USA > Virginia > Frederick County > Frederick County > Shenandoah Valley Pioneers and Their Descendants: A History of Frederick County, Virginia. > Part 70
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The Battle of Gettysburg which opened July Ist, 1863, was the result, it appears, of inciden- tal movements-demonstrations and skirmishes between outlying divisions. Meade had relieved Hooker; and was on the field more to inspect positions than to join battle with Lee. Every road leading towards the general field, was lined with troops hastening to repel further in- vasion. The first day's battle developed the positions around which the powerful legions of both armies were to test the valor and ability of their soldiers, from the chiefs in command to the foot-sore private. The stupendous Battle of Gettysburg, that appalled nations in their study of the American Soldier, and immortalized the "Blue and the Gray," has been an exhaustless theme for historians, novelists and poets; and the reader must be referred to the vast collec- tions found in the public libraries for pen pic- tures of that famous field, reeking with the blood of heroes for days, and then abandoned on the Fourth of July. Lee with his shattered divis- ions, quickly withdrew towards the Potomac, while Meade with his crippled corps, stood aghast at the carnage, and withdrew to positions beyond the awful spectacle, where the medical corps of both armies were gathering up the wounded, and details were hastily covering the slain with the earth their blood had drenched. It is not within the scope of this work to do more than show briefly where the Valley men were in the desperate struggle.
It will be remembered that Ewell's Corps em- braced the Stonewall Brigade and other Virginia
troops; and in tracing the movement of Ewell, Early and Edw. Johnson, the Shenandoah Val- ley troops are included; while the J. E. B. Stuart cavalry embraced the Brigades of Jones and Imboden of the Cavalry, and Chew and others of the artillery. The writer feels his in- ability to do justice to any of the splendid bat- talions handled by the leaders mentioned; and lack of space forbids personal mention of indi- vidual heroism. All have heard how and why Lee failed to occupy Cemetery Ridge. Long- street comes in for his share of criticism for failure to appear at the right moment; while he and his personal friends have sought to shift the blame to Genl. Ewell, charging that the im- petuosity of Genl. Early with his invincible Val- ley Army, storming impregnable positions with terrific loss, enlightened the Federals as to Lee's desperate condition. A careful study of the battle and subsequent reports from all comman- ders, reveals the lamentable fact that Early could have been supported by Longstreet with his fresh divisions at 5 P. M. the first day; but for some reason the support was withheld, and Early forced to retire from the very key of the field. Genl. Lee expected Genl. Longstreet to use his discretion in supporting any effort made to seize the crest of the historic ridge; and certainly did not contemplate his failure to move to some point. Ewell was in position at 4 P. M. to join any effort made to take Culp's Hill, a strong point from which heavy cannonading was bearing upon A. P. Hill's posi- tion on Seminary Ridge. Genl. Edw. Johnston was struggling to maintain a foothold under the brow of the hills. Ewell dispatched Early for his support, expecting Longstreet to join not later than 6 o'clock. On the right, Early and Johnson did not have their full brigades. Other regiments had been used for rear guards of two columns. Early's official report agrees with that of Johnson. They passed over all obsta- cles-two ridges and several batteries-and across the long deep hollow bordering Cemetery Ridge, and finally scaled the crest, beating down everything before them with heavy loss to the charging Virginians. The enemy's breast-works were taken, where two batteries were in position; and while holding this position in the face of strong divisions in their front, were overwhelm-
388
389
GETTYSBURG
ed with astonishment that no attack had been made on the right by Longstreet or any of the brigades they expected to move that way. Their position was plainly untenable; for the heavy force that should have been attacked on the right, meeting nothing from that quarter, imme- diately turned against their position on the crest; and they prudently fell back under heavy fire, "but with comparatively slight loss." Even the gallant Rodes failed to appear. His report shows he was engaged at two important points. We dare not attach blame to any of the brave men who were on that field. All doubtless, did their duty as they saw it. The first day was a victory for the Confederate brigades engaged, but ended with no good results. The second day was full of preliminaries for the next day's battle. Long- street fought several engagements with the ene- my during the forenoon, and held his positions. The afternoon was spent in a drawn battle be- tween part of the Ist Corps and a large force of the enemy, who fought fiercely to recover what they had lost in the morning. Longstreet yielded at dark, and fell back. In his reports, he intimates that Ewell and Hill were to blame for failure to cooperate; while his Chief of Ar- tillery, Genl. E. P. Alexander, in his attractive history of this battle, states the case in these words : "Co-operative attacks by Ewell and Hill ordered by Lee, failed to be effective because both Ewell and Hill had failed to have their di- visions in proper positions for the charge long before the moment arrived, although each had ample time." We have no comment to make. The curious can see the O. R. and judge the case from all the evidence.
