Shenandoah Valley Pioneers and Their Descendants: A History of Frederick County, Virginia., Part 59

Author: Cartmell, T. K. (Thomas Kemp), 1838-1920
Publication date: 1909
Publisher: [Winchester, Va.] : [Printed by the Eddy Press Corp.]
Number of Pages: 607


USA > Virginia > Frederick County > Frederick County > Shenandoah Valley Pioneers and Their Descendants: A History of Frederick County, Virginia. > Part 59


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stay further movement up the Valley. Jackson was in the vicinity of Mt. Jackson, and deter- mined that his vantage ground justified another engagement with the Federal force now under the personal command of Banks. The latter in his letters to Washington, began to show anxiety about his position; and instead of driving Jack- son out of the Valley as Mcclellan ordered him to do, he began to write about the Luray Valley affording a way of flank movements, that might annoy his communications. He also discovered that roads found their way through the Blue Ridge, and that over these, reinforcements might come to Jackson. Thus he whined until the 17th of April, when he put his army in motion. By a flank movement, his cavalry took possession of New Market and captured one of the new companies that had reported to Ashby, whose force had now swelled to about 2,000. This for- ward movement of Banks', was the most serious of any yet made, so far as the Confederate ar- mies of the Valley and Ewell's army East of the Ridge, were concerned. Their communication was in danger. Jackson taking in the situation, acted promptly to secure the pass through the Blue Ridge known as Swift Run Gap. But to do this, he must go to the Luray valley; and the only way was to take a long march by fall- ing back to Harrisonburg, and there swing around to the South end of the Massanutton Mountain. This required a forced march, in order to reach the desired point in the Elkton Valley before Banks' detachment could secure the pass. On the 18th, the army was in rapid march to ac- complish this object, and we find him at a point 5 miles East of Harrisonburg in the evening, having made 31 miles. The next morning, the 19th, he crossed over the mountain road leading to Conrad's store on the East side of South River, which he crossed on a bridge that he strongly fortified; then moved further East and took possession of the Swift Run Gap pass, camping on the Elk Run. Banks was not idle. He sent detachments over the Massanutton from New Market to Luray; and there found the Con- federates in the act of destroying two bridges. They were driven off, and the bridges secured by a strong guard. Banks had gone to Harri- sonburg, discovering that Jackson had flown. But the cautious General began to take in the situation. Jackson was then on his left flank, where he might secure reinforcements from Ewell and recross the mountain in his rear, cut his retreat, and endanger his army equipment. Should he move on to Staunton, with the hope of a juncture with Fremont who was pressing Genl. Edw. Johnson somewhere West of Staunton? Nothing lay between his lines and Staunton. But advices from Washington gave him excuse for


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not moving further South; and in no sense was he to rely on Fremont joining him at Staunton. (O. R., Vol. XII, p. 104.) Also the latter was not to rely on Banks, as he might be recalled to a base nearer the Lower Valley. Jackson was not content with the simple check given to Banks, by his appearance on his flank; and was corres- ponding with Genl. Johnston in reference to one of his plans to produce marvelous changes in the Valley. But Johnston disapproved of any movement that would prevent his immediate re- inforcement of Ewell, ostensibly reinforcing the former. At this critical juncture, Genl. Lee was assigned control of all armies in Virginia; and he wrote Jackson on the 21st April a very con- fidential and agreeable letter-"I have no doubt that an attempt will be made to occupy Fred- ericksburg and use it as a base of operations against Richmond. Our present force there is very small (2,500 men under Genl. Field), and cannot be reinforced except by weakening other corps. If you can use Genl. Ewell's division in an attack on Banks, it will prove a great re- lief to the pressure on Fredericksburg." (O. R., Vol. XII, part iii, p. 859.) This was the plan that Jackson had vaguely submitted to Johnston, which the latter declined. Jackson and Ewell had been in correspondence on this plan, and both were prepared, had Johnston permitted them, to unite. Jackson upon receipt of Genl. Lee's let- ter, hastened to apprise Ewell and have him pre- pared for any emergency. Jackson wrote Lee on the 23rd more fully of his plans; and sug- gested that Ewell remain quiet a few days, so as to be used by Lee if necessary. On April 25th, Genl. Lee wrote Jackson again and express- ed his appreciation of Jackson's forethought, as the situation had developed his need of Ewell. On the 28th of April, Jackson wrote Lee that Banks had 21,000 men within one days' march of his position, and that Blenker was at Win- chester on the 20th with 7,000 men. "I propose to attack Banks if you will send me 5,000 more men. *


