USA > South Carolina > The history of South Carolina in the Revolution, 1780-1783 > Part 20
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"'We must always calculate on the maxim "that your enemy will do what he ought to do." We will dispute every inch of ground in the best manner we can, but Rawdon will push me back to the moun- tains. Lord Cornwallis will establish a chain of posts along the James River and the Southern States thus cut off will die like the tail of a snake.'
" These are his very words," says Davie. "They made a deep and melancholy impression and I shall never forget them.
" After expressing an anxious desire to remain as near as possible to cover the retreat of Lee from Fort Motte, we recurred again to the map where I had it in my power to assure him from personal knowl- edge that the country abounded in strong positions ; and as to subsist- ence there would be no difficulty, as we should be falling back on our depots or magazines in North Carolina; that if he was obliged to retreat further he must permit me to resume my original plan, as I was morally certain a respectable force could be raised in the western districts of that State." .. .
" General Greene possessed, in an eminent degree, those high ener- gies requisite to conquer appalling difficulties, united with that cool and moral courage which resists the anguish of disappointment and the pressure of misfortune. I never observed his mind yield but at this gloomy moment when he conceived himself not only abandoned by all the constituted authorities of the confederacy, but even by that por- tion of the population of the Southern States who had everything to hope from his success and everything to fear from his failure. I em- ployed the whole night in writing until an orderly sergeant sum- moned me to headquarters about daylight. On entering the General's
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tent I soon perceived some important change had taken place. ' I have sent for you,' said he, with a countenance expressing the most lively pleasure, 'to inform you that Lord Rawdon is preparing to evacuate Camden- that place was the key of the enemy's line of posts, they will now all fall or be evacuated - all will now go well. Burn your letters, I shall march immediately to the Congaree. Ar- range your convoys to follow us. And let me know what expresses and detachments you want."
Mr. Lee, while severely criticising this statement, and doubting either the accuracy of Colonel Davie's recollec- tion, whose veracity he, however, declares is beyond impu- tation, or of Judge Johnson's recording, the inaccuracy of which he does not hesitate to charge as more probable, declares that the conversation, if correctly remembered by Colonel Davie, will show a surprising mutability of mind in General Greene and a variation of views on the same day which cannot be accounted for. But this is assuming the very matter in question. Was not this the very fault of General Greene's mind? Was he not subject alike to fits of confidence and despondency? How confident he was on the morning of the 25th of April, not only of de- feating Lord Rawdon, but of capturing his whole army ; and yet by night was he not calling upon Sumter, Marion, and Lee, each and all, to hasten to his rescue ? Irresolu- tion and indecision of mind were characteristics which his enemies attributed to him, and to which they considered their victory at Hobkirk's Hill was owing.1
But, however that may be, Colonel Davie's statement, which was, no doubt, correctly given by Judge Johnson, presents the conduct of Greene in its most favorable aspect, for it represents him contemplating a retreat upon public grounds alone, and then only from position to position as he might be forced, after vigorous resistance; while that of
1 Annual Register, vol. XXIV, 81.
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Dr. Irvine and Judge Peter Johnston represent him as bent upon a hasty and unconditional abandonment of the State, in which personal ambition was in a great measure the ruling motive; and, strange to say, Mr. Lee greatly strengthens the latter view by the publication of a letter from General Greene to his father, Colonel Lee, written on the very day in the evening of which General Davie states his interview with General Greene to have taken place.1 It is as follows : -
" COLONEL'S CREEK, May 9, 1781.
" Dear Sir: - I have not time to write in cyphers.2 Yours of the 8th by Captain Davis was delivered me last evening. We have no further intelligence from Lord Cornwallis, and therefore I am per- suaded he has gone northerly. General Philips is at Petersburg, and our army beaten back ; but whether the Marquis or the Pennsylvania line has arrived I am not informed. Keep this a secret, as it is not known here. We moved our camp night before last from Twenty- five Miles Creek to Sandy Creek,8 five miles higher up the river. Lord Rawdon came out yesterday morning as I expected he would, and I suppose with an expectation of finding us at the old encampment. I did not like our new position to risk an action in, and ordered the troops to take a new position at this place, four miles still higher up the river, leaving on the ground the horse, the pickets, and infantry. The enemy came up in front of our encampment and drew up in order of battle, but did not dare to attempt to cross the creek, and, after waiting an hour or two, retired suddenly towards Camden. Major Hyrne having made you fully acquainted with my general plan of operations it will be unnecessary for me to be more explicit on that head. It gives me great pleasure to find that your sentiments so per- fectly correspond with mine in all points except the duty of 4 310 [Gen-
