USA > South Carolina > The history of South Carolina in the Revolution, 1780-1783 > Part 5
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1 Johnson's Life of Greene, vol. I, 365.
2 Tarleton's Campaigns, 216.
8 Granby, or Friday's Ferry, is half a mile below present city of Columbia, on the opposite bank of the Congaree.
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swamps, and did not get out of them until the 14th of Janu- ary; and when he did he was halted at Camden, where he remained until Cornwallis was ready to move from Winnsboro.1
In the meanwhile Morgan's position at Grindal's Shoals, Washington's attack and slaughter of the Tories at Ham- mond's Store on the 29th, and the dispersion of Cuning- ham's party at Williams's plantation on the 30th of December alarmed Cornwallis for the safety of Ninety Six, an alarm which was much increased by the growing disaffection in that region which hitherto had been the most loyal to the King of any part of the State. Curiously, too, while he knew that the fortifications at Ninety Six were sufficient to secure it against attack unless with artillery, he had failed to learn that Morgan was entirely deficient in that arm of the ser- vice. While waiting for Leslie to struggle through the swamps, Cornwallis determined to check the disaffection in the western part of the province and to clear his left flank of Morgan. Accordingly, on the 1st of January, he ordered Tarleton over Broad River with his corps of cavalry and infantry of 550 men, the first battalion of the Seventy-first Regiment, consisting of 200, and two three- pounders. His instructions to Tarleton were that if Mor- gan was still at Williams's plantation or anywhere within his reach he should push him to the utmost. With his usual celerity Tarleton obeyed this order, and, leaving his baggage behind, crossed the Broad at Brierly's, now Stro- ther's, Ferry and advanced into what is now Union County some twenty miles. He had been directed by his lord- ship to inquire and report upon the condition of affairs in this region, and, finding that Washington had fallen back to Morgan on the Pacolet, and hearing that the reports of the rising of the people had been exaggerated, he halted
1 Tarleton's Campaigns (notes), 148, 260.
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here and reported to Cornwallis that Ninety Six was safe and that Morgan was far distant. He requested that the baggage which he had left behind should be forwarded to him, and asked for the Seventeenth Light Dragoons and the Seventh Regiment, which latter he proposed to send to Ninety Six with a field-piece. He proposed to Cornwallis that when he advanced up the west side of the Broad his lordship should advance up the east, so that when he drove Morgan's corps from the Pacolet it would be forced to re- cross the Broad towards King's Mountain, where his lord- ship would be ready to fall upon it. To this plan Cornwallis agreed, and sent the reinforcements Tarleton asked. The Seventh Regiment, 200 men, and 50 dragoons of the Seven- teenth Regiment brought his baggage to Tarleton, who then received permission to retain the Seventh Regiment instead of sending it to Ninety Six.
Cornwallis moved on Sunday, the 7th of January, a few miles to a place called McAllister's, and wrote Tarleton that he would remain there till Tuesday, the 9th, march to the crossroads on Wednesday, halt Thursday, and reach Bullock's Creek meeting-house, in what is now York County, on Saturday, the 13th. He did not, however, move from Mc Allister's until Saturday. He was waiting for Leslie, who was still in the swamps. On Sunday, the 14th, he was at Bull Run, about two miles southeast of the present town of Chester. From this place he informed Tarleton that Leslie was at last out of the swamps.
Tarleton, on receiving the reinforcements of the Seventh and Seventeenth regiments, moved westwardly and crossed Indian Creek in the present Newberry County, and after- wards Dunkin's Creek in the present Laurens County, seeking practicable fords for the passage of the Enoree and Tyger rivers. These rivers were passed, on the 14th, above the Cherokee Road, and in the evening Tarleton ob-
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tained information that Morgan guarded all the fords upon the Pacolet, that Cornwallis had reached Bull Run, and that Leslie had surmounted the difficulties which had retarded his march. Tarleton thereupon informed Cornwallis that he would endeavor to pass the Pacolet, and thus force Morgan to retreat up the Broad. He urged his lordship to proceed up the eastern bank of that river without delay, as such a movement, in cooperation with his, would undoubtedly stop the retreat of the Americans, cut off, as they would be, from the main army under Greene. Cornwallis, how- ever, still waited upon Leslie's movements, and detained him at Camden after he had passed the swamps until the 16th in order to mislead Greene as to his own movements.1 Nor had he himself advanced at the time farther than Turkey Creek, in what is now York County, 25 miles to the southeast of Morgan's position, instead of having ad- vanced as many miles to the north on the route which the latter must have proceeded to join Greene or to seek shelter in North Carolina. It was not until the 18th that Leslie, by his orders, crossed the Catawba, and joined him in what was spoken of as the middle road, i.e. the route between the Catawba and the Broad. From the 14th to the 17th Tarleton was left without information as to his " lordship's movements ; but having ascertained the position of Morgan's outposts, and supposing that the main army was now in Morgan's rear, he commenced his march on the evening of the 15th, directing his course to the old iron works which were situated higher up the river, indi- cating an intention of crossing it above Morgan's position, and thus to place his adversary between himself and the main army. Morgan, deceived by this stratagem, made a corresponding movement up the river, upon which Tarleton, silently decamping in the night, secured a passage below, 1 Cornwallis to Lord George Germain, Tarleton's Campaigns, (note) 260.
