USA > South Carolina > The history of South Carolina in the Revolution, 1780-1783 > Part 6
Note: The text from this book was generated using artificial intelligence so there may be some errors. The full pages can be found on Archive.org (link on the Part 1 page).
Part 1 | Part 2 | Part 3 | Part 4 | Part 5 | Part 6 | Part 7 | Part 8 | Part 9 | Part 10 | Part 11 | Part 12 | Part 13 | Part 14 | Part 15 | Part 16 | Part 17 | Part 18 | Part 19 | Part 20 | Part 21 | Part 22 | Part 23 | Part 24 | Part 25 | Part 26 | Part 27 | Part 28 | Part 29 | Part 30 | Part 31 | Part 32 | Part 33 | Part 34 | Part 35 | Part 36 | Part 37 | Part 38 | Part 39 | Part 40 | Part 41 | Part 42 | Part 43 | Part 44 | Part 45 | Part 46 | Part 47 | Part 48 | Part 49 | Part 50 | Part 51 | Part 52 | Part 53 | Part 54 | Part 55 | Part 56 | Part 57 | Part 58 | Part 59 | Part 60 | Part 61 | Part 62 | Part 63 | Part 64
The truth is that Morgan had no business on the west side of Broad River for any other purpose than for one of those raids by which the partisan bands in this section had broken up the British outposts during the last six months,
1 Johnson's Life of Greene, vol. I, 371.
2 Original report of General Morgan. Collection of Mr. T. Bailey Myers of New York, published in News and Courier, Charleston, South Carolina, May 10, 1881.
40
HISTORY OF SOUTH CAROLINA
in the absence of any regular army in the field. He had been sent by Greene to threaten Ninety Six, and to coun- tenance and aid the uprising of the people there. He had accomplished the dispersion of Cuningham's party at Williams's plantation, and had come back reenforced by Pickens and McCall. But when Tarleton was interposed between himself and Ninety Six, and it was known through Marion that Leslie was approaching a junction with Corn- wallis, he should no longer have allowed two large rivers -the Broad and the Catawba -to remain between Greene's army and his detachment. Greene had written to him on the 9th : " It is not my wish you should come to action unless you have a manifest advantage and a moral certainty of succeeding.
Put nothing to the hazard. A retreat may be disagreeable, but it is not dis- graceful. Regard not the opinion of the day. It is not our business to risk too much; our affairs are in too critical a situation, and require time and nursing to give them a better tone." His position on the Pacolet was precarious in the extreme. He was practically between Tarleton and Cornwallis, beyond any possibility of succor from Greene at Cheraw. The line of the Pacolet itself was a weak one. The stream was shallow and abounding with fords. But there he remained while Tarleton was strongly reinforced by Cornwallis. From this position by his first move his opponent outmanœuvred him. Moving as if to cross above, Tarleton induced him to uncover a better crossing below, and then by a sudden and concealed countermarch in the night threw his force across the Pa- colet so promptly and quietly as to compel Morgan, pre- cipitately, to abandon his camp, leaving his half-cooked rations on the ground. Morgan had now no alternative but to fight or fly to the mountains. Lee supposes that Morgan's decision to fight where he did grew out of irrita-
t t a I C 0 1
41
IN THE REVOLUTION
tion of temper, which overruled the suggestions of his better judgment ; 1 but it rather appears that Tarleton had deprived him of any other alternative. Early in the night of the 16th Tarleton's scouts reported that Morgan had struck into byways tending towards Thicketty Creek, whereupon Tarleton immediately prepared for pursuit, and began his march at three o'clock in the morning of the 17th. Before dawn he had overtaken Morgan, who had now either to fight or to retreat with the enemy hanging upon his rear - a retreat which would probably have ended in rout. But even could he have reached the Broad, his troops, fatigued and dispirited, could scarcely have crossed in the face of Tarleton's powerful cavalry. Well did Corn- wallis write to Tarleton after the battle, "The means you used to bring the enemy to action were able and masterly, and must ever do you honor."2 Accustomed to fight and to conquer, as he had been, Morgan did not hesitate to accept the issue of battle thus forced upon him; and how- ever ill suited the ground, masterly was the disposition of his forces to meet it, but not such as he afterwards so foolishly stated them to have been. Tarleton had pro- ceeded but a little way before his advance guards reported that the American troops had halted and were forming.
