USA > South Carolina > The history of South Carolina in the Revolution, 1780-1783 > Part 18
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1 Moultrie's Memoirs, vol. II, 276.
2 Memoirs of the War of 1776 (Lee), 336.
3 Stedman's Am. War, vol. II, 356.
4 Annual Register, 1781, vol. XXIV, 82.
5 Johnson's Life of Greene, vol. II, 94-95.
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were on the right of the road, the Fourth under Lieuten- ant-Colonel Campbell, and the Fifth under Lieutenant- Colonel Hawes. The two Maryland regiments, under Colonel Otho H. Williams, were on the left, the First Maryland under Colonel Gunby, and the Fifth under Lieutenant-Colonel Ford. The reserve consisted of the cavalry under Lieutenant-Colonel Washington, and the North Carolina militia under Colonel Read. Conjecturing that the enemy were still unapprised of the arrival of his artillery, the two centre regiments - the Fifth Virginia and the First Maryland - were closed across the road, and masked the pieces which were placed there. Patrols were out to scour the country upon Greene's right, and two strong pickets, commanded by Captains Morgan and Ben- son, were a mile in advance on his left, and in support of them was posted Captain Kirkwood of Delaware, with the remains of his gallant command.
The enemy's advance was announced by the firing of these pickets, who advanced with the utmost coolness, gathering in their videttes, retiring in good order, and forming under Kirkwood. As the British approached, the American infantry unmasked the artillery, and re- ceived the assailants with showers of grape. Availing himself of the effect of this fire of his artillery, Greene assumed the offensive, assured of an easy victory. Nothing more appeared to be necessary but to close upon the flanks of the enemy, and cut off the flying troops from regaining the redoubt of Camden.1 As the British front occupied a smaller space than the American, it was re- ceived by Colonel Hawes's Virginians and Colonel Gunby's Marylanders, Colonel Campbell's Virginians on the extreme right, and Colonel Ford's Marylanders on the left overlapping the attacking column. Confident of suc-
1 Johnson's Life of Greene, vol. II, 77-80.
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cess, Greene hurriedly ordered Washington to make for the enemy's rear, Colonel Campbell to wheel upon their left and Colonel Ford upon their right, and the centre regiments, Hawes's and Gunby's, to charge. But Greene had no ordi- nary adversary to deal with in Lord Rawdon, nor had his troops inferior men to oppose. Lord Rawdon at once ad- vanced his support, and extended his line in such a manner as not only to counteract this movement of the Americans, but to expose their wings to the very disadvantage to which Greene had proposed to subject his. As Campbell and Ford executed Greene's order, and wheeled their regiments to attack the flank of the advancing column of the British, they themselves were outflanked by Lord Rawdon's sup- port, now extended on the right and left. Disorder fol- lowed, and Greene's flanking wings were driven back. Nor did the centre regiment respond to his wishes.
The deflection to the right pursued by Rawdon had brought the brunt of the attack upon Greene's left centre. But nowhere else could he have wished it to have fallen, as that was the position of the famous First Maryland. Against this excellent regiment, the movements on the field had thrown the best troops on the British side - the Sixty-third Regiment of the line, and the King's American Regiment.1 Here, then, might well have been expected a terrific struggle for the mastery. But, strange to say, the Marylanders, who had fought so gloriously against the Seventy-first at Cowpens, and fought half the battle at Guilford now quailed before the Sixty-third, and shrank away in a panic. The first symptom of confusion was shown by the fire contrary to orders. This was scarcely sup- pressed when Captain Beatty, who led the right company of the First Marylands, who was the pride and stay of his command, fell pierced to the heart. His fall caused
1 Tarleton's Campaigns, 463
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those nearest to him to check their progress, and the halt was rapidly communicated, from right to left, through two companies before the cause was understood. Some hesita- tion ensued when the men were urged to regain the line. Then occurred the event upon which Greene asserts that the fate of the battle turned. Colonel Gunby despatched Lieutenant-Colonel Howard with orders to his remaining companies of the regiment, then advancing with confi- dence, to halt and fall back in order that he might reform their faltering comrades upon them. But, instead of this,
the retrograde movement only extended the panic to those who had been before without fear. Nor did the evil end here. While Williams, Gunby, and Howard were actively and earnestly engaged in a combined effort to rally their regiment, Colonel Ford, whilst gallantly execut- ing his orders on the American left, fell from his horse with a mortal wound. His regiment, dispirited by the fall of its leader, and severed from the line by the retire- ment of the First Maryland, soon faltered and retired.
