Shenandoah Valley Pioneers and Their Descendants: A History of Frederick County, Virginia., Part 56

Author: Cartmell, T. K. (Thomas Kemp), 1838-1920
Publication date: 1909
Publisher: [Winchester, Va.] : [Printed by the Eddy Press Corp.]
Number of Pages: 607


USA > Virginia > Frederick County > Frederick County > Shenandoah Valley Pioneers and Their Descendants: A History of Frederick County, Virginia. > Part 56


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thousands of prisoners captured before they could reach Centreville. The routed army would in itself have swept McDowell from his base; and the Confederates would not only have gained an easy victory, but could have pursued the en- emy far out on the road to Washington. As it was, McDowell and the two Confederate gen- erals were unprepared for the unexpected situ- ation viewed by them at 4 P. M., brought about by heroic efforts of the Confederate brigade under the leadership of Jackson, Bee, Bartow and others. The two heroes of Manassas, Bee and Bartow, had just been killed, as Bonham appeared on Jackson's right; and Kirby Smith and his splendid brigade, arrived from the Val- ley, was coming up in fine order. This brigade was thrown against the right wing of the ad- vancing Federals. Before this brigade reached their position, the Federals had gained the crest of the hills, driving back every Confederate posi- tion except Jackson's, whose brigade was screened from view as they lay flat on their faces. They had not fired a gun, excepting what had been delivered by the 33rd. The moment had come for victory or rout. Jackson about 3 o'clock, approached the center of his line, where the 2nd and 4th Va. lay waiting, and coolly but firmly gave them this order "Reserve your fire until they come within fifty yards; then fire and give them the' bayonet; and when you charge, yell like furies." The long line of Vir- ginians who had virtually been inactive for three hours under the hot rays of the July sun, with bursting shells falling around their strained posi- tion, was ready for any service that would re- lieve them of this terrible discipline. They had not long to wait, for the Federal infantry and artillery swept all from their approaches to the crest. The first brigade arose as one man, and poured a volley of destruction into the Federal line then within forty yards of their line, which broke the center and produced such confusion, that they were caught unawares by the gleam of bayonets and Rebel yells. For the first time the elated Federals felt the terror of the bayonet; and demoralized by the shouts heard above the sound of musketry, the hitherto victorious lines gave way, never to reform on that field during the day. Up to that time, they had things their own way by good fighting and overwhelming numbers; but now with their centre broken, Bonham hammering their left flank, and Kirby Smith falling upon their right with about 2,000 fresh men, nothing short of defeat awaited them. No Confederate dreamed it would end in a rout. Genl. Kirby Smith being wounded on the firing line, when victory was in sight, was a severe blow, but Col. Elzey, the ranking Colo- nel, assumed command and executed Smith's de-


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sign. At this juncture, the broken regiments composing the commands of Evans, Bee and Hampton, formed on Jackson's right. The whole Confederate line was then advanced by order of Beauregard, and the Federals were swept from the Henry Hill and over the slopes. The rout was well on, when the division that had been ly- ing inactive about Centreville, came sweeping in to take part in a battle now lost. McDowell has been severely criticized by experienced offi- cers for his inability to grasp the situation. Genl. Howard at the head of a fresh brigade, met the routed army, and fought his men well; but they soon became demoralized by stories told them by retreating comrades, of how the Rebels had fought with bayonet, and nothing could stay them now. Howard gave way; a new position was secured, and other reinforcements under McDowell formed on a small creek, with a battalion of regulars in the centre. While they were forming, Jubal Early came up with a fresh brigade and struck their right flank a terrific blow. Beauregard left Jackson to hold the com- manding hill positions, with what he could col- lect from his scattered battalions, and together with captured artillery, to await orders; while he galloped over the Mathews hill in time to see the Federals give way in disorder, ending in a rout. The regular soldiers have been given credit by survivors of both armies, for their splendid order of retreat. When the retreat- ing army was full under way towards Centre- ville, Stuart and his cavalry were sent to har- rass their rear, with Early's brigade for support. The main body of fugitives rushed their own lines that were crossing Stone Bridge in great disorder, and swept on towards Sudley, where they were overtaken by the cavalry, which before 6 P. M. had more prisoners than they could guard; while Early's infantry followed in their wake, gathering up thousands of muskets and other accoutrements the "Yankees" had thrown away. Back on the Confederate battle line, the Confederate banners were hoisted in evidence of their victory. Waiting in fairly good order were the surviving brigadiers, with remnants of their brigades, expecting every moment orders from Johnston or someone, to follow the retreating foe, that had now become a confused mass of infantry, artillery, cavalry, wagon trains, ambu- lances and everything possessed by the splen- did army that had maintained its claim for pres- tige full eight hours. While in this disorder and confusion, what was the victorious army doing! Surely, none can say it was demoralized and in confusion. It is true many wounded men and stragglers were wandering over the plateau, seeking help; but the lines were intact by 4 P. M. Official reports show this; and they also


