USA > South Carolina > The history of South Carolina in the Revolution, 1780-1783 > Part 26
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1 Sumter MSS., Year Book, City of Charleston, 1899, Appendix, 112. 2 Ibid.
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Lord Rawdon had now two thousand excellent troops, part of them fresh and vigorous, and the rest well seasoned and disciplined. And though Lee declares the cavalry raised by the Loyalists in Charlestown were but poorly mounted,1 it appears that on this march at least they had so well covered the movements of the army as to cause Greene's wonder where so numerous a cavalry could have been collected. So far from beating the advancing British, Sumter's men themselves incurred a great disaster.
Lord Rawdon's direct course from Orangeburgh to Ninety Six was in a northwesterly direction, nearly parallel with the North Edisto and Congaree rivers. Instead, however, of following this road, he bore to the right. This threat- ened the post of Granby, Sumter's headquarters and the depot of the American stores, as well as the position of a detachment recently established there. General Sumter therefore, had remained there, and to that point ordered up his reenforcement of militia until he had ascertained that Lord Rawdon on the 15th had passed Orangeburgh. Sum- ter then moved slowly up the Congaree and Saluda, so as to keep up his communications with the detachment below and Ninety Six above. But Lord Rawdon, passing Granby, pushed on, and having the shorter route, crossed the present county of Lexington, entered that of Edgefield, and crossed the Little Saluda near its junction with the greater river of that name. By this movement Rawdon had placed himself directly between Greene and Sumter. In his letter to Sumter of the 17th Greene had directed that officer to detach a small party into the enemy's rear to cut off supplies and pick up stragglers. As soon, therefore, as Lord Rawdon appeared, Colonel Mydelton, who was at McCord's Ferry, moved out to harass his rear and to cut off his parties engaged in collecting cattle. Mydelton suc-
1 Memoirs of the War of 1776 (Lee), 379.
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ceeded in giving considerable trouble in this way, but unfor- tunately he allowed himself to be led into an ambuscade by Major Coffin and his cavalry, and his party was so com- pletely cut to pieces and dispersed that only 45 out of 150 could be collected. Some stragglers rejoined their commander, but many were killed, and more too much demoralized to return to the service.1
The shouts of the garrison as Lord Rawdon's messenger rushed into the gates not only confirmed Sumter's reports of his lordship's approach, but assured Greene that Cru- ger was now also aware of it, and that the garrison would endure their thirst until the expected relief should arrive. It now became necessary, therefore, to hazard an assault, to meet Rawdon, or to retire. Greene was disposed to turn upon Rawdon. But his regular force did but little exceed the half of that of the relieving army, which, added to the partisan bands of Sumter, Marion, and Pickens, still left him numer- ically inferior to the British general. Compelled to relin- quish this plan, he determined to storm the fort, although his works were yet unfinished. This determination seems to have been influenced largely by the troops themselves, who demanded to be led to the assault.2
Orders were issued to prepare for storming, and the hour of twelve on the next day, 18th of June, was appointed for the assailing columns to advance by signal from the centre battery.
On the left of the besiegers their third parallel was com- pleted, two trenches and a mine were nearly let into the enemy's ditch, and the Maham tower was finished. On their right the trenches were within twenty yards of the enemy's ditch. Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell of the First
1 Johnson's Life of Greene, vol. II, 153 ; Tarleton's Campaigns, 487 ; Sumter's letter to Greene in Nightingale Collection.
