USA > South Carolina > The history of South Carolina in the Revolution, 1780-1783 > Part 22
Note: The text from this book was generated using artificial intelligence so there may be some errors. The full pages can be found on Archive.org (link on the Part 1 page).
Part 1 | Part 2 | Part 3 | Part 4 | Part 5 | Part 6 | Part 7 | Part 8 | Part 9 | Part 10 | Part 11 | Part 12 | Part 13 | Part 14 | Part 15 | Part 16 | Part 17 | Part 18 | Part 19 | Part 20 | Part 21 | Part 22 | Part 23 | Part 24 | Part 25 | Part 26 | Part 27 | Part 28 | Part 29 | Part 30 | Part 31 | Part 32 | Part 33 | Part 34 | Part 35 | Part 36 | Part 37 | Part 38 | Part 39 | Part 40 | Part 41 | Part 42 | Part 43 | Part 44 | Part 45 | Part 46 | Part 47 | Part 48 | Part 49 | Part 50 | Part 51 | Part 52 | Part 53 | Part 54 | Part 55 | Part 56 | Part 57 | Part 58 | Part 59 | Part 60 | Part 61 | Part 62 | Part 63 | Part 64
244
HISTORY OF SOUTH CAROLINA
him. It was probably with these mixed motives and senti- ments that on the 14th he wrote to Greene: "I hope it may not be disagreeable to recall Colonel Lee, as his services cannot be wanted at that place [Granby]; and as to his taking command, as at the post at Motte, I cannot believe it would be your wish. And notwithstanding I have the greatest respect for Colonel Lee, yet I could wish he had not gone to that place, as it is a circumstance I never thought of; his cavalry can be of no service there, and may be of the greatest here. I have been at great pains to reduce that post - I have it in my power to do it -and I think it for the good of the public to do it with- out regulars."1 Having written thus to the general com- manding, he hurried on to Granby, to learn, before he reached the post, that Lee had accepted the capitulation.
The fact that Lee had thus snatched from Sumter's men and himself the honor of the recovery of the post was pro- voking enough to a man of his temperament; but his in- dignation knew no bounds when he learned the terms which had been given to Maxwell. The fort had been the depot of all the plunder that Maxwell and his party had been rioting in for months past, and the place of refuge of the most obnoxious Loyalists. It had now been invested for some time by Colonel Taylor's command, the very men who had suffered under the rapine of its garri- son, and they had been solacing themselves with the hope of restitution, indemnity, and revenge. In all these they were disappointed, and compelled to look on and see cov- ered wagons, drawn by their own horses, crammed with plunder from their farms, and their own slaves, all carried away before their eyes by Hessians and Tories, under the escort of Lee's Legion. Feeling ran high at the sight, it may well be imagined; but when, the next morning,
1 Johnson's Life of Greene, vol. II, 122.
245
IN THE REVOLUTION
Colonel Lee's own men paraded, equipped in new clothing, while the patriot soldiers were left to prosecute the war in rags, then even Colonel Lee's motives were drawn into question, and a bitterness engendered which was never allayed.
Sumter had surely no right to expect that the taking of the post would be delayed by Greene to suit his conven- ience or to gratify his ambition; but, on the other hand, he had cause for just indignation if the capitulation had been hurried merely to deprive him of its honor, especially if, in order to hasten it for this purpose, improper terms had been granted to the enemy. That Maxwell obtained every advantage in the negotiation for surrender is clear. The conditions allowed were such that, though Captain Eggle- ston was intrusted with the fullest powers to conclude finally upon the terms if he found the enemy disposed to surrender, he declined to act upon his authority, and re- quired the sanction of Lee himself to them. The first, as Lee himself declares, was diametrically repugnant to the course contemplated by him, as it prevented the restoration of plundered property. And yet Lee allowed them, and permitted Maxwell to march off under escort, carrying off the property of men who stood by with arms in their hands. The hasty granting of such terms certainly de- mands some explanation, and this Lee has attempted to give; the fact of the receipt of information of Lord Raw- don's advance, he declares, would have determined him had he not already decided upon his action. But the facts of the situation will scarcely justify his precipitancy.
Maxwell's garrison did not actually number 350 men, but 60 of whom were regulars, the rest loyal militia. Lee's own corps numbered about 3001 when he returned to South Carolina, and they had since lost but few 1 See authorities cited, ante.
