, Leslie having formed a junction with him, Cornwallis began his march northward. 1
1 This movement of Lord Cornwallis in prosecution of the original ministerial plan was the subject of bitter controversy in England after the loss of the colonies. Sir Henry Clinton attributed to it all of the subse- quent disaster to the British arms. He admits that such an advance had been part of the original plan by which the war was to have been prosecuted from South to North, and that upon Lord Cornwallis's junc- tion with the forces of Leslie sent to meet him in Virginia the objective point was to have been Baltimore, and thence an advance northwardly. But Sir Henry's contention was that, after his reverses in South Carolina and the failure of the Loyalists in North Carolina to rise in 1780, as had been expected, Lord Cornwallis should have abandoned the campaign and remained in South Carolina ( Clinton-Cornwallis Controversy, 2 volumes, compiled by B. F. Stevens, London, 1888). But whatever force there is
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Colonel Lee states that Greene was quickly advised of the advance of the British from Winnsboro; indeed, that he learned of this movement before he learned of Morgan's victory, and that he accordingly issued preparatory orders for the movement of his own troops.1 He heard of the vic- tory on the 23d, for on that day he wrote to Marion inform- ing him of it, and requesting him to communicate the intelligence to Lee, but there is no intimation in his letter of any movement on his part, on the contrary, he left Lee to continue his attack upon Georgetown.2 He writes again to Marion on the 25th, reiterating the agreeable news of the defeat of Tarleton, and urging an attack by Lee and himself
in Sir Henry's position must be restricted to his lordship's decision and action after his losses at Cowpens, and must not include his previous losses at King's Mountain, etc., in 1780, for if these former reverses should have influenced the combined movements, Sir Henry was himself as much to blame in the matter as Cornwallis-nay, more so, for he was the Commander-in-chief and should have countermanded the movement. He was immediately informed of the disaster at King's Mountain by Lord Rawdon, who wrote to Sir Henry on the 29th of October, during the illness of Lord Cornwallis, giving Sir Henry a full account of it ( Clinton-Corn- wallis Controversy, vol. I, 277). This letter Clinton received on the 5th of December, and on the 13th replied to Lord Corn wallis, acknowledging the receipt of Lord Rawdon's letter, approving his lordship's call to Leslie to join him, and informing his lordship that he had sent Arnold with a corps to replace Leslie's, which had gone to him (ibid., 310). Cornwallis received this letter of Sir Henry on the 6th of January (ibid., 315). Had Sir Henry then thought proper to abandon the ministerial plan, he should have so instructed his lordship in his letter of the 13th. Unless, there- fore, the defeat of Tarleton at Cowpens should have influenced him, Cornwallis had no choice under his existing instructions but to proceed with the plans, as he did on the 19th. He writes to Sir Henry on the 18th, the day before he began his march, " It is impossible to foresee all the consequences that this unexpected and extraordinary event [Tarleton's defeat at Cowpens] may produce, but your Excellency may be assured that nothing but the most absolute necessity shall induce me to give up the important object of the winter's campaign," etc. (Ibid., 321.)
1 Memoirs of the War of 1776 (Lee), 232.
2 Gibbes's Documentary Hist. of the Am. Rev. (1781-82), 16.
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on Watson at Nelson's Ferry, saying nothing of his own movements.1 On the 26th he writes to Lee that he intended to start for Charlotte to consult with Morgan, Davidson, Sumter, and Pickens in regard to assembling all his force and moving against Ninety Six. But on further reflection, it is said, he abandoned these ideas, and determined to limit his plans to a junction of his main body with Morgan, and resisting, if possible, Cornwallis's advance to Virginia.2 If, as Colonel Lee says, Greene received the gratifying intelli- gence of Morgan's victory the day after he heard of Corn- wallis's advance, it was, therefore, on the 22d that he did so, and yet it was not until the 28th that he decided upon his course in consequence, and then, as his biographer says, he committed what will be deemed by many the most im- prudent action of his life. With only a guide, one aide, and a sergeant's guard of cavalry, he started across the country to join the army of General Morgan and aid him in his arduous operations. The distance was one hundred miles at least, the country infested with Tories, and Camden not far on his left where such a prize would be liberally paid for.3 This was indeed a most extraordinary step to have taken after six days of hesitation and indecision. Why he should have deemed it so necessary to abandon his main army and leave it under Huger, to join Morgan with his detachment, as to warrant this mad ride, it is difficult to imagine. Before he started he had recalled Lee and directed General Isaac Huger to follow with the army he had at Cheraw, and to join Morgan at Salisbury. Huger, on the 29th, began his march, and South Carolina was again aban-
1 Gibbes's Documentary Hist. of the Am. Rev. (1781-82), 17.
2 Great Commanders Series, General Greene (Greene), 193-194.
3 Johnson's Life of Greene, vol. I, 394. In the Great Commanders Series, General Greene, it is said that he was accompanied by his aide, Major Burnet, a sergeant, and three mounted militiamen, 194.