2 Memoirs of the War of 1776 (Lee), 375.
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Virginia Regiment, with a detachment of the Maryland and Virginia line, was charged with the attack on the left, and Lieutenant-Colonel Lee with the Legion infantry and Kirkwood's Delawares with that on the right. Lieutenants Duval of Maryland and Seldon of Virginia commanded the forlorn hope of Campbell, and Captain Rudulph of the Legion that of Lee. Fascines were prepared to fill up the enemy's ditch, long poles with iron hooks were furnished to pull down the sand-bags, with every other requisite to facilitate the progress of the assailants. At eleven o'clock the third parallel was manned, and the sharpshooters took their station in the tower. Upon the signal as ordered, the assailing columns entered the trenches. At the second cannon, which was discharged at the hour of twelve, Campbell and Lee rushed to the assault. Cruger, always on the alert, received them with his accustomed firmness. His works were manned and bayoneted pikes bristled above the parapet, while from the loopholes between the sand-bags poured an incessant stream of fire, making dread- ful havoc among the assailants. The form of the redoubt gave complete command of the ditch, and exposed the storming party to a cross fire, the effects of which increased as the abatis was removed. Duval and Seldon had entered the enemy's ditch at different points, and Campbell stood prepared to support them in the rear of the party, furnished with hooks to pull down the sand-bags. This party had also entered the ditch and began to apply the hooks. Un- covering the parapet now, says Lee, would have given us victory, and such was the vigorous support afforded by the musketry from the third parallel, from the riflemen in the tower, and from the artillery mounted in battery, that san- guine expectations of this happy issue were universally indulged. The moment the bags in front were pulled down, Campbell would have mounted the parapet, where
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the struggle could not long have been maintained. Major Green, commanding in the star redoubt, perceiving the danger to which he was exposed if this lodgement was effected, determined to put a stop to the assault. Two parties of thirty men each, one under Captain Campbell of the New Jersey volunteers, and the other under Captain French of De Lancey's, issued from the sally port in the rear of the star, entered the ditch, and, taking opposite directions, charged the Americans who had made the lodge- ment with such impetuosity that they drove everything before them until they met in the opposite quarters. The bayonet being the only weapon used, the carnage was great. Two-thirds of the Americans who had entered the ditch were killed or wounded. The few survivors escaped with the hookmen to the trenches where Campbell yet remained. On the other side Rudulph gained the enemy's ditch and, followed by the column, soon opened his way into the stockade fort which the enemy had previously evacuated, but in which there were now a few remaining, who, giving their last fire, retreated precipitately. Lee was preparing to follow up this blow by passing the rivulet entering the town, when Greene, recognizing that the effort to reduce the place by storm could only succeed at a sacrifice he could not afford, called off the assailants.
Greene's loss during the siege was 185 killed and wounded,1 the enemy's loss 27 killed and 58 wounded,2 in all. Captain Armstrong of the Maryland line was the only American officer killed, and Lieutenant Roney the only one on the other side.
Greene reluctantly resolved to abandon the siege, and in the night of the 19th moved off across the Saluda, having first issued orders to Sumter to move up within the fork of the
1 Memoirs of the War of 1776 (Lee), 377.
2 Stedman's Am. War, vol. II, 373.
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Broad and Saluda, and to form a junction with him. The retreat from Ninety Six was pressed without intermission be- yond Bush River, a distance of twenty-two miles on the route that crosses the streams at their lowest fords, in what is now Newberry County. Here Greene halted to observe the movements of the enemy. On the morning of the 23d intelligence was received that Lord Rawdon had entered Ninety Six at two o'clock on the 21st, and the American army was immediately put in motion. Crossing the Enoree, Tyger, and Broad rivers, it halted on the 25th at a place called Tim's Ordinary, eleven miles beyond Lyle's Ford, on Broad River, in what is now Fairfield County, near Winnsboro. Greene's army thus now occupied the very position from which Lord Cornwallis had advanced in January.1
Lord Rawdon did not move from Ninety Six until the morning of the 24th, believing from the reports of deserters that the American army was still encamped at Bush River. On that day, taking with him the troops of the garrison and all the force capable of sustaining the fatigue, in all about two thousand effectives, and without even their knapsacks or a wheel carriage except his ammunition wagons, he made a vigorous push to overtake the retreating army. He did not, however, extend his pursuit beyond the Enoree. Washington and Lee covered the rear of
1 It was while Greene was between the Enoree and Broad rivers that he is alleged to have sent Miss Emily Geiger with a despatch to Sumter, over a hundred miles away, on the Wateree River. But the despatches which passed almost daily between Greene and Sumter, and the evidence of all contemporary historians, show that Sumter was never on the Wat- eree at any time that Greene was west of the Congaree or Broad rivers, but that he was on the west side all the time that Greene was, and that he crossed to the east side of the Broad at the same time that Greene did, and that Emily Geiger could not have borne such a message as she is alleged to have borne.