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within six miles of Morgan's camp, and made good his crossing before daylight. Upon this Morgan fell back, precipitately, towards Thicketty Creek.1 Tarleton then advanced to some log houses, formerly constructed by Major Ferguson, which lay midway between the British and Americans. Here he intended to take post with his whole corps behind the cabins, and await Morgan's move- ments, but a patrol discovering that the Americans were gone, Tarleton occupied their abandoned position, in which he found a quantity of provisions and half-cooked rations, so suddenly had Morgan been compelled to move. Here he remained during the 16th, and, supposing that his ad- versary was resolved to fly early on the morning of the 17th, started in pursuit.
The forces, British and American, about to be engaged, were as follows : On the British side Tarleton had his own Legion, which he puts at 550 men, the Seventh Regiment, 200, and a detachment of the Seventeenth Dragoons, 50. To these were added the First Battalion of the Seventy- first Regiment, 200, and a detachment of the Royal Artil- lery to man the field-guns, about 50. So that Tarleton's force, by his estimate, was about 1000. The Americans contended that it amounted to 1150, and there certainly was a party of Loyalists with him, not included in his estimate, for he mentions the capture by such a party of a militia colonel from whom he obtained information in regard to Morgan's movements.2 These are also said to have been about 50,3 which may have brought his force up to the American estimate.
Johnson, in his Life of Greene,4 asserts that Morgan's
1 Tarleton's Campaigns, 221; Stedman's Am. War, vol. II, 320; Memoirs of the War of 1776 (Lee), 226.
2 Tarleton's Campaigns, 210, 211, 214.
8 Johnson's Life of Greene, vol. I, 374. 4 Ibid., 346.
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1
whole force on duty consisted of 290 regular infantry, 80 cavalry, and 600 militia, in all, 970. General Greene, in his letter appointing Morgan to this command, informed him that it was to consist of the Maryland line of 320, a detach- ment of the Virginia militia of 200, Washington's cavalry of from 60 to 100, and that he would be joined by a body of volunteer militia under General Davidson of North Car- olina, and those of South Carolina, lately under the com- mand of General Sumter.1 From a disagreement between Sumter and Morgan the former's troops do not appear to have formed a part of the latter's command. In a letter of Morgan to Greene, written on the 15th of January, two days before the battle, he puts the militia from South Car- olina and Georgia at 200, and those from North Carolina at 140.2 So that his whole force was 940. In a recent work 3 this statement is made as to the respective quota of militia from the States of North and South Carolina and Georgia. Accepting Morgan's statement as to the strength of the Continental troops and Virginia militia composing his corps, the author goes on to say -- " To this were added McDowell's mounted North Carolina volunteers, 190 men, Davidson's Mecklenburg volunteers, a part of whom, how- ever, were from Tryon, -in all 310 North Carolinians. Pickens's South Carolinians, 70 men, and the Georgians under McCall about 30 men." To this it may be ob- jected that Morgan's report to his commanding officer, immediately preceding the battle, is at least more likely to be correct as to the strength and composition of his force than estimates made long after; and in his report Morgan gives 140 as the exact strength of the North Carolina mili- tia, and estimates the South Carolina and Georgia contri- bution at 200. The author of the work quoted, while