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doned by the Continental army, to contend as best she might with the British forces still remaining within her border.
The position at Cheraw with which General Greene was so much pleased when he took it did not prove to have the advantage which he supposed. It did not compel Lord Cornwallis to divide his forces. On the contrary, his lord- ship did not hesitate to order Leslie to join him when he was ready to move, though Greene was still at Cheraw; nor did he hesitate to prosecute his views on Virginia, and to advance into North Carolina, though Greene was upon his flank; nor did Greene find it practicable to advance upon Charlestown, the goal of all movements in the South. Instead of all this, as Greene had fondly considered, he found himself cut off from Morgan despite Morgan's vic- tory, and forced, as he deemed, to take a most desperate ride across the country to join Morgan, leaving his army under Huger to make the best of its way after him. Had Cornwallis advanced with promptness and despatch he would completely have divided Greene's forces, which he would have crushed, one after the other. Greene's es- cape was entirely the result of his lordship's dilatoriness. Greene reached Morgan on the 30th, and learned that Corn- wallis was only a few miles away, across the Catawba.
The British forces in South Carolina on the 1st of Decem- ber, 1780, amounted to 7384.1 Sir Henry Clinton estimated that Lord Cornwallis ought to have had with him, after the battle of Cowpens, 3000 men exclusive of cavalry and militia. 2 The loss at Cowpens was 784. Deducting the 3784 from the British forces in the State on the 1st of Decem- ber, 1780, there remained 3600 men. But Lord Cornwallis did not take all his army with him when he marched for North Carolina. He left with Lord Rawdon, at Camden,
1 Washington's Writings, vol. V, Appendix, 544.
2 Johnson's Life of Greene, vol. II, 4.
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the Sixty-third Regiment and Rawdon's own, the Volun- teers of Ireland. These Rawdon estimated at 700;1 but Stedman, the historian, places the number at 800.2 There still remained therefore, in South Carolina, a British force of at least 4300 men, against which Sumter and Marion, alone with their volunteers, were left to contend.
There seems to have been some question upon whom the command of the British forces remaining in South Carolina devolved in the absence of Lord Cornwallis. Lieutenant-Colonel Nisbet Balfour, the commandant at Charlestown, was the ranking officer in the line, he being lieutenant colonel of the Twenty-third Regiment, known as the "Welsh Fusileers," of which Sir William Howe was colonel, while Lord Rawdon, holding the position on the staff of adjutant general with the rank of lieutenant colonel, was ranked by Balfour in the line, and was colonel only of a provincial regiment, the Volunteers of Ireland, which he had raised in Philadelphia, and as such, it was said, was subordinate to the youngest lieu- tenant colonel of the line. But Cornwallis, before he left the State, had intrusted the command of the troops on the frontier to Lord Rawdon, limiting Colonel Balfour's command to the country within the Santee, Congaree, and Saluda rivers.3 This arrangement was not at all
1 Memoirs of the War of 1776 (Lee), Appendix, 615.
2 Stedman's Am: War, vol. II, 355.
8 Letter of Marquis of Hastings, formerly Lord Rawdon, written July 23, 1813, appendix to Memoirs of the War of 1776 (Lee), 613.
The comparative rank of Lord Rawdon and Colonel Balfour was a matter about which there was question, and one which we shall see assuming considerable importance in the case of the execution of Colonel Isaac Hayne and of their respective responsibility therefor. The facts appear to be that Lord Rawdon was a lieutenant colonel on the staff of the British army, and as such was adjutant general to Sir Henry Clinton ; but desiring to serve in the line, he had raised in Philadelphia a provincial regiment, the " Volunteers of Ireland," of which he was colonel.