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Greene's army and prevented any foraging on the part of the British, whose newly raised cavalry under Major Coffin were inadequate to oppose the veteran cavalry of these officers. Nor were the British troops in a condition to press the pursuit after their recent march of two hundred miles in ten days, to which they had now added thirty- seven in a day and a half. They suffered too greatly under the intense heat of the season, especially the newly arrived European soldiers, clad in thick cloth uniforms. Lord Rawdon on the 24th retraced his steps and returned to Ninety Six.
Such was the disastrous end of the siege of Ninety Six- a post which would have been evacuated but for the unfortu- nate move against it. It was, of course, not by any means impossible that had Greene followed Sumter's advice and followed Lord Rawdon to Monck's Corner in May, and forced him to battle there, he might have been beaten, for indeed, such was his ill fortune that he gained no single victory throughout his Southern campaigns. But if fight he must, as he was obliged afterwards to do at Eutaw, it was surely better to have offered battle in open field, while his own troops were flushed with success, and his ranks, full in consequence, were ready to be led on; while the British, reduced in numbers and dispirited, were in no condition to oppose him. The chances of success immediately after the fall of Orangeburgh, Fort Motte, and Granby were infinitely greater than when he was afterwards obliged to risk them in September. The last two weeks in May, from the fall of Granby to the arrival of the British fleet off Charles- town bar on the 2d of June, presented the great opportunity to Greene of striking a decisive blow which might have ended the campaign and covered him with glory. With Sumter's and Marion's corps then full in numbers and buoyant with victory, he might with the rest of his Conti-
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nentals have risked battle, even had he sent Lee with his Legion to assist Pickens in reducing Augusta. Ninety Six would have fallen without a blow, and the garrison met in the open field rather than behind fortifications which proved impregnable. As it was, by turning aside to be- siege the post at Ninety Six, Greene allowed Cruger's small garrison to engage exclusively the attention of his Continental army, and thus to neutralize it until Lord Rawdon, reinforced by the newly arrived troops, could come to Cruger's relief. The siege of Ninety Six had caused the loss of all that had been gained in May by Sumter, Marion, and Lee. The country below the Con- garee and the Saluda was again in the possession of the British.
But Greene had his usual consolation. The miscarriage of the siege was somebody else's fault, not his. The battle of Guilford had been lost by the North Carolina militia, that of Hobkirk's Hill by Gunby's mistake and Sumter's absence, and now it is Governor Jefferson who plucked away his laurels. "Had the Virginia militia joined us, agreeable to orders, success would have been complete," he wrote to the President of Congress, and adds, " Our move- ment to the southward has been attended with very great advantages, and had not this reenforcement arrived so soon, or had not the Virginia militia failed me, the manœuvre would have been crowned with complete success." 1
1 Johnson's Life of Greene, vol. II, 151.
CHAPTER XIII
1781
LORD RAWDON had now driven Greene back across the great rivers, and recovered the country lately wrested from him by Sumter, Marion, and Lee. He had raised the siege of Ninety Six, and relieved its garrison of Northern Tories, who had emulated the conduct of the best British troops of the line. But could he hold the territory which the accidental reenforcement he had received had enabled him to recover ? This question pressed upon his consider- ation, and demanded an immediate determination. It had, in fact, as we have seen, been decided by him before Greene's advance upon Ninety Six; and that movement alone had prevented the evacuation of the post and the consequent abandonment of the country. Had his reën- forcements and Greene's forced retreat altered the condi- tions of the situation to such an extent as to change his policy ? Clearly not. The evacuation of the post had been resolved upon before Greene had crossed the Con- garee, because of the loss of his intermediate posts of Granby, Motte, and Orangeburgh. These, it is true, were not now held by the Americans, but they were just as liable to recapture if garrisoned again as they had been to the first assaults made upon them. It was these "little strokes " which Greene so much despised that had broken up the British line of communication and decided Lord Rawdon to abandon the country. True, Rawdon had received a reenforcement of three regiments, but this was in part
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neutralized by the loss of the king's American Regiment, which, at the demand of Sir James Wright, he had sent as a reenforcement to Savannah; and to a greater extent by the loss of the garrisons captured. If, then, he should attempt to hold this part of this province, he must use his new troops to reestablish the garrisons he had lost. But here another consideration presented itself, causing him to hesitate to call upon Balfour for more troops from Charles- town, and possibly to doubt if such call would be answered if made. The expectation and apprehension of a French fleet and army on the coast in order to cooperate with Greene and to put a final end to the war in this quarter had a great influence on the operation of this campaign, and on the conduct and movement of the commanders on both sides.1 While this apprehension existed, would Balfour consent that the newly arrived troops should leave the town and be marched into the country, out of reach in case the French should appear? This he could scarcely expect, unless, indeed, for the temporary pur- pose of facilitating his own retreat to the town. For this purpose he determined to apply to Balfour at Charles- town, urging the expediency of sending a strong corps to Orangeburgh as a provision against any immediate attempt upon that place. The result of the application will pres- ently be seen.