* * Now, as it appears to me, is the golden opportunity for striking. Un- til I hear from you, I will watch an opportunity for striking


some exposed point." Subsequent events


proved that Jackson had secured the confidence of Genl. Lee at this early period, and he was one, if not the closest, adviser he had. Jackson submitted three plans to Genl. Lee, showing fully what he pro- posed to do, if any one would meet his approval. These plans embody too much to unfold them in this volume. If the reader desires to study them, he will be edified by a careful reading of their comprehensive treatment by Henderson in his Life of Stonewall Jackson, Vol. I, pp. 283-4. Genl. Lee answered that he had care-


fully considered the three plans proposed, and that he was satisfied Jackson would select the "one that promised the most good to the cause in general." Jackson chose the one that would take him West of Staunton to surprise and de- feat Milroy, who was then hammering Genl. Edw. Johnson, who being thus relieved, could return with him to the Valley and cripple if not destroy Banks' Army.


Jackson's army was in motion by the time Lee's letter was read; and everything hastily preparing for an advance to some point, none knew where. He kept his own secrets at that time ;- held no counsel with staff or others. Three roads lay out before him: one by Har- risonburg; the second, by Port Republic, Cross Keys and Mt. Sidney; the third, the river road by Port Republic and Staunton. The first of these was already occupied by the Federals. (Henderson, Vol. I, p. - ) Jackson chose the river road; and by Noon of May 30th, he was on his march to McDowell via Staunton, going by Port Republic, and arriving at Mechem's Sta- tion on the Virginia Central on May 3rd, after a march over almost impassable roads and through Spring rains. All the streams were at flood; wagons and gun carriages sank in quagmires to the axle. The army had spent days of toil over a route that under ordinary circumstances the foot cavalry could have traversed in one.


We left Ashby making demonstrations in Banks' front, greatly to the annoyance of the latter. On the 30th, Ewell with 8,000 men glided through Swift Run Gap and camped on Jack- son's old camp ground. This led Banks to be- lieve that Jackson was still in the bottle, waiting unconsciously for him in his own time to cork and seal. May 4th was Sunday. Jackson had heard from Genl. Edw. Johnson, who needed help. Infantry was put aboard the long train of cars and hurried away to Staunton. Artillery and wagons went by wagon road. By the 6th, all were up and formed a juncture with John- son. The Staunton people had heard that the Valley Army had crossed the Blue Ridge and Edw. Johnson had fallen back from Milroy's front, and felt disheartened. But when Jack- son's men marched through the streets that Sunday morning, they rejoiced to know that their dear old Valley had not been abandoned to the invader. The 6th was spent in resting the troops after their eight days' march. Banks knew nothing of this movement, and continued to interest his Washington authorities with his attractive letters, which afford good reading even now after the lapse of 45 years. One of them written May 30th, '62, is so full of gross ig- norance of the situation, that a few quotations are given to show the trend of his intentions,


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etc. He says: "There is nothing to be done


* in the Valley this side of Strasburg * * and if permitted to do so, would cross the Blue Ridge and sweep the country North of Gor- donsville. * *


* Jackson's Army is re- duced, demoralized, on half rations, they are all concentrating for Richmond. * * * I am now satisfied that it is the most safe and effect- ive disposition for our corps. I pray your fa- vorable consideration. Such order will electrify our force." Subsequent events show that his force was electrified, but not in the way he pre- dicted. Jackson apparently understood his ad- versary well enough to know that he would not move to Staunton as long as he could threaten his rear from the Elkton Valley; and that he had not discovered the change from that point, which put Jackson's army in his front at Staun- ton and Ewell ready to strike when told.


When Jackson left Staunton on the 7th, Banks informed Washington that the "Jackson Army was preparing to attack Harrisonburg." This would mislead his authorities to believe that he held that place, when it is an actual fact that Ashby had been holding that vicinity steadily since the 5th of May. We have it from Dab- ney, (Vol, 3, p. 65,) how the march was started from Staunton to look after Milroy and others in the Monterey or McDowell section-"Edw. Johnson's regiments led the way, several miles in advance; the Third and Second Brigades fol- lowed; the 'Stonewall,' under Genl. Winder, a young West Point officer of exceptional prom- ise, bringing up the rear. The corps of Cadets of the Virginia Military Institute, was also at- tached to the expedition."