Morgan, thus forced to action, took ground on an emi- nence gently ascending for about 350 yards and covered with an open wood. On the crown of this eminence were posted what, as he considered, his best troops, composed of the 290 Maryland regulars, and in line on their right the two companies of Virginia militia veterans, under Triplett and Taite, and a company of Georgians, under Captain Beale, about 140 in the whole, making his second line to consist of 430 men. This was commanded by Lieutenant- Colonel Howard. One hundred and fifty yards in advance 1 Memoirs of the War of 1776 (Lee), 226. 2 Tarleton's Campaigns, 252.
42
HISTORY OF SOUTH CAROLINA
of this line the main body of the militia, about 270 in number, were posted in open order. These, all volunteers and practised marksmen, most of them burning under a sense of personal injury, were commanded by Colonel Pickens. In advance of this line, about 150 yards, were posted 150 picked men, deployed along the whole front, on the right commanded by Major Cunningham of Georgia, and on the left by Major McDowell of North Carolina. The descent in the ground behind the second line was sufficiently deep to cover a man on horseback. Behind this the Ameri- can reserve was posted, consisting of Washington's and McCall's cavalry, the former 80, and the latter 45 in number. The skirmish line of militia, under Cunningham and McDowell, were permitted to consult their security as far as circumstances would permit by covering their bodies with trees and firing from rest. Their orders were to reserve their fire until the enemy were within 50 yards. Then, having delivered it, to retire, covering themselves with trees as occasion offered, until they reached and re- sumed their places in the first line. The orders to the first line were to deliver two deliberate discharges at the distance of 50 yards, and then to retire and take their posts on the left of the regulars ; if charged by cavalry, every third man to fire, and two to remain in reserve lest the cavalry should continue to advance after the first fire. The second line were cautioned not to be alarmed at the retreat of the militia in their front. The orders given to the militia were detailed to the regulars. They were directed also to fire low and deliberately ; not to break on any account, and if forced to retire, to rally on the eminence in their rear, where they were assured that the enemy could not injure them. The baggage of the American army had been sent off early in the morning under a suitable escort, with orders to halt a few miles in the rear, and the militia horses-for
43
IN THE REVOLUTION
the volunteers were all mounted - were secured to the boughs of trees a convenient distance in the rear of the reserve. Every arrangement having been thus completed, the men were ordered to rest in their places.1 All were in high spirits and ready for the action, for, however Morgan disparaged the militia in his correspondence, he had fol- lowed the custom of the warfare in this region and had submitted to them, with the other troops, the question whether they should fight. They had replied with a uni- versal cry to be led to battle.2
It was about eight o'clock in the morning that the British army arrived in view of the Americans, and, instead of overtaking his adversary in the hurry, confusion, and fatigue of a flight, Tarleton found him rested, breakfasted, and deliberately drawn up, every man at his post, and their commander, in a forcible style of elocution, addressing them. On the other hand, the British troops had been five hours that morning on the march; but Tarleton judged the excitement of the moment of greater consequence than rest or refreshment, and prepared immediately for action. The American army calmly looked on while the enemy formed his order of battle at the distance of four hundred yards from the first line.3
Tarleton had approached with his army in the following order : the Light Infantry and Legion Infantry and the Seventh Regiment, with the artillery in the centre, and a captain and 50 dragoons on each flank composed his advance. The battalion of the Seventy-first Regi- ment and 150 dragoons composed his reserve. As they arrived upon the ground, the infantry were required to dis- encumber themselves of everything except their arms and
1 In this account of Morgan's disposition for the battle Johnson has been followed, Life of Greene, vol. I, 377-379.
2 Johnson's Life of Greene, vol. I, 372.
8 Ibid., 372, 379.
44
HISTORY OF SOUTH CAROLINA
ammunition. The Legion Dragoons were ordered to drive in the skirmish line which covered Morgan's front, that it might be more conveniently and distinctly inspected. On the advance of the cavalry the American parties retreated and fell back into the first line. This retreat upon their part, it is said, was made earlier in the action than Morgan had intended, but not before they had inflicted a blow upon the enemy from which they did not recover and which proved ultimately fatal to their fortunes 1- Cunningham's and McDowell's marksmen had, before falling back, given the British cavalry a few discharges which made them tremble, for at least that day, at the deadly aim of the American riflemen.
The American skirmishers having fallen back, the British Light Infantry were filed to the right till they covered the flank of the American front line ; and the Legion Infantry formed upon their left. Before the other troops had been placed in position Tarleton ordered an advance of the partly formed line under fire of a three-pounder to within 300 yards of the American line. Here the Seventh Regiment was formed upon the left of the Legion Infantry, and the other three-pounder was given to the right division of the Seventh. The two field-pieces were placed equidistant from each other and from the extremity of each wing, thus divid- ing the line into thirds. A party of dragoons of 50 under a captain was placed on each flank of the corps which formed the British front line, to protect their own and threaten the flanks of their adversaries. The reserve, composed of the Seventy-first Regiment and 200 cavalry, was posted 150 yards in the rear and to the left of the line of battle.
