USA > Virginia > Frederick County > Frederick County > Shenandoah Valley Pioneers and Their Descendants: A History of Frederick County, Virginia. > Part 63
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It must not be wondered that the Federals were so imperfectly supplied with good scouts, the most of them being of the class mentioned, and the remainder hirelings, to perform a service hazardous in the extreme. Consequently the Con- federates were able to move and change base without detection. Not so with General Lee and his generals. Every man was not only a hero but a patriot. Many of them had left home and fireside within the Federal lines; and when in- formation was desired, the Confederate general could entrust the mission to hundreds of such brave fellows, who took delight in flanking pick- ets, entering the enemy's lines, visiting the old home, and in many ways contriving to obtain information of inestimable value. They were
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trained soldiers; they had reason for being ac- curate in estimating numbers, for they well knew that 'ere many days they would be pitted against those bluecoats they were sizing up; and besides, they were experts as to what troops did on the eve of marching, and whether for marches or en- gagements, and the direction to be taken. The author made such surveys frequently. So, from such causes the two great armies stood strangely apart on the 28th of June, 1862. The Federals knew nothing definite. Here is Secy. Stanton's exact language found in the O. R. addressing McClellan : "As to numbers or position of Jack- son's force, we have no definite information. Within the last two days the evidence is strong that for some purpose the enemy is circulating rumors of Jackson's advance in various direc- tions, with a view to conceal the real point of attack. Neither McDowell nor Banks nor Fre- mont have any accurate knowledge of the sub- ject." What an admission of inefficiency! And this dispatch was received by McClelland after Jackson had been on his flank for 12 hours.
Not so with the Confederates. Genl. Lee knew every position, and went to battle on plans mark- ed out; and found the field notes correct. The battle opened on the 26th, and for the first time Jackson failed to occupy ground at the time he had himself fixed during the council, and con- sequently did not take the part contemplated in the Beaver Dam Station battle; and some critics have argued that Jackson was only obeying orders of his superior, and failed to take the same in- terest he would have done if it had been his independent campaign. This is unfair, for a careful study of the official orders of Lee and Jackson of this great battle, prove that the blow struck by Jackson on the 28th made greater ter- ror and came at a time when Mcclellan was un- prepared and had no time to change front, and was compelled to witness all his plans frustrated, his army defeated, and no hope for reinforce- ments within four days march from McDowell; and this he knew had passed beyond his control; for Stanton had informed him in the dispatch mentioned, which he received during the engage- ment, that a new army corps had been organized with Genl. Pope as commander. This would embrace the columns of McDowell, Fremont, Banks, etc.,-he to operate against the troublesome Valley Army under Jackson and Ewell, and henceforth Mcclellan would not have Jackson to reckon with. This seems absurd now, when we read of Jackson coming in on a bloody field of the 28th.
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To appreciate and understand in part this great battle, the famous orders of Genl. Lee re- lating to this battle, and issued as a result of
the council referred to, is copied from the official reports of the battle.
"Headquarters, Army of Northern Va.
June 24, 1862.
Genl. Orders No. 75.
I. Genl. Jackson's command will proceed to- morrow (June 25) from Ashland towards the Slash Church, and encamp at some convenient point west of the Central Railroad. Branch's Brigade of A. P. Hill's Division, will also, to- morrow evening, take position on the Chicka- hominy, near Half Sink. At three o'clock Thurs- day morning 26th, Genl. Jackson will advance on the road leading to Pole Green Church, com- municating his march to Genl. Branch, who will immediately cross the Chickahominy and take the road leading to Mechanicsville. As soon as the movements of these columns are discovered, Genl. A. P. Hill, with the rest of his Division, will cross the Chickahominy at Meadow Bridge and move direct upon Mechanicsville. To aid his advance the heavy batteries on the Chicka- hominy will at the proper time open upon the batteries at Mechanicsville. The enemy being driven from Mechanicsville and the passing of the bridge being opened, Genl. Longstreet with his divisions, and that of Genl. D. H. Hill, will cross the Chickahominy at or near that point; Genl. D. H. Hill moving to the support of Genl. Jackson, and Genl. Longstreet supporting Genl. A. P. Hill; the four divisions keeping in com- munication with each other and moving en éche- lon on separate roads if practicable; the left division in advance, with skirmishers and sharp- shooters extending in their front, will sweep down the Chickahominy, and endeavor to drive the enemy from his position above New Bridge, Genl. Jackson bearing well to the left, turning Beaver Dam Creek, and taking the direction towards Cold Harbor. They will then press forward towards the York River R. R., closing upon the enemy's rear, and forcing down the Chickahom- iny. An advance of the enemy towards Rich- mond will be prevented by vigorously following his rear and crippling and arresting his progress.