1 Campaigns in the Carolinas, 355-357.
2 General Greene, it will be observed, was then in the habit of corre- sponding in cipher with Colonel Lee, and in cipher discussing Sumter and Marion, under whom he was yet placing Lee to operate. It will be seen, too, that he used the " alphabet of figures," which he had used in corre- spondence with his partners of Barnabas Deane & Co., while quarter- master.
8 Sawney Creek.
4 Italics the author's.
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eral Greene 1]. This I suppose you mean as a compliment, upon your general principles that all men are fond of flattery. But you will give me leave to tell you that if 306 [Lord Cornwallis] is gone to the northward great abilities will not be wanted here. The plan being laid, and a posi- tion taken, the rest will be a war of posts, and the most that will be left to be performed by the commanding officer until we come to Camden, is to make proper detachments and give command of them to proper officers. The plan being laid, the glory will belong to the executive officers executing the business. The benefit resulting from our operations will in a great measure depend upon the proper management of affairs in Vir- ginia. If the principal officer in the enemy's interest is there, who should be opposed to him? Which will be more honorable, to be active there or laying, as it were, idle here ? From whence comes our supplies to the quarter, and who is most likely to give timely and necessary support to all parts of the department; one that has but a partial interest or one that is interested equally in all the parts ? I am confident nothing will come to this army, and all things be in confusion if 310 [General Greene] was not to go to the northward. Therefore, whether taken up in a military, personal, or public view, I am decided it is his interest and duty to go, nor can I conceive the great in- conveniences will arise from it you mention. I am confident B-s 2 will arrange matters very well and 310 [General Greene] will take care to direct him to the proper objects to employ. Much is to be done in Virginia, and without great prudence on our part matters may be reduced to great extremity there; and depend upon it the enemy's great push will be against that State, as it may be said in some sorts to sever the continental interest asunder. More advantage will result from 310's [General Greene] going than staying; for he can serve them more effectually yonder than here; and vanity will lead him to think that he can oppose the enemy more effectually there than those that will command if he don't go. I perceive that 312 [General Marion] is not satisfied, and I think you are not mistaken respecting 311 [General Sumter]. However, be careful, be cautious, be prudent, and, above all, attentive. This with men as well as with ladies goes a great way," etc.
1 The names in brackets are those given in the text of Mr. Henry Lee's work.
2 Supposed to refer to General Isaac Huger, who was next in command to General Greene, and with whom he would naturally leave any part of the Continentals he would not take with him to Virginia.
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What a change had apparently come over this officer. When, adopting Lee's plan, he was about to return to South Carolina, he had written to General Washington from Deep River, March 29th : -
"In this critical and distressing situation I am determined to carry the war immediately into South Carolina. The enemy will be obliged to follow us or give up his posts in that State .. If the former takes place it will draw the war out of this State and give it an opportunity to raise its proportion of men. If they leave their posts to fall, they must lose more than they can gain here. If we continue in this State, the enemy will hold their possessions in both. All these things con- sidered I think the movement is warranted by the soundest reasons both political and military. The manœuvre will be critical and dangerous, and the troops exposed to every hardship. But as I share it with them, I hope they will bear up under it with that magnanimity which has already supported them, and for which they deserve every- thing of their country." 1
He had thus contemplated both contingencies, and de- termined upon the move as a wise one, whether Corn wallis followed him into South Carolina, or left South Carolina to its fate and moved northwardly. In either event he would share with his troops the danger to which he would expose them in so critical a moment. The movement was made, and now, upon the first reverse, he determines to abandon the great enterprise he had so confidently inaugurated, and to desert the troops whom he had led upon so inglorious an expedition. "This letter," i.e. the letter to Lee of the 9th, says the author of the Campaigns in the Carolinas, "reveals a disposition of mind and a direction of views not only at variance, but incompatible with the sentiments contained in the statement given from Colonel Davie. In the latter General Greene is desponding, intent upon projecting his retreat, and solicitous for the safety of Lee. In the former his mind is buoyant and lively, his views ambitious and