These dispositions having been made, the British advanced under the fire of the artillery and also with some firing of
1 Memoirs of the War of 1776 (Lee), 228 ; Johnson's Life of Greene, vol. I, 379.
45
IN THE REVOLUTION
the line and with loud shouts for approaching victory. The infantry fire Tarleton declares to have been only from some of the recruits of the Seventh Regiment, which he suppressed. The militia under Pickens maintained their line with perfect coolness. They received the enemy's fire with a firmness which astonished the British, unaccustomed to such resist- ance from the description of the troops they supposed they had in front of them.1 At the distance ordered they delivered their fire with unerring aim, and it was, says Johnson, the magnanimous confession of a gallant officer of the Maryland line who fought on this day "that here the battle was gained." The killed and wounded of the British commis- sioned and non-commissioned officers who lay on the field of battle where the fire of the riflemen was delivered, and the great proportion which the killed and wounded of this description bore to the whole number sufficiently justified the assertion.2 The riflemen had carried out the determina- tion which they had formed before the action to "mark the epaulette men." 3 The British line now charged with their bayonets, upon which Pickens ordered a retreat to the post assigned them before the action began, on the left of the Continental troops.4 As the volunteers fell back the enemy rent the air with their shouts, and quickened their advance ; but from that moment the work of Pickens's marksmen be- gan to show its effects ; the loss of officers was soon manifest by the confusion which ensued in the ranks.
As soon as the second line was cleared the latter com- menced their fire, and for near thirty minutes it was kept up with coolness and constancy. The fire on both sides
1 McCall's Hist. of Ga., vol. II, 357.
2 Johnson's Life of Greene, vol. I, 380.
$ Ibid., 378.
4 General Morgan reports, " Majors McDowell and Cunningham gave them a heavy and galling fire, and retreated to the regiments intended for their support; the whole of Colonel Pickens's command then kept up a fire by regiments, retreating agreeable to orders."
46
HISTORY OF SOUTH CAROLINA
was well supported and occasioned much slaughter. The British, though frequently halted for the restoration of or- der, continued to advance, but with such hesitation that Tarleton ordered up the Seventy-first into line on his left, while his cavalry mnade a sweep upon the American right.
The cavalry of Tarleton's left wing had fallen upon the rear of the retreating militia, who, having to traverse the whole front of the second line to reach the ground on which they were ordered to rally, were much exposed in doing so. Washington, seeing this, dashed to their assistance, and, repulsing the enemy, enabled the militia to recover their composure and steadiness. The eminence which covered this reserve was exceedingly favorable to their purpose, and Pickens ably availed himself of it. Here most of them gathered around him, and were soon reduced to order.
Apprehensive that the reserve could not be brought up in time to defend this exposed flank, or if it were that it would leave his other flank too much exposed, Morgan sent an order to the Virginia and Georgia militia on his right, to fall back so as to form a new line at right angles with that of the Continentals, and repel the enemy's advance upon his right flank. To effect this movement with preci- sion and despatch, the commanding officer ordered his men to face to the right-about and wheel on their left. The first part of the order was executed with coolness. And now came the crisis of the battle. An accident, under a misapprehension of orders, which for a while threatened the destruction of the American army, was averted, strange to say, by a misapprehension of the commander-in-chief of what had actually taken place. The Continentals, seeing the movement of the militia on their right, and supposing that this was the state of things which required a retreat to the eminence in their rear, faced about also and began to move rather in an accelerating step, but still in perfect
47
IN THE REVOLUTION
order, towards the intended second position. Howard, pre- suming that the order must have emanated from the com- mander, made no opposition, but bent his whole attention to the preservation of order and encouragement of his men. Morgan, also, under the impression that the movement was made under the order of Howard, and thinking favorably of it under existing circumstances, rode along the rear of the line, reminding the officers to halt and face as soon as they reached their ground. But just at this crisis, says Johnson, whose account is here followed, they were accosted by another officer, and their attention drawn to some facts which produced an immediate change of measures. This officer was a messenger from Colonel Washington, who, having been carried, in pursuing the enemy's cavalry, some distance in the advance of the American line, found the right flank of the enemy wholly exposed to him, disclos- ing the confusion existing in their ranks, from the want of the officers who had fallen under Pickens's fire. "They are coming like a mob - give them a fire and I will charge them," was the message delivered, and the messenger gal- loped back to join his command. At that instant Pickens showed himself above the second hill, advancing to support the right, and in twenty minutes more the whole British army were prisoners of the Americans.