The third day at Gettysburg found both armies fully prepared for the final struggle. Meade was proving his ability to command the hosts that surrounded him. His corps commanders were all experienced leaders, and many of his division and brigade commanders had shown enough skill and bravery to justify the impression that pre- vailed in Lee's camp during the night. All felt that the third day must be the last, and all were keyed up for the supreme effort. Genl. Lee in his official report ending with the accounts of the second day's battle, uses this language: "The result of the (second) day's operations induced the belief that with proper concert of action, and with the increased support that the positions gained on the right would enable the artillery to render the columns, we should unltimately succeed, and it was accordingly determined to continue the attack."
The general plan was unchanged. Longstreet reinforced by Pickett's three brigades, was to attack in the morning, and Ewell was ordered to assault the enemy's right at the same time.
The latter during the night, reinforced by John- son with two brigades from Rodes' and one from Early's division.
The plans of Lee started off favorably at early dawn, with several brigades from Ewell's Corps, under the impression that Longstreet was to at- tack at the same hour. The latter says in his "Memoirs," that he received no orders during the night, and his troops could not be gotten into their positions before Noon. This sounds strangely, when we have it from Genl. Lee plain- ly that "Longstreet was to attack the next morn- ing." Some staff officer probably failed to find Genl. Longstreet. So we have the Virginians in the thickest of the fray nearly all day, repulsing heavy divisions of Federal infantry and artillery without support, which compelled the brave Con- federates to fall back from every position they had taken at such heavy cost. Official figures show that the loss that morning to Edw. John- son's command was 1,873. Ewell and the other brigades of his corps, were hotly engaged until after 2 P. M. Then the terrific cannonading was at its height-several hundred guns sending death and destruction every moment for several hours. Then there was a lull-a fitting prelude to the sacrifice about to be offered by the im- mortal Pickett and his men. An ominous silence seemed to pervade the two great armies, fore- telling, as it were, that some event would occur that day which would live for ever. The aw- ful drama was well set, and the actors were ready; General George E. Pickett being the star, while his veteran brigade was his support. Well did they enter the arena that hot July afternoon, to the music of cannon and yells from friend and foe. The story of Pickett and his charge for the possession of Round Top has been told at every fireside in the land; yet none can ever become familiar with the deeds of heroism im- mortalized on the slopes and summit of that hill side. And strange to say, none were there to sustain and hold the prize he at one time held. Every other feat performed by brave men on the field of Gettysburg, did and will ever pass into obscurity under the blaze of glory that shone around the pinnacle of fame of Pickett's Brigade.
Why say more! The final sacrifice seemed to satisfy friend and foe. Lee's broken columns were more closely drawn to lines for either at- tack or defence. Meade and his great army seemed stunned by the spectacle, and patiently waited for hours, giving no appearance of a victorious army. After nightfall, Lee formed his lines on Seminary Ridge, with the flank ex- tending far off to Willoughby Run. Here he was on the morning of the 4th of July, in sul- len silence waiting for attack. This was a mas-
390
CARTMELL'S HISTORY
terly movement under the circumstances. His army was in condition for battle. He had al- ready in the afternoon of the 3rd, prepared for retreat, let the battle be won or lost. He sent for Genl. Imboden, who arrived with about 2,100 men and one battery, whom he instructed to col- lect all wagons, etc., into a train and accompany to Williamsport without halt. Here he was to stop only to feed; then ford the Potomac and proceed to Winchester. Imboden gives a graphic account of this huge undertaking. At least 1,800 vehicles were to be collected, and all safely and secretly conducted to Virginia. He says: "His column would be at least 17 miles long." About 4 P. M. on the 4th, the head of the train was moving past Cashtown. Very shortly after the train was in motion, Imboden says: "A heavy rainfall suddenly came, and probably 4 inches of water fell within 12 hours, and this was sure to make the Potomac unfordable for a week." (See his Battles and Leaders.) A brigade of cavalry was to guard the rear. Provision was made to take all the wounded who could bear handling, in the empty wagons and ambulances. The first and third corps were started about 5:30, while the second corps under Ewell remained in the vicinity of Gettysburg until 12:30 on the 5th. How all this could be done in the face of an army that claimed a victory, has never been suf- ficiently explained. Surely Meade could have surrounded this corps and compelled surrender. Doubtless Lee had an object in leaving the Shen- andoah men in his rear; and beyond doubt Meade knew who they were. Imboden and the trains moved on roads far to the right of the infantry and artillery, and were thus protected from cavalry attacks; while out on the right was Genl. Wm. E. Jones' cavalry brigade of Valley men, who knew the country roads. Many skirmishes occurred between this brigade and the cavalry from the upper Potomac district.
