Shenandoah Valley Pioneers and Their Descendants: A History of Frederick County, Virginia., Part 61

Author: Cartmell, T. K. (Thomas Kemp), 1838-1920
Publication date: 1909
Publisher: [Winchester, Va.] : [Printed by the Eddy Press Corp.]
Number of Pages: 607

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CARTMELL'S HISTORY

attempts. Jackson was then moving rapidly to gain Port Republic. The army made good use of the 5th and 6th, but was compelled to halt at Cross Keys, a small village on Mill Creek, about S. W. from Harrisonburg. On the night of the 5th, Jackson had his wagon trains and prisoners with the army. The sick and wounded had been sent to Staunton. The Federals wasted no time in pursuit. The burned bridge was all that stood in the way of Fremont and Shields heading off Jackson. The lion was now at bay; and he was ready for Fremont, who came first. He alone, without Shields' help, opened the battle of Cross Keys on the 6th of June, 1862. Bayard dogged every step of the Confederates, and seemed determined to cross swords with Ashby. He recklessly rode in with about 1,000 cavalry upon a long wooded ridge, about 212 miles from Harrisonburg. The Confederates had chosen their position well, knowing that the Federals would follow, being sure of their game they had been hunting for nearly a week. Believing they outnumbered the Confederates, and that the time must soon come when they could boast of their prize of having killed or captured Ashby, the Bluecoats came charging to the point on the hill that had been prepared for them. Their drawn sabres proved a fatal error. The gray line advanced to the crest of the hill and poured volley after volley into their ranks. The line gave way; and then it was the Confederate cav- alry, following with blazing guns and yells, stampeded the whole command, who ran back nearly to Harrisonburg, losing 4 officers and 30 men killed and a number wounded, besides many horses carried back by the Confederates and several well-mounted officers. Subsequent events showed that the Federals had been led by an English officer who was seeking fame on an American battlefield. He was Percy Wyndham who commanded the First New Jersey Cavalry. He had frequently declared that he would cap- ture Ashby. One of the mounted officers proved to be this Wyndham. Wm. Mckeever and Jim Baker of Harness' Company, who brought the Englishman in, said he was the most crest- fallen prisoner they ever captured. This repulse brought Genl. Bayard out with a heavy force, which consisted of cavalry, several regiments of infantry, and batteries. Bayard was persistent and skillful. Throwing his entire cavalry into line in good order, well supported by steady lines of infantry, they boldly marched to good positions and planted their artillery. Being fully ready, they made a desperate charge, seeming de- termined to annihilate the cavalry that had an- noyed their advance up the Valley, and had an hour before repulsed them with such vigor. Ash- by had gone out to the two regiments Ewell

had sent him, the 58th Virginia and the Ist Maryland, and there led a charge that was to break the force of the Federal charge now bear- ing down on the thin line of gray troopers. The onset was terrific. The thin line was outnumbered, and was beaten back upon the two regiments which Ashby was leading with all his old-time spirit, urging the men to meet the shock. Dash- ing to the front, his horse was killed and he was thrown. For a moment he seemed stunned, but was on his feet at once, and rushed into the open space where some Confederates were cross-firing. His voice was heard above the din of battle, crying: "Charge, men; for God's sake, charge." They seemed to heed his cry; swept into the Federal lines, and drove them back. But their idolized chieftain had fallen with a bullet through his heart. The Federals could no longer hold out against that charge of brave men, now animated to avenge the death of the hero stretched out near the skirt of timber. When the cavalry fell back, they soon rallied and gave place for the infantry regiment to de- liver their terrible volley. The gray cavalrymen rushed to a position in the rear of the Federals, taking with them the light-horse artillery; and from their new position, rattled shot into the confused Federals, who broke up in disorder and fled from the field. During the night, they returned to Harrisonburg, leaving a number of dead and wounded on the field.

The news of Ashby's death soon found its way to his old squadrons, who rushed headlong to the place where he lay, surrounded by scores of men lamenting his death. But when his own men came, who had followed him through so many tight places and over a hundred fields, through mountain and stream, the scene was painfully pathetic. Some of his old comrades tenderly bore the lifeless warrior away. They knew not what to do. Finally it was determined to send his body to Port Republic. Jackson re- laxed his discipline enough to direct several of his followers to accompany their dead chief. He was temporarily buried in the old graveyard at that place the next morning, where he re- mained until his removal to Stonewall Ceme- tery at Winchester, where the tomb of the Ashby Brothers on each recurring Sixth of June is covered with flowers.