But however manifest was the policy of withdrawing into closer lines in a military point of view, the political aspect of the question was most embarrassing. The dis- tricts of Ninety Six and that between the Saluda and Broad had been overwhelmingly loyal to the king, and had been supported in their opposition to the Whigs by the garrison at Ninety Six. The Tory sentiment in this region had been greatly strengthened by Colonel Cruger, 1 Tarleton's Campaigns, 504.
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who was as wise an administrator as he was a gallant officer. What, then, was to become of the king's friends in this region, who had stood so loyally to his cause ? In this dilemma, Lord Rawdon convened the principal Tories of the region, and made proposals to them that, if they would keep together and undertake the defence of the district against their fellow-countrymen, a small party should be left to keep them in countenance, with the further encouragement that detachments from the Con- garee should at all times be sent to their support, equiva- lent to any force which Greene might despatch to invade their territory ; and that, on the other hand, care should be taken to provide for the removal of such families as should prefer to be settled upon the abandoned plantation within the new frontier which was now intended to be established. The Loyalists decided, for the security and preservation of their families, to bring them away under the protection of the army, determining also that, when settled within the assigned limits, the men should be embodied in order to make incursions into the abandoned territory.1
Lord Rawdon did not wait, however, even for the determi- nation of the Loyalists in this matter, but, leaving Colonel Cruger behind with much the greater part of his force for the purpose of carrying his orders into execution, on the 29th of June he marched, himself, with eight hundred infantry and sixty horses, for the Congaree. As has been stated, he had previously written to Colonel Balfour, urging the expediency of sending a strong corps to Orangeburgh, and that he ex- pected to meet it at that place. Upon Balfour's applica- tion to Colonel Gould, who still retained the independent command of the troops he had brought with him, that officer had immediately granted a battalion of his corps for
1 Annual Register, vol. XXIV (1781), 94.
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that purpose; and Lord Rawdon, before his departure from Ninety Six, had received advice from Balfour, not only of Gould's compliance, but that the Third Regiment was under orders to arrive at Orangeburgh by a specified day, and there to wait his instructions, and, as if to remove every possi- bility of doubt, he received a subsequent letter from Colonel Alexander Stuart,1 who commanded the regiment sent, informing him that he was already considerably advanced on his way to Orangeburgh. This information and a full confidence in the expected support were the grounds upon which Lord Rawdon based his immediate plan of operations, and were particularly the cause of his leaving so great a part of his force with Colonel Cruger at Ninety Six. Assured of Colonel Stuart's advance, his lordship de- spatched a number of messengers to meet him, appointing their junction at the Congaree on the 3d of July.2
In the meanwhile Greene had sent Lee with his Legion to hover about the post of Ninety Six, observing Rawdon's movements, and to keep him informed of minutest occur- rences. Washington, with his cavalry and Kirkwood's in- fantry, was directed to move down between the Broad and Wateree - the present county of Richland -to Granby, and, throwing himself between that post and Orangeburgh, to pursue the same course as pointed out to Lee. General Sumter at the time was preparing for an expedition lower down the country, and Marion was instructed to cooperate with him in that quarter.3 Having made these arrangements, Greene recommenced his march, quieting the apprehension
1 In the American histories this name is usually spelled Stewart, but we prefer to follow the English authorities, Tarleton, and Stedman's American War, in which it is spelled Stuart. In the Annual Register it is, however, spelled Stewart.
2 Annual Register, supra.
8 Johnson's Life of Greene, vol. II, 158 ; Greene's letters to Marion and Lee, Gibbes's Documentary Hist. (1781-82), 100-101.