II. The divisions under Genls. Huger and Ma- gruder will hold their position in front of the enemy against attack and make such demonstra- tions, Thursday, as to discover his operations. Should opportunity offer, the feint will be con- verted into a real attack.
IV. Genl. Stuart with the Ist, 4th and 9th Va. Cavly. The Cavly. of Cobb Legion and the Jeff Davis Legion will cross the Chickahominy tomorrow (Wednesday 25th) and take position
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to the left of Genl. Jackson's line of march. The main body will be held in reserve with scout well extended to the front and left. Genl. Stuart will keep Genl. Jackson informed of the movements of the enemy on his left, and will * ** cooperate with him in his advance. *
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The foregoing is given to show Genl. Lee's plan of the great battle. If the reader will study this together with the official reports of Jack- son, the two Hills and Genl. Stuart, good rea- sons will appear why Jackson was not at his place at the appointed time. His supply train from Richmond failed to connect with him on the 25-6, and while thus unavoidably detained, Jackson was supplied with such information on the 26th as required material changes in his plan for attack. It is true A. P. Hill must have suf- fered without his support. Genl. Lee's ordert plainly indicate that Jackson must be regarded with peculiar privileges. He must determine without conference with Genl. Lee, what changes of position or attack would be desirable; and Genl. Jackson was to supply Lee with infor- mation, and to protect his flanks. Jackson had soon divined the intentions of the enemy in his front and flank. The official reports show that staff officers in filling up the general orders, committed blunders that Jackson soon discov- ered; and to extricate his army from tangled, marshy forests, turbid streams and damaged bridges, he was compelled to rely upon his own staff and the vigor of his guides to unravel the threads of his approach to the arena. Hill's struggle was desperate, his loss heavy; and if Jackson could have taken his position at the crucial moment, the Federals would have been driven from the field with great slaughter. But the impetuous Hill could not restrain his gallant spirit long enough to open communication with Jackson; so he plunged into what seemed to him an inviting field. The enemy changed base dur- ing the night, and at 5 A. M. June 27th, Jack- son had crossed Beaver Dam Creek, and ar- ranged to form a juncture with Longstreet, Old Cold Harbor being the objective point. Jack- son was compelled to abandon the direct route and take a more circuitous one, which caused several hours delay. The battle opened early in the day; and gradually the lines opened for attack for a great distance, covering ridges, swamps and boggy creeks, one of the latter run- ning from Cold Harbor near the McGehee house. Along this line was to be the battle to deter- mine the fate of the two leaders, Mcclellan and Lee. During the afternoon, when Genl. Lee was near the front to witness the concentrated charge of every available arm of his army-knowing that Jackson was striking at the same moment, and the fate of Richmond if not the Confederacy,
depended upon the result of this great struggle, he gave out the word-"The Valley men are here." Henderson says-"with the cry of Stone- wall Jackson for their slogan, the Southern army swept across ravine and morass into the galling fire of deadly batteries, which had turned their canister into the ranks of the rushing Southerners;" and the battle of Gaines Mill and Cold Harbor passed into history as a victory to the Confederates, but at what sacrifice! Official Reports show a loss of at least 8,000 officers and men, killed and wounded. The Federals left on the field 4,000 dead and wounded, and several thousand prisoners.