show in part why that line waited until 6 P. M. for orders to move. The dead and wounded of both armies lay on the field all around, and men were maddened beyond endurance. Surely the fighting lines were not expected to break ranks and perform field hospital service. This had been already amply provided for by the medical corps. It was simply impossible to restrain men from individual effort to find missing comrades and friends; and this caused the scene witnessed by President Davis when he arrived at Man- assas that afternoon. He was overcome with the impression that the Confederates had been routed. It has been frequently asked why John- ston and Beauregard did not pursue the retreat- ing army and reap such results as the demoli- tion of Mr. Lincoln's first army and the capture of Washington. This has been answered with some claim for sufficient reasons,-that pursuit would have ended in disaster. Thousands, how- ever, know now and so express themselves, that the Southern leaders there committed their first great war blunder. Genl. Johnston and Beaure- gard endeavored for many years to shift the re- sponsibility to the shoulders of President Davis; but careful study of the correspondence and official papers, prove that Davis offered no re- straint, and they were free to close the day ac- cording to their own plans, and were not ham- pered by Genl. Lee or the President. Students of this military question never hesitate to hold these two generals solely responsible for the in- activity of the victorious Confederates. We have evidence that the brigade commanders not only advised but urged pursuit; and pointed to the fresh troops of Longstreet and D. R. Jones, who had wasted the entire day as already shown, within three miles of Centreville. Longstreet in his "Manassas to Appomattox," makes it clear that he was crossing Bull Run at Blackburns ford all day, and never saw the time when he could use a platoon of soldiers to any good pur- pose. The battle was over when Mr. Davis ap- peared on the field; but seeing so many strag- glers, he made himself known and urged them to rally and follow him to the front, and en- deavor to save the day. Genl. Jackson was at that time undergoing treatment for a wound in his hand; and not understanding the President's language, asked his surgeon Dr. Hunter McGuire, for an explanation. When he understood Mr. Davis' fears, Jackson cried out "We have whipped them; they ran like sheep. Give me 5,000 fresh men and I will be in Washington City tomorrow morning." Subsequent events proved that Jackson could have gained fresh laurels that day, had the two commanders showed a like spirit of venture. Here was the man and here the hour. The "fresh men" were at


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hand; and the fleeing army could never make a report as the story of some excited men who successful stand. The Federals were fully con- mistook our force for that of the enemy." Some minor movements were made the next day, which resulted in capturing a score or two of stragglers. Genl. Johnston declined to advance on Washington, and gave his attention to the care of wounded and dead men, and as he says, "reorganized his army." The Confederate Army received a greater shock for the failure to fol- low up their victory, than from the shock of battle; and the morale of the entire command suffered from inactivity. While they loved their leaders, and tried to feel they knew best, they chafed under the situation. Their losses had been severe in killed and wounded,-about equal to that of the Federals- vinced that superior numbers had met and over- whelmed them with defeat; and they were has- tening on to tell the Washington government of their disaster and that the capital was in danger. The pursuing columns could have oc- cupied Arlington Heights by Noon of the 22nd; and from this point, so shelled the city, that evacuation must have come within twelve hours. Writers on this situation who were in Wash- ington during those days, have asserted that Confederate Cavalry could have ridden through the streets of the capital any time during that week unmolested. The place had not been fully fortified; and these few positions were not manned by men who would likely be in the way Federal killed .... 460; wounded. . 1,124 Confederates killed 387; wounded. . 1,582 of a victorious army. This is no reckless state- ment. McClellan says in his narrative of the The Confederates captured 1,560 prisoners, 26 cannon and their equipment in caissons, and many artillery horses, many battle flags, nearly 4,000 rifles, muskets, large quantities of ammunition, and much needed hospital stores, wagons, am- bulances, etc. The wagon trains were never in reach of the Confederates during the day, and McDowell sent them towards Washington. Hun- dreds of them broke down in the rout and were burned. first battle and the situation at the capital when he succeeded McDowell, says: "When I ar- rived in Washington July 26th and rode around the city, I found no preparations whatever for defense, not even to putting troops in military positions. Not a single avenue of approach guarded. All was chaos, and the streets, hotels and barrooms were filled with drunken officers and men, absent from the regiments without leave. *


* * There was really nothing to prevent a small cavalry force from riding into the city *


* If these cessionists attached any value to the possession of Wash- ington, they committed their greatest error in not following up the victory of Bull Run."


