Shenandoah Valley Pioneers and Their Descendants: A History of Frederick County, Virginia., Part 66

Author: Cartmell, T. K. (Thomas Kemp), 1838-1920
Publication date: 1909
Publisher: [Winchester, Va.] : [Printed by the Eddy Press Corp.]
Number of Pages: 607


USA > Virginia > Frederick County > Frederick County > Shenandoah Valley Pioneers and Their Descendants: A History of Frederick County, Virginia. > Part 66


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CARTMELL'S HISTORY


his plans fully executed, and remarked to one of his aides that a Federal rout would occur. Federal official reports show that Sedgewick lost 2,000 killed and wounded within eight min- utes. Jackson's official report says: "Sedge- wick's Division was defeated and driven from the field in confusion; and when a Brigade was sent from the 12th Federal Corps to support Sedgewick, McLaws met and overwhelmed the reinforcements, and this cleared the field of all save dead and wounded." The Confederates jubilant over their victory, were soon called upon to meet fresh troops that Mcclellan was rushing to strong positions to save his army. The First and Twelfth Corps were completely disabled, and no more appeared in line that day. But Meade and his Pennsylvania Reserve Corps was coming into action, and supported by the Veteran Sixth Corps, with over 100 guns, was a formidable army to engage troops that had borne the storm of the entire day; for A. P. Hill had not yet arrived, and there were no new troops to send to meet the fresh Federals. At 1 P. M., the Confederates hastened to new positions. The Federals were supported by ar- tillery that never ceased to fill the air with screaming shells and crashing timber; the cav- alry of both armies were skirmishing on all exposed flanks, and possibly every available man in both armies had been engaged in the hottest strife for more than 7 hours. The Dunkard Church, Roulette Farm, Piper House, Bowman's Woods, Sunken Road and Bloody Lane, West Wood, The Corn Field, Antietam Creek and Heights, are places that can never be forgotten by the survivors of that terrible day; and only the veterans of the contending armies could ever appreciate the slaughter and deeds of valor wast- ed on the battlefield of Sharpsburg Sept. 17, 1862. The afternoon was spent in maneuvres. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart called for reinforcements to aid him to turn the Federal right wing, which was swinging around toward the Potomac. Jack- son started the Valley Army, and gave orders for other troops to move in same direction. But by 4 o'clock, Stuart was compelled to give way, and thus Mcclellan's right rested on the Potomac. Stuart declined a general engagement, and night settled down upon both armies-the tired survivors sleeping restfully, as only worn- out soldiers can. 21,000 dead and wounded were lying on the nearby fields. Whole regiments were entirely wiped out. The Virginia regi- ments suffered beyond recognition; but as the groups were found the next morning, they had place under other commanders, and answered the call to duty once more. The reorganized forces waited patiently all through the day (18th), expecting an engagement; but McClellan was