Nothing, says Johnson, could exceed the surprise and disappointment of the commander at this instant. His favorite regiment, in whose courage and conduct he re- posed with such confidence, now blasting all his fair hopes by a retreat without making the smallest trial for victory ! Conscious of the vital importance of rapidity in the movement of the wings, he had spurred his horse up to the extreme right, and was leading on Campbell's right in person when he was called away by the hesitation and confusion manifested in his centre. He vainly tried the influence of his voice and presence to bring his panic- stricken soldiers once more into action. They heard him and they halted, but by this time they had reached the bottom of the hill, and his attention was now drawn away by the loud shouts of the enemy. Again urging
VOL. IV. - O
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his horse to the summit of the hill, the whole extent of his misfortune opened upon his view.
Hawes's regiment was now the only one remaining intact. The artillery was left open and exposed on the summit of the hill. Its loss, besides the certain evidence of defeat, could not have been repaired. In the midst of the flying bullets which were showered about him, for he was then almost alone upon the most exposed part of the hill, his historian asserts, his orders were issued in a tone of perfect composure, to draw off the right and left regiments and form them on Gunby's regiment which was now rallied; while Hawes with the Second Virginia should cover their retreat. This order was well executed, and in the issue left the American commander the election of a renewal of the battle or a composed retreat. But during its execution the artil- lery was exposed to imminent danger. To save this Greene ordered up Captain Smith, who commanded a light in- fantry company detailed from the Maryland line. The enemy, with loud shouts, ascended the hill, and the British horse, commanded by Captain Coffin, now appeared to join in the pursuit. The matrosses were quitting the drag-ropes when Greene galloped up alone,- for his aides were engaged elsewhere carrying his orders, - and, dismounting, himself seized the ropes, thus inspiring his men with a zeal which could not be resisted. Smith now arrived and assisted in drawing off the guns, until Coffin's cavalry approached the hill, when, forming in the rear of the artillery, he poured into Coffin's ranks a volley from which they recoiled and re- treated. Again and again did Coffin return to the charge, while Smith's men in the intervals assisted at the drag- ropes ; and as often as Coffin repeated his attempts was he foiled and driven back with loss. But the enemy's infantry now coming up, Smith's men began fast to fall. He him- self was badly wounded, but neither his resolution nor
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even his cheerfulness flagged. His little party of forty-five men was now reduced to but fourteen, and some accident having caused them to deliver an irregular fire, Coffin suc- ceeded in forcing them, and every man was killed or taken. The artillery would now have been lost had not Colonel Washington appeared on the field, and, charging in, put an end to the contest.
Colonel Washington's appearance at this critical moment undoubtedly saved Greene the loss of his artillery ; and Greene, in his official report, gives him great credit, assert- ing that he had penetrated into the enemy's rear, found them flying, and made two hundred prisoners. But, strange tosay, it appears that these prisoners were all non-combatants, to secure or parole whom Washington not only lost the most precious time, but actually encumbered his own force. General Davie, who was with Greene at this time, thus describes his action : -
In turning the enemy's left Washington made a circuit so large as to bring him into the open commons between Log Town and Camden ; this space was filled with doctors, surgeons, quartermasters, commis- saries, wagon masters, waiters, and all the loose trumpery of an army who had pushed out to see the battle. The cavalry immediately charged this mixed multitude, and employed in taking, securing, and parolling a great number of these people those precious moments which would have brought them in actual contact with the second line of the enemy, either before it moved up to extend the front, or while this manœuvre was performing, and in either case the charge would have been decisive, and the battle would not have lasted fifteen minutes. But the charge was never made on the line of the enemy, the critical moment was lost, and in battles minutes are hours. The British officers acknowledged the unfortunate effect of the clemency of our cavalry in waiting to capture and parole prisoners when they should have cut them out of their way without stopping, and charged the rear of the British line. They were, in fact, so encumbered with prisoners they could do nothing." 1
