USA > South Carolina > The history of South Carolina in the Revolution, 1780-1783 > Part 16
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1 Johnson's Life of Greene, vol. II, 67. 2 Ibid., 45.
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the State, enjoining upon both Marion and Pickens their obe- dience to him, and requiring that all communications from them should be sent under cover to Sumter, which Sumter should forward under cover to General Greene. The gov- ernor had thus left, as he hoped, matters in such order as to prevent any friction in the future between these officers. Marion, it has, however, been seen, had paid very little atten- tion to these instructions, and Sumter had again had cause to complain of the neglect of his authority. Greene's course now tended to aggravate this trouble. In his letter of the 30th he had expressly put the preparatory move- ments in South Carolina into Sumter's hands. He had written, "I beg you will therefore give orders to Generals Pickens and Marion to collect all the militia they can to cooperate with us." The object was to be kept secret to all but the generals. "I am in hopes," he wrote, "that by sending forward our horse and some small detach- ments of light infantry to join your militia you will be able to possess yourself of their little outposts before the army arrives."
Sumter undoubtedly had a right to regard himself under this letter, independently of his command of all the militia, as charged with the movements in South Carolina before the arrival of Greene with his army. This supposition must have been further confirmed upon the arrival of Major Hyrne with another letter from Greene, of the 7th of April, saying, " This will be handed you by Major Hyrne, who has been kind enough to come on before the army, which is on the march for South Carolina, to see and con- sult with you respecting the force you are likely to collect to aid our operations."1
Acting upon this supposition, Sumter appears to have
1 Sumter MSS., Year Book, City of Charleston, 1899, Appendix, 86, 87.
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entered eagerly into the general's plans. He wrote on the 9th, at once, in reply: 1-
" . . . Thursday next I should have had five hundred ten-months men in the field, chiefly so well mounted as to perform tolerable service, and from the activity of the enemy & indiscression (?) of our militia, I think all the men that can by any justifiable method be procured will not be too many.
"Gen' Pickens men are much scattered. He will have but few out, that is, in any short time. I expect four or five hundred will be ready to join you out of Gen1 Marions brigade. I have requested him to take a position high up Black river if it can be done with safety, to prevent the enemy from foraging that way to have as much provision as possible provided. . ..
" Nothing in the summit of power shall be neglected that may in the least tend to further your operations against the enemy."
As it became a matter of much discussion thereafter as to the number of men Sumter had promised to bring to the support of Greene, it is well now to observe that Sumter in this letter reports that he will have five hundred ten-months men in the field, capable of tolerable service, and that he expected four or five hundred would be ready to join out of Marion's brigade. From Pickens he could hope for but few. All that Sumter hoped that he could get were one thousand men, including Marion's. This letter Greene re- ceived, probably by Major Hyrne. On the 14th he wrote to Sumter : -
" I received your letter dated the seventh instant and am happy to understand that our plan of operations agrees with your sentiments. You will collect your force with all possible speed and endeavor to take a position as mentioned by you to Major Hyrne where you may be enabled to cut off or intercept the communication between Camden
1 Nightingale Collection, Year Book, City of Charleston, 1899, Appen- dix, 7-8. This letter was undoubtedly received by Greene, for it is found among his papers, now in the possession of Mr. Nightingale, but its receipt is not acknowledged. Greene on the 14th acknowledges a letter of the 7th which is not found among his papers.
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and the other posts of the enemy, keeping it in your power to cooper- ate with or join this command should the movements of Lord Corn- wallis render such measures necessary," etc.1
Sumter, it is thus seen, was not only put in charge of the movement, but his plan of it was accepted. What must have been his surprise and mortification, then, to learn that the " horse and some small detachments of light infantry " which had promised to join his militia so as to enable him to take the outposts of the enemy, without his knowledge or any notification to him, had been sent forward as early as the 4th of April, not to him - but to Marion ? Was it to be supposed that Sumter, with his quick and impetuous temper, would not have resented such trifling with his confidence and disregard alike of the assurances given him and of his authority as Marion's commanding officer ?