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satisfactory to Lord Rawdon, who complained that he was left to defend Camden, a position which he had always reprobated as being on the wrong side of the river and covering nothing, with but seven hundred men. He complained that his only concern with the interior posts of Motte's House, Granby, and Ninety Six was the necessity he was under of subordinating his movements to their protection, while he could draw no reinforcements from them for his own, or even for the protection of his communications, without the leave of Colonel Balfour, between whom and himself there was an estrangement. Sir Henry Clinton, with whom Balfour was no favorite, in order to assure Lord Rawdon the command, subse- quently promoted him to the rank of brigadier general, but the commission, it is said, did not arrive until Lord Rawdon had left the field and embarked for England.1
Supposing the commission incompatible with that on the staff, he had tendered his resignation of the commission of lieutenant colonel. But his resignation was not accepted. Lord George Germain, Secretary of State for the Colonies, writing to Sir Henry Clinton July 5, 1780, says : "The King is fully sensible of his lordship's merits, and of the great advantage which the corps under his command has derived from his lordship's at- tention to it ; but his Majesty commands me to signify to you his royal pleasure that you do immediately acquaint his lordship that he still re- tains his rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the army."-Clinton-Cornwallis Controversy, vol. I, 230. Lord Cornwallis certainly regarded Rawdon as ranking Balfour. He writes to Lord George Germain on August 20, 1780, " I set out on the 21st of June for Charlestown, leaving the command of the troops on the frontier to Lord Rawdon, who was, after Brigadier-General Patterson, the commandant of Charlestown, the next officer in rank to me in the province."-Ibid., 244. Lieutenant-Colonel Balfour had not, however arrived in the province on the 21st of June ; but in another letter from Cornwallis to Germain in which Colonel Balfour's arrival is mentioned, Cornwallis writes, " I likewise think it highly proper that as Lord Rawdon is acting with and commanding all these officers, he should be allowed the same allowance," to wit, the pay of a brigadier general. - Ibid., 240.
1 Letter of Marquis of Hastings, supra.
VOL. IV. - H
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While General Greene, with the Continental troops, had abandoned South Carolina to the domination of the British forces under Balfour and Rawdon, Judge John- son claims for him the conception of the bold operations undertaken by Sumter and Marion in his absence; for these gallant leaders did not hesitate, with their volunteer bands, at once to assume the offensive in the face of the overwhelming force of the enemy remaining in the State. General Greene had certainly suggested to Marion an attack upon the British post at Nelson's Ferry before the 19th of January, for he closes a letter on that day, "I wish your answer respecting the practicability of surprising the party at Nelson's ; the route, and force you will be able to detach." 1 Again, on the 23d, he wrote to Marion : "I wish to have your opinion of the practi- cability of crossing the Santee with a party of three or four hundred horse, and whether they would be much exposed by being in the rear of the enemy; also whether the party could not make good their retreat if it should be necessary, and join our people towards Ninety Six. If the thing is practicable, can your people be engaged to perform the service ?" 2 But in a letter of the 3d of February, he wrote to Sumter from North Carolina : " I agree with you in opinion that if proper measures are taken, the enemy may be made apprehensive of their rear. For this purpose I have desired General Marion to cross the Santee if possible, and in order to pave the way for this service I desired Lieutenant-Colonel Lee to surprise Georgetown, that the militia be left more at liberty to cross the river." 3 This rather implies that
1 James's Life of Marion, Appendix, 16.
2 Johnson's Life of Greene, vol. I, 361.
8 Johnson's Life of Greene, vol. I, 362 ; Sumter MSS., Year Book, City of Charleston, 1899, Appendix, 80.
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the suggestion was Sumter's. It certainly indicates that it was as much Sumter's scheme as his own. The order was extended by General Huger. On the 28th of January this officer, before marching to join Greene, wrote to Marion : "General Greene wishes that you will attempt to cross the Santee, and if possible reach some of the enemy's magazines, and destroy them. I am persuaded you will not leave any practicable measure unattempted to effect this business. The execution is left entirely to your judgment and address."1 But whether this move was first suggested by Greene or Sumter, the order for it had been anticipated by the action of Marion him- self. Marion, who was then at Cordes's plantation one hundred miles distant, on the 29th,2 that is, a day at least before the letter could possibly have reached him, ordered Captain John Postell to cross the Santee with twenty-five men, and make a forced march to Wadboo bridge, which crosses a prong of the western branch of Cooper River, known as the Fair Forest Swamp, about twenty-five miles from Charlestown, and there to burn all the stores of every kind. "It is possible," Marion wrote to Postell, "you will find a small guard there, which you