Eighteen miles West of Staunton, they en- countered the first line of pickets, some of whom were captured. Johnson halted and bivouacked on a deserted camp after his march of 14 miles. Jackson moved 6 miles further on, when night forced a halt. Milroy learned from the escaped pickets, of Johnson's return. He gathered in his outposts, and soon had his force of about 3,700 men at McDowell, a village at the base of Bull Pasture Mountain. Fremont was known to be somewhere in the South Branch Valley, to whom Milroy looked for help when he needed it. The force nearest to him was a brigade about Frank- lin, Pendleton County, 34 miles North. To this force Milroy dispatched for reinforcements. This proved to be Genl. Schenck's force, and the mes- senger found him so near at hand that he easily marched up and took position on the morning of the 8th. Jackson and Johnson were disap- pointed when they beheld the extent of Milroy's lines, and their strong positions. Milroy had heard through scouts and Union men that Jack- son had joined Johnson; and he had sent such


word to Schenck, who at once started towards McDowell. The Valley men had come to fight, and Jackson opened battle from several strong positions. The Federal force was composed of Western Virginia and Ohio troops chiefly, and fought desperately; but after repeated assaults, were compelled to retire under cover of the night that had come. Genl. Johnson was wounded, and losses on both sides were heavy. Confederate losses killed and wounded was 498, including 454 officers. The Federals owing to their strong nat- ural defenses-hills, ridges and crests, sustained but slight loss-256 killed, wounded and missing. The Federals kept their camp fires burning brightly all night where they halted about three miles North; but when morning came, they were not to be seen. All had gone in the night, and Jackson had accomplished what he had come so far to do-force the Federals to retire. The McDowell campaign has often been mentioned with Jackson's other victories, and comparing its results with his other battle of Kernstown, it is safe to conclude their strongest feature was the destruction of the enemy's plans rather than his army.


On the morning of the 9th, a cavalry detach- ment was sent on Milroy's trail, while the in- fantry tarried in McDowell to be supplied with rations. Then they started in pursuit; but the cavalry reported Milroy twenty miles ahead and pushing on to Franklin. Jackson endeavored to overtake them, but was hindered by forest fires that had been kindled by the retreating foe; and through the dense smoke Jackson's men plunged on, making forced marches on the 10th and IIth. By this time the rear guard was overtaken, and from every vantage ground the Federals planted cannon and shelled the ap- proaching column. At Franklin, Fremont and Blenker had come up, and Jackson prudently started back on the 12th on his return to the Valley. The Federal army offered no resist- ance, and Jackson and his army continued their march via McDowell; but we find he waited long enough to give his men time to hold divine service the day he left Franklin. On May 15th the Valley Army was on the road to Harrison- burg, and going into camp at Lebanon Springs. The 16th was spent in camp, to observe the day set apart by President Davis for fasting and prayer. On the 17th the line of march was once more taken up. Dabney mentions an incident in his biography of Stonewall Jackson that oc- curred during this day's march that some old comrades may recall. He says: "A mutiny oc- curred in the 27th Virginia among some com- panies who had volunteered for twelve months, and whose time had expired and who demanded


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their discharge. On this being refused, they threw down their arms. Col. Grigsby referred to the general for instructions. Jackson's face, when the circumstances were explained, set hard as flint. "Why," he said, "does Col. Grigsby refer to me to learn how to deal with mutineers? He should shoot them where they stand." The rest of the regiment was ordered to parade with loaded muskets. The insubordinate companies were offered the choice of instant death or in- stant submission. The men knew their comman- der, and at once surrendered. This was the last attempt at disobedience in the Valley Army."


Genl. Ewell met Jackson at Mt. Solon, having


ridden over from his camp to consult with the General and post him as to the situation in the Valley. Banks had gone to Strasburg, and Ash- by was busy with his cavalry, falling trees across the roads through the mountains to prevent Fre- mont's easy march to reinforce Banks. Fremont says in his official report, (Vol. XII, part I; p. II) "that in one instance trees were felled along the road for one mile, and culverts torn up and heavy rocks rolled from the mountain sides in many places."


Banks was now in danger. Jackson, Ewell and Johnson were meditating an attack while he was virtually cut off from Fremont's support.