It must not be supposed that the army of con- quering Confederates laid down on the field they had won with heavy loss, and there gloated over their spoils. Longstreet gives an account of what his division did after 7 o'clock the night after the battle, and how he was cautioned not to bring on another battle. Beyond Centreville he dislodged the division that was covering the retreat; and then he was called off; while Kem- per, Kershaw and Elzey out in the vicinity of Bulls ford, Stone Bridge and Sudley Springs, were pressing the fugitives and capturing scores of them, they were called off and received orders through Col. Ferguson, member of Beaure- gard's staff, for all the Confederates to retire to the South side of Bull Run. Col. E. P. Alexander Chief of Signal Service during the battle, and afterwards Chief of Artillery in Long- street's Corps, says in his "Military Memoirs," P. 49, "That he was present when these orders were given at 7 P. M., and demanded the rea- sons, and the answer was that Beauregard and Johnston had been informed that a force of the enemy had been seen South of Bull Run in rear of our flank, and both staff officers regarded the


The Stonewall Brigade suffered most of all. Out of its 3,000 officers and men, 488 were killed or wounded. We could name a number of the Valley men who were found on the battle field, but will mention only a few at this time, hoping to give a complete list later on: Capt. Wm. L. Clark, of the Winchester Rifles, fell with a wound that affected him for nearly 40 years thereafter; Col. L. T. Moore, likewise, with his limping gait; while Isaac Glaize, Young Powell, Gilbert, Streit, Barton and others of Winches- ter were killed. Peyton Harrison and the Con- rad brothers of Martinsburg were among the slain. The old Valley began to feel the distress of war; and the sorrowful homes could be num- bered then, when every heart had sympathy and concern for the first losses. But as times went on and battles more numerous, the days came when the muster roll had to be examined to know who had fallen, and thus learn of other broken home-circles.


The 7th Va. Cavalry, Col. A. W. McDonald, commanding, arrived too late to take part in the Manassas campaign. Col. McDonald and his regiment were sent to Staunton to reconnoitre the Western Virginia thoroughfares leading into Staunton, and report if any demonstrations were made from the mountain regions. The McDowell failure caused all Federal lines to be contracted along the Virginia border. The 7th Cavalry was again sent to Romney, to keep in touch


4


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with the B. & O. Railroad. Ashby, with several companies, was sent to Charlestown, Jeff. Coun- ty. Patterson had disappeared from Virginia along with McDowell. During the month of August, both armies were disposed to cease active operations. New levies were added to both, and divisions were formed into corps. Drill and discipline were practiced. Army sup- plies, wagon trains, etc., increased the appear- ance of war at every point. The militia under Genl. James H. Carson, had become very effi- cient as the home guard of the Lower Valley, with McDonald and Ashby out on the border.


September brought out from their retreats on the North side of the Potomac, numerous Fed- eral expeditions, and caused some interest at Harpers Ferry and Romney. Ashby with Bay- lor's and Henderson's companies of Cavalry and about 500 militia, met Genl. Geary at the former place; and McDonald with his companies of cavalry and several hundred militia, held a Fed- eral force back from Romney for two days. They finally compelled McDonald to retire. Fed- erals entered the town, but were driven out the next day, after the Virginians learned that the surrounding country was being pillaged by the invaders. A desperate charge was made by the cavalry, supported by the Hampshire militia un- der Cols. E. H. McDonald and Alex. Monroe. The Federals were driven out and pursued to New Creek station on the B. & O. Railroad, losing many of their men and horses. No further effort was made by the Federals to retake Romney un- til the latter part of October. During the inter- val, the Confederates frequently appeared along the B. &. O Railroad, taking observations as to the use of the railroad for transportation for troops, etc. Much valuable information was thus obtained, and the Richmond government fully apprised of the concentration of troops to points on the Lower Potomac. The Federals saw the necessity for their occupation of so strategic a point as the South Branch Valley; and deter- mined to renew their efforts. On the 26th Oc- tober, the lower end of the little Valley was occupied, but they made no effort to retake Rom- ney; but their position protected the railroad for about 50 miles. On the 24th of November, Genl. Kelly marched into Romney with a large force. Col. McDonald met them at Mechanicsburg Gap, but was driven back to Romney, where he made a gallant stand. Major O. R. Funsten was left at the Bridge over the river with one piece of the "Flying Artillery." When the enemy ap- peared at the West end of the bridge, Maj. Funsten opened fire into the advancing column, killing horses and men, producing wild confu- sion. Federal cavalry found a ford, and sud- denly struck the weak flank of the daring Con-