1 Johnson's Life of Greene, vol. II, 83.
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The British accounts make still less of Colonel Wash- ington's movement in their rear. They restrict its results to the capture of a few stragglers and the parolling of some British officers who lay on the ground.1 Not only did Washington waste his time in parolling wounded officers and non-combatants, but he encumbered his cavalry by mounting these useless prisoners behind his troopers, thus exhausting his horses and rendering them, while thus doubly burdened, useless for further action. It was in this condition that he approached his own army upon his return, and had, of course, to lose further time while throw- ing off his prisoners before he could make the charge.
When Greene found his artillery, ammunition wagons, and other material safe from the enemy, he remained only long enough to collect his wounded as far as circumstances would permit, and ordered a retreat; upon which Lord Rawdon occupied the ground whereon the American army had been drawn up. He did not pursue far, and Greene, after retiring two or three miles, halted to recover his stragglers. Here he remained until afternoon, and, hav- ing refreshed his men, continued the retreat with his infantry and artillery as far as Sanders's Creek, about four miles from the field of battle and near the place of Gates's defeat in August before, and there he encamped.
Lord Rawdon did not pursue farther, but as Greene retired he also withdrew towards Camden, leaving Captain Coffin and some mounted men on the field of battle. This party Washington succeeded in drawing into an ambush, and cut to pieces or dispersed, and thereupon occupied the position where Greene had drawn up his army in the morn- ing, and thus, in a manner, the Americans remained in possession of the field.
1 Stedman's Am. War, vol. II, 358 ; Annual Register, vol. XXIV, 82 ; Tarleton's Campaigns, 464.
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The Americans lost in this action 19 killed, 113 wounded, and 136 missing, in all 268.1 The British lost 258, of which about 38 were killed.2 The loss to the Americans in officers was severe. Lieutenant-Colonel Ford's wound proved mortal, and, as has been seen, Captain Beatty was killed. The British lost no officers of prominence. One only was slain and 11 wounded. The respective losses on the two sides were thus as nearly equal as was the strength of the contending armies.
Great was Greene's disappointment at the result of this battle. He had confidently anticipated victory, and in this his officers appear to have joined, but upon what ground it is difficult to perceive. The opposing armies, as it has appeared, were almost of exact equality in numbers, and in material the British were in no wise inferior. The only advantage which Greene possessed was in his three pieces of artillery. In any event the issue of a struggle with so good a soldier as Lord Rawdon upon such equal terms must have been in doubt to the last. But Greene's con- fidence, and his singular want of respect for his adversary, led him to commit the great error of attempting to attack on all sides an enemy whose force was equal to his own. Thus it was that, in attempting to strike his opponent upon both flanks, he exposed his own wings to the very danger he designed for his opponent. As the wings under Camp- bell and Ford, on the right and left, in obedience to his order, wheeled towards the advancing British column, they themselves exposed their flanks to the prolongation of the British line made to meet them. So, too, Washington, in carrying out his order to make for the enemy's rear, was
1 Johnson's Life of Greene, vol. II, 85; Memoirs of the War of 1776, 339; Return of Col. Williams, Adjutant General ; Tarleton's Campaigns, 470. 2 Stedman's Am. War, 358; Annual Register, vol. XXIV, 83; Tarle- ton's Campaigns, 464.
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practically withdrawn from the battle, and his strength and energy wasted in a raid which had no effect upon its result.
But Greene was not convinced of his error by the prac- tical working out of his plan of battle in defeat. The loss of victory was due to some one else. There must be found a victim, and so Colonel Gunby was settled upon as the responsible author of the defeat. He was immediately called before a court of inquiry consisting of General Huger, Colonel Harrison, and Lieutenant-Colonel Wash- ington. The court found that Colonel Gunby's spirit and activity were unexceptionable, but that his order for the regiment to retire was extremely improper and unmilitary, and in all probability the only cause why they did not obtain a complete victory. Gunby, though thus personally exculpated from all but an error of judgment, was de- tached upon some employment in the rear of the army, and did not rejoin it.
