USA > South Carolina > The history of South Carolina in the Revolution, 1780-1783 > Part 28
Note: The text from this book was generated using artificial intelligence so there may be some errors. The full pages can be found on Archive.org (link on the Part 1 page).
Part 1 | Part 2 | Part 3 | Part 4 | Part 5 | Part 6 | Part 7 | Part 8 | Part 9 | Part 10 | Part 11 | Part 12 | Part 13 | Part 14 | Part 15 | Part 16 | Part 17 | Part 18 | Part 19 | Part 20 | Part 21 | Part 22 | Part 23 | Part 24 | Part 25 | Part 26 | Part 27 | Part 28 | Part 29 | Part 30 | Part 31 | Part 32 | Part 33 | Part 34 | Part 35 | Part 36 | Part 37 | Part 38 | Part 39 | Part 40 | Part 41 | Part 42 | Part 43 | Part 44 | Part 45 | Part 46 | Part 47 | Part 48 | Part 49 | Part 50 | Part 51 | Part 52 | Part 53 | Part 54 | Part 55 | Part 56 | Part 57 | Part 58 | Part 59 | Part 60 | Part 61 | Part 62 | Part 63 | Part 64
1 Sumter at this time was forty-five years of age, Lee was but twenty- five.
325
IN THE REVOLUTION
came in communication with Greene and Morgan he was an ill man, suffering intensely from his wound received at Blackstock ; that he was little better when leading his expedition to Granby and Orangeburgh in February, being scarcely able to write for pain, and yet in his saddle day and night ; and that but three weeks before he started upon this expedition, Colonel Polk, who had just been with him, informed Greene that his health was worse and his wound more troublesome. Probably Sumter was not in a physical condition to have undertaken this expedition. But who besides himself could have led it ?
When Colonel Stuart resumed his advance to join Lord Rawdon with the Third Regiment, or "Buffs," as they were called, Lieutenant-Colonel Coates was sent in command of his regiment, the Nineteenth, and a body of mounted infantry of the South Carolina Rangers of 150, with one piece of artil- lery, to the post at Monck's Corner. This post, it will be re- membered, is about forty miles from Charlestown, little more than a half-mile to the west of the western branch of Cooper River, near its source, -the point at which the Santee Canal was subsequently made to enter it,-and near, also, to Biggin Church, in which a large amount of supplies were stored, about the same distance from the river on the eastern side. The direct road from Monck's Corner to Charlestown ran some twenty miles through the pine woods, until it met, at the Eighteen Mile House, the road from Dorchester ; then, crossing the Goose Creek bridge, a mile or two below, it continued, passing the Quarter House, situated at the commencement of the peninsula of Charlestown Neck, five miles, to the gates of the town. There was, however, another road, much travelled, which lay to the east of the western branch of Cooper River, which, after passing Biggin Church, crossed Fair Forest Swamp, another branch of the Cooper River, at Wadboo bridge, at the
326
HISTORY OF SOUTH CAROLINA
plantation belonging to Mr. J. N. Colleton, from which point there was a choice of two routes : one, keeping close to the river, passed Childsbury Church and crossed the eastern branch at Bonneau's Ferry; the other, turning still farther to the east, crossed the eastern branch of Cooper River much higher up, at Quinby bridge, at Colonel Shubrick's plantation. Both of these roads passed through St. Thomas' Parish and ended at Hobcaw, on the river, nearly four miles from the town, the point, it will be remembered, at which communication was so long maintained during the siege of the city. There was also a British post at Dorchester, and an outpost and guard at the Quarter House. This latter place, five miles from the town, was quite a resort for the inhabitants upon their pleasure drives, and for social par- ties - a custom kept up during the occupation of the town by the British. It was upon these posts, thus situated and garrisoned, that Sumter was now about to raid.
In a letter to him on this occasion, written on the 14th of July, General Greene advised him "that by a letter from General Pickens, he finds that Cruger must have formed a junction with Lord Rawdon the evening before;" therefore, he says, " there is no time to be lost; push your operations night and day; keep a party to watch the enemy's motions at Orangeburgh as they move down. Should they move in any other direction, I will advise you. Keep Colonel Lee and General Marion advised of all matters from above, and tell Colonel Lee to thunder even at the gates of Charlestown. I have high expectations from their force and enterprise. Nothing can deprive you of complete success but the want of time. Do not neglect to have your boats in readiness for crossing your artillery over Santee, should it be necessary." 1