It has been charged by Colonel Lee that General Greene expected to be joined by General Sumter before Camden ; but that Sumter held off, much to the surprise, regret, and dissatisfaction of the General-in-chief, and very much to the detriment of his plans and measures.2 And, strange to say, Johnson countenances this charge in a summary of the grounds of complaint which Greene entertained against Sumter,3 forgetting, apparently, that in previous pages he had himself shown how unwarranted were these jealousies of Sumter's conduct.4 Colonel Lee himself had undoubt- edly been misled by General Greene as to the force Sumter had undertaken to raise. On the 10th of April the General had written to Lee, then on his march to join Marion, "General Sumter will have one thousand men to join us." 5
1 Sumter MSS., Year Book, City of Charleston, 1899, Appendix, 87, 88.
2 Memoirs of the War of 1776 (Lee), 333.
3 Johnson's Life of Greene, vol. II, 212.
4 Ibid., 107-109.
5 Gibbes's Documentary Hist. (1781-82), 51.
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But Johnson shows that in this Greene had made a great mistake. He says that it was on Hyrne's report and Sum- ter's letter of the 7th that General Greene founded his ex- pectation that Sumter would be able to bring one thousand men into the field; but that, on comparing the two docu- ments, it is found that, while they agree as to the number, in Sumter's letter four or five hundred of the one thousand are expressly made to consist of the men to be brought out under Marion and five hundred of his own brigade.1 Sumter hoped to have this number of the ten-months men he was attempting to raise on the bounty of a prime negro per man, for which purpose he had his best officers actively engaged in procuring enlistments in both States along the Catawba. Hyrne's report says, "General Sumter expects by Monday (the 18th) to have upwards of two hundred ten-months men from South Carolina, and three hundred from North Carolina; these are immediately to join the militia, who will amount to about five hundred, and pro- ceed down the country," but makes no mention of four or five hundred expected under Marion.2 Greene, apparently without observing the discrepancy between Sumter's own letter and Hyrne's report, or that Hyrne's report did not mention Marion, assumed, against the expressed statement of Sumter's letter of the 7th, that Sumter promised himself to bring one thousand men to his assistance. Not only counting upon this himself, he writes it to Lee. Hyrne had also anticipated by two the day upon which Sumter had fixed as the time when he hoped to have this reënforce- ment. Promising the most zealous cooperation, Sumter did not express a hope that he would be able to take the field before the 20th. Opposition, it seems, was made to his enlisting men in North Carolina, professedly on the ground of its interfering with the draft then going on in Johnson's Life of Greene, vol. II, 107. 2 Ibid.
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that State, but really, as Sumter asserted, because it raised the price of substitutes. Greene was no doubt disappointed by not receiving earlier support from Sumter, but Johnson admits that no suggestion of a suspicion can be found that it was not as sensibly felt by Sumter himself.
We would call attention here, again, as we may have still further occasion to do, to the extraordinary mistake or mis- conception of Greene, exhibited again and again during his campaign, in failing to recognize and appreciate the con- dition of affairs in South Carolina, and Sumter's position and power. From his first entry into the State he persisted in treating Sumter as having the power to bring out as many men as he desired, as if he had a settled government behind him through which he could draft militia and en- force the attendance of those drafted to the army ; whereas, the fact was, that there was no government in South Caro- lina at the time, and that it was only through the personal influence of Sumter, Marion, Pickens, and other leaders, appealing to the patriotism of the Whigs, that these could be brought into the field, and then only as volunteers and not as drafted men. It was impossible, therefore, for Sumter to undertake or promise to furnish any given number of men, and it is strange indeed that Greene should have sup- posed that he did so, and counted upon them as he claims to have done.
So, too, with regard to provisions. Greene had solicited Sumter to take measures to collect all that he could, for on this his whole operations would depend; and Sumter had made every endeavor to do so through the officers who com- manded where the provisions were sought, but he constantly declared, as was unquestionably the fact, that all the pro- visions were within the enemy's lines.1
Although disappointed greatly in the number of men
1 Johnson's Life of Greene, vol. II, 108.
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and the provisions he expected to collect, Sumter actually commenced operations by the time he had promised. It has been charged that, instead of descending between the Broad and Catawba rivers, he moved down beyond the Broad River.1 Upon what this criticism is based it is dif- ficult to understand, as there was no outpost to attack between these rivers, and it is certain that Sumter was never ordered to form a junction with Greene prior to the affair at Camden.2 The position he was to take was determined upon in consultation between Hyrne and him- self, and was doubtless that mentioned with approval by Greene in a letter to Lee of the 10th of April, as "a position between Camden and Ninety Six about thirty miles from the former."3 From this post Sumter soon swept the country between the Broad and the Saluda, as well as between the Broad and the Wateree.