Jackson's main army remained in camp dur- ing the 6th and 7th of June, resting and wait- ing for new developments. During both days, however, large detachments of cavalry were re- quired to picket and guard the approaches to the Massanutton Mountain-Shields on the East and Fremont on the West-Jackson's bivouac camp was immediately South of the South end of the Massanutton range, in full view of the

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peak known as Peaked Mountain or Signal Moun- tain. Up to this time, neither Shields nor Fre- mont knew Jackson's position. In the evening of the 7th, a large infantry force while scout- ing, stumbled over one of Ewell's picket posts, near Cross Keys. This was one of Fremont's reconnoitering parties, which retired after firing a few wild shots. The Stonewall Brigade had been sent to Port Republic. The 7th of June was remembered as a day of extreme quiet. Wagon trains parked in the valley between the two rivers, extending South to Weyer's Cave. But Jackson had his eye on Shields in the Luray Valley, as well as Fremont's large camps around Harrisonburg. The two armies were now plan- ning for his capture. Shields was at Luray on the 6th, and sending word to Fremont that Jack- son must now be bottled up, as he was moving up the Valley and expecting to join him (Fremont) and surround the Rebel camp. The situation of Shields was well known to Jackson. He knew he had had trouble with the bridges at Luray and bad roads all through the Valley; that his army was stretched out in several sections, and that he could never get his entire army in posi- tion to give regular battle, without exposing one of his sections to attack. But the two armies were slowly coming together. Jackson had chosen the strongest position he ever held. Port Republic is situated at the point where two small rivers form the South River. One is the North Fork and the other the South Fork. Over the North Fork is a bridge for the road leading to Cross Keys and Harrisonburg .- No bridge over the South Fork. Just North of the bridge is high land, commanding the little valley lying out towards the base of the Blue Ridge. Through this valley Shields must come to make his at- tack. Artillery from the hills above the bridge could rake an army from every point; besides, the river was unfordable. But Fremont was coming; and he must be crippled before dam- aging Shields. Ewell was on the ground at Cross Keys on the 8th, with part of his division, about 6,000 men, 5 batteries and 500 cavalry. Fremont soon appeared, at 10 A. M., and opened 8 bat- teries on Ewell's position, which was strong. Ewell's reserves were 4 miles in the rear. Jack- son had not left Port Republic. A large force of cavalry was known to be at Conrads Store, and they could work along under cover, and possibly reach Port Republic unexpectedly. So he remained long enough to get a glimpse of the advance guard which suddenly appeared with a large force of cavalry and two batteries. This was a surprise to the Port Republic camp. They were soon repulsed, however. The whole force, losing heavily, fell back on the main army strug-

gling through the mud towards Luray. Jackson placed two brigades in position near the bridge and then hastened away to Ewell, taking the remainder of his army. Ewell's guns were plainly heard about four miles distant, where Fremont was pressing his Germans to their doom. Fremont failed to grasp the situation; for his official reports show that he sent only 5 regi- ments of Blenker's Dutch out of his 24 full regi- ments of infantry, large cavalry force and splen- did batteries. Part of Trimble's Brigade was in ambush (3 regiments) ; and at the proper time the Germans were swept from the field, and Ewell occupied the ground that night in full view of Fremont's beaten army. But it must not be accepted that the victory had been easily won. The losses indicate that some of the Fed- eral battalions fought bravely. The 8th New York lost nearly all of its men, while Trimble lost over 200 men. Federal official reports give their loss as 684 killed, wounded and missing. While Fremont was content to remain passive through that night, Ewell was preparing to with- draw and place himself in position to execute what Jackson would have for him on the mor- row. It will be shown later on how Fremont regarded the situation after his two unsuccess- ful attempts to whip Jackson and form junc- ture with Shields at Port Republic. Following Jackson from Ewell's front, we find him fully apprised of Shields' presence South of Conrads Store, marching on Port Republic. During the night, the Confederates were assembling for an attack on the army now taking positions in full view from the ridge above the bridge. The South Fork was now swollen and dangerous to ford, and required temporary pontoon bridges. This was supplied by collecting wagons and boards from citizens, and a rough but successful one was provided. Old citizens of the village pointed out to the writer the exact spot where this crossing was made, and the remnants of one of the old wagons used for that purpose that was dragged to the East side of the Fork and afterwards preserved. The army was astir at 5 o'clock the next morning; and by the time the Stonewall Brigade was over, Genl. Dick Taylor followed, and struck squarely towards level land on the Lewis farm. Ewell was also crossing the impromptu bridge, leaving one regiment of infantry and part of Ashby's old cavalry under Col. Munford on the West side of North Fork to watch Fremont. Col. Munford later on de- stroyed the bridge in time to prevent Fremont's advance column crossing in Jackson's rear. Jack- son with bold and fearless men, routed the Shields army before the main body appeared, as will be shown later on.