1 Johnson's Life of Greene, vol. II, 166. (This letter is not in the Sumter MSS.)
f n
re
be and
327
IN THE REVOLUTION
At the date of this letter General Sumter's detachments were sweeping by every road that led direct to Charles- town, whilst he, with the main body, was pursuing the Congaree road leading down the south of that river and the east of the Cooper, towards Monck's Corner and Biggin Church. To Colonel Lee, with his legion, was assigned the service of carrying Dorchester, and then pressing on to carry terror to the gates of Charlestown, as Greene had directed. Colonel Wade Hampton, at the head of a de- tachment of Sumter's cavalry, was ordered to cooperate with Lee, whilst Colonel Henry Hampton seized and held the bridge at Four Holes Creek, a branch of the Edisto, to watch the enemy's motions from Orangeburgh, and to guard that pass, should Rawdon return. But as it was expected that Dorchester would offer some resistance, Henry Hampton, after posting a party at the bridge, had orders to proceed on and support Lee in the attack on that post. Colonel Wade Hampton, also acting in concert with Lee, passed on east of Dorchester, by the Wassamasaw Road, to Goose Creek bridge, thereby cutting off the communica- tion between Dorchester and Monck's Corner, and between the latter place and Charlestown by the direct route. A detachment of Marion's men, under Colonel Maham, pass- ing the head of Cooper River, penetrated below to the eastward of Biggin Church and Fair Forest Swamp, and seized the Wadboo bridge over that creek, which he was directed to destroy, and thus cut off the retreat of the gar- rison over that route. Thus admirably were the plans laid for this incursion, and the movements begun with prompt- ness and zeal.
Contrary to expectation, Colonel Lee encountered no resistance at Dorchester. The garrison at the time had been greatly reduced by the draft made on it by Stuart, and recently by a very serious mutiny, in which it was said
328
HISTORY OF SOUTH CAROLINA
many were killed and wounded. The sudden appearance of Wade Hampton at Goose Creek bridge seems to have alarmed the garrison of Dorchester, and in their then de- moralized condition caused the post to be abandoned. But Colonel Lee arrived in time to seize a number of horses, variously estimated at from fifty to two hundred, and four wagons, three of which were empty, but the fourth contained a valuable supply of fixed ammunition.
Whilst Lee was securing and sending off his prize, Wade Hampton's patience, it seems, became exhausted at his post at Goose Creek bridge, and hearing nothing from the former, and fearing that the opportunity of striking would be lost by the alarm that the knowledge of his appearance would occasion, or perhaps, as Johnson observes, apprehending that Lee meant to appropriate to himself the glory of the dash into the vicinity of the town, on Sunday morning, the 15th, he moved rapidly down the road, and, reaching the church at the time of service, he found a large congregation there, whom he surrounded and made several prisoners, whom he paroled, capturing also a number of horses.1 About two o'clock, Captain Read, who commanded Hampton's vanguard, reached the Quarter . House, where he encountered a patrol of twelve of the Royal South Carolina Dragoons, under Lieutenant Waugh, who had just mounted and were setting out to reconnoitre. These Read immediately charged and made prisoners. Captain Wright of Wassamassaw was cut down in the scuffle by Lieutenant Waugh, who himself was also killed. The British claimed that Waugh was shot after he sur- rendered.2 Upon Hampton's approach, the guard posted at this place, after exhibiting themselves on the advanced re-
1 The Royal Gazette, July 18, 1781, speaks of this raid as having been commanded by Richard Hampton, but it was by Wade Hampton.
2 Ibid.
329
IN THE REVOLUTION
doubts, surrendered. Several Loyalists, gentlemen of the town, were spending the morning at the Quarter House, some of whom were taken and paroled, and some escaped. But poor William Trusler, the butcher, who had been one of Gadsden's Liberty Tree party, and whose meddling with politics had so offended William Henry Drayton,1 and who had, like Drayton, changed sides, but, reversing the example, was now a good Tory, in attempting to make his escape was shot.2 Hampton's party retired, carrying off with them fifty prisoners, among whom were several officers. The news of this inroad as it reached the town created the greatest alarm and confusion. The bells were rung, the alarm guns were fired, and the whole city was under arms.3
If Hampton, determined that Lee should not get ahead of Sumter's cavalry on this occasion, as he had at Fort Motte and Granby, anticipated that officer's course, the latter, as an author, has avenged himself for the opportunity thus snatched from him; for in his account of these trans- actions, which have been recorded and preserved by John- son, and mentioned in The Royal Gazette, he speaks of Hampton's success as trivial, and without any allusion whatsoever to Hampton's surprise and temporary posses- sion of the post at the Quarter House, he states that a party of the Legion horse was pushed down below the Quarter House, on the Neck, from the confidence that in a place so near Charlestown an advantageous stroke might be made; but that it so happened, he says, that on that day none of the usual visits to the Quarter House took place, nor was even a solitary officer picked up in their customary morning rides.4
1 History of So. Ca. Under Roy. Gov. (McCrady), 591, 651, 656, 752.
2 The Royal Gazette, supra; Johnson's Traditions, 33.
& Johnson's Life of Greene, vol. II, 167, 168.