The British, seeing the second line retreating, as they supposed, advanced rapidly with shouts of victory, but in the disorder which Washington had described. They had reached within thirty yards of Howard's rear when, at Wash- ington's suggestion, that officer halted his troops. "Face about and give them one fire, and the victory is ours," was reiterated by Morgan as he passed along the line. It was promptly obeyed. The enemy were within a few yards tumultuously shouting and rapidly advancing ; scarcely a man of the Americans, it is said, raised his gun to his
48
HISTORY OF SOUTH CAROLINA
shoulder; when their fire was delivered they were in the attitude of using their bayonets. The bayonets of the two armies were interlocked. The enemy threw down their arms and fell upon their faces. The cry of "Tarleton's quarters " rang from right to left, but Howard controlled his men, and his order to "give them quarter" was
obeyed. Tarleton as a last effort sent orders to his dragoons to charge the right of the Americans while he attempted to rally the infantry to protect the guns; but the deadly aim of Pickens's riflemen in the commencement of the action had so completely demoralized men who had been accustomed only to sabring defeated troops and plun- dering the unprotected, that he could get no response to his order. His efforts to collect his infantry were alike in- effectual. Neither promises nor threats, he declared, could gain their attention. They surrendered or dispersed, and abandoned the guns to the artillerymen who defended them for some time with exemplary resolution. In this last stage of defeat Tarleton made another struggle to bring his cavalry to the charge, hoping that such an attack might retrieve the day, but all attempts to restore order or reani- mate their courage proved fruitless. Tarleton admits that above two hundred dragoons forsook their leader and left the field of battle. They had been accustomed to slaughter fugitives, not to take part while the battle waged. They had massacred Buford's regiment at the Waxhaws, had sabred the fugitives from Camden, had surprised and cut to pieces Sumter's unarmed men at Fishing Creek ; but they failed to dislodge this same leader's recruited ranks when they had arms in their hands at Blackstock, and when
brought face to face with the foe at Cowpens they ignomini- ously fled. But very unlike the conduct of the cavalry was that of the Royal Artillerymen ; abandoned by the cavalry and supported only by a few of the infantry who rallied
49
IN THE REVOLUTION
around them, these devoted men stood to their guns, though Washington's cavalry was amongst them. Most were killed or wounded by the time that Tarleton, with a number of mounted officers and all that remained to him of his cavalry, about fifty in number, returned to support them. Here it was that occurred that memorable contest between Tarleton and Washington from which Wash- ington so narrowly escaped. Seeing Tarleton approach, Washington ordered his men to charge and dashed forward himself. Tarleton ordered a retreat. Being in the rear of his retreating men and looking behind him, Tarleton per- ceived that Washington was very near him and fully thirty yards ahead of his troops. Observing this, with three offi- cers he wheeled about and advanced to meet his pursuer. One of his officers, the one on the right, led, and parrying a blow aimed at him by Washington, the sword of the latter proved of inferior temper and broke in half. Wash- ington, now at his mercy, was about to fall under the sword of this British officer, when the latter was disabled by an American sergeant who had come to the assistance of his leader. At the same instant a serving-man, too small to wield a sword, but who had joined the affray, by a pistol shot saved Washington from the sabre of the British officer who had come up on the left. Then Tarleton himself, in the centre, made a thrust at Washington, which was parried ; when, retreating a few paces, he used his pistol, with which he wounded Washington's horse.1 In the mean- while all was over with the British army on the extreme right of the Americans. The Seventy-first behaved, as usual, with courage, and maintained their order to the last. But when the cavalry fled and the whole weight of the American army pressed on them, resistance was vain.
1 Marshall's Life of Washington, vol. IV, 317 ; Johnson's Life of Greene, vol. I, 383.
VOL. IV. - E
50
HISTORY OF SOUTH CAROLINA
They laid down their arms, and Colonel Pickens in person received the sword of their commander, Major McArthur.