We hasten on to the Potomac where Imboden had landed his advance wagons loaded with wounded men. Williamsport was called upon to prepare provisions for the wounded; the river was forbidding, in its muddy rush of water, past fording; and only two small ferry boats were at his disposal. During the night the trains drew in and found place to halt for feed, etc. The next morning, a large cavalry force appeared, 7,000 strong with a battery. Imboden armed teamsters and convalescents; and with his own cavalry presented such an array of soldiers, that the Federal commander withdrew just in time to escape a fight with Stuart's and Jones' cav- alry that came thundering down the roads in fine style. The infantry columns were making deliberate marches by several other roads-all leading to Williamsport, where they began to
arrive on the 5th and 6th; and by the 8th all divisions were up and going to suitable bivouac stations. The river had fallen somewhat, and a crossing was expected for the 7th, but another two days' rain interfered; and besides, some demonstrations were made on the leading roads by large bodies of cavalry. Genl. Lee imme- diately put his army in position to receive bat- tle in case Meade made an attack. Good lines of defence were chosen; and the old Army of Northern Virginia seemed ready for either de- fense or attack. But fortunately the latter was not attempted. Imboden was busy pushing the ambulances over by ferry; then came the turn of the 5,000 prisoners, which required hours; and then came the wagons, some of which were now crossing on the pontoon bridge that had been made out of lumber torn from some old warehouses. A crossing was effected during the night of the 13th (July). The river had fallen enough to justify fording by the infantry. Long- street's and Hill's corps crossed via the bridge, while Ewell's corps passed by the ford. The river was on another rise. The routes from the camps to the ferry and bridge, were through water-soaked fields. Through the dark night, large fires were kept burning to light the col- umns on their way. All night was consumed in efforts to pass the entire army. Many wagons stalled in the quagmire roads. This delay pre- vented Hill reaching the South side until about I o'clock on the 14th-all being safely over, save a few stragglers and disabled horses and men. Stuart remained on the North side to skir- mish with any advancing lines. It is natural for some to ask where was Meade from the 4th of July until the 15th. Eleven days frittered away with an army of untold numbers, half of which should have been able to inflict sufficient damage to Lee's retreating squadrons, that would have turned an orderly retreat into a rout; and the other half have sailed in and gathered up the broken regiments. Meade has undertaken to answer this through his official reports. But the Washington government had their faith shaken.
Meade felt the censure; and consulted some of his officers; but nothing was done until the 12th, when it was determined to move forward the next day. Had they done so, they would have caught Lee's army in the worst plight it had ever been-all in the mud, or in the Potomac on pontoons or ferry boats-with nothing to offer in return for shells from 200 guns that could have been planted to sweep the river by front or enfilade; and 15,000 cavalry to sweep by every obstacle offered by Stuart's worn-out horses and men.
Meade waited until the 14th before he got
391
GETTYSBURG
away; and moved cautiously, allowing the ad- vance to be halted several times, owing to some cavalry skirmishes between Kilpatrick and Stuart. During the retreat to Williamsport, the Confederate cavalry desperately fought over every foot of ground with the Federal cavalry under Fitzpatrick, whose men deserved the sup- port that Meade could so easily have given. Very often the wagon trains were in the grasp of Kilpatrick's numerous brigades, that seemed to be everywhere. The service rendered by the Confederate Cavalry during that retreat must go down in history as an example to men of this branch of any army, of what cavalry can ac- complish when handled by such leaders as Jeb Stuart and his veteran brigadiers. From Fair- field to Williamsport had been their battle- ground; through forest and glen, over fences, swollen streams, through clouds of dust, ending in quagmire on the Potomac in their final strug- gle, when Kilpatrick was beaten back and foiled in his persistent effort to capture the trains and produce rout in the Confederate infantry. In the numerous battles, Jones' brigade did valiant work. The 11th Virginia led by Col. Lomax, made some of the most desperate charges horse- men ever made with drawn sabres. They often bore down on many times their number, losing many brave men. Near Williamsport this regi- ment charged headlong into two Federal regi- ments; drove them from the field and brought back 100 prisoners. The 7th Virginia Cavalry, led by the gallant Col. Marshall, fought and overpowered the 6th U. S. Regulars, bringing back 60 prisoners. On this long battle line, all the cavalry under Stuart and Imboden, nobly did their part in this retreat-unparalleled in history for orderly movement under most try- ing circumstances.