1 Johnson's Life of Greene, vol. I, 346. 2 Ibid.
8 No. Ca., 1780-81 (Schenck), 205.
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severe upon Judge Johnson for alleged intemperate zeal on behalf of his State, South Carolina, has himself fallen into palpable errors in attempting to show mistakes by the author of the Life of Greene. He states that Pickens's command proper was only 70 men, and McCall's Georgians were only 30 in number.1 He evidently supposes McCall himself to have been a Georgian. As has appeared, he was a South Carolinian from Ninety Six, having been in the service during the siege of Ninety Six in 1775, with a com- pany from that district.2 Fortunately for the fame of South Carolina, the historian of Georgia has given the account of the organization of Pickens's party. When this officer took the field he assumed command of an encampment of his followers at Long Cane, in Ninety Six District, and marched to join Morgan. The historian of Georgia goes on to say : "Lieutenant-Colonel McCall was ordered to make a selection of forty-five men, who, equipped as dra- goons, in which there were several Georgians, to act with Colonel Washington's regiment. Major John Cunningham commanded the Georgia troops under the orders of General Morgan." McCall's mounted corps were, with the excep- tion of a few, South Carolinians.3
There was a marked difference in the character of the opposing forces at Cowpens from those who fought at King's Mountain. At King's Mountain there were no British regulars of the line on the one side nor Continen- tal regulars on the other. It was a battle between Amer-
1 No. Ca., 1780-81 (Schenck), 201.
2 James McCall, captain Ninety Six, Hist. of So. Ca. in the Revolu- tion (McCrady), 9; commands expedition to capture Indian agent (ibid., 189, 190); joins Sumter on the Catawba (ibid., 633); joins Clarke in effort to recover Georgia (ibid., 733); with Clarke lays siege to Augusta (ibid., 734); takes part under Sumter in battle of Fishdam (ibid., 821); in battle at Blackstock (ibid., 826); with Clarke moves against Ninety Six; takes part in battle of Long Cane and is wounded (ibid., 831-850).
3 Hist. of Ga. (McCall), vol. II, 354, 355.
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ican Tories, from North and South, and American Whigs, from the Carolinas and Virginia. Ferguson appears to have been the only British officer present. The British forces at Cowpens were nearly all regulars. The three regiments, Seventh, Seventeenth, and Seventy-first, and the Royal Artillery were all from the British line ; and Tarle- ton's Legion, though raised at New York, were practically regulars. On the American side there were present the Maryland line and Washington's Dragoons of the Continen- tal Army. In the quality of troops, it has been supposed, says Johnson, that the British had infinitely the advan- tage, but this was scarcely so. At least 300 or 400 of the enemy are said to have been new recruits and probably not yet disciplined or ever before in battle, and it appears that Tarleton's own corps, the famous British Legion, had been recruited from the prisoners taken at the battle of Camden, and it is said, seeing their own regiment opposed to them, would not proceed against them, but broke. On the other hand, besides the Continentals he commanded, such a body of militia as served under Morgan has seldom been collected in the field of battle. Two companies of them, under Cap- tains Triplett and Taite, were from Virginia, and were mostly veteran soldiers who had served out their enlist- ment and were now hired as substitutes by the drafted militia. The Georgians consisted of Clarke's veterans, vol- unteers, 100 in number, who had been almost the whole war in constant service, and a more dauntless little corps it would have been difficult to find. Their gallant Colonel did not share in the honors of the field, for he had recently been disabled by a severe wound; but they were led by two gallant officers, Cunningham and Jackson.1 The 140
1 In a letter written by Major Jackson to General Morgan, dated Jan- uary 20, 1795, from the U. S. Senate chamber, he says : "The officers commanding ... were Major Cunningham and Captain Samuel Hammond, VOL. IV. - D
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North Carolina Riflemen under Major McDowell had fought at Musgrove's Mills, King's Mountain, and in almost every action during the preceding summer, and had therefore seen service and were reliable.1 The rest of the militia were new men from Ninety Six District, South Carolina, under Pickens - 45 of them mounted under Lieuten- ant-Colonel McCall, and the remainder riflemen. These as yet had probably seen no service, but like their com- mander, Colonel Pickens, they had entered the field fully aware that for themselves there was no quarter to be asked, and realized that death upon the field was prefer- able to the ignominious end which would be theirs if taken. They were practised marksmen, and with the desperation of their situation, voluntarily assumed, were most formi- dable foes. Morgan's force was also most admirably offi- cered. The Regulars or Continentals were commanded by two distinguished officers; the North Carolina militia by Major McDowell, who had seen much service ; and Pickens, who commanded the South Carolinas, had already com- manded with great success in the field and had now even gained the esteem of Morgan.2 No eulogium, says Johnson, is necessary to the reputation of Pickens; but McCall is less known and has been too soon forgotten. He was amongst the most distinguished partisan leaders of his time ; unfortunately he did not live to see the issue of the contest in which he had taken part. Excelled by no one for activity, resolution, and intelligence, he fell a sacrifice to small-pox contracted in the field.3
When Tarleton turned his position on the Pacolet, Mor-
George Walton, and Joshua Inman. ... The detachment was under my immediate command and direction, although I acted also as brigade- major to all the militia present." - Atlanta Constitution, January 5, 1902.