246
HISTORY OF SOUTH CAROLINA
men in action. If we exclude for the present Colonel Taylor's regiment, whose presence Lee does not mention, but which was doubtless at hand, it must be remembered that Greene's army was just across the Congaree River at Friday's Ferry, while at this time, the 14th of May, Lord Rawdon was but crossing the Santee at Nelson's Ferry, more than sixty miles distant, with Marion upon his flanks, and Sumter between Lee and himself. It turned out that Rawdon was not coming that way at all, that in fact he was retreating in the opposite direction, to Monck's Corner. But Lee did not know that; his information by Captain Armstrong was that Rawdon was advancing towards Fort Motte, which was on the way to Granby. Still, even had that been so, Rawdon could scarcely have reached Granby before two days were Sumter and Marion not in his way. There was, therefore, no cause for any precipitancy ; and it can scarcely be doubted that Lee's ambition to add another to his list of captures had induced him to grant terms to Maxwell which should never have been allowed.
Sumter, in his anger at Lee's conduct, tendered his resig- nation, and sent on his commission to General Greene. It has been asserted that Greene compelled Lee to apologize to Sumter.1 This is probably an exaggeration of what did take place.
Whether through apology or explanation, it is more than probable that Lee exerted himself to reconcile Sumter, who was pacified, if not convinced and satisfied. On the 17th of May General Greene wrote to Sumter : -
" I take the liberty to return you your commission which you for- warded me yesterday for my acceptance & to inform you that I can- not think of accepting it & to beg you to continue your command.
"I am sorry for your ill health and shall do everything in my 1 Johnson's Life of Greene, vol. II, 123.
247
IN THE REVOLUTION
power to render your command as convenient as the nature of your service will admit.
" It is unnecessary for me to tell you how important your services are to the interest and happiness of this country and the confidence I have in your abilities and zeal for the good of the service. Your continuing in command will lay the public in general, and me in par- ticular, under very great obligations & tho' it may be accompanied with many personal inconveniences yet I hope you will have cause to rejoice in the conclusion of the business from the consideration of having contributed so largely to the recovery of its liberty."
Well, perhaps, it might have been had General Greene accustomed himself usually to write in this strain in regard to Sumter to others as well as to Sumter himself, espe- cially to Colonel Lee. But, as it has appeared, the gen- eral wrote to others in very different terms of this officer, repeatedly and querulously referring, as the author of the Campaigns in the Carolinas observes, to the failure of Sum- ter to join him with one thousand men as the cause of his defeat at Hobkirk's Hill.1 General Greene was indeed unhappy in his correspondence during the campaign. Johnson, commenting upon the fact that, from April 14th until the siege of Fort Motte, Lee acted under the com- mand of Marion, observes that Greene's official corre- spondence was exclusively with Marion " as commander of the party." "Colonel Lee," he says, " often writes also to General Greene, but if answers were returned they must be considered as private, since no copies of such answers are to be found among the official papers." Unfortunately, though no official copies may have been kept, Greene not only received, but invited, communications from Lee, while under Marion's command by his orders, and appears regularly to have replied to them.2 No more uncomforta-
1 Campaigns in the Carolinas (Lee), 363.
2 See Greene's letter to Lee, Campaigns in the Carolinas, Appendix, x, xii, xiii; Gibbes's Documentary Hist. (1781-82), 51, 61, 63.
248
HISTORY OF SOUTH CAROLINA
ble relation could possibly have been created, nor one more certain to lead to misundertanding, if not to rupture. And so the result proved. Writing to Lee, Greene criti- cises and expresses doubts of Sumter's good faith, and in reply Lee complains against Marion who, he charges, is withholding supplies due the Commander-in-chief. Such a correspondence was in violation of the most essential principles of military rule, and should never have been allowed. Once Lee was put under Marion's command, no communication should have passed between the Commander- in-chief and Lee except through Marion himself.
CHAPTER XI
1781
LORD RAWDON, on his retreat from Camden, was met at Nelson's Ferry by Colonel Balfour, the commandant of Charlestown, who came to represent to him, and to con- sult upon, the affairs of the city, as well as of the province in general. He stated that the revolt was now universal, and so little had this serious and alarming turn of affairs been apprehended that the old works of the town had been levelled to make way for new, which had not yet been constructed; 1 that he had the fullest conviction of the disaffection in general of the inhabitants; and that under these circumstances his garrison was inadequate to its defence against any force of consequence that
might attempt the city. The royal militia in the city were in such a state of mutiny that a part of them had to be disarmed; they were ready, it was said, to seize the gates of the town if Greene would present himself suddenly before them.2 The conclusions drawn from this untoward state of affairs were that, if misfortune happened to the corps under Lord Rawdon, the probable
1 The old works had been levelled by order of Lord Cornwallis in January, 1781, before he moved into North Carolina. New ones designed had not been erected. This was one of the strongest points made by Sir Henry Clinton against his lordship in their bitter controversy. (Clinton-Corn- wallis Controversy, vol. I, 484.)