CHAPTER LIX

Battle of Port Republic, Etc.

Shields had been delayed in his march up the Luray Valley-his intention being to cross the Massanutten at Luray and join Fremont at New Market-leaving a small force South of Luray to intercept Jackson when he should attempt to escape through Swift Run Gap. His first plan was, as he dispatched Fremont, for the latter to press from Harrisonburg, and he Shields to cut his retreat about Port Republic. But Jack- son had retarded Shields' movements, by burning the bridges North of Luray, causing enough de- lay to enable Jackson to formulate his plans to defeat both in detail.

June 8th, while Ewell was engaging Fremont, Shields was at Luray, struggling with the bridges, but preparing to move on Port Repub- lic. Early in the morning, a splendid body of cavalry under Genl. Carroll, two regiments of mounted infantry, and several pieces of light artillery, left Conrad's Store and made a forced march of 16 miles to Port Republic; and there unexpectedly surprised themselves by surpris- ing Jackson-the latter having depended upon a weak detail of cavalry to keep him posted as to Shields. This detail was on the West side of the river North of McGaheysville, when Shields' advance went sweeping South. Some were dispatched to inform Jackson, arriving about the time the Federal column struck him near the bridge at the North fork of the South River, -Jackson barely escaping capture. Shields' two Brigades, Tyler's and Carroll's, with about six pieces of light artillery, seemed to be every- where; but Jackson soon brought order out of confusion; and with Carrington's battery, several detachments of cavalry and one company of in- fantry, a vigorous effort was made to stem the tide that threatened destruction. Reinforcements dropped in on their way to join Ewell, and a rout was skillfully produced in Shields' advance guard, who left every gun and many straggling prisoners and horses. Many troopers, throwing away their arms and accoutrements, returned to Conrad's Store in much disorder, where the two commanders endeavored to reorganize their com- mands and patch up a report to send Genl. Shields, who had made a bluff start to bring up his main army and reinforce Fremont. But he had sore difficulties to meet, Jackson had made the approach by Port Republic unsafe; and upon

the return of his column to Conrad's store, they found the wooden bridge over South River, about 1/2 mile West from the store (Millers Bridge) had been burned by the straggling cavalry, thus closing the only avenue from this point to Harri- sonburg. An incident occurred at Conrad's Store, while this advance guard was stationed there for several days. The author gives it as re- lated to him during the preparation of this work, by a gentleman who in 1862 was a half-grown boy and saw all that transpired. Genl. Carroll, he says, occupied the old Miller brick home- stead. Miller being a Southern man, was not around. A notorious Union man from the near- by mountain appeared at Headquarters and de- sired to see Mr. Miller or some member of his family. Mrs. Miller answered his call, where- upon he proceeded to inform her that the secesh property had been confiscated, and he had come to give the family notice that he had been told by the Union General that he could have the Miller farm as a reward for his services, and that he now would take possession in a few days, and the family must vacate at once. Mrs. Miller hastened to inform Genl. Carroll (who was in an adjoining room with several members of his staff) of the situation and asked what she should do. The General pointed to a pistol ly- ing on the table, and calmly said: Take that and go to the door and shoot him and I will pro- tect you. Mrs. Miller executed the order by firing two shots, the last striking the gate post as the man went over the fence at one bound. It is well to preserve the name of this Loyal- ist.