Never was victory more complete. Not a British corps retired from the field under command except the few cavalry who accompanied Tarleton. Washington pursued the fly- ing enemy until evening, and on his return drove before him near 100 straggling prisoners collected on his route. Two field-pieces, four-pounders, 800 muskets, two stands of colors, 35 baggage wagons, and 100 dragoon horses fell into the hands of the victors. Johnson, upon a review of the authorities and from original matter, concludes that the British loss was 600 prisoners and 184 killed and wounded, of whom he estimates the slain at 60. The loss in officers was particularly great. At least one-tenth of the killed and wounded were commissioned officers. Ten were found on the field of battle, almost all of whom had evidently fallen under the fire of the militia. Hence the irretrievable confusion which the writers on both sides admit to have ensued in the British line.1 A part of Tarleton's cavalry fled to Hamil- ton's Ford on Broad River, and reached Cornwallis's camp at Fisher's Creek, about twenty-five miles from Cowpens, in the evening. The remainder arrived with Tarleton the following morning.2 The whole American loss was but 11 killed and 61 wounded. No officer of rank was among the killed or wounded.3
The distinguishing feature of the battle of Cowpens upon the American side was undoubtedly the effective work of Pickens's marksmen. It was this which in the very com- mencement of the action had carried terror into the hearts of Tarleton's dragoons, and it was this which disorganized
1 Johnson's Life of Greene, vol. I, 384.
2 Memoirs of the War of 1776 (Lee), 227.
8 Johnson's Life of Greene, vol. I, 383.
51
IN THE REVOLUTION
the British line to such an extent as to render it only & mob when the critical moment of the onslaught had arrived. So far from deserving the subsequent preposterous, though cruel, censure of the leader they served so well that day, it was Pickens himself who received the sword of the gallant commander of the Seventy-first Regiment.1 And yet it was of these men that Morgan wrote years after that he would have thanked Tarleton to have kept them in their ranks. Whatever confusion occurred among them this day was the result of Morgan's own orders.2
Thus ended the brilliant but cruel career of Lieutenant- Colonel Tarleton in South Carolina. Lord Cornwallis, his commander, loyally stood by the young officer to whom he had intrusted this important movement, and so many of his best troops. "You have forfeited no part of my esteem as an officer by the unfortunate event of the action of the 17th," wrote his lordship on the 30th of January. "The means you used to bring the enemy to action were able and masterly and must ever do you honor. Your disposition was unexceptionable; the total misbehavior of the troops could alone have deprived you of the glory which was so justly your due." 3 But not so considerately was Tarleton's
1 Johnson's Life of Greene, vol. I, 383.
2 In his official report Morgan writes : "Such was the inferiority of our numbers that our success must be attributed under God to the justice of our cause and the bravery of our troops. My wishes would induce me to mention the name of every private centinel in the corps." In an order mentioning the names of the commissioned officers in the action the general announces, " Colonel Pickens and all the officers in his corps behaved well; but from their having so lately joined the detachment it has been impossible to collect all their names and rank so the general does not particularize any lest it should be doing injustice to others." And yet it is these men that in after life he said he had to keep in their places by posting men to shoot them down if they broke !
3 Tarleton's Campaigns, 252. Tarleton did not reciprocate his lord- ship's generosity ; in his work he by no means stands by his chief, who so
52
HISTORY OF SOUTH CAROLINA
conduct generally regarded in the British army. There was much jealousy of Tarleton among the officers of the British line, whose rank as commandant of the Legion, a provincial organization, superseded officers who had been long in the service. Especially was this the case in regard to Major Mc Arthur of the Seventy-first and Major Newmarsh of the Seventh or Fusileers, officers who had held commissions long before Tarleton was born.1 The partiality which the Com- mander-in-chief constantly displayed in Tarleton's favor was not calculated to abate this jealousy or to assure him the cordial support of those over whom he was thus placed. Had the misfortune of the battle involved only the Legion, it is not probable that it would have excited so much criticism. But it was observed with bitterness, that, while after the battle few of the Legion cavalry were even missing, the only body of his infantry which escaped was the guard left with the baggage, which had not reached Cowpens at the time of the action. The Seventh, the Seventy-first, and artillery, commanded by veteran officers who had not been in any way consulted as to the action, had been sacrificed to the impet- uosity of this officer, without experience in anything but partisan warfare. It was impossible, it was said, to form any other conclusion than that there was a radical defect and a want of military knowledge on the part of Colonel Tarleton. It was admitted that he possessed bravery in- ferior to no man, but his talents never exceeded that of a partisan captain of light dragoons, daring in skirmishes.2 Moultrie relates that he happened to be in Charlestown at the time when the news of the battle was received, the
Need help finding more records? Try our genealogical records directory which has more than 1 million sources to help you more easily locate the available records.