4 Memoirs of the War of 1776 (Lee), 357.
330
HISTORY OF SOUTH CAROLINA
This movement of Colonel Lee's was made the day after Hampton's attack upon the place. Is it possible that Colonel Lee did not know this, nor understand the cause of a desertion of a place usually not only well guarded, but full of life ? The two parties, Lee's and Hampton's, after this united and returned to join Sumter, as Johnson sug- gests, probably in no very good humor with each other.
It is not unworthy of observation, in passing, that the two blows which had been struck the nearest to the town since its fall-indeed under its very guns -had each been delivered by one who was fighting, it may be said, in the language of the times, truly, if figuratively, with a halter around his neck; for Hayne and Hampton had taken their lives in their hands and were fighting without hope of quar- ter if taken. This truth Hayne was soon to experience.
The first cause of the partial failure of the expedition so auspiciously begun is to be found in an unfortunate occur- rence which drew Sumter's attention away from the main objects, and occasioned a loss of that precious time of which Greene had warned him, and on which no doubt he fully appreciated that his success must depend. On his march he received intelligence that the enemy had ap- peared in force at Murray's - that afterwards known as Gourdin's - Ferry, across the Santee. This lay to the left of his line of march, but he thought it advisable to send off a strong detachment of three hundred men to strike at this hostile party. The intelligence was erroneous; nor can it be understood from whence Sumter could have sup- posed any formidable body could have been drawn in that quarter. There certainly were no regular British forces in what is now Williamsburg County at this time. But, how- ever it was, this action caused delay, as Sumter considered himself too weak in the absence of his detachments to approach the enemy at Monck's Corner, within striking
331
IN THE REVOLUTION
distance. In the meantime the garrison at that place recovered from the alarm, and preparations were made for destroying the stores and evacuating the post.
Colonel Coates had already, at the first intimation of the movements of Sumter, crossed from Monck's Corner to the church on the other side of the river, thus determining the course of his retreat, should that be necessary, by the cir- cuitous route by Wadboo bridge across Fair Forest Swamp, and then by Quinby bridge across the eastern branch of Cooper River, and through St. Thomas' Parish to Hobcaw. Biggin Church was a strong brick building and had been fortified; and to this the enemy's supplies had all been removed from Monck's Corner.
On the 16th, Sumter's force being collected, with the exception of Colonel Henry Hampton's regiment, which was still watching Cruger's movements, he moved for- ward so as to support Maham's detachment, which had been sent to make an attempt upon Wadboo bridge in Coates's rear. This detachment having been reenforced with another under Colonel Peter Horry, with whom was Colonel Lacey, Horry, ranking Maham, assumed command of the whole party, and proceeded to effect the desired destruction of the bridge. This Coates sent out his mounted men to prevent, who advanced with a great show of confidence, but were received with firmness and driven back in confusion, Colonel Lacey, with his mounted rifle- men, breaking entirely through their line, some were killed and a number taken prisoners. Horry then de- spatched an officer to destroy the bridge, and remained to cover the party engaged in the work ; but the enemy, who had actually begun their retreat, soon made their appear- ance in such force that Horry, unfortunately, considered it proper to call in the party engaged in destroying the bridge, and to retire before them to the main body.
1
332
HISTORY OF SOUTH CAROLINA
Sumter, on the other hand, misconceiving Coates's move- ment, and believing that he had moved out to give him battle, retired behind a defile in his rear, and prepared for receiving the enemy. But Coates's purpose was only to delay him; and accordingly, retiring in the evening, he gathered his stores in the church, set fire to them, and moved off on the road to the eastward, crossing the Wad- boo bridge, which Horry had abandoned.