inactive. Genl. Lee devised several plans to at- tack the Federals on their right, but was dis- couraged by Genls. Jackson, Stuart and others. Genl. Jackson and Col. Stephen D. Lee com- manding the Artillery division, at the request of Genl. Lee, had reconnoitred that formidable right, and found evidences of the terrific strug- gle Genl. Stuart and his cavalry had experi- enced the day before in their effort to prevent Hooker and the 12th corps reforming there after the battle. Dead and disabled horses, caissons and guns were on every hand, but the gallant riders had been compelled to give. way; and Genl. Jackson reported that it would be unwise to make any effort to force that right. Genl. Lee then decided to recross the Potomac that night. All day, however, Lee from several posi- tions challenged Mcclellan to reopen battle; but at no time did the Federals show any disposition to attack, preferring to await reinforcements that were hourly arriving. Couch's division of vet- erans from the vicinity of Harpers Ferry, no longer needed there, Genl. Humphrey's division from Frederick City-all fresh troops-were has- tily forming on the Antietam; and the Pennsyl- vania militia were coming from every point in the State to resist the further march of Lee. Looking at the situation to-day, from many posi- tions, in company with both Federal and Con- federate officers, the opinion expressed to the author was "That Mcclellan should have rushed upon Lee on the 18th, and crippled him to such an extent that he could not have possibly re- crossed the Potomac except in a disorganized condition;" and further, "if Genl. Lee on the 18th could have mustered such an army as he had before it was so badly decimated by the bat- tle of the previous day, that nothing could have withstood his attack on Mcclellan's right, the front would have given way and a veritable . rout ensued." As it was, we find Mcclellan in- active and actually allowing Genl. Lee to change his base and transfer his army, trains and all, over the Potomac near Shepherdstown, without the slightest interruption. The Federals certain- ly could not have been ignorant of this. Their front and both flanks must have been aware of a change, and doubtless gave Genl. Lee credit for some new strategem; and were surprised on the 19th to find that he had not appeared else- where-then safely seated on the South bank of the Potomac, with every wagon, gun and soldier, except the wounded who had been left in Sharpsburg carefully cared for and a few stragglers. Jackson and the remnant of the Valley Army forming the rear guard, crossed the river about 9 o'clock that morning. Stuart's cavalry skirmish line later in the day were driven in, and then, his division retiring under


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CIVIL WAR INCIDENTS


heavy fire, still threatened Mcclellan's flank and even rear. That gallant Stuart and his brave riders were fighting on an abandoned line, for he had not yet received orders from Genl. Lee to fall back and cross the river at Williams- port 15 miles above; consequently he was igno- rant of Lee's situation, when late in the evening several Federal brigades crossed the river and made a desperate attack on what they now be- lieved a retreating foe. The Confederates had carelessly disposed their commands for bivouac and rest after their night's work, and the rear guard was surprised and driven from their posi- tion, losing four guns. Genl. Pendleton then in command of the rear guard, apprised Genl. Lee of the situation, who at once ordered Jackson to take charge. This was about I o'clock at night. The messenger found Genl. Jackson in his saddle and far to the front, giving orders for A. P. Hill and Early (who had succeeded Lawton) to march from their camp near Mar- tinsburg and proceed to Shepherdstown and clear the South side. On the morning of the 20th, the Federals were driven back and the forward movement checked. The Federal ar- tillery from the opposite side of the river shelled the advancing Confederates under Hill. Soon, however, the Federals were driven over the bluffs and hastily returned to their main line, suffering some loss. The Confederate loss was less than 300 in killed and wounded; but the loss they sustained by this vigorous check was great; for had the Federals poured their hosts across the river and rushed upon the scattered camps of Confederates, the story of Lee's change of base might have been sadly different. But McClellan was deceiving himself again-over- estimating Genl. Lee's strength,-and failed to discover the careless camps of the Confederates. He also was annoyed by the unceasing encoun- ters from Genl. Stuart on the lines of his rear, which led him to believe that Genl. Lee had some counter stroke in store for him. For in his official reports, he complains that his cavalry rendered very little service, and failed to dis- cover Lee's retreat and misconstrued Stuart's movements. They reported that a heavy force threatened his rear. Thus it appears that the cavalry handled by Stuart and his famous sub- alterns, prevented Mcclellan's pursuit of Lee. On the evening of the 21st of September, Stuart sent the Laurel Brigade, composed of the 6th, 7th, 11th and 12th regiments, and White's bat- talion, to give the great Northern army his part- ing salute, which was accomplished by a bril- liant charge on the enemy's flank, bringing away prisoners and horses, without the loss of a man. The gallant warrior, with his long black plume hanging over his shoulder, rode gallantly away,


across the Potomac, and fell in on the rear of the Army of Northern Virginia, thus ending a series of battles embracing six months of the Spring and Summer of memorable 1862. The great armies having changed their positions from the country near Richmond to the country over- looking Washington City; the Summer cam- paign closing on the North bank of the Poto- mac within thirty miles of the fortifications of the Capital. The outlines of the movements of Jackson and the Valley Army thus briefly given, has required more space than was contemplated by the author; but he had been importuned by many veterans and their descendants to outline if possible the movements of the Valley men; and the foregoing may interest many readers to search the sources of information referred to, and obtain much that not only relates to indi- vidual divisions, brigades, regiments and com- panies, but to individual deeds of valor rendered by the heroes in gray or blue, that may be dear to the reader of these pages, long after the ac- tors in that great campaign have answered the last reville.