2 Letter from Marquis of Hastings, Memoirs of the War of 1776 (Lee), Appendix, 613; Clinton-Cornwallis Controversy, vol. I, 484.
249
250
HISTORY OF SOUTH CAROLINA
consequence would be the total loss of the province, in- cluding the capital; but that, although the highest degree of prudence and caution were upon that account indis- pensably necessary, yet, as he was just joined by Major McArthur with about three hundred foot and eighty dragoons, Lord Rawdon conceived he might, without hazarding too much, endeavor to check the operations of the enemy on the Congaree.1
And now was manifested the excellent work that Sum- ter had done while Lee was snatching from him the laurels at Fort Motte and Granby. So completely had he cleared the country that, it is stated, for five days after Lord Rawdon had passed the Santee not a single person of any sort whatever, whether with intelligence or on any other account, came near the army, although he had ad- vanced directly from Nelson's Ferry that night and the following day to a point where the roads from Nelson's and McCord's ferries met. Nor could the scouts and spies which he detached on all hands procure him any reliable intelligence as to the situation of the enemy or the state of the country. A number of reports, however, which were contradictory in other respects, seemed to concur in one point, which was that Greene had passed the Congaree and was pushing down the Orangeburgh road with a strong force. This report was of too great moment to be slighted, and not only obliged the British commander to relinquish his design of advancing to the Congaree, but caused him to fall back to the Eutaws and thence to Monck's Corner, for the protection of Charles- town and of the rich intervening country. So meagre was his intelligence and so difficult to be obtained, that it was not until after his arrival at Monck's Corner that
1 Annual Register, 1781, vol. XXIV, 85 ; Clinton-Cornwallis Contro- versy, vol. I, 484, 485.
251
IN THE REVOLUTION
Lord Rawdon discovered it was not General Greene, but Sumter only, who had taken possession of Orange- burgh.1
Sumter's genius at once took in the situation. He per- ceived that now had occurred the opportunity for strik- ing a blow with Greene's united forces. The audacity of his own attack upon Granby and Orangeburgh, of Mar- ion's upon McLeroth, Doyle, and Watson, and Harden's brilliant strokes in the Low-Country during the absence of Greene in North Carolina, and the fall of all the British posts on the Congaree since his return, had turned the popular tide in favor of the American cause, had strengthened the weak and determined the wavering, and, as he conceived, had prepared the way for decisive action. Delighting in vigorous enterprise, says Johnson, and appreciating the effect of these successes upon the spirit of the enemy as well as upon that of the people of the country, Sumter strenuously urged upon Greene that, united with Lee, Marion, and himself, he should now fall upon Rawdon. The British force outside of Charles- town, he believed, could now be destroyed and the cam- paign ended.2 The respective numbers of the two armies now warranted the attempt. Greene had present at the battle of Hobkirk's Hill 939 men. He had lost in that engagement 268 men, leaving him 671; Major Eaton had soon after joined him with 220 North Carolina levies ; Lee's Legion numbered 300. Putting Marion's men at but 150, to which number they were said to have been reduced by the apprehension that their horses were to be taken from them, and Sumter's at 500, Greene at this time must have had between 1800 and 1900 men. On
1 Annual Register, 1781, vol. XXIV, 86-87 ; Clinton-Cornwallis Contro- versy, vol. I, 480, 486.
2 Johnson's Life of Greene, vol. II, 124.
252
HISTORY OF SOUTH CAROLINA
the other hand, Lord Rawdon, at the battle of Hobkirk's Hill, had but 900 men, of whom 258 had been lost, and his only reinforcement since had been Watson's corps, which the Americans estimated at 600, but the British at 500,1 and McArthur's, which joined him when he crossed Nelson's Ferry, of 380.2 His lordship had there- fore probably not more than 1600 or 1700 men present with him at the Eutaws in May. When the decisive ac- tion did take place, four months afterwards, these propor- tions were changed, and General Greene was compelled then to meet a force equal, if not superior, to his own in numbers, and from which the effects of the disasters in the spring had been in a measure at least removed. But he who had been so anxious for united action at Camden, and so con- fident there of capturing the whole British army, now hesitated and shrank from the risk of an attack when it promised such great results.