On the 13th, Jones crossed the Potomac to take the front of Lee's Army and keep the Gen- eral informed of any attempt to intercept his further movements South. When the infantry corps left the defences on the North side, Stuart entered them and held back all night any advance of the enemy. The next day he withdrew and crossed his entire command to the Virginia side. The 12th regiment was not in the campaign, but was left at Harpers Ferry, and performed good service at that point. They were compelled to give way on the 14th, when a Federal force re- captured the place. This shows why Lee had Jones to cross into Virginia on the 13th and at once march to Charlestown, where he was in position to do such picket service as the situation required.
Genl. Rodes says in his report: "My division waded the river just above the acqueduct over the mouth of the Conococheague. The operation was a perilous one. It was very dark, rainy and
excessively muddy. The men had to wade through the acqueduct. The water was cold, deep and rising; and the lights on either side of the river were dim, just affording enough light to mark the place of entrance and exit. The cartridge boxes of the men had to be placed around their necks. The water was up to the arm-pits of a full-sized man. We crossed without loss except of some 25,000 or 30,000 rounds of ammunition, unavoidably wetted and spoiled. After crossing, I marched a short dis- tance beyond Falling Waters and then biv- ouacked; and there ended the Pa. Campaign."
A study of Genl. Lee's official reports indicates clearly that he intended to cross the Blue Ridge into Loudoun County, where he hoped to oppose Meade's crossing into Virginia; but the Shenan- doah was impassable by the floods. Meade did cross the Potomac below Harpers Ferry, and seized several of the passes, and moved along the eastern base of the ridge. This was intended to cut Lee off from Gordonsville and the rail- road. Longstreet was sent forward; crossed the Shenandoah with great difficulty, and prevented the Federals from occupying Manassas and Ches- ter Gaps, through which Longstreet passed July 24th and on to Culpeper Court House. Hill's Corps soon followed, and Ewell's crossed at Thornton's Gap further South.
August 4th, 1863, found the Army of Northern Virginia along the South side of the Rapidan; while the cavalry under Stuart remained at Cul- peper.
Meade with the Army of the Potomac, formed his lines along the Rappahannock.
To answer, what was the result of the terrible campaign? We subjoin the following tables. The totals given are from the official returns of both armies; but the Confederate returns are known to be very incomplete. The table was prepared by Genl. Edward P. Alexander, which the writer now takes the liberty to copy and enter at this point. It will preserve a convenient plan to show what brigades fought in the great battle; and some old comrades will be able to review memories, and associate themselves once more with the fighting squadrons.
GETTYSBURG Confederate Casualties. Approximate. By Brigades. McLaws' Division.
Commands
Killed Wounded Missing Total
Kershaw
115
483
32
630
Semmes
55
284
91
430
Barksdale
105
550
92
747
Wolford
30
192
II2
334
Cabell's Artillery
8
29
.. . .
37
313
1,538
327 2,178
392
CARTMELL'S HISTORY
Pickett's Division
Anderson's Division
Commands
Killed Wounded Missing Total
Wilcox
51
469
257
777
Armistead
88
460
643
1,19I
Mahone
8
55
39
I02
Kemper
58
356
317
731
Wright
40
295
333
668
Dearing's Artillery. .
8
17
25
Perry
33
217
205
455
Posey
12
71
. . . .
83
232
1,157
1,499
2,888
Hood's Division
Laws
74
276
146
496
Anderson, G. T.
105
512
54
671
Robertson
84
393
120
597
Benning
76
299
122
497
Archer
16
144
517
677
Davis
. 180
717
...
897
Garnett's Artillery ..
5
17
22
343
1,504
442
2,289
Alexander's Artillery
19
114
6
139
Washington's Artillery
3
26
16
45
Reserve Artillery ...
22
140
22
184
Aggregate of Ist Corps 910
4,339
2,240
7,539
Early's Division
Hays
36
201
76
313
Hoke
35
216
94
345
Smith
12
113
17
142
Gordon
71
270
39
380
Jones' Artillery.
2
6
....
156
806
226
1,188
Johnson's Division
Steuart, G. H ..
83
409
190
682
Cavalry
Hampton
17
58
16
91
Lee, Fitz.
5
16
29
50
Jones'
58
302
61
421
Jones
12
40
6
58
Jenkins' Artillery.
....
. .
229
1,269
375
1,873
Total Cavalry.
36
140
64
240
Rodes' Division
Daniel
165
635
116
916
Iverson
130
328
308
820
Doles
24
124
31
179
Ramseur
23
122
32
177
O'Neal
73
430
193
696
Carter's Artillery ..
6
35
24
65
421
1,728
704
2,853
Brown's Artillery ..