The Little Napoleon was compelled to change his base and act on the defensive, and to ur- gently call on Washington for more troops. He already had more men than he could use to ad- vantage. The next day Jackson received orders from Genl. Lee to make a forced march to the Long Bridge Road, by way of White Oak Swamp, and from his new position guard Lee's left flank from the enemy who would force the bridges and fords of the Chickahominy, and to hold positions on that road until further orders. Some have thought he should have joined Long- street and not wait "for further orders." It must be admitted that this was Genl. Lee's cam- paign. His was the master mind; and if a fail- ure to destroy Mcclellan's army occurred, the fault should not be laid at the door of his sub- ordinate who obeyed orders. The battle of Fray- ser's farm did not result as Mcclellan feared it would he was in better condition when he fell back on Malvern Hill July Ist, than he ex- pected, though his army left evidences along the line of march that the retreat resembled a rout. It is hard to understand how a young Napoleon with 95,000 men, could be routed and forced to abandon all his plans by an army of 75,000, many of whom were exhausted before the campaign opened; but it is not the writer's province to criticize this General, but to briefly follow Jack- son and his Valley army, and point out the en- gagements, leaving the study of the campaign to readers who may desire to know the features of the Seven Days battle around Richmond.
Jackson was at Malvern Hill, but his Valley army did not bear the brunt of the fearful day. D. H. Hill and Magruder's forces, about 30,000, suffered heavy losses in beating against the strong positions held by the best troops under Genl. Porter, that Mcclellan commanded to the front. The havoc in the Confederate ranks failed to hold Mcclellan to the field. The .morning re- vealed a fearful condition to the Confederates. Official reports from General Trimble of Genl. Ewell's Division, say-"I went off the next morn- ing to ask for orders, when I found the whole
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army in the utmost disorder-thousands of strag- gling men were asking every passerby for their regiments; ambulances, wagons and artillery ob- structing every road, and altogether in a drench- ing rain, presented a scene of the most woeful and distracting confusion." Here seemed Mc- Clellan's opportunity to rout Lee's army. But we find by the official reports that he left the field early in the day and rode away to Har- rison's Landing on the James, but wrote his famous letter to Washington before he left the field-"that his men were exhausted, and dreaded an attack from fresh troops under Stonewall Jackson." Continuing, he says: "I will retire to- night to Harrison's Landing under cover of the gunboats;" and begs for time, and reinforce- ments. "My men have proved themselves the equals of any troops in the world, but they are worn out." (See O. R., Vol. XI, part III, pp. 282, etc.) This proves an overwhelming defeat of the commander, whether his army had the same fear or not; and this, too, after such generals as Jackson, Magruder and D. H. Hill had re- coiled from their disastrous attack on Genl. Por- ter's strong position. Henderson, in his intense- ly interesting review of this campaign, presents the scene at Genl. Jackson's headquarters next morning : "The condition to which Mcclellan was reduced, seems to have been realized by Jackson. The crushing defeat of his own troops failed to disturb his judgment. Whilst the night still covered the battlefield, his divisional gen- erals came to report the condition of their men, and to receive instructions. 'Every representa- tion,' says Dabney, 'which they . made was gloomy.' At length after many details of losses and disasters, they concurred in declaring that McClellan would probably take the aggressive that day, and that the Confederate army was in no condition to resist him. Jackson had listened silently, save when he interposed a few brief questions to all their statements; but now he re- plied: No; he will clear out in the morning. Jackson was correct in his view; for when morn- ing fully dawned, Malvern Hill was found de- serted, but on the field were scores of surgeons at work among the wounded, and everywhere hundreds of dead Federals were lying uncared for. One of Mcclellan's generals, Hooker, gave as his evidence on the conduct of the War, (O. R. p. 580) "We retreated like a parcel of sheep, and a few shots from the enemy would have panic- stricken the whole command." A committee of Congress which took evidence on the conduct of the war, state that "Nothing but a heavy rain, thereby preventing the enemy from bringing up their artillery, saved the army from destruction."