We left Marion, it will be remembered, after the affair at Witherspoon's Ferry, on the point of retreating into North Carolina for the want of ammunition, a step which had only been arrested by the news of the approach of Colonel Lee, the advance of General Greene, upon his return to South Carolina. While Marion was in the great- est despondency from this cause, and about to retreat to North Carolina, one Johnson, an old tried Whig, came into the camp in an almost starving condition, begging for God's sake for something to eat. A pot of cold rice was put before him, and when his hunger was somewhat allayed he was asked the news. "Fine news," said he; "I saw a great number of Continental troops, horse and foot, crossing at Long Bluff." "Come, tell the general," said Captain Gavin Witherspoon. "No," replied the Whig.
1 Johnson's Life of Greene, vol. II, 212.
2 Ibid., 109.
3 Gibbes's Documentary Hist. (1781-82), 51.
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" I am starving with hunger; if the general wants the news, he must come to me." The general soon complied, and going to the hungry, but true and tried, bearer of the good tidings, he soon satisfied himself of the truth of the infor- mation. The news, says James, was sudden and unex- pected, and to men now in a state of desperation nothing could be more transporting -scarce was there a dry eye. All sufferings appeared now to be at an end, and that balm of the soul, hope, began to revive. Even while Johnson was still communicating his intelligence, it was confirmed by the sound of an approaching drum.1 Lieutenant-Colonel Lee, when within a day's march of the Pee Dee, had de- spatched a small party of dragoons under Captain Conyers to find Marion. By Conyers, Marion received Greene's letter ordering him to cooperate with Lee in striking at the posts below Camden. Marion received Lee's officer with joy, and furnished boats, which he had kept concealed on the Pee Dee, for the transportation of his corps across the river. On the 14th of April Lee joined the general.
Colonel Watson, it will be remembered, upon Sumter's retreat to the Waxhaws in March, had been sent by Lord Rawdon with his own regiment and Harrison's Tories, numbering in all about five hundred men, to crush out Marion. This, however, he had not accomplished. On the contrary, Marion had assumed the offensive, and had fought him at Wiboo Swamp, Mount Hope, and Black River, and had finally driven him into Georgetown. Hav- ing refreshed himself at Georgetown, Watson had pro- ceeded again towards the Pee Dee. He had taken the nearest route, across Black River at Wragg's Ferry, the Pee Dee at Euhany, and the Little Pee Dee at Potatobed Ferry, and had halted at Catfish Creek, a mile from where the town of Marion now stands. Here Gainey's party 1 James's Life of Marion, 107.
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flocked to him in such numbers that he was soon nine hun- dred strong.1 Leaving Captain Witherspoon with a small party to watch Watson, Marion and Lee moved through Williamsburg and took position in the open country with Watson to their left, considerably below them, and on the route for the fort at Wright's Bluff, called by his name. But Watson, having learned of Lee's approach through Captain John Brockington, a noted Tory, about the same time as Johnson, the Whig, had informed Marion, had immediately rolled his two field-pieces into Catfish Creek, destroyed all his heavy baggage, recrossed the Little Pee Dee, and not venturing by the route he came, he crossed the Waccamaw, and retreating between that river and the sea, crossed Winyaw Bay three miles west, and then returned again to Georgetown.2
Upon the junction with Colonel Lee, Marion proposed to pursue Watson, and if unable to capture him, at least to prevent his junction with Lord Rawdon; but Lee was of opinion that the pursuit would carry them too far from General Greene, who was marching upon Camden. Marion gave up the movement with great reluctance, and was afterwards heard repeatedly to regret that his orders had not allowed him to pursue it. A great consideration, however, against Marion's plan and in favor of another, was the fact that both Lee and himself were in great want of ammunition, and an opportunity presented itself of sup- plying themselves in this particular from Fort Watson, into which, it will be remembered, the supply obtained by Sumter in March had been taken through the treachery of a guide. Fort Watson was known to be otherwise well supplied in this essential article, and was now with but a small garrison in the absence of its commander, who had retreated to Georgetown. Still another advantage pre-