Greene was greatly chagrined at the result of the battle. He was one of those commanders who can always persuade themselves that but for the untoward conduct of others, great victories would undoubtedly have been achieved. Of the battle of Guilford Court-house, he had written with the same confidence, " Had the North Carolina militia done their duty, the victory would have been certain and
easy." 1 So now he writes: "Gunby was the sole cause of the defeat. . . . We should have had Lord Rawdon and his whole command prisoners in three minutes if Colonel Gunby had not ordered his regiment to retire." 2 And again : "We have been twice beaten, the last time by the unfortunate order of Colonel Gunby, who ordered the First Maryland Regiment to retire when the enemy were fleeing before them and in confusion in all quarters.
1 Johnson's Life of Greene, vol. II, 24. 2 Ibid., 86-87.
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Victory was certain, and the fall of Camden as certain, as I had taken measures to cut off their retreat." 1
The result of the battle might have been much longer in doubt, and might have been decided very differently, had not the Marylanders failed at this critical moment. But it will be observed that Gunby's order was not the begin- ning of the difficulty. The trouble arose from one of those unaccountable panics which occasionally take possession of the best troops, and against which no precaution can be main- tained, and over which no leadership can prevail. Greene's line had been broken, not by Gunby, but by Captain Beatty's men upon his fall. Had Gunby taken a different course, the Marylanders might have been rallied and brought back to action. But they might not. And to assert that but for his mistake victory was certain was mere assumption. With quite as much reason may the defeat have been at- tributed to the course pursued by Washington on his raid into a deserted camp, instead of a charge upon the flanks of the fighting enemy; or, indeed, to Greene's own mis- management, by which in advancing his centre he covered his artillery so completely as to silence it, while, attempting to assail both flanks of the enemy, he exposed his own wings to a like danger.
It does not appear that there was any such break or confusion in the British ranks as Green supposed. The grape-shot from his field-pieces was very destructive to the enemy, but, so far from fleeing before it, it was their steady advance which so disconcerted the Marylanders.
Greene's chagrin was not confined to the loss of the battle by Gunby. He was disheartened and dissatisfied. To his friend, Governor Reed of Pennsylvania, he pours out his complaints. The nature of the war and the re- sources of the country appear, he writes, to be little known
1 Johnson's Life of Greene, vol. II, 87-89.
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to the northward. The strength and resources of these States to support the war had been greatly magnified and overrated, and those whose business and true interest it was to give a just statement of the situation had joined in the deception, and from a false principle of pride in having the country thought powerful had led people to believe it was so. It was true there were many inhabitants, but they were over a great extent of country and nearly equally divided between the king's interest and ours. The produce raised in it was difficult to collect from the extent of the country in the best of times, and it was utterly impossible to do so then, as all the horses and means of transportation were destroyed. The love of ease and want of zeal among the friends of the cause rendered their exertions very languid, and unless the Northern States could give more efficient support these States must fall; and what was worse, their fall would sap the foundations of the liberties of all the rest. The service in their quarter was so disagreeable to the Continental soldiers that many of them deserted and entered the British service. Camden, Ninety Six, and Augusta covered all the fertile parts of the States, and the enemy had laid waste the upper country in such a manner that an army could not subsist in the neighborhood of their posts; and this must secure them. Nothing but a superior army to the enemy's collective force could give relief to this distressed country, the miseries of which ex- ceeded all belief. He did not believe any people suffered greater calamities. The Whigs and Tories were butcher- ing each other hourly. The war here was on a very dif- ferent scale from what it was at the North. It was a plain business there. The geography of the country reduced its operations to two or three points. But here it was every- where. The country was so full of deep rivers and im- passable creeks and swamps that one was always liable to
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misfortunes of a capital nature. In collecting provisions and forage he was obliged to send the same guards and escorts as if the country was avowedly the enemy's.