The flames bursting through the roof of the church about three o'clock in the morning announced to Sumter that the enemy had flown. The pursuit was immediately begun, but unfortunately Lieutenant Singleton, with his piece of artillery, was ordered to remain on the ground that he might not delay the movement of the infantry. Lee and Hampton led the pursuit and, passing Wadboo bridge, discovered that the mounted men of the enemy had sepa- rated from the infantry. The British account in The Royal Gazette states that the mounted men-the loyal South Carolina troop which had just been raised - were sent off because they could not longer be brought into use. This party took the road to the right nearest the river, while Coates, with the Nineteenth Regiment, turn- ing to the left, pursued that by Quinby bridge. Hampton struck off in pursuit of the mounted party, hoping to' overtake them before they could cross either at Bon- neau's or Strawberry ferries, but he was disappointed ; they crossed at the former before he could reach them, and secured the boats on the opposite side. Hampton had then to make his way back to witness the escape of the remaining object of pursuit; the enemy's infantry, lost, as it has been observed, perhaps because the first- the enemy's cavalry -had divided the attention of the pursuers.1
1 Johnson's Life of Greene, vol. II, 170.
333
IN THE REVOLUTION
Marion's cavalry under Colonel Maham had meanwhile joined Lee in pursuit of the infantry. It was very impor- tant to overtake Coates before he reached Quinby bridge, as it was well known that the stream there, the eastern branch of Cooper River, was only passable at the bridge, which it was certain Coates would destroy as soon as he crossed. The pursuit was therefore pressed with the utmost speed, and about a mile to the north of the bridge the rear guard of the retreating party was overtaken with nearly the whole of their baggage. The rear guard, commanded by a Captain Campbell, consisted of one hundred men of the Nineteenth Regiment; they at first exhibited a show of resistance, but, terrified at the furious onset of the cavalry, having as yet seen no service, being all recruits, it is said, they threw down their arms without firing a gun. Indignant at their conduct, Captain Campbell attempted to make his men resume their arms, an effort which unfortu- nately recalled Lee for a few moments from the pursuit of the body of the regiment, which he had resumed. The surrender of the rear guard, however, nearly proved fatal to the whole British regiment.
Colonel Coates had passed Quinby bridge and had made dispositions for its destruction as soon as his rear guard and baggage should have crossed in safety. The planks which covered the bridge had been loosened from the sleepers, and a howitzer placed at its opposite end to protect the party left to complete its destruction after the rear guard should have passed. As neither alarm gun nor message had ap- prised Coates of an enemy's approach, and believing that his rear guard was still between him and the enemy, he was not prepared for immediate action. But fortunately for his command he was present at the bridge when the American cavalry came in view, and his measures were promptly taken to avert the threatening danger. His main
334
HISTORY OF SOUTH CAROLINA
body was at the time partly on a causeway on the south side of the bridge, and partly pressed into a lane beyond it, huddled together in such a position as to prevent their forming for action. Coates took immediate steps to extri- cate his men, and put them in such a position of defence as the emergency allowed.
The Legion cavalry as they approached the bridge were in advance of Maham's command, Captain Armstrong leading their first section. Upon coming in sight of the bridge and of Coates's force, unguardedly reposing on the other side, but knowing that Lee, his commander, had been misinformed of the proximity of the bridge and of the situation, Armstrong sent back for orders. Lee, ignorant of the condition of affairs, sent his adjutant, warmly reminding him of the order of the day, which was to fall upon the foe without respect to consequences. Stung with this answer, the brave Armstrong put spur to his horse at the head of his section, and dashed across the bridge though the planks were sliding into the water and the lighted port fire approaching the howitzer at its end. So sudden was his charge that he drove all before him, the enemy abandoning the howitzer. Unfortunately, some of the loosened planks were thrown off by Armstrong's section, as they galloped across, thus forming a chasm in the bridge and presenting a most dangerous obstacle to their followers. Nevertheless, the second section of the Legion, headed by Lieutenant Carrington, took the leap and closed with Armstrong, then engaged in a personal combat with Colonel Coates, who, placing himself on the side of a wagon which, with a few others, had kept up with the main body, was enabled effectually to parry Armstrong's sabre strokes at his head. Most of his soldiers, panic-stricken at the sudden and daring attack, had abandoned their colonel and were running through the field, some with,
L an ch ene the was par
cons
tem
1 M . JO zad of Append
335
IN THE REVOLUTION
some without arms, to take shelter in a farmhouse.1 The third section of the Legion, under Captain O'Neill, had fol- lowed Carrington, but faltered, whereupon Maham charged by the third section, but the killing of his horse arrested his career. Captain McCauley, however, who led the front section of Maham's men, pressed on, crossed the treacher- ous bridge, notwithstanding its dangerous condition. The causeway was now crowded, and a desperate hand-to-hand conflict ensued. Two of Lee's dragoons fell dead at the mouth of the howitzer, and several were severely wounded. Lee himself had now come up, and alighting, was engaged with Maham and Dr. Irvine, his surgeon, in endeavoring to repair the bridge. At this moment Armstrong and Mc- Cauley, perceiving what was before them, and cut off from retreat by the broken bridge, with a presence of mind which belongs exclusively to consummate bravery, dashed through the flying soldiers on the causeway, and, wheeling into the woods on their left, escaped by heading up the stream.