1 Johnson's Life of Greene, vol. II, 37.
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extensive ; he considers the war in Carolina, whose pros- pective magnificence had tempted him from Deep River as curtailed in extent, limited in consequences, pale in repu- tation, and subordinate in dignity - deems the field which was soon to wave with laurels of Eutaw as destitute alike of danger and glory and no longer worthy of his abilities, and is decided, in spite of the remonstrances of Lee- always attentive to his general fame -to seek a more splendid theatre in Virginia and support and direct his lieutenant in Carolina, and, as he says, to satisfy in so doing his interests and duty in a military, personal, and public point of view." 1
However wavering Greene's conduct was in this cam- paign, his views as represented by Davie and by his own letters do not appear as inconsistent as Mr. Lee contends. In either case his declared purpose was to abandon South Carolina. With Colonel Davie he discusses the movement in its public and military aspect. With Colonel Lee he con- siders it in its personal bearing upon his own reputation. In regard to the latter Mr. Lee observes : " It is impos- sible to foresee the extent or to be blind to the magnitude of the mischief which the execution of Greene's project would have produced. Had he proceeded to Virginia and abdicated the honors of the scene before him, however fine and generous his motive, the spirit and organization of his army, already greatly impaired, would have been abolished ; the comparative strength of the enemy doubled ; the Loyalists encouraged to a fearful preponderance ; the desultory ardor and dangerous activity of Marion and Pickens would have subsided ; the three Southern States been lost without a blow and the issue of the struggle, if not changed, at least grievously protracted. Recent from a defeat at Camden he would have appeared in Virginia with
1 Campaigns in the Carolinas, 359.
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the disgrace, but without the grandeur, of Gates's reverse - would soon have been superseded by Washington, and either retained as an inferior in command or ordered back to the South with less reputation and worse prospects than he had left behind him." 1
From all of this the author of the Campaigns in the Carolinas claims that it was Lee's advice and remonstrance which saved his commander, and with a sneer at the desul- tory ardor and dangerous activity of Marion, without even the mention of Sumter, he attributes to the plan of which we think he has shown his father to be the author, all the success which followed. "And so irresistible was the design," he writes, "that although its execution was de- feated in two cardinal points by the wonderful spirit and vigor of Lord Rawdon ; although Greene with the main army did not succeed in a single effort incident to it, yet the enemy, twice demonstrated to be masters of the field, were rebuked by its genius, and vanquished by its strength. They drove Greene from Camden with disgrace and slaughter - they offered and he declined battle; but the power of the plan, aided only by the swift though subordinate successes of Lee, either combined with Marion or alone, forced Lord Rawdon to yield the upper district and leave Ninety Six and Augusta to their fate." 2
Thus complacently does this author claim for his father all the results of the partisan warfare which had been carried on by the volunteers in South Carolina under Sumter, Davie, Marion, Pickens, and Harden! to say nothing of what had been done by Shelby, Sevier, Cleve- land, Campbell, Clarke, and McCall. The important point to be noted here, however, is that Greene, who has been held up as a reconqueror and redeemer of South Carolina, had determined upon, and was on the point of, abandoning
1 Campaigns in the Carolinas, 362. 2 Ibid., 331-332.
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the State; and was only deterred from doing so by an event which he had but little part in bringing about. As far as General Greene is concerned, he had deliberately made up his mind to forsake South Carolina for a field in which he thought greater personal reputation could be achieved.