The following statement is subjoined for easy reference, to show what Confederate troops were engaged in the battle at Sharpsburg (or Antietam,) and losses. This has been taken from the official reports :


General Jones Division, 1,800


Loss


The Stonewall Brigade 260


88


Taliaferro's Brigade. 173


Starke's Brigade. 287


Jones' Brigade


152


700


General Ewell's Division, 3,600


Loss.


Lawton's Brigade, 1,180.


569


Early's Brigade, 1,240. 204


Trimble's Brigade, 740. 237


Hays' Brigade, 550.


336


1,346


A. P. Hill's Division, 3,000


Loss.


Branch's Brigade


104


Gregg's Brigade. 165


Archer's Brigade. 105


Pender's Brigade.


30


Field's Brigade (not engaged)


Thomas's Brigade (at Harpers Ferry).


Artillery


67


472


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CARTMELL'S HISTORY


Genl. D. H. Hill's Division, 3,500


Reported Loss.


Rodes' Brigade.


203


Anderson's Brigade. 302


Estimated Loss.


Garland's Brigade.


300


Ripley's Brigade. 300


Colquitt's Brigade.


300


1,405


Genl. McLaw's Division, 4,500


Estimated Loss.


Kershaw's Brigade. 355


Cobbs' Brigade. 156


Barksdale's Brigade 294


Semme's Brigade.


314


1,119


Semme's four regiments engaged in Jackson's counterstroke, reported percentage of losses as follows: 53rd Ga., 30 p. c .; 32nd Va., 45 p. c .; 10th Ga., 57 p. c .; 15th Va., 58 p. c .; (Hender- son, Vol. II, pp. 371, etc.)


FIRST CORPS-LONGSTREET


Genl. D. R. Jones' Division, 3,500


Estimated Loss.


Toombs' Brigade.


125


Drayton's Brigade. 400


Kemper's Brigade.


120


O. R. Estimated


Loss


Anderson's Brigade


87


Garnett's Brigade 99


Jenkins' Brigade.


210


1,041


Genl. Walker's Division, 3,500


O. R. LOSS


Walker's Brigade.


825


Ransom's Brigade. 187


1,012


Genl. Hood's Division, 2,250


O. R Loss.


Laws' Brigade.


454


Hood's Old Brigade.


548


Evans' Brigade, 250.


200


1,202


Genl. R. H. Anderson's Division, 3,500


O. R. Loss


Featherston's Brigade.


304


Mahone's Brigade. 76


Bruor's Brigade. 182


Armstead's Brigade 35


Wright's Brigade. 203


Wilcox's Brigade. 221


1,021


Artillery


O. R. Low


Col. S. D. Lee's Battalion.


85 Washington's Artillery .(N. Orleans) 34


Estimated


Cavalry


143


260


Total Conf. loss, killed and wounded.


. 9,566


ARMY POTOMAC-FEDERAL ARMY


(Mcclellan)


O. R. Loss


First Corps, Hooker.


2,590


Second Corps, Sumner. 5,138


Fifth Corps, Porter 100


Sixth Corps, Franklin.


439


Ninth Corps, Burnside. 2,349


Twelfth Corps, Mansfield. 1,746


Cavalry Division, Etc.


39


Total Federal killed and wounded.