In defence of Greene's course at this time it was said that Lord Rawdon had gained at least a day's march, and, com- manding all the means of transportation the country afforded, could sweep along with him or destroy all the provisions ; and having gained the banks of the Santee, a few field-pieces could have stopped the advance of a very superior army through the passes of the river swamp should Greene have pursued him on the eastern side of the Wateree. And what, it was asked, was to be expected from the descent on the west side? The route was so circuitous that the British army could have thrown itself on the American front; nay, reinforcements might have advanced from Charlestown to Nelson's Ferry in the time the American army could have reached the latter point. What, then, would have been Greene's situation ?
1 Stedman's American War, vol. II, 360.
2 Annual Register, 1781, vol. XXIV, 84.
253
IN THE REVOLUTION
The reinforcements from Ireland might have arrived and joined their forces to Lord Rawdon's, and Greene must have risked everything on a battle with a superior enemy, etc.1
No battle would ever be fought if the attacking party should run no risk. But these objections are easily an- swered. If Rawdon had started with at least a day's march before Greene could move, he had showed no dis- position to take advantage of his start and was proceeding very leisurely. He began his movement on the night of the 9th of May, but did not begin to pass the river until the night of the 13th, nor was he safely across until the evening of the 14th, when he met Balfour with his alarm- ing report of the condition of the country, and learned that Fort Motte had fallen, and that Maxwell was besieged at Granby. Hoping to relieve Maxwell, he moved a day's march up the river, on the 15th, but, learning of the sur- render of that officer, he retraced his steps.2 During the four days of Rawdon's leisurely retreat from Camden, Sum- ter had made his masterly raid through the country down to Dorchester, sweeping away horses and everything in the way of transportation that could assist the British in their retreat. In the meanwhile Greene, who, Lee says, had pressed on with much expedition, was on the 15th within a
1 Johnson's Life of Greene, vol. II, 427, 428. It is said that the subject was fully discussed by Williams, Lee, and Carrington before the public in 1792, and that it was fully proved that the movement in the pursuit of Raw- don would not only have been visionary and hazardous, but impossible. No doubt it was so to Lee's satisfaction, for he claimed the credit of hav- ing advised Greene, instead, to move against Ninety Six ( Campaigns in the Carolinas, 382). But Sumter was by no means convinced, and stoutly maintained the soundness of his advice upon the floor of the House of Representatives in Congress, when the subject was broached there, upon the occasion of relief sought for by General Greene's widow.
2 Rawdon to Cornwallis, Clinton-Cornwallis Controversy, vol. I, 482, 483.
254
HISTORY OF SOUTH CAROLINA
few miles of Friday's Ferry or Granby. So far, therefore, from there being any difficulty in Greene's overtaking Lord Rawdon, the two armies were within striking distance on that day; Rawdon, believing that Greene had already crossed the river and was at Orangeburgh, was not yet dis- posed to abandon the line of the Congaree, and could easily have been brought to battle had Greene so desired. Nor will it do to say that the reinforcements from Ireland, that did arrive soon after, might have arrived and joined Rawdon; for while it was true Rawdon was hoping for the arrival of some force that might put Charlestown out of danger,1 and that Greene himself had received informa- tion that British reinforcements might be expected in Charlestown, it behooved Greene all the more to strike before Rawdon received such assistance. The reënforce- ments did not, in fact, arrive until the 3d of June, near three weeks after, and it was in this time that Sumter urged that the battle should be given. But a still more conclusive answer to the objections against Sumter's advice on this occasion is that four months after, when the British had been reënforced by three fresh regiments from Ireland, had defeated Greene at Ninety Six and released Cruger, and had to some extent at least recovered from the demoraliza- tion which Balfour had reported to Rawdon on his arrival at Nelson's Ferry, Greene was at last compelled to fight the battle which might have been fought with so much more chance of victory at this time. Sumter was over-
1 Lord Rawdon writes to Cornwallis from Monck's Corner on the 24th of May : "I am using every effort to augment our cavalry in hopes that the arrival of some force which may put Charlestown out of danger will speedily enable us to adopt a more active conduct. But the plundering parties of the enemy have so stripped the country of horses and there is such difficulty in getting swords and other appointments that I get on but slowly in this undertaking." - Clinton-Cornwallis Controversy, vol. I, 486.