federates, who were forced to retire to Ceme- tery Hill, then occupied by McDonald, who with one rifled gun was delivering a telling fire in the ranks of the Federal column as they crossed the bridge. Col. McDonald allowed his com- mand to be placed at great disadvantage. The wagon trains were East of the town, with a long mountain road before them, while the mili- tia and cavalry were unequal to the strength of Kelly's force and unable to take care of them- selves, much less protect the wagons. It is need- less to say that a rout ensued; the men were scattered everywhere. McDonald and Funsten barely escaped capture, and abandoned every- thing. Every wagon was captured, also the two guns that had been the pride of the old Ashby Command. Several company officers made an ineffectual attempt at Blue's Gap to rally the fugitives who were freely alarmed, and reck- lessly fled to Winchester. This portion of the 7th Virginia cavalry never heard the last of the Romney defeat during the War.


Col. McDonald at his own request, was re- lieved from command of the Seventh, and later on was made Commandant of the Post at Win- chester. The writer was provost marshal dur- ing his incumbency, and takes pleasure in tes- tifying to his efficiency respecting his new office. This office he filled with satisfaction to Genl. Jackson, and to every faithful officer with whom he had official relations. The Colonel was a strict disciplinarian; and if his age and health had not interfered with his active service, doubtless the Confederacy would have felt the effect of his military genius, undaunted courage and spotless integrity. He was a graduate of West Point, but spent the most of his 62 years a private citizen in the Virginia Valley, and was unfitted for the hardships of field service. Turner Ashby was promoted to Colonel of the Seventh. Many of the young men had been clamoring for this promotion; they regarded Ashby as the brilliant flower in all the collec- tion of Virginia chivalry. He possessed in his person every attribute of the ideal cavalryman- Young, handsome, brave and athletic, with per- fect health and a burning desire to avenge the wrongs of his native State. No wonder, then, that men rejoiced when general orders were read, announcing him as their leader. He estab- lished his headquarters near Charlestown. The Western part of Hampshire had been abandoned to the Federals. The Confederate line extend- ed from Bath (Berkeley Springs) to Harpers Ferry. This was guarded by the Ashby Cavalry. The Valley Cavalry was thus distinguished until his death in 1862; and many old cavalrymen at this writing will tell you they "belonged to Ash- by's Cavalry."


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Ashby felt the need of light artillery, and ef- forts were made to organize a battery company. Thirty-three men so organized, received author- ity Nov. 11, 1861, to elect officers. R. P. Chew was elected Captain; Milton Rouss, Ist Lieut .; J. W. McCarty and James Thompson, Second Lieuts. They were furnished with three guns; the men, their own saddle horses; and as the Mounted Artillery-often called the "Flying" Ar- tillery, the celebrated Chew's Battery was thus started, developing the larger battery as the War progressed. We may add here that Capt. Chew was given command of Stuart's Horse Artillery in 1864; and the world was astonished at the destruction they wrought until their guns were surrendered at Appomattox. Of course, old ar- tillerymen know that this battery saw its first service in the Valley with Ashby, and protected Jackson's rear as he fell back from Winchester, and was at the front when he returned. We could relate many noble deeds if space allowed. It was during the Summer and Autumn of 1861 that Harvey L. Bitzer and several other Fred- erick County men were given authority to re- cruit a company from the militia regiments, to serve as scouts and messengers. Bitzer was elected Captain. The company was ready for service when Genl. Jackson assumed command of the Valley District the same Autumn; and for