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of the country by advancing a day's journey on the route to Granby. Here he halted, as well to ascertain the ulti- mate view of the enemy as to await the arrival of a detach- ment of two hundred North Carolina levies under Major John Armstrong, and remained for two days at Big Spring on Rocky Creek, in the present Fairfield County. He had learned from a deserter who came in on the evening of the 28th of June, that a quantity of stores, under an escort of four hundred infantry and forty cavalry, was moving slowly up the Orangeburgh road for Rawdon's army, not making more than ten miles a day. This, no doubt, was the party which Rawdon had appointed to meet him on the 3d of July at Orangeburgh. Lee was at once ordered to form a junction with Washington at Ancrum's plantation, near Granby, and intercept this body. Sumter was also directed to detach Mydelton's regiment to join Washington.1 This last officer, however, who had been pushing his observations towards Orangeburgh, had fortunately intercepted a letter of Colonel Stuart informing Rawdon of his advance towards Orange- burgh, but stating the impracticability of reaching Granby by the 3d of July. Lee, at the same time, that is, on the even- ing of the 1st, informed him that Rawdon had marched from Ninety Six with less than half his force. Greene determined at once to seize the opportunity of striking Rawdon before Stuart reached him. The American army was put in motion, but had proceeded no farther than Winnsboro by the 3d of July; here it was stripped of everything which could im- pede its march, and was left under the command of General Huger with orders to press on to the Congaree, while Greene himself, attended by a small escort of cavalry, pushed on to find Colonel Washington and to observe more particularly the indications by which his measures should be directed. Lord Rawdon appears to have been informed of this hurried
1 Sumter MSS., Year Book, City of Charleston, 1899, Appendix, 117.
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movement of Greene, and, at once apprehending danger to the reenforcement he had sent for, he too hastened to reach Granby in advance of the American army. This brought him to Granby two days before the time appointed, and his appearance there had no small effect upon the issue of Greene's scheme, for the seizure of this post was all impor- tant to its success. Greene's failure to secure this position between Rawdon and his reenforcement was in some degree compensated by a successful blow struck by Lee on his lord- ship's arrival at Granby, but rendered less important by the recall of Stuart, a knowledge of which neither party at the time possessed.
Colonel Lee had, with his usual zeal and activity, obeyed Greene's order and kept close watch upon the move- ments of the British army. From his knowledge of the adjacent country, he was satisfied that, upon his arrival at Granby, Lord Rawdon would be compelled to send out foraging parties to the south of that place, as nowhere else in the neighborhood could he obtain supplies. Deter- mining to avail himself of any opportunity which might thus arise, he detached Captain Eggleston of the cavalry to proceed, with thirty dragoons, along the enemy's right, and, taking with him Captain James Armstrong, previously despatched in that quarter with a reconnoitring party, to make, in the course of the night, a proper disposition of his force for the contemplated purpose. Eggleston immedi- ately joined Armstrong, and placed his party in a covered and convenient position. As Colonel Lee had anticipated, a foraging party, consisting of fifty or sixty dragoons and some wagons, soon after daylight of the 3d of July, were discovered approaching the very farm to which Eggleston had directed his attention. As soon as the wagons and escort had advanced within reach of Eggleston, he rushed upon the enemy, broke up the foragers, routed the party,
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and brought off forty-five dragoon prisoners, including a captain, without any loss whatsoever to his party.1 This was quite a serious blow to Rawdon, as it deprived him of almost his entire cavalry, and so rendered him incapable of either collecting supplies or obtaining information.
Learning nothing of Stuart, who had in fact been recalled by Balfour to Charlestown upon some alarm of French in- vasion, and had retraced his steps as far as Dorchester,2 but convinced by Lee's appearance of the approach of the American army, Lord Rawdon delayed only to destroy the boats for some distance down the river, and immediately pressed on to reach Orangeburgh. His route lay across Congaree Creek, a branch of the river of that name, at about three miles distant, a broad piece of water in some parts deep, and enclosed by difficult banks. Lee made some opposition to the crossing of this stream. He de- stroyed the bridge and felled trees to render the fords impracticable. But after a few ineffectual shots between the parties he withdrew, and the British crossed and pressed on. In this march from Ninety Six to Orangeburgh, more than fifty of the British army fell dead from heat, fatigue, and privation.3
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