255
IN THE REVOLUTION
ruled. "Greene never ventured on a hazardous game when he could play a safe one," says his biographer.1 The posts in the interior country, he now thought, presented the most desirable object. There appeared to be no doubt of their falling, and with them might be acquired supplies, provisions, and the country they commanded. This was certainly a very different view from that expressed to Sumter on his assuming command of the department, when Greene wrote to that officer that the salvation of the country did not depend upon little strokes -that it was not a war of outposts. It would have been well if he had now recalled and acted upon the advice he had then given. " If we can introduce into the field a greater army than the enemy, all their posts will fall themselves; and with- out this they will reestablish them though we should take them twenty times." A greater army than that of the enemy had not been introduced ; but by the repetition of little strokes the partisan bands had reduced the enemy to inferiority, and the remaining outposts were about to be abandoned by him, when to their surprise Greene, instead of advancing upon Rawdon, turned aside to besiege Ninety Six and Augusta. With the fall of the posts on the Con- garee the fall of Ninety Six was assured, for, as Greene himself had written to his friend Governor Read, on the 4th of May, all the fertile parts of the State around Camden, Ninety Six, and Augusta had been laid waste in such a manner that an army could not subsist in the neighborhood of any of these posts.2 Cut off, therefore, from its supplies from Charlestown, Ninety Six must have been evacuated.3 And this indeed had been determined upon by Lord Raw- don, who considered the risk too great to be hazarded for the purpose of protecting the place or even of extricating
1 Johnson's Life of Greene, vol. II, 124.
2 Ibid., 57. 8 Ibid., 57.
256
HISTORY OF SOUTH CAROLINA
the troops; nor would he venture to its relief without other means of subsisting his army on the march than the gleanings of a wasted and hostile country. Thus circum- stanced, Lord Rawdon despatched several messengers by different routes, and, to guard as much as possible against mischance, applied to Colonel Balfour to send others from Charlestown, with instructions to Colonel Cruger, who commanded at Ninety Six, to abandon that place and to re- move with the garrison as speedily as possible to Augusta.1 It was not among the least vexatious freaks of fortune, says Johnson, that Greene owed all the mortifications he experienced before Ninety Six to the successful activity of the Whig militia. Had they been less diligent, he would have been saved the necessity of this expedition, and would have found himself, without a struggle, in command of the whole upper country. Nor is it probable, observes that author, that Cruger, after uniting with Browne at Augusta, could have made good his retreat to Savannah,2 for General Pickens, with about four hundred of Anderson's regiment, was lying between Augusta and Ninety Six to prevent his junction with Browne;3 and Harden, with his party, was in the neighborhood. But why put the blame of the failure before Ninety Six, and the loss of all that had been gained by the partisan bands during the year, upon their excessive zeal in the simple performance of their duty, rather than upon the true source of Greene's misfortune, his rejection of Sumter's advice to advance upon Rawdon, rather than turn aside towards Ninety Six ? It is nevertheless a curi- ous fact that the evacuation of Ninety Six, and the conse- quent abandonment of the whole upper country by the
1 Annual Register, 1781, vol. XXIV, 87 ; Tarleton's Campaigns, 484; Clinton-Cornwallis Controversy, vol. I, 485.
2 Johnson's Life of Greene, vol. II, 140.
3 McCall's Hist. of Ga.
257
IN THE REVOLUTION
British, was only prevented by the interception of Raw- don's messages on land; and the surrender of the place was only prevented, as we shall see, by the interception of Sir Henry Clinton's despatches on the sea.
There is, however, another view to be taken of Greene's conduct in turning back to Ninety Six instead of pressing on towards the recovery of Charlestown. He was still hankering after the field in Virginia, to which he had learned that Cornwallis had gone. He was still asking himself: "If the principal officer in the enemy's interest is there (i.e. in Virginia), who should be opposed to him ? Surely the commander of the Southern Department!" 1 The fact is that Greene was not contemplating the further prosecution of the war in South Carolina. He yearned to go to Virginia, where he thought more honor was to be won. He was again about to leave the protection of what had been regained to the partisan bands which had secured it, and with his Continentals to abandon the State. The day after he reached Ninety Six he wrote to Lafayette, " If we are successful here I shall move northwardly imme- diately with a part of our force if not all."2 That is, if Ninety Six fell, he would leave Sumter, Marion, and Pickens to contend with Rawdon.
We must now turn our attention to another part of the field. Major Harden, who, it will be recollected, had crossed the country and successfully carried back the war into the Low-Country, after the capture of Fort Balfour, when last mentioned was endeavoring to form a junction with General Pickens. He had not since been idle, and it is time now to look after his movements in connection with the Georgians who had survived the struggle on the other side of the Savannah. After the affair at Beattie's Mill,
Need help finding more records? Try our genealogical records directory which has more than 1 million sources to help you more easily locate the available records.