1 James's Life of Marion, 108. . 2 Ibid., 106.
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sented itself to a movement against the fort instead of a pursuit of the commander, and that was that at the fort they would be on the road by which Watson was expected to move to rejoin Lord Rawdon - there being then no road from Kingstree to Camden.1
In the estimate of one thousand men which Sumter had reported to General Greene he hoped to raise to join him, he had counted upon Marion's having from four to five hundred; but so far from this, so many of Marion's men had gone home to rest and to plant their crops, after the operations against Doyle and Watson, that he was reduced to but eighty men when Lee joined him.2 Lee's Legion corps numbered about three hundred horse and foot.3 The combined force thus numbered about 380. Marion's men were, however, coming in one or two at a time. With this force the two leaders determined to carry Fort Watson without delay, and sat down before it early in the evening of the 15th of April, not doubting from their information that the garrison must soon be compelled to surrender for want of water, with which it was only sup- plied from Lake Scott, and from which it might be readily and effectively excluded. The garrison consisted of about eighty regular troops and forty Loyalists, under the com- mand of a brave and efficient officer, Lieutenant James Mckay.4 Fort Watson, as the post at Wright's Bluff was called, from which Sumter had lately been repulsed, was an Indian mound at least thirty feet high, surrounded by a plain table-land and far removed from any ground that could command it. In a very few hours the customary mode of obtaining water was completely stopped, and had
1 James's Life of Marion, 109.
2 Ibid.
8 Memoirs of the War of 1776 (Lee), 333.
4 Johnson's Life of Greene, vol. II, 70.
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the information upon which Marion and Lee acted been correct, a surrender of the garrison could not long have been delayed. But Mckay was an officer of resource as well as of courage, and he immediately cut a trench secured by abatis from his fosse to the river which passed close to the Indian mound. Neither party possessed artillery, and the steep sides of the mound and strong palisades forbade an attempt at storming it. Marion and Lee had nothing else to do, therefore, but to sit down to an investment of the place and thus lose most precious time.
Greene, in the meanwhile, had broken up his camp at Ramsay's Mill on Deep River in North Carolina, and advanced on Camden, and on the 19th of April had taken post at Hobkirk's Hill, about a mile and a half in advance of the British redoubts. Marion, fearing that he would not be able to carry the fort without artillery, and learning of Greene's arrival, sent an urgent request that a piece should be forwarded to him. Greene, it will be remem- bered, had lost all of his artillery at Guilford, but he had since received two pieces, and one of them he resolved to forward to Marion, but the fort had been reduced before the piece was on the road.
While Marion and Lee were impatiently waiting for the field-piece Colonel Maham, one of Marion's officers,1 sug- gested a plan which led to the immediate reduction of the place. At King's Mountain the underbrush at the foot of the mountain concealed the Americans, while the bare rock on the top exposed the enemy to the unerring aim of the mountaineer's rifle. But here the case was reversed. The open plain afforded no shelter for Marion's marksmen, while the stockade and abatis protected the British upon the mound, and enabled them to fire upon the Americans
1 See this officer mentioned, Hist. of So. Ca. in the Revolution, 1775- 80 (McCrady), 144, 298.
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with security. To counteract this advantage Colonel Ma- ham proposed to build up a tower of logs which would overtop the mound, and from this to fire into the stockade on the mound. This suggestion was at once adopted. There was an abundance of timber in the neighborhood of the fort, and axes were obtained from the neighboring farms. During the night trees were felled and were borne on the shoulders of the men, and piled crosswise until a tower higher than the mound was raised. To the aston- ishment of the besieged, as soon as light permitted the discrimination of an object, the fatal effect of a shower of bullets announced to them that their stronghold was com- manded by a superior work. A detachment of Marion's men under Ensign Baker Johnson and of the Continentals under Mr. Lee, a volunteer in the Legion, then made a lodgement near the stockade, and began to pull down the abatis and to dig away at the mound itself. Such was the effect of the fire of the riflemen upon the tower, having complete command of every part of the fort, that the besieged found it impossible to resist the lodgement effected Lieutenant Mckay, who had so by the attacking party. gallantly held out for eight days, then hoisted a white flag, and the garrison capitulated. The American loss was two of Marion's men killed and three wounded, and three Continentals wounded.1 Far beyond the prisoners taken was the value of the arms, and especially ammunition, secured in the fall of the post, which included the arms and ammunition Sumter had taken, but had lost by the treach- ery of his guide.