. 12,40I


Genl. McClellan in his official reports of the recent campaign, complains bitterly of his de- pleted ranks; and insists that he must be al- lowed time for reorganization; that his supply trains were badly crippled, and that every arm of the service required recuperation and rest; and believed it wise to allow the army to enjoy rest after the arduous campaign from the Penin- sula to South Mountain, where they had won brilliant victories, but with great loss. This ex- tract from his correspondence with President Lincoln, indicates the condition of himself and his army. He says on the 27th: "The Army is not now in a condition to undertake another campaign nor to bring on another battle unless great advantages are offered by some mistake of the enemy, or pressing military exigencies render it necessary." This shows plainly that he was expecting Genl. Lee to renew his in-


369


CIVIL WAR INCIDENTS


vasion. He therefore was content to remain on the North side of the Potomac, sending an occasional cavalry scout to the South side, to ascertain Lee's intentions. The vigilant Stuart with his dashing horsemen, filled them with such dismay, that they hurried back to inform Mc- Clellan that Lee was gathering his strength for a vigorous movement. How strange this ap- pears to the student of this fierce campaign; for he will discover that Genl. Lee was endeavor- ing to reorganize his army in camps from Win- chester to Bunker's Hill, struggling to bring back his stragglers who were swarming by thousands through the Lower Valley, seeking old homes, to relate the trials through which all had passed. Thousands of their comrades had been left dead or dying on the slaughter fields from Malvern Hill to Sharpsburg; and the dispirited and bro- ken-hearted survivors desired to tell their story to some sympathetic ear. These stragglers were not deserters. They knew as well as Genl. Lee that they had inflicted a blow to McClellan; that he would not likely cross the river to renew battle; they knew the spirit of the army they : had vanquished; they knew that thousands of the Federals had broken ranks and fled, and that both armies had endured too much to make battle probable. We find Genl. Lee complaining to President Davis in his letter of the 25th of September, of the temper and spirit of his army, and that stragglers were everywhere, including officers. Every arm of the service seriously affected, and that he had established a system to arrest them and return them to camp. Genl. Jones had been sent to Winchester with about 300 cavalry to execute the order. The reader will bear in mind that this straggling extended from Leesburg to North Mountain, a territory too great to cover with small provost guards. We find, however, in Genl. Jones' report to Genl. Lee that he had sent back to their com- mands about 6,000 men within five days. The ragged but brave and loyal stragglers needed only to be reminded that Genl. Lee required them at once. Many survivors of that old pro- vost guard,-the author being one, recalls with pleasure, how cheerfully these stragglers re- ceived their notices, and how promptly they re- sponded and reported to their commands; and in none but a few flagrant cases, were men treated as deserters. Poor fellows! the tempta- tion was irresistible. With the old firesides and loved ones to listen to the fate of their boy left on some far-away plain,-the last good bye to the aged and helpless, and the other adieus- too tender to mention and only told by wistful glances from sad-eyed maiden, as she watched her ragged soldier disappear over the copse in


the direction of the bivouacs of the Old Stone- wall Brigade.


The author dare not state here that the in- vasion was a mistake; for many military critics have regarded this as a master-stroke of Gen- eral Lee and his great lieutenants. But it must be said, though the Sharpsburg-Antietam bat- tles were won by the Confederates with great loss of life, the morale of the Army of North- ern Virginia had suffered fearfully; and if the Army of the Potomac had not suffered to a greater extent in this respect, Genl. McClellan could have forced his way into the Lower Val- ley, and given Genl. Lee such an encounter as would possibly have shattered his entire army.


But it may be said the Confederates never felt that the blow inflicted on Mcclellan's army, accomplished profitable results. The army of Northern Virginia had thrown the Federals on the defensive; and for the time being, the Wash- ington authorities were in confusion, and com- pelled to take up the old question how to take Richmond and save Washington. The Confed- erates felt, furthermore, that their last engage- ment was with seasoned veterans, supported by every army equipment, led by experienced and brave officers, like Hooker, Porter, Sumner and others, and with numbers far in excess of the Southern forces. They felt justly proud of the tremendous effort made to save the honor and reputation of the Army of Northern Virginia. The Little Napoleon (McClellan) was removed, and Burnside installed as Commander of the Army of the Potomac. The Confederates hailed this as part of their great victory, and felt confident that any successor to Mcclellan would result favorably to them. They knew Mcclellan had become familiar with the strategems of Lee and Jackson; and with the great army he had trained, his strength was more perceptible in every battle; and though wary and slow, he had become more active and alert; and his de- feat in the campaign around South Mountain, Antietam and Sharpsburg, considering the rela- tive strength and position of the contending armies, must go down in history, a stupendous victory for the Confederates.