CHAPTER X
1781
LORD RAWDON declares that he had always reprobated the station at Camden, not merely from the extraordinary disadvantages which attended it as an individual position, but from its being on the wrong side of the river and covering nothing, while it was constantly liable to have its communication with the interior district interrupted. Lord Cornwallis, he says, did not consider how much he augmented this objection, often urged to him, by an ar- rangement whereby he (Rawdon) was debarred from any interference with the district from which alone he could be fed, the country in front of Camden, as well as that between the Wateree and Broad River, being so wasted as to afford nothing beyond precarious and incidental sup- plies.1 Sumter, Marion, and Lee each perceived this as well as Rawdon. Greene alone seems not to have appre- ciated its importance. Acting upon it during Greene's absence in North Carolina with the Continental troops, the volunteer bands under Sumter, Marion, Postell, and Harden had kept a continual warfare in Lord Rawdon's rear, had fought, as we have seen, twenty-six engagements, had taken his posts, seized upon his trains, captured his garrisons and convoys, and had killed, wounded, and taken prisoner many of his men. Colonel Lee is justly entitled, we think, to the credit of suggesting to and urging upon
1 Letter to Colonel Lee, Appendix to Memoirs of the War of 1776, 615.
VOL. IV. - Q
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General Greene his return to South Carolina, and opera- tions here which would engage Lord Rawdon's attention at Camden while these attacks should be continued in his rear. But for the scheme of carrying on the war in this way as low down in the country as possible he has no claim to originality, as that was in successful operation before he proposed his plan to the commander. Sumter had pushed across Rawdon's rear to within fifty miles of Charlestown, besieged his posts, destroyed convoys, and captured pris-
oners. Marion had beaten and pursued McLeroth, had fought Watson and driven him across the country to Georgetown; Pickens had cut to pieces Dunlap's party in Ninety Six; and Harden, carrying the war almost to the gates of Charlestown, had advanced still farther into the Low-Country and captured Fort Balfour, and when Lee returned to the State with Greene, was moving to form a junction with Pickens on the Savannah. Rawdon's com- munications were thus completely broken up before Lee's suggestion to Greene. This, indeed, was the very point of difference between Greene and Sumter. From his first assumption of the command Greene had discouraged and disparaged this system of warfare. The salvation of the army didn't depend upon " little strokes," he had written to Sumter. Partisan affairs in war, he said, were "like the garnish to a table, - they gave splendor to the army and reputation to the officers, but they afforded no sub- stantial national security." This war was not one of posts, he said, but of contests of States. Sumter, on the other hand, believed in the system of constant attrition, by which the invading army would be worn away piece by piece. Greene wished to see a battle in grand array. He wished to collect all his forces on some great field, and then lose or win it all in some famous action of which he would be the hero. He did not like this business in which his sub-
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ordinates were achieving fame. Urging upon Colonel Lee the reasons of his wish to abandon South Carolina for what he thought a more conspicuous field, he makes this signifi- cant observation : "The plan being laid," that is, of par- tisan war on South Carolina, "and a position taken, the rest will be a war of posts, and the most that will be left to be performed by the commanding officer until we come to Camden is to make proper detachments, and give the command of them to proper officers. The plan being laid, the glory will belong to the executive officer executing the busi- ness." It was this jealousy of Sumter, of Marion, and of Lee himself, which induced Greene to desire to have them under his immediate personal direction. But the British at home, as well as Lord Rawdon in the field, appreciated, as we have seen, very differently what had been accom- plished by the "little strokes " of one partisan leader.1
There was another aspect of vast importance in this sys- tem of warfare, which Greene overlooked. The breaking up of his posts and the interruptions of communication were the material results to the enemy ; but of far greater consequence was the moral effect upon the people of the State. The first fruit of Lord Rawdon's victory in his front, it was said in England,2 was the general revolt of the whole interior country at his back; so that the diffi- culties of his situation, instead of being removed or lessened by success, were increased to such a degree as to render them insurmountable.