1 James's Life of Marion, Appendix, 20.
2 James's Life of Marion, 20, Appendix, 91. Marion appears at this time to have had what were called three regiments. Of these Peter Horry was colonel of one, with William Benison as major, and John Baxter, John Postell, Daniel Conyers, and James McCauley, captains. Adam McDonald was colonel of another, but then being a prisoner, the regiment was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Hugh Horry. A third regiment was commanded by Colonel John Ervin, who resigned and was succeeded by Captain John Baxter. Captain William McCottry com- manded a company of riflemen, but whether attached to one of these regiments or as an independent command does not appear. The following list of other of Marion's officers is compiled from those mentioned from time to time in James's Life of Marion : Colonels James Postell, William Harden, and Hezekiah Maham, Majors John James and Alexander
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may surprise, but bring no prisoners with you. You will . return the same way, and recross the river at the same place, which must be done before daylight the next morning. After effecting my purpose at Wadboo it will not be out of your way to come by Monck's Corner, and destroy any stores or wagons you may find there." 1 This order gave Captain Postell but twenty-five men, but it appears that he took thirty-eight with him. Colonel James Postell was at the same time despatched with about an equal number. Colonel Postell burnt a great quantity of valuable stores at Manigault's Ferry, and Captain Postell a great many more in its vicinity. Thence the latter posted to Keithfield, near Monck's Corner, and burnt fourteen wagons loaded with soldier's clothing, baggage, and other valuable stores, and took prisoner about forty British regulars, without losing a man. The taking of these prisoners, though against Marion's orders, appears to have been approved, for General Greene extends to the Postells his particular thanks for the spirit and address with which they had executed Marion's orders over the Santee. To the Postells it was said nothing appeared difficult.2
As the navigation of the Wateree did not permit the transportation of supplies, the British were obliged to have their stores of rum, salt, ammunition, and clothing sent overland across from Nelson's Ferry to Camden. Marion had in the last summer shown that Nelson's Ferry was not beyond his reach, and the Postells, under his orders, had now
Swinton, Captains John T. Greene, Thomas Waties, Gavin Witherspoon, Thomas Potts, - Irby, John Simons (killed at Quimby), William All- ston, Samuel Cooper, William Capers, G. Sinclair Capers, John Futhey, Bennett, William Clay Snipes, John Carraway Smith, Lieutenant Sınizer.
1 James's Life of Marion, Appendix, 20.
2 Ibid., 91, Appendix, 20.
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reached Monck's Corner. So that the transportation of stores was now threatened along the whole road from the Cooper to the Santee, and to the Wateree. To protect the route the British had established a line of posts. The first of these was at Biggin's Bridge over the Cooper, just above Monck's Corner; the next at Nelson's Ferry; then one at Wright's Bluff, on Scott's Lake, about ten miles above Nelson's Ferry ; another at Thomson's plantation, on the Congaree, protecting the roads to McCord's and to Granby on the Congaree; and still another at the latter place, which was also known as Fridig's or Friday's Ferry. These lines of posts thus protected the road either to Cam- den or Ninety Six. Besides the additional security thus afforded, the supplies were always attended by escorts, which, since the enterprises of the two Postells, seldom consisted of less than three hundred or four hundred men. But not even with these precautions were these lines secure.
About the middle of February Major McLeroth,1 of the Sixty-fourth Regiment of the British army, was marching from Nelson's Ferry at the head of one of these escorts, when Marion, with about an equal number of mounted men, assailed him near Halfway Swamp, eighteen or twenty miles from Nelson's Ferry, in what is now Clar- endon County. Marion at first cut off in succession two pickets in McLeroth's rear, then, wheeling round his main body, attacked him in flank and front. As McLeroth had no cavalry, his situation became perilous in the extreme ; but by a rapid march, with constant skirmishing, he gained a field upon the road about a mile and a half from the swamp, which was open, but enclosed with a fence. Here he posted himself on the west of the road within the en-
1 In his Life of Marion James spells the name of this officer, McIlwrath (p. 91) ; we follow the spelling found in Tarleton's Campaigns, p. 153, and in the Army List, Almanac, 1780.
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closure. On the east, skirting the road, there was a large cypress swamp stretching towards Halfway Swamp, on the verge of which Marion took position.
In this situation of the parties a most curious and ro- mantic incident took place. Major McLeroth sent a flag to Marion, reproaching him with shooting his pickets con- trary, as he alleged, to all the laws of civilized warfare, and defying him to combat in the open field. Marion replied that the practice of the British in burning the houses of all who would not submit and join them was more indefensi- ble than that of shooting pickets, and that as long as they persisted in the one he would persevere in the other. That as to his defiance, he considered it that of a man in desperate circumstances; but if he wished to witness a combat between twenty picked men on each side he was ready to gratify him. Strange to say, this extraordinary proposition of Marion was accepted by McLeroth,1 and a place for the combat, near an oak tree which stood for many years afterwards, agreed upon. Accordingly Mar- ion appointed Major John Vanderhorst, then a supernu- merary officer, to take command of this band, and Captain Samuel Price to be second in command. The names of the men were written on slips of paper and presented to them individually. The first chosen was Gavin Wither- spoon, who promptly accepted, and no one else who was chosen refused. Major Vanderhorst formed his party in
1 The character of Major McLeroth, says James, has been constantly represented by the inhabitants of this State among whom he passed as the most humane of all the officers of the British army. To those in their power even forbearance was at that time a virtue, but his virtues were active. It has been currently reported, adds James, that he carried his dislike of house-burning so far that he neglected to carry into effect the orders of his Commander-in-chief on that point to such an extent as to gain his ill will and that of many other British officers. James's Life of Marion, 97-98.
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