Burnside prepared for a change of base, and chose the Rappahannock. The army was soon reorganized; the nearby States poured in the re- inforcements urgently called for. Longstreet had been sent to Culpeper C. H. Burnside moved towards Falmouth, passing through War- renton, arriving in the vicinity of Aquia Creek on the 17th and 18th of November. At this point his army was easily supplied by waterway transports. Jackson was left in charge of the Lower Valley, to threaten another invasion. About this time there seems to have been a


7


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CARTMELL'S HISTORY


mixing-up of the armies. The Federals were massing troops along the Manassas Gap Rail- road, endeavoring to form a new line from the Blue Ridge to his Aquia Creek supply station. Genl. Lee found that his stragglers had once more given him a most formidable army on their return to their new commands, greatly re- cuperated and rested; and they cheerfully took up the arduous march. On the 17th, Longstreet sent part of his corps to Fredericksburg. Jack- son had been hovering in the Valley, hoping to see his way clear to make a feint along the Potomac, to check Burnside in his headlong career along the Rappahannock. But the new commander felt impelled to strike Genl. Lee as soon as possible; and to prepare for this, Jackson was ordered to bring his army through the Blue Ridge and quietly camp at Orange C. H. The old Valley had enjoyed the presence of Genl. Jackson and the Valley Army for a full month. McClellan was content to remain on the Maryland side during all this time, re- cruiting his strength and courage to cross swords with Lee once more; and while thus waiting, Genl. Stuart, with Genl. Hampton, Col. Wm. E. Jones and W. H. F. Lee and about 1,200 picked men crossed the Potomac near Darkes- ville (Oct. 9th,) capturing pickets wherever found; marched due North through Mercers- burg and Chambersburg, then swept around the rear of the Union Army, through Emmitsburg; crossed the Monocacy near Frederick City, then through Hyattstown; headed for the Potomac and crossed to the Virginia side at White ford, without the loss of a man killed, having en- countered in his ride of 126 miles, many de- tachments of Federals who were routed and cap- tured-wagon trains broken and destroyed, and bringing out at least 800 horses, etc. Strange to say, this command was sailing gaily around McClellan for about 60 hours, and part of the time within 30 miles of Harpers Ferry, near to which Mcclellan had his headquarters. The reader must not be deceived and take for grant- ed that Mcclellan was ignorant of this raid. Not so; he knew of it, and rushed every horse- man he could muster in pursuit, and made great efforts to head Stuart off and capture the entire force. But men were with the raiders who knew every road and path through field or forest that led to the Potomac. Genl. Stuart and his fearless riders never forgot the hardships of that famous ride. Genl. Lee received more in- telligence of Mcclellan's position and apparent in- activity than he hoped from the adventure. It is shown in Federal official reports that the en- tire cavalry forces under Pleasanton and Averill were completely disabled by their forced marches. It is recorded that Averill's command rode 200


miles in four days, and Pleasanton marched 78 miles in twenty-four hours. This crippled the Federals and interfered with the forward move- ment. The correspondence between Mcclellan and Washington shows this raid caused the sud- den change of commands.


Nov. 22nd, '62, Genl. Jackson had his army in motion heading South. Many sad farewells were said on that memorable day. The General, like many of the men of his Valley Army, never returned to the historic old town. Out the Valley Pike the line of march took its way, passing Kernstown, Strasburg and on to New Market; then through the Massanutton to the Luray Valley; then into Fishers Gap over the Blue Ridge, stopping at Madison C. H. on the 26th. After a day's rest, the whole corps was in camp at Orange C. H., 36 miles from Fred- ericksburg. Jackson reports that the army had marched 120 miles with no straggler reported. This should convince the reader that this cele- brated army was composed of patriots; and the statements made in former reports, of their deser- tion in the close of the last campaign, were unjust and should never have been published. The old Valley Army was again in close touch with Genl. Lee. This increased Genl. Lee's strength to 78,500 officers and men of all arms, exceeding largely his numbers that fought the Maryland campaign.