3
19
22
Nelson's Artillery ..
ยท
....
Reserve Artillery. ..
3
19
22
2nd Corps Totals .. .
809
3,823 1,305
5,937
100
477
577
Lane
.41
348
389
Thomas
16
136
....
152
Scales
102
323
IIO
535
Poague's Artillery. .
2
24
6
32
262
1,312
116
1,690
McIntosh's Artillery
7
25
32
Pegram's Artillery ..
IO
37
I
48
Reserve Artillery ...
17
62
I
80
3rd Corps Totals. ..
837
4,407
1,491
6,735
Nichol
43
309
36
388
Stonewall
35
208
87
330
Latimer's Artillery. .
IO
40
..
. .
50
Heth's Division
Pettigrew
190
915
1,105
Brockenbrough
25
123
...
148
Henry's Artillery ...
4
23
...
27
41I
1,905
534
2,850
Pender's Division
Perrin
147
1,128
840
2,115
Commands
Killed Wounded Missing Total
Garnett
78
324
539
941
..
. .
Lane's Artillery. ..
3
21
6
30
..
..
Aggregate Losses. .
2,592
12,709
5.150 20,451
The foregoing table does not embrace Imboden's Cavalry, who sustained losses on the extreme left; nor does it include Jenkins' Cavalry, nor the N. C. Brigade of Chambliss, nor White's Bat- tery, nor Chew's Battery. These commands sus- tained heavy losses, which will receive attention in another chapter. These omissions partly ac- count for the discrepancy between Genl. Alex- ander's Table of Casualties, and what is found in "Numbers and Losses in the Civil War," col- lected by Livermore, whose estimate is as fol- lows :
Total killed 3,903; Wounded 18,735: Missing 5,425; Total 28,063.
. . ..
8
.
GETTYSBURG
393
GETTYSBURG Federal Casualties. Approximate.
Command
Killed Wounded Missing Total
Ist Corps.
666
3,131
2,162
6,059
2nd Corps.
797
3,194
378
4,369
3rd Corps.
593
3,029
589
4,211
5th Corps
365
1,611
211
2,187
6th Corps.
27
185
30
242
1Ith Corps.
369
1,922
1,510
3,801
12th Corps.
214
812
66
1,082
Artillery and Cavalry Total
1,098
Aggregate
3,155 14,529
5365 23,049
A revision of losses now being made in the War Department, estimates an increase of losses at 55 per cent. Adding this to the ag- gregates above, show a large excess of loss over the Confederates, as given by Livermore. -
CHAPTER LXIV
LEE AND MEADE ON THE RAPIDAN Gen. Early in the Shenandoah Valley
The Army of Northern Virginia had ample time to reorganize while in camps along the Rap- idan; and it was marvellous to see how rapidly it rallied. No evidence of a defeated army. Officers and men regarded the Pennsylvania campaign a failure; but never doubted the ability of their great commander to lead them in any campaign he chose to map out. Meade seemed contented with the situation, and there rested with his many corps for several days; allowing Genl. Lee to send Longstreet to Tennessee to reinforce Genl. Bragg, while being pressed by Rosecrans. Lee, in summing up the situation as reported to the War Office, says he was called to Richmond the 23rd of August by the President; and there remained for two weeks in consultation regarding proposed changes; and that Sept. 9th, the first effort was made to get Longstreet away with five brigades. Some perti- nent questions have been asked the writer, for reasons of Meade's refusal to attack Lee; and in many cases has referred such to the pithy writings of Northern historians. We have not space for further notice of these historical facts, nor for mention of the historic slaughter at Chickamauga.
While the infantry divisions and batteries were quickly recruiting on the Rapidan, there was no rest for the cavalry under Stuart. He had re- organized his command, forming two divisions, with Generals Fitzhugh Lee and Wade Hamp- ton in command. Ashby's old brigade, Wm. E. Jones, Col., was assigned to Hampton. About the middle of September, this old brigade was dispatched towards the old Rapidan bridge, where a large force of Federal cavalry was crossing, with Col. Lomax of the 11th in com- mand. (Genl. Jones had been placed under ar- rest some two weeks previous by Genl. Stuart. This will be more fully noticed later.) Lomax had the 11th, 7th, 12th and 6th regiments and Chew's Battery. It was not long before the brigade encountered their old antagonists Kil- patrick and Buford; and held their two divis- ions in check for two hours near Culpeper C. H .; Chew and his famous battery doing great ser- vice with its well-timed shots. An infantry corps coming up to the support of Kilpatrick, Lomax fell back to another position, where he was joined by W. F. H. Lee's brigade, and for hours these
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