He complained that Virginia, which had exerted herself the winter before when the enemy approached, had done nothing since. That North Carolina had done nothing at all until she saw that the enemy would not be allowed to possess the State quietly. Maryland had given no assist- ance to his army. Not a recruit had joined him from that State, and he was discharging his men daily upon the expiration of their terms of service. "You hear great things," he continues, " from Generals Marion and Sumpter. These are brave, good officers; but the people who are with them just come and go as they please. These par- ties rather seem to keep the dispute alive than lay a foundation for the recovery of the country. Don't be deceived in your expectations from this quarter ; if greater support cannot be given for the recovery of these States, they must and will remain in the hands of the enemy."
" The prospects here," he declared, " are so unpromising, and the difficulties so great, that I am almost sick of the service and wish myself out of the department. When I made this last movement I expected two thousand Virginia militia to operate with us and one thousand men with Sumpter ; 1 but both have failed and I am in the greatest distress. The tardiness of the people put it out of my power to attempt anything great. If our good ally the French cannot afford assistance to these Southern States, in my opinion there will be no opposition on this side of Virginia before the fall, and I expect the enemy will possess all the lower country of that State. The want of subsist- ence will prevent further operations in this country unless
1 In this, as it has appeared, he was mistaken. Sumter's estimate in- cluded Marion's men as well as his own.
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we can take post on the Congaree where provisions are to be had in great plenty." 1
Such was Greene's despondency and discontent. Yet Sumter and Marion, whose achievements he so belittled as to declare that they rather served to keep alive the dispute than lay a foundation for the recovery of the country, had already in the judgment of Lord Cornwallis and Lord Raw- don rendered necessary the abandonment of Camden, and it was Greene's coming only which had postponed its evacua- tion. Lord Rawdon had the earl's instructions to retire within the cover of the Santee, which had only been delayed by Greene's approach.2 If the French could not afford assistance, it was Greene's opinion that before the fall there would be no opposition this side of Virginia. The French did come to the assistance of Virginia; but before their arrival there South Carolina had been recovered, and the British confined to the neighborhood of Charlestown. What part Sumter, Marion, and Pickens had in the accom- plishment of this great result has already appeared, and will still further appear in the sequel. It is sufficient now to observe that Greene failed to appreciate that the geography and topography of the country of which he complained was much more disadvantageous to the enemy than to the Americans. Its deep rivers and impassable swamps were so many natural defences against the invaders. Marion understood this, and, availing himself of these fastnesses, became a terror to the enemy. Greene had no taste nor talent for this kind of warfare. He was for a grand army and open country, in which he might apply the stock of military knowledge which he had acquired, as his biographer tells, at Boston in the commencement of the Revolution.
Lord Rawdon had achieved a decisive victory over Greene
1 Johnson's Life of Greene, vol. II, 87-89.
2 Tarleton's Campaigns, 461, 462.
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and his Continental troops, but the work of the Carolina partisan bands, while Greene was in North Carolina, was not undone. The spirit of the whole people was aroused, especially in the Low-Country, which had been stunned by the blow of the fall of Charlestown and the following disasters ; armed parties of patriots were everywhere scour- ing the country. The British were not deceived by Lord Rawdon's victory ; they yet fully recognized the gravity of their situation. Colonel Balfour, writing to Sir Henry Clinton, giving him an account of that success, thus closes his letter : 1-
"But notwithstanding this brilliant success, I must inform your Excellency that the general state of the country is most distressing, that the enemy's parties are everywhere, the communication by land with Savannah no longer exists. Colonel Brown is invested at Augusta, and Colonel Cruger in the most critical situation at Ninety Six, nearly confined to his works and without any present command over that country. Indeed, I should betray the duty I owe your Excellency, did I not represent the defection of this province so universal, that I know of no mode short of depopulation to retain it.
" This spirit of revolt is in some measure kept up by the many officers prisoners of war here, and I should therefore think it advisable to remove them, as well as to make the most striking examples of such as, having taken protection, snatch every occasion to rise in arms against us."
This was the work of Sumter and Marion, as the Brit- ish recognized it; but which, in Greene's opinion, served only to keep alive the dispute, rather than lay any foun- dation for the recovery of the country.
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