Genl. Lee had already divined Burnside's in- tentions. He knew the pressure put upon him to do battle, and of his burning desire to show the Washington authorities that no mistake had been made by placing him in command of Mc- Clellan's splendid army, now thoroughly reor- ganized. This work had been accomplished by the latter before his removal. In fact, McClel- lan had already planned a new campaign, and had his advance columns crossing the Potomac below Harpers Ferry, when Burnside appeared and changed the whole plan. Genl. Burnside was well known to Genl. Lee and his lieutenants, and also to many of the rank and file. They knew he was a fighter, and also knew him as a blunderer. Many remembered his dismal fail- ure when, with his splendid corps on the Fed- eral left at Sharpsburg, he maneuvered an attack on the Confederate right, which resulted in ter- rific slaughter to his detached columns; and the same Burnside was now laboring to maneuvre the entire army of the Potomac along the North bank of the Rappahannock, feeling his way for an easy crossing. Genl. Lee disposed his di- visions on the South side, and awaited the hour when the new commander would appear on his front for battle, believing that he could crush any force that would venture. Longstreet was on the ridges West of Fredericksburg, called


371


CIVIL WAR INCIDENTS


Mayre's Hill. Jackson was in control lower down the River; Early with Ewell's division was at Skinner's Neck about 12 miles below Fredericksburg ;- D. H. Hill at Port Royal; A. P. Hill and Jackson's old Valley Army under Taliaferro, were in the vicinity of Guinea Sta- tion. Survivors of Stuart's cavalry may recall their first experience in fighting gunboats. They had been called upon to attack everything they found in their front, on land; but when Genl. Stuart called for experts with long range guns, they were sent to the water line, and from am- bush they were to pick off the prominent fig- ures on deck as the monster boats turned their prows up stream. The troops from the ridges viewed with amazement the results of this effort. The gunboats with great difficulty, changed their course, and finally drifted down stream beyond the range of the troopers' guns. Fed- eral official reports show that these gunboats had been ordered "to appear in the river at Port Royal, and shell the Confederates on the ridges, while a crossing was effected at Skinners Neck;" but the enemy appeared in great numbers along the river, and with long-range guns, killed offi- cers, seamen and gunners on board, the gunboats being helpless to protect themselves." Their guns could not get the range on the low grounds. Burnside wrestled with his plans for days and nights, making several efforts to cross the river, but he never abandoned his original plan, which was to bring Lee to battle before he could strengthen his army.


Dec. 12, '62, four army corps crossed the river on pontoons, led by Hooker, Sumner and Franklin. Genl. Lee concentrated his forces and waited for the crucial moment. Lord Wolseley, in the North American Review, Vol. . 149, pp. 282, etc., says: "Once more the Army of North- ern Virginia was concentrated at exactly the right moment on the field of battle." We find the Valley Army as usual, well up and well pro- tected by natural formations, as likewise were the entire Confederate lines. Heavy guns opened early in the day; and at 9 A. M., the Federal battle lines were well defined. One of the sur- vivors of that battle says: "The Army moved in three lines, with scores of batteries-full 80,000 men coming with great precision-bayo- nets glittering-banners waving-bands playing. The scene was one of supreme grandeur; and the mighty host seemed invincible, as they bore down on the lines in gray." Major Dabney graph- ically describes the opening of the battle, saying "that Stafford Heights, where the Federal re- serves were posted in dense masses, sent a storm of shot and shell into the Confederate lines ; and for once War unmasked its terrible propor- tions with a distinctness hitherto unknown in




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