1 No. Ca., 1780-81 (Schenck), 201.
2 Letter to Greene, Johnson's Life of Greene, vol. I, 371. 8 Ibid., 373.
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gan fell back to the Cowpens, near Thicketty Mountain, in what is now Spartanburg County, the scene of the mem- orable bivouac of the gathered clans on the evening of the 6th of October, 1780, and from which they marched to the victory of King's Mountain.1 Here Morgan was forced to deliver battle. His choice of ground has been severely censured. The ground about the Cowpens was an open wood, admitting the operations of cavalry with facility, in which arm of the service the enemy trebled his own. His flanks had no resting-places, but were exposed to be readily turned, and Broad River ran parallel to his rear, forbidding the hope of a safe retreat in the event of dis- aster. "Had Morgan crossed the river," says Lee in his Memoirs, "and approached the mountain (i. e., King's Mountain), he would have gained a position disadvanta- geous to cavalry but convenient for riflemen, and would have secured a less dangerous retreat. But these cogent rea- sons, rendered more favorable by his inferiority in numbers, could not prevail. Confiding in his long-tried fortune, conscious of his personal superiority in soldiership, and relying on the skill and courage of his troops, he adhered to his resolution. Erroneous as was the decision to fight in this position," says the author, "the disposition for battle was masterly."2 To this criticism Morgan himself has replied, as follows : -
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"I would not have had a swamp in the view of my militia on any consideration'; they would have made for it and nothing could have detained them from it. And as to covering my wings, I knew my adversary, and was perfectly sure I should have nothing but down- right fighting. As to retreat, it was the very thing I wished to cut off all hope of. I would have thanked Tarleton had he surrounded me with his cavalry. It would have been better than placing my own men in the rear to shoot down those who broke from the ranks.
1 Hist. of So. Ca. in the Revolution, 1775-80 (McCrady), 774, 775.
2 Memoirs of the War of 1776 (Lee), 226.
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When men are forced to fight they will sell themselves dearly; and I knew that the dread of Tarleton's cavalry would give due weight to the protection of my bayonets, and keep my troops from breaking as Buford's Regiment did. Had I crossed the river, one-half of the mili- tia would immediately have abandoned me." 1
The victory of Saratoga must surely have turned the heads of those who achieved it. This attempted justifica- tion by Morgan - one of its heroes -for the violation of every military rule, if indeed he voluntarily chose the ground, is as rash and silly as it is bombastic, and is much in the style of his commander Gates when in the height of his folly upon the surrender of Burgoyne. He would not, he declared, have had a swamp in the view of his militia on any consideration, because they would have made for it, and nothing could have detained them from it! And yet it was from the swamps of the Wateree that Sumter had fallen upon Carey's Fort at Camden Ferry, and carried off as prisoners the whole garrison and convoy of the pro- vision train. It was in the swamps of the Santee that Marion's men had rescued the Continental prisoners lost at Camden by Gates. It was through the swamps of Thick- etty Creek itself that Campbell's Virginia militia had marched to victory at King's Mountain. And it was in the swamps of the Pee Dee that Marion was even then keeping alive the spirit of resistance in the Low-Country - swamps which Marion was to render famous in history by the deeds of volunteer militia. He would not cover his wings because he knew his adversary and was sure he would have nothing but downright fighting ! Did ever a military leader announce a more foolish proposition ? He had no confidence in his militia, which constituted nearly two-thirds of his whole command, and would have thanked Tarleton for surrounding them and saving him from the