Jackson, in the early morning, discovered after riding through the same rain to the front, the
apparent rout; ordered his staff to form three lines of battle and be prepared for an advance that Genl. Lee would certainly expect to order. But a council of war held at Genl. Jackson's headquarters (Willis's Church) on the 2nd of July-Genl. Lee, President Davis, Longstreet and others being present,-decided not to advance in force. Major Dabney writing to Col. Henderson on this feature, says: "Jackson favored vigorous action. He knew Mcclellan was retreating with a defeated and demoralized army, which could be virtually destroyed if pressed that day; but Mr. Davis opposed a general engagement lest the enemy would turn towards Richmond and ulti- mately defeat Lee. A compromise was effected, and the army allowed to advance on the 3rd, but this delay was disastrous." Dabney further states : "That the Valley army, crawling in rear of Longstreet, marched only three miles that day, and such sluggish progress put the climax to Jackson's discontent; and the morning of the 4th he exhibited much anger at the slow move- ment of his staff, and ordered the mess chest locked and put into the wagon. Thus the staff lost their breakfast and incurred the displeasure of their chief." The day was spent waiting, watching the enemy. No fierce fighting. Mc- Clellan had time to gain an impregnable posi- tion on heights, under cover of his gunboats. The next three days were spent in securing the spoils, arms, stores, etc., the Federals had left on their lines of retreat-52 guns and 35,000 rifles told the story of the plight of Mcclellan's host on the 2nd and 3rd; and shows that Jack- son's view of the situation was correct, and that someone erred when the advance was stayed. Students of the seven days campaign may con- clude for themselves where the blame should rest. On the 8th of July, Genl. Lee fell back to Richmond. McClelland had been frustrated in all his plans, but the Confederates suffered the heavy loss of 20,000 men, while the Federal loss was 16,000. (The student in his study of McClellan's report to his government, will be confused somewhat by his declarations, and may desire fuller explanation that he gives in O. R., Vol. XI, part III, pp. 299, etc. This will be found in Report of Congressional Com. on Con- duct of the War, pp. 27-580, etc.) It will be seen that reinforcements were drawn from every possible point to recruit Mcclellan. Lincoln called earnestly for 300,000 recruits; but all the States were disheartened, and regarded the man- agement of the war as a dismal failure; and Con- gress was urged to investigate. The country seemed on the verge of revolt. Regarding the Seven Days Battle from this standpoint, the Southern people arose in their might and pro- claimed Lee and Jackson invincible; and although
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thousands of her bravest had gone down in woeful carnage, and sorrow was in every home, yet the verdict was : a glorious victory, and Rich- mond safe. The grand armies of the North, combining the reinforcements with the original 95,000, presented to the world an armed host numbering full 150,000 (See O. R.) to stem the invasion threatened by Lee. What a spectacle! And this at a time when Lee with his depleted 75,000 should have been overwhelmed by this mighty host.
Major Dabney in his careful study of the situation after the battles, says that Genl. Jack- son advised an advance at once of the Valley Army towards the Northern border, to invade the enemy's country, expressing as his opinion that Mcclellan was beaten and had no intention to move on Richmond. This view he presented to Mr. A. R. Boteler, member of congress from the Valley District, "and insisted that the horrors of war should be transferred across the border -- throw 60,000 men into Maryland, and it was the only way to bring the North to its senses and end the war;" and added he was not seeking leader- ship, but would follow Lee or anyone who would fight." Mr. B. asked, why do you not urge your views on Genl. Lee? I have done so, replied Jackson. And what does he say to them? "He says nothing," was the answer. "But do not understand that I complain of this silence; it is proper that Genl. Lee should observe it. He is wise and prudent. He feels that he bears the responsibility, and he is right in declining a hasty expression of his purpose to a subordinant like me."
It is apparent that Jackson's suggestions were considered by either Davis or Lee, for we find in O. R., C. S. A., that Jackson received an order July 13th to march westward; and we find him at Gordonsville on the 16th, where he found Pope's Cavalry near that point in large numbers. The Valley Army now 11,000 to check Pope and his Army of Virginia with 47,000, com- posed of Fremont's command, now Seigel's, 13,000; Banks 11,000; McDowell's 18,000, and Bayard's and Buford's Cavalry 5,000 (O. R., Vol. XI, part III, p. 334, etc.) This was an army of veterans, with leaders well known to Jack- son, all commanded by the braggart Pope. These columns or corps, were dispersed over a long line from Sperryville near the Blue Ridge to Fredericksburg. Here was another field for old Stonewall and his strategy. McClellan in his correspondence with Washington (O. R., Vol. XI, Part III) discloses his ignorance of Lee's strength; for he says, "we believe that Jackson has started towards the Valley with 60,000 to 80,000 troops." Strange he did not move on Lee and crush him. He calls for 30,000
reinforcements, to enable him to move on Rich- mond. Jackson's plans were submitted to Genl. Lee; and were promptly approved. (See his let- ter of July 27, among army files.) A. P. Hill and the 2nd Louisiana Brigade sent as reinforce- ments, arrived at Gordonsville, and all remained for several days, making full preparations for the celebrated battle that was imminent; for Pope's order, with Headquarters in the Saddle, was so famous, that the whole section was familiar with his boastful intentions. To preserve it for con- venient reference, it is given here in full as taken from O. R., Vol. XII, part III, pp. 474, etc.)