t S y ne n, he eir on, sed From whatever cause or motive, it is quite certain that Lee did not on this occasion act with his usual decision and vigor. Sumter reported that if the whole party had charged across the bridge they would have come upon the enemy in such confusion, while extricating themselves from the lane, that they must have laid down their arms.2 It was Lee's delay, caused by his returning to the captured party upon Campbell's attempt to retake their arms, and the consequent hesitation of Armstrong when finding himself ith in a position which he knew his commander had not con- f & templated, that allowed Coates the opportunity of loosening th the planks on the bridge. And even then, it was considered
1 Memoirs of the War of 1776 (Lee), 390.
2 Johnson's Life of Greene, vol. II, 171-172 ; Sumter's letter to Greene, 12d of July, 1881, Nightingale Collection, Year Book, City of Charleston, Appendix, 46.
ng ske the with
336
HISTORY OF SOUTH CAROLINA
that with more energy he might have rescued his brave men from their dangerous position. It is due, however, to him to give the reasons he assigned for his failure to do so. He stated that the dragoons who dismounted for the pur- pose of replacing the planks could not, even though cling- ing to the studs of the bridge, keep from sinking, there being no foothold to stand upon ; nor was it possible to find any firm spot from whence to swim the horses across.1 This is very plausible to all who are familiar with the swamps of this region. But Lee's vindication of himself in this particular would be accepted the more readily and cordially were it not that, though Sumter was present and directing the movements of his troops in the action which followed, in the account which he has given of it, he ignores that officer's presence and represents himself as directing the movements of Marion as well as his own.
Colonel Coates, leaving the bridge in an impassable con- dition, retired to the adjoining plantation of Captain Shu- brick, and, not daring to trust himself to the open country in the face of such an active cavalry, took cover under the shelter of the buildings, which afforded him many advan- tages. These were situated on a rising ground; the dwell- ing-house was of two stories, and contiguous to it a number of outhouses and rail fences, affording security from the cavalry and a covering from the marksmen of the enemy.
As the Americans had now to make a considerable cir. cuit to approach the house in consequence of the destruc. tion of the bridge, it was three o'clock P.M. before General Sumter's force arrived on the ground. He found the enemy drawn up in a square in front of the house and prepared to receive him. As he had few bayonets it would have been folly to have made a direct attack, and the precedent o King's Mountain furnished him with his order of battle
1 Memoirs of the War of 1776 (Lee), 391.
d 1 W
be
mit ect ch hi th
337
IN THE REVOLUTION
His own brigade, under Colonels Mydelton, Polk, Taylor, and Lacey, advanced in front under shelter of a line of negro houses, which they were ordered to reach and occupy. General Marion's brigade, which was very much reduced, was thrown into two divisions and ordered to advance on the right of the enemy, where there was no shelter but fences, and those within forty or fifty yards of their position. The cavalry not being able to act, was stationed in a secure position remote from the scene of action, but near enough to cover the infantry from pursuit. The attack was made against the opinion of Marion,1 and though Lee by his own account was present late in the evening, he took no part in the affair.2
Notwithstanding these discouraging circumstances, Sum- ter would not forego the attempt. It was four o'clock when the parties reached their respective positions and the signal was given to advance. With the utmost alacrity they moved to the attack. Sumter's brigade soon gained the negro houses in their front, and from these directed their rifles with certain effect. Colonel Thomas Taylor, with about forty-five men of his regiment pressed for- ward to the fences on the enemy's left, and delivered a fire which drew upon him a charge of the British bayonet, before which he retreated.
Marion's men, says Johnson, were resolved not to be idle spectators, and, seeing the danger of Taylor's party, with a firmness of veteran troops, rushed through a galling fire up to the fences on their right and extricated Taylor; and, not- withstanding that the open railing afforded but a slender pro- tection, continued to fire from this slight cover as long as a charge of ammunition remained in the corps. The brunt of the battle fell upon Marion's party, and they maintained
1 James's Life of Marion, 126.
2 Memoirs of the War of 1776 (Lee), 392.
Need help finding more records? Try our genealogical records directory which has more than 1 million sources to help you more easily locate the available records.