1 Johnson's Life of Greene, vol. I, 375, 376.
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necessity of placing men in his rear to shoot down those who broke from their lines. And yet, situated as he was, with the best troops in the British service in his front, especially strong in cavalry, led by a desperate fighter, Morgan would have us believe that he deliberately selected as his battle-ground an open field, and of purpose formed his line of battle with his "wings in the air " ! This he did, he asserts, because he knew that the dread of Tarle- ton's cavalry would give due weight to the protection of his bayonets, and keep his troops from breaking as Buford's regiment had done. Mark! As Buford's regiment had done ! He seems ignorant of the fact that Buford's regiment were Continental regulars and not militia, and entirely ob- livious of the glorious deeds which had been accomplished by the partisan bands in South Carolina since that event. His bayonets could not have exceeded 300. The Maryland line, the only regular infantry he had, amounted to but 290, and the militia were armed only with rifles and shotguns. Tarleton's cavalry alone numbered 350, and to oppose the Maryland line was the famous Seventy-first Regiment, to say nothing of the Seventh, which it is supposed was somewhat inferior because of its newly recruited ranks. What bayonets had he, then, with which to protect his militia ? Forsooth, his bayonets had all they could do that day to protect themselves. Through the whole of this, his justification, runs the vein of criticism and distrust of the volunteer soldiery so common to the writings of all the Con- tinental officers of the time. Men who had voluntarily aban- doned their families and homes to enter the struggle for liberty without pay, a service in which, to many of them, there was no quarter to be expected, most of whom had had also as much, and in some instances, even more experience in actual warfare than those who so derided them, were con- temptuously termed "militia," and their conduct esteemed
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less trustworthy than that of enlisted men who were fighting only for pay. Clarke's and McCall's volunteers, who had been victors at Musgrove's Mills and had fought so desperately at Augusta and Long Cane, and McDow- ell's riflemen, who had borne their part at King's Moun- tain and in many other fields, were not considered worthy to be associated with the Continentals who had been de- feated at Camden, and had since lain idly by while the partisan bands of North and South Carolina and Georgia had victoriously fought twenty-six battles and put hors de combat of the enemy more than three times their own loss.
If Morgan, for the reasons assigned by him in this letter, deliberately chose the field of the Cowpens as his battle- ground, he was unfit for the command with which he was intrusted, notwithstanding all his previous services; nor could the brilliant victory achieved by his troops on the ill-chosen field relieve his memory, in this instance, of the most wanton and reckless conduct. This justification in the choice of his position was, however, an afterthought. The history of the battle does not comport with its theory - a theory worked out to meet adverse criticism long after the battle had taken place.
That no such idea was entertained by Morgan at the time is clear from his communications both before and after the battle. Writing to General Greene on the 15th of January, two days before the battle,- the day before Tarle- ton manœuvred him out of his position on the Pacolet,- requesting that he should be recalled with his detachment, he proposed that General Davidson and Colonel Pickens might be left with the militia, as they would not be so much the object of the enemy's attention, but would be capable of being a check on the disaffected, which is all he himself could effect. He adds, Colonel Pickens is a valu- able, discreet, and attentive officer, and has the confidence
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of the militia. Objecting to Greene's proposal of attack upon Cornwallis in his camp, he says he has only 200 South Carolina and Georgia and 140 North Carolina volun- teers. "Nor do I expect to have," he adds, "more than two-thirds of these should I be attacked, for it is impossible to keep them collected." 1 He objected to the straggling of the militia or volunteers, but so far from doubting their courage and conduct, he proposes to leave them to over- come the disaffected, while he joins Greene with his Con- tinentals. In his report of the battle, written on the 19th, two days after its occurrence, there is no suggestion of such an idea. The report is disingenuous, for it makes no allusion to the fact that he was forced to abandon the line of the Pacolet by Tarleton's stratagem, but accounts for his movements giving " the appearance of a retreat," as of his own choice, seeking a more advantageous position ; but so far from implying any doubt of the efficiency of the volunteers, as he calls them, he details how he placed them, under Colonel Pickens, to guard his flanks. He reports, " The volunteers from North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, under the command of Colonel Pickens, were posted to guard the flanks." 2 And yet, in his old age, he would persuade us that he had to place "his own men in the rear to shoot down those (whom he had thus posted to guard his flanks) if they broke." Was ever anything more preposterous !
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