Greene's determination to abandon the State for a field of greater fame, as has been seen, was suddenly changed by the information that Lord Rawdon was preparing to evac- uate Camden. To this necessity his lordship had been reduced, not by the advance of Greene's army, for that he had so beaten on the 25th of April that it declined to
1 Annual Register, vol. XXIV, 83. 2 Ibid.
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meet him again when he moved out to invite action on the 7th of May, but by the operations in his rear. With his communications then entirely broken up, Lord Rawdon, on the 9th, published to the troops and to the loyal militia his design of abandoning Camden, and offering to such people of the latter place as chose to accompany the army all possible assistance. He spent the night in destroying the works, and in sending off, under a strong escort, his baggage. To cover the movement, the remainder of the troops continued at Camden until the following day was far advanced. The most valuable part of the stores were brought off and the rest destroyed. The mill, prison, court- house and other buildings were burnt, many private build- ings sharing the same fate. Camden was left a heap of ruins. The sick and wounded who were unable to bear a removal were of necessity abandoned, and the American prisoners left to remain with others as an exchange. The army brought off, not only the militia who had been attached to them at Camden, but the well affected to the Royal cause, who were afraid to fall into the hands of the Amer- icans, with their families, negroes, and movables taken equally under his lordship's protection.1 The loyal fami- lies who accompanied his lordship, were, however, cruelly neglected after their arrival in Charlestown. They built themselves huts without the line of fortifications, in a settlement called Rawdon Town, which, because of its poverty and wretchedness, became a term of reproach. Many women and children who had lived comfortably on farms near Camden soon died of want in their miserable habitations.2
Brilliant successes to Sumter and Marion with their par- tisan bands and Lee's Legion now followed in rapid suc-
1 Annual Register, vol. XXIV, 85.
2 Ramsay's Revolution, vol. II, 232, 233.
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cession. The 10th, 11th, 12th, and 15th of May were dis- tinguished by the fall of the British posts of Camden, Orangeburgh, Fort Motte, and Granby in the order of date. The assertion of Greene that Sumter had promised to join him with one thousand men by the 8th of May, it has been seen, was a mistake. But his old leaders, Taylor, Lacey, Winn, Bratton, Henry Hampton, and Mydelton, at once responded to his call, and were soon joined by the two other Hamptons, Richard and Wade ; while McCall, Purvis, Brandon, and Hammond came out under Pickens, and were soon reinforced by Harden from Marion's corps, working his way across from the Pee Dee to Combahee and thence up the Savannah.
Although disappointed greatly in the number of men and the provisions and stores he expected to collect, Sumter actu- ally commenced operations by the time he proposed. His first blow was aimed at a party collected in force on the Tyger River, but they fled before him ; whereupon, dividing his force into detachments, he simultaneously struck at several of the disaffected settlements, whilst a party was pushed down to the main army with the pittance of provi- sions he was enabled to collect, consisting only of about ten wagon loads. The country between the Broad and Saluda rivers and the Broad and Wateree was soon swept over; and on the 2d of May he laid siege to Fort Motte and Fort Granby on the south side of the Congaree. To assist in the investment of these places, Sumter had applied to Greene, while he lay at Twenty-five Mile Creek, for a six- pounder, which, on the 4th, Greene wrote, promising to send him.1 The piece did not arrive, however, until after Marion and Lee, finding that Watson had eluded them, had appeared at Fort Motte. This post thus provided
1 Sumter MSS., Year Book, City of Charleston, 1899, Appendix, 94, 95.
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against, deeming the reduction of Granby secured, Sumter left Colonel Taylor there, in command of a strong party to keep up the investment 1 while he made a dash at Orange- burgh, taking with him the six-pounder Greene had sent him ; the sound of which he did not doubt was to bring that post to terms. The effort was crowned with success ; on the 11th the garrison surrendered, and some supplies, with a large stock of provisions and nearly one hundred men, were the fruits of victory.
On the 11th Sumter was in readiness to return from Orangeburgh; but, intercepting one of Rawdon's expresses, he learned of his lordship's retreat from Camden, before Greene's despatch of the 10th, informing him of it, could reach him. Perceiving immediately that there was service to be performed on the line of Rawdon's communication between Camden and Charlestown, which he could very soon reach from his present position, he struck across the country towards Fort Motte for the purpose of uniting with Marion and Lee in front of Lord Rawdon, not doubt- ing that, with two field-pieces and their united forces, greatly to embarrass his lordship in the passage of the river at Nelson's Ferry. The south bank of the Santee was defended by a small fort, which he hoped to carry before Rawdon could approach the river.
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