"I have come to you" addressing his soldiers, "from the West, where we have always seen the backs of our enemies-from an army whose busi- ness it has been to seek the adversary, and beat him when found, whose policy has been attack and not defense * * * I presume that I have been called here to pursue the same sys- tem, and to lead you against the enemy. It is my purpose to do so, and that speedily. Mean- time I desire you to dismiss from your minds certain phrases, which I am sorry to find in vogue amongst you. I hear constantly of tak- ing strong positions and holding them-of lines of retreat and of bases of supplies. Let us discard such ideas * *
* Let us study the probable line of retreat of our opponents, and leave our own to take care of ourselves. Let us look before and not behind. Success and glory are in advance. Disaster and shame lurk in the rear."
Jackson was well supplied with such infor- mation, and was studying the braggart's weak places. Pope had ordered his corps commanders to subsist on the country; and he has the credit of being the first Federal commander to issue such an order, which meant devastation of every vestige of food supply. Many battalions of his army had in other sections, without orders, pil- laged the country on their marches. The help- less home people were enraged at this brutal warfare, and vied with each other in conveying to Jackson and his brave men, intelligence of the atrocities. And thus the Valley Army became aroused to strike a telling blow. Jackson through the same source, knew every movement of the enemy, as well as of the hellish acts of his soldiery; and has left on record evidences of his determination to annihilate such foes, or be ex- tinguished forever from war's arena. Pope and his mode of warfare, was a new feature on the Virginia border. A bristling activity in his cav- alry betokened activity in the grand army, mass- ing for the complete overthrow of Jackson. This genius of war and adept in strategy, realized that no ordinary antagonist was in his front; and besides he knew that many thousands in
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the divisions preparing to engage him, were no longer raw recruits, but were seasoned soldiers, and had given evidence in the Valley campaign of being foemen worthy of respect, when on the battle line led by competent leaders. Jackson could not conceal his movements as readily as was his wont. The Federal cavalry had become a power, under the leadership of Bayard of the Valley Campaigns, an officer of rare ability, aided by the veteran Genl. Buford. They had trained their cavalry for the last three months to be- come bolder; and they were soon discovered near Gordonsville, watching Jackson. While his cavalry was alert, they were unable to pene- trate the neutral ground far enough to obtain much information regarding the main army. Genl. Stuart finally made a dash towards Fred- ericksburg, and learned enough to cause Jack- son to shift positions; and this induced Pope to make a dash, under the impression that Jack- son was retreating. But the famous strategist was preparing for his greatest achievement.
All the old Valley combinations, joined by McDowell and commanded by the hitherto in- vincible Pope, pitted against him an army of about 50,000, supplied with munitions of war truly appalling. Against this serried host, were opposed about 24,000 worn-out men, with limited munitions, and other supplies. The scene was one stupendous array of men and steel. Army trains were on every road leading towards Cul- peper C. H., led by great columns-Banks sweep- ing down from Sperryville-Part of McDowell's fine corps heading for the same point; while two other columns were coming from Warrenton and Falmouth. This was Jackson's supreme hour. He determined to take them in detail, as usual. The Old Stonewall Division, under Genl. Win- der, 3,000; Ewell, 7,550; A. P. Hill, with his flying division of 12,000; and Stuart, 12,000 cav- alry. Every command had lost heavily in the terrific struggles; and the depletion of their ranks was perceptible. Brigades had dwindled to small regiments; and as the eye ran along their lines, many famous leaders were missing. But the same old spirit shone out from every squadron; and their General knew he had the men near him to undertake the great work. Washington hoped that Genl. Pope would strike a telling blow; and at his suggestion, a large force of 11,000 men under Genl. Cox, was ordered to march across country from Lewisburg (a point S. W. from Staunton) and threaten Jack- son's flank and rear. Jackson knew this; and Genl. Lee informed him that Mcclellan was pre- paring for, another move on Richmond, and the hour had come for their old tactics of strategy. And as Jackson and his tried soldiery once more breathed the pure mountain air and drank from
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