CHAPTER LVIII


Battle of Winchester - Jackson and Banks


The return of Jackson to the Valley with his gallant little army, was destined to produce changes in the war arena, that the Northern government did not expect; and the Southern government had but faint hope that the ray of light held out from the distant Valley could in any event blazon out to encourage the whole South- land. To better appreciate the situation in May, 1862, it may be well to briefly sum up the con- ditions that perplexed the Southern government and encouraged the Northern. New Orleans had fallen. This virtually filled the Mississippi River with Federal gunboats. Richmond was seriously threatened by McClellan, who had changed his base from West Point-or North of York River- to the White House within twenty miles of Rich- mond, with 112,000 men; McDowell with 40,000 on the Rappahannock, within four days' march ; gunboats in the James River, subject to McClel- lan's call. To meet this forward movement was the grand army of Joe Johnston, but with less than one-third the strength of the great host that seemed to be pressing from every point. Richmond was so hard pressed, that precautionary measures had been taken. Military stores had already gone to a place of greater safety; Presi- dent Davis and his family were ready to leave at a moment's notice. His cabinet, with their chests packed, and probably the Confederate gov- ernment, would have been on wheels in a short time, had they not waited to consider the pro- tests of Virginia through her General Assem- bly and the City Council of Richmond. The President, however, deemed it best for the gen- eral good, to carry out his original plans. For- tunately, Robert E. Lee was at the front, and his military eye saw a gleam of light off in the Shenandoah Valley sky, which a genius for strategy had kindled. Stonewall Jackson held the beacon; and Lee grasped the situation as no others had, and was willing to flash this back to the Valley sentinel: "Whatever movement you make against Banks, do it speedily; and if suc- cessful, drive him back towards the Potomac, and create the impression, as far as possible, that you design threatening that line." Genl. Lee had been considering a long letter Jackson had written him on May 16th, after he and Genl. Ewell had consulted at Mt. Solon. Briefly stated, Jackson pointed out Banks, cut off from rein- forcements, so unaware of the close proximity of a threatening Confederate army, that he was contemplating a move by way of Gordonsville to join the Federal hosts then closing in on Rich- mond; that if two brigades were sent him


promptly, he could relieve Richmond, by not only crushing Banks and checking his movement, but would tend to withdraw from Mcclellan, troops to reinforce efforts being made to clear the Val- ley by Fremont and Milroy, temporarily bottled up in the South Branch Valley. We find Jack- son in a dilemma on the 17th. Instead of rein- forcements, Ewell had received orders to recross the Blue Ridge, leaving the cavalry to simply watch Banks. Genl. Joe Johnston had interposed objections to anything that would weaken his force. Ewell and Jackson hastily consulted, and a telegram to Lee resulted, to wit: "I am of opinion that an attempt should be made to de- feat Banks; but under instructions from Genl. Johnston, I do not feel at liberty to make an attack. Please answer by telegraph at once." This telegram brought the foregoing telegram from Lee. By the morning of the 18th, Jackson felt free to act. Banks was fortifying at Stras- burg, whether of his own will, or by order from Washington, need not appear now. Jackson sent Ashby to New Market to establish a picket line near Woodstock, to conceal if possible his own movements. Jackson then moved to the former place on the 20th. Ewell was already in Luray; but had detached one brigade and sent it over to Jackson. This gave Jackson and Ewell a combined strength of 17,000 men and II batteries, (according to Col. Wm. Allan's estimates in his Valley Campaign, pp 92-3.) The two armies were considered as two divisions; and in order to show to enquirers, who the men were who participated in the celebrated Valley Campaign, the following table is given of regiments com- posing the divisions; and old soldiers can readily identify their respective companies; and thus company officers and men may be traced through tables that may appear in this volume.


Jackson's Division.


First (Stonewall) Brigade-Genl. Winder-2nd Va., 4th Va., 5th Va., 27th Va., 33rd Va.


Second Brigade-Col. Campbell-21st Va., 42nd Va., 48th Va., Ist Regulars (Irish.)


Third Brigade-Col. Taliaferro-10th Va., 23rd Va., 37th Va.,


Ashby's Cavalry, 7th Va. and several new companies.


Five batteries-22 guns.


Ewell's Division.


First Brigade-Genl. Dick Taylor-6th Louis- iana, 7th Louisiana, 8th Louisiana, 9th Louisiana, Wheat's Battalion of Louisiana Tigers.


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Second Brigade-Genl. Trimble-21st N. Ca., 21st Ga., 15th Ala., 16th Miss.


Third Brigade-Genl. Elzey-13th Va., 31st Va., 25th Va., 12th Ga.


Fourth Brigade-(Johnson's)-44th Va., 52nd Va., 58th Va.


Maryland-Ist Md.


Cavalry-Genl. G. H. Stuart of Md .; 2nd Va., Col. Munford; 6th Va., Col. Flournoy.


Six Batteries, 26 guns.


Inclination is strong to attempt a portrayal of the two chiefs as they appeared in grotesque figure at the head of the two little armies, as well as the brigade, regimental and other offi- cers and men, that were now prepared to enter upon the campaign of unfaded glory. Many of them were familiar figures to the writer. Jack- son and his lemons; Ewell with his boiled wheat; Winder with his tactics; Taliaferro with his dig- nity; Dick Taylor and his Louisiana curiosities of Creoles, Tigers and Planters; Elzey with his Maryland men, ever singing "Maryland, My Maryland," until stilled by the New Orleans band, playing superb music to the dancers, of whom Dick Taylor makes mention in his "De- struction and Reconstruction." Then we have Trimble, "the nimble," as he was called; A. P. Hill, the inimitable Ashby, Munford, and a host of others. So many of those brave men seem to be flitting before the writer as he pens these lines. But we must hasten to follow them on their march and through their battles, though in briefest manner possible.