From Georgetown, to which place Watson had retreated upon the junction of Marion and Lee, the most practicable route to Camden, where he should now proceed to reën-
1 Memoirs of the War of 1776 (Lee), 331-332 ; Johnson's Life of Greene, vol. II, 70 ; James's Life of Marion, 109-110.
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force Lord Rawdon, was by crossing the north and south branches of the Santee River and advancing up the south- west bank of that river to Nelson's Ferry, and thence by the ordinary route up the east bank of the Congaree and Wateree to Camden. But Marion and Lee now stood at Fort Watson to dispute the passage of Nelson's Ferry. By coming to the assistance of McKay, Watson might have compelled the raising of the siege of Fort Watson, and have forced his way on this the direct road to Camden. But this he did not think the state of the force with him sufficient to justify, and rather determined to sacrifice the post and to evade Marion in his attempt to reach Camden. After crossing the Santee on the route from Georgetown, therefore, he moved down by Monck's Corner and cau- tiously advanced. Relieved of the siege of the fort and supplied with ammunition, Marion moved, on the 23d, to the High Hills of Santee, and occupied a position from which all the roads that led to Camden could be securely watched. From this place he pushed forward his pris- oners by the Black River road to the depot in rear of Greene's army. This movement of Marion towards Cam- den brought on the battle of Hobkirk's Hill.
Johnson asserts that from the time of this junction until the siege of Fort Motte, Colonel Lee acted under the com- mand of General Marion.1 This Mr. Henry Lee, in his work in answer to the judge, denies, and ridicules the idea that the commander of the Legion - a Continental lieutenant colonel should be outranked by a militia gen- eral, especially by one holding his commission from Gov- ernor Rutledge during the interregnum of Carolina.2 The
1 Johnson's Life of Greene, vol. II, 69.
2 Campaigns of 1781 in the Carolinas (H. Lee), Review of Johnson's Life of Greene, 249, 250. In point of fact Marion, though now acting under his commission of brigadier general of State militia, was actually
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fact, nevertheless, appears to be as stated by Johnson. In a letter of the 28th of April General Greene writes to Marion, informing him of the result of the action of Hob- kirk's Hill, making light of his repulse and saying, " You will cross the river Santee, or detach Lieutenant-Colonel Lee, and direct your force as information and circumstances may direct." 1 And in a letter of the next day to Lee himself, appended by Mr. Lee to his reply to Judge Johnson, he repeats, "In my letter to General Marion last evening I desired him either to detach you, or cross the Santee with you as he might think advisable."2 It may have been, as Lee asserts, that he was by his own request under Marion. But under him he undoubtedly was. Marion, as com- pared with Sumter, was Greene's favorite, though in his private correspondence Greene was accustomed to sneer at both. While constantly criticising Sumter, for Marion he had, to him, only words of praise.
" When I consider," he writes to Marion on the 24th of April, " how much you have done and suffered, and under what disadvantages you have maintained your ground, I am at a loss which to admire most, your courage and fortitude, or your address and management. Certain it is no man has a better claim to the public thanks or is more gen- erally admired than you are. History affords no instance wherein an officer has kept possession of a country under so many disadvantages as you have; surrounded on every side with a superior force, hunted from every quarter with veteran troops, you have found means to elude
still a lieutenant colonel in the' Continental line, and as such two years the senior of Lee, and thus ranked him in that line.
1 Gibbes's Documentary Hist. (1781-82), 61.
2 Campaigns of 1781, Appendix C. In a letter of General Greene of the 16th of January, 1782, written to General Marion upon the subject of a legionary corps then raised by Maham, he says, "Lee's Legion is fre- quently under particular officer's command according to the nature of the- service." This must refer to the command of Sumter, Marion, or Pick- ens, for under no other officer, except Laurens, was it ever so put; but it was put at different times under each of these officers.
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