Shields' war blood was up, and he crowded everything he had to the front; and was on the plain around Conrad's Store when he received his dispatches. Tradition of the village, as related to the author, gives Shields credit for making military matters breezy for an hour, as he stood in his stirrups ejecting language that made his Irish veterans quail. The American vets so recently driven back from Port Republic, took their share of censure; and all rallied with new courage, as the glowing language fell from the lips of the hot-headed Irishman, who had been chafing under such restraints as bottomless roads, burnt bridges and other drawbacks. But now the crush must come, and with Jackson out

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BATTLE OF PORT REPUBLIC

of the way, he and his victorious army could press on to Charlottesville. The 9th of June found the three armies in such positions, that if Fremont and Shields could only have divined Jackson's tactics, and that morning hurriedly forced a combined attack, Jackson's army would have been crushed. But Fremont, unable to comprehend the engagement that ended the pre- vious evening, magnifying Jackson's forces and attack, was content on the memorable 9th to take time to consider. Jackson had long since measured the Pathfinder; and felt sure he could keep him in one position with a small force. So leaving Trimble and Patton with their brigades, to keep Fremont at safe distance, he himself during the night planned to have Ewell rejoin him at Port Republic, and then with his com- bined force meet Shields, on some well chosen ground. Though Jackson was apparently at times endowed with superhuman intelligence, as he determined the plans his foe would likely adopt, an experienced soldier surveying and studying these battle fields at this day, must con- clude the wonderful results were due to the masterful mind of a military genius. Fremont South of Harrisonburg, with his 10,000 infan- try, 2,200 cavalry and twelve batteries-all per- fectly equipped-held in check by the two weak brigades of not over 3,000 men all told-allowed Ewell to withdraw on the morning of the 9th and cross the river on impromptu bridges, rickety and dangerous to the host crowding over, to where Jackson was concentrating his available force to meet Shields' army, as it presented it- self on the ridges and plains about four miles North of Port Republic-many positions on what was known as the Lewis farm. The Federal force engaged up to 10 A. M. on the 9th has been variously estimated. Jackson's report gave them 4,400. Shields says the forward move- ment was conducted by skilled officers-1,200 cav- alry, 4,000 infantry, 22 pieces artillery. Civil- ians encountered during the day gave the force as 12,000. With his reserves between Conrad's Store and the battle ground, why Shields was not up with his entire force, and why Fremont with his legions did not sweep Trimble and Pat- ton out of his way and force his march over the river, as by II o'clock he was well supplied with pontoon bridges and every available means to cross the narrow river and strike Jackson while he was engaged with Shields. Why this was not done, can never be explained. Shields blundered in separating from his forward move- ment, and inability to give support. Had he given this support, it is doubtful if Jackson could have held his position; for he had already found it necessary to withdraw Trimble and Patton from Fremont's front. Then if Fremont had fol-

lowed their withdrawal, as he could so easily have done with half of his well equipped army, they could have saved the bridge that Patton took his last man over and then burned, in full view of the scouting cavalry who hastened back to report the situation to Fremont. This was about 9:30 A. M .- the battle raging on the East side of the river, with odds against the Con- federates at that hour-not too late then for Fremont to hasten with his battalions of artillery and strike Jackson in the rear. But he, with apparent composure, moved his columns-but ar- rived too late. He had shown some pretence of a forward movement during the early morning, while the Confederates were retiring. His re- ports show that he was wary-believing that Jackson was preparing an ambuscade for his command. He knew that Shields needed him. The administration after the campaign, proved in their correspondence that Shields had informed him as early as 10 o'clock that he had engaged Jackson and needed his support. His official reports state that his advance was stubbornly resisted, when it has been proven by many stu- dents of this campaign, that not a shot was ex- changed during the withdrawal of Trimble and Patton-the whole forenoon having been con- sumed in marching 7 miles. Carl Schurz says in his magazine articles that one of Fremont's staff officers told him, when he joined the com- mand a few days later, that when the General beheld the burnt bridge and groups of Federal prisoners and wounded in the plain beyond, he ordered his artillery to fire upon the retreating foe, killing several Federal prisoners, who had hoisted signals of distress. Fremont apparently chagrined at the dismal failure he and Shields made in their imbecile efforts to bag Jackson, fell back to his easy quarters at Harrisonburg, and sent in his famous report of the Valley Campaign. His unfitness to command an army had become well known to Lincoln and Stanton, and a change of commanders was desired by them; but Mr. Lincoln who often played politics, avoided Fremont's displeasure. Later on will be shown the scheme Lincoln adopted to bag Fremont, since he could be of so little use in bagging Jackson.