May 21st, 1862, the early morning saw Jack- son's army astir and the column heading North, with Genl. Dick Taylor in the lead. All now expected to sweep down the Valley Pike and suddenly strike Banks. They were set to won- dering what "Ole Jack" was adoin', when the column turned to the right and was soon cross- ing the Mountains, and went into the vicinity of Luray that night. The next day, 22nd, the whole army was in motion, quietly moving towards Front Royal, stopping that night within ten miles of that place, which was occupied by a considerable force from Banks' command, to fill the place of Shields who had gone across the Ridge to reinforce McDowell. The Wash- ington government felt easy; and waited to hear of glowing victories from the various plans well inaugurated to crush the Rebellion; and were in total ignorance of Jackson's real position. Had they known that he had 17,000 men on the flank of the only Federal force in the Valley, say ten miles to the East and a less distance to points on the Valley Pike, someone in Wash- ington would have spent a restless night. Bank's army was reduced to 10,000, and this scattered. Col. Kenly of the Ist Federal Maryland (of


whom we will hear more later on) was at Front Royal with 1,100 men and several cannon. He occupied the low ground between the town and the river, guarding the two bridges and all ap- proaches, but unaware that Jackson was in camp within a few miles of his camp. On the morning of the 23rd he was surprised by a rush of Con- federates from the woods upon his pickets and through the town. Kenly bravely undertook to stay the charge, and for some time made a gal- lant stand, using two pieces of artillery with such effect, that he had time to burn his camp equipment before retiring to Guard Hill, and later on to Cedarville. Jackson had taken part of the 6th Va. Cavalry, and finding a fording place, landed on the North side of the river, and recklessly joined in a charge that drove the enemy from their strong positions on the hill. Jackson sent the cavalry forward and waited for the infantry and artillery ;- then all advanced on the Cedarville position. Kenly boldly held out until he fell, seriously wounded. The cav- alry handled by brave and competent officers, performed the service that eventually produced a Federal rout, and crowned themselves with glory, with the fruits of their victory in hand- 250 Confederates overpowered and brought in 600 Federals, including 15 officers and part of a battery. 32 men were killed at that point and 122 wounded, while the Confederate loss was II killed and 15 wounded. Ashby had not been idle with his Seventh all this time. He was at his old tricks, tearing up the railroad at Buckton (Riverton,) cutting the telegraph line and intercepting a message just going to Banks, who was yet in blissful ignorance of what was happening at Front Royal. He believed firmly that Jackson was marching down the Valley Pike, from demonstrations in his front by three companies of Ashby's Cavalry that had been left at Woodstock. Capt. Wm. N. McDonald, author of the History of the Laurel Brigade, says, "That Capt. Sam Myers, Capt. E. H. Mc- Donald and Capt. Wm. H. Harness (the writer's Company) drove in the pickets and erected breastworks on the hills near Strasburg in sight of Banks' army. Moving his troops from point to point, partly in view of the Federals, created the impression that he was supported by a large force." It was during these maneuvres, that a detail from the writer's company was posted on the high jutting point of the Massanutton Moun- tain, overlooking both positions-Banks' quiet camp at Strasburg, and the smoke and shifting firing at Front Royal; beholding later in the day, Banks' break in his camp.


Ashby in destroying the railroad communica- tion at Buckton, encountered a garrison strongly fortified in an old log house near an embank-


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ment, which withstood frequent attacks, but was finally overcome and part of two companies cap- tured, who were trying to escape on two freight cars. Ashby accomplished much, but he lost much. At this spot two gallant captains were killed: Capt. Geo. F. Sheetz, of Company F., 7th Va. Cavalry, and Capt. John Fletcher who had succeeded Turner Ashby in command of Company A., 7th Regt. Splendid men they were; fearless leaders, always up with their companies. Several of their men fell beside them. Jack- son halted his advance at Cedarville and sent dispatches for infantry and artillery in the rear, to take up line of march for Middletown and Newtown, with the view to cutting Banks' retreat; but owing to the inefficiency of young and inexperienced cavalrymen who were couriers, orders went astray, and much delay and unneces- sary hard marching ensued, frustrating some of the general's plans. This occasion induced him to plan his special messenger and scout service.




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