several months rendered efficient service. The company was disbanded when authority was given by the Confederate government for the organization of a company from the Lower Val- ley to serve at Genl. Lee's Headquarters as "scouts, guides and couriers." This 'being done, A. P. Pifer was elected Captain. This was known as Company A. of the 39th Batt., com- manded by Col. Richardson. This branch of the service was very important to Genl. Lee. Every section of the border was represented, and the battalion could furnish competent guides and couriers on all occasions. Genl. Lee took great pleasure in mingling with several of the com- panies, and always looked after their comfort. Indeed, the "Scouts, Guides and Couriers" were a favored lot, as other soldiers would frequently say; but on the battle fields as they were seen speeding with orders to corps commanders through shot and shell, many would ask, how can those fellows escape? The following named men were from Frederick County: Capt. Pifer, Joshua S. Lupton and his two brothers Jno. R. and Thomas, R. M. Cartmell, Granville Harper, Charles Forsythe, Jno. C. Lupton and brother J. Frank Lupton, B. C. Campbell, Robert M. Campbell, Frank Lupton, J. E. Baker, G. Wash. Pifer, Charles Houck, Chas. I. Sloat.


.


CHAPTER LVI


Jackson at Winchester, Bath Campaign, Jackson and Loring


The Autumn found the Confederate Army around Centreville enjoying the same passive and monotonous life that August and Septem- ber brought. Malaria was in the air; and scores of soldiers sank under its insidious invasion- worse even than that of the enemy. In the lat- ter case, the dull camp life would have been broken, and men could have thrown off their lethargy. They had spent nearly three months in idleness. Though the routine of camp life embraced drill and dress parade, this was not the kind of life the men longed for. An epidemic of measles appeared in the camps, sending hun- dreds of men to the hospital. Johnston was or- ganizing his army into divisions, and preparing for the enemy. Jackson was rigid in the drill service for his brigade, and it was thoroughly equipped for duty. The new camps around Man- assas Junction by the first of October, betokened plainly nothing but quiet camp life. Mr. Davis paid another visit to Genl. Johnston about this date; and then discussed the plans for this army of 40,000 men to adopt. When he discovered so much sickness and furloughs, he expressed himself freely. Johnston wanted at least 15,000 men; and assured the President that if he could furnish this number, he would cross the Poto- mac and conduct a campaign in Maryland. The president said he was not averse to such a move- ment, but that he had neither troops nor arms to offer; and besides the enemy had been given too long time to recruit their wasted forces; "and that the army at Manassas was not able now to make an invasion, if it was not able to follow McDowell on the 22nd of July and cross the Potomac on the heels of a routed army." One of Mr. Davis' biographers, in speaking of this incident, says Mr. Davis told him that Genls. Johnston and Beauregard were offended at his language. It is useless to say the invasion scheme was abandoned. McClel- lan was then in command of the Federal Army ; and he, too, seemed content to let the Rebels rest, while he completed his organizations. One of his division commanders asks this pertinent question in a narrative he wrote about the war: "When did McClellan complete his organiza- tion?" About the middle of October, Mcclellan began to feel the pressure from Washington for him to do something. He avoided anything like


a general engagement ; but October 19th, he sent Genl. Baker with about 3,000 men to see what the Confederates were doing at Leesburg under Genl. Evans. (Hero of the Stone Bridge en- gagement.) This was reconsidered by McClel- lan, fearing it would alarm Evans and cause him to retire beyond his reach. So he ordered Genl. Stone who was stationed on the Mary- land side, to cross over and send out a strong reconnaissance toward Leesburg, hoping to en- trap Evans. (See Mcclellan's report of the Skirmish at Balls Bluff.) On the 20th, Stone was ordered by wire to cross the river at two points-Edwards Ferry and Balls Bluff, two miles apart. Genl. Evans with three regiments and several guns, gave his attention to the Edwards Ferry party, while the 18th Miss. watched the Balls Bluff detachment. They soon were engaged in battle, and drove the Federals back on their main force to the Bluff. There Genl. Baker threw his whole reserve force against the Mississippians. Evans hastened to their relief with the 8th Va. and 17th Miss. regiments, and a desperate fight ensued. Genl. Baker was killed and his entire force driven over the bluff. Many were drowned. The Federal loss reported by Mcclellan was, killed 49; wound- ed 158; missing 714 Total 921. The Confed- erate loss as reported by Evans was: killed 36; wounded 117; missing 2. Total 155. McClel- lan was denounced by the Northern press, while Evans and his little brigade received the plaudits of the South. In justice to Genl. McClellan, we will add that subsequent events proved that he instructed Genl. Baker to confine his move- ment to a reconnaissance of the enemy's posi- tion, and under no circumstances to bring on a general engagement.




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