Shields' "forward movement force" was leaving the field in disorder, When Fremont hove in sight, which soon ended in a rout, which was fol- lowed by cavalry and light artillery for about 8 miles, to a point South of Conrad's store be- tween the mountain and South River, where Shields had hastily barricaded roads and thrown up some show of defence. And there the boast- ful General awaited the arrival of the mysterious Jackson. His official report of this battle must amuse as well as disgust the survivors of the

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two splendid brigades commanded by Generals Tyler and Carroll, who distinguished themselves in two attacks on Jackson. The Stonewall Bri- gade under Winder and the Louisianians under Genl. Dick Taylor, met soldiers and not Blenker's Dutch, when they struck the regiments of these brigades. Some of their own blood was in the Ohio and West Virginia troops-men who had fought bravely at Kernstown and won the dis- tinction of holding the battlefield while Stone- wall Jackson withdrew from the only field on which he was not victor. Jackson having accom- plished his great object, called off his pursuit of the Shields Army, and proceeded to bring his own brigades out of the confusion of this active campaign.

Fremont, as some old veterans may recall as they read this brief sketch of the Valley Cam- paign in 1862, will remember how incessantly Fremont's guns sent shells over the river to lodge somewhere, in the hope of helping some if sent home from his safe ridges overlooking the little valley. Jackson's orders sent out to officers, were for all troops to report at Browns Gap.

The most of this concentration was made dur- ing the night. The author could mention many tired, hungry and wounded men who fell on the grass when orders came to cease pursuit; and, forgetful of all else, slept until the next morn- ing's sun was high in the heavens, when the haversack was overhauled once more, and farm houses sought.

The army was soon in good shape; rigid dis- cipline enforced, and repairs to ragged and worn uniforms, as well as broken wagons, caissons, harness and lame horses, made. The cavalry saw no rest-watching Fremont across the moun- tain, and Shields at Luray. The army soon grew alert to some new movement of their vigilant cominander.

Jackson and his hard-worked army enjoyed their few days rest, while Genl. Munford with the old Ashby Cavalry, pressed flank and rear of Fremont, as he fell back on his old place Harrisonburg, leaving the vicinity of Port Re- public June 10th. Not one picket could be seen on the morning of the 11th, when the Cavalry crossed the river. Scouting parties were soon on the trail, and not long in discovering the beaten General strengthening his position. Gen- eral Munford distinguished himself that day and won the confidence of Ashby's followers. While not the dashing horseman of the Knight of the Black Plume, he displayed such skill in maneuvering his men in front of Fremont, that the latter became alarmed and fell back to Mt. Jackson, leaving valuable stores in camp, hospital supplies, and about 250 wounded. Munford

seemed inspired as a leader, to divine the thoughts and actions of his antagonist. He harassed the retreating forces on every road, boldly de- claring that Genl. Jackson was in close support, and Fremont must fight, run or be captured; that the Federals should have no respite until driven beyond the Potomac. The men caught his fer- vor and zeal; and when the morning of the 12th dawned upon the old tactician and his foot cavalry crossing the South River, and pressing toward a camp forming on Meridian Ridge, the whole Upper Valley was ablaze with new hope that Jackson was massing for a forward move- ment on the enemy's country, that he and his army regarded invincible. Besides officers and men declared that Genl. Lee was sending large reinforcements. This news spread like wild- fire, reaching Fremont's camp. He was seized with his old pain of consternation, and hastily withdrew to Strasburg. The reader should see his official reports to be able to appreciate his predicament. The great leader was deceived by a ruse practiced by Jackson, in this feint to cover his prearranged plan to leave the Valley and succor General Lee.

On the 14th, Fremont halted at Strasburg, not knowing what course to pursue. Banks was in Middletown, and he could not ignore him. He was doubtful about the route via Front Royal, for Shields-where was he. So the General contented himself with an effort to repair his losses and hold favor with Washington, where Lincoln and Stanton were maturing plans that would revolutionize the Valley Campaigns.

This being the last stand made by this Gen- eral, who had entered the Shenandoah country in May to capture Jackson, it may be well to briefly sum up a few incidents of his military career, as gathered from official records.

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Shenandoah Valley Pioneers and Their Descendants: A History of Frederick County, Virginia., Part 61

Author: Cartmell, T. K. (Thomas Kemp), 1838-1920 Publication date: 1909 Publisher: [Winchester, Va.] : [Printed by the Eddy Press Corp.] Number of Pages: 607

Author: Cartmell, T. K. (Thomas Kemp), 1838-1920
Publication date: 1909
Publisher: [Winchester, Va.] : [Printed by the Eddy Press Corp.]
Number of Pages: 607