USA > Vermont > The Lake Champlain and Lake George valleys, Vol. I > Part 22
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Carleton was now in possession of practically all of Lake Cham- plain and, as we have seen, the control of this waterway was essential to any British invasion of New York from the north. The unequal shipbuilding race which had blocked hostilities for so long was now over, and the American fleet destroyed. Carleton's spirits as he dreamed of the future were much brighter than they had been on the morning of October twelfth, when Arnold had temporarily escaped. He treated his prisoners with great kindness and finally sent them to Ticonderoga on condition that they should not fight again until they were formally exchanged. There is no question but that he was greatly impressed with their heroic conduct; but he also felt that he could afford to be magnanimous under the circumstances.
The fortifications at Crown Point were not formidable enough to withstand an assault by the British, and the patriots lost no time in withdrawing to Ticonderoga after they destroyed the works and removed the supplies at the northern post. Carleton promptly landed and took possession on both sides of the lake. He was anxious to continue on to Ticonderoga and had every intention of doing so, but the elements decreed otherwise. For eight days the south wind blew so hard that it was impossible for his ships to proceed. To anyone who has not seen Lake Champlain in an angry mood this may sound like exaggeration, but this historic waterway is apt to be extremely temperamental in the fall of the year, as many men have learned to their sorrow. This situation was naturally very pleasing to Gates, who was in command at Ticonderoga. Each day of delay was a great help to the American cause, as the patriots continued to strengthen their position. Furthermore, the early northern winter was not far away, and the British had no time to loiter if they were to accomplish much of anything in 1776. The wind could not last indefinitely, how- ever, and Carleton was able to approach Ticonderoga on the morn- ing of October twenty-seventh. He soon found that the American garrison was set to make a determined defense and that it would take time to pry Gates out of his position. Time, however, was some- thing the English did not have, to any considerable extent. Realizing that the season was now too late for a long campaign, the British com- mander withdrew to Crown Point and soon continued on to Canada,
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the Americans reoccupying the northern post on November third. Gates dismissed the militia and marched with the bulk of the regular soldiers to New Jersey to join Washington's army, leaving Anthony Wayne in command of Ticonderoga.
There has been a tendency to underestimate the importance of the Champlain Valley in the affairs of 1776. The long drawn-out duel for naval supremacy on the lake was of great significance. Arnold's fleet, although destroyed, had accomplished much. The building of his ships and the Valcour Island engagement had delayed and held back the projected English invasion for so long that when Pringle and Carleton finally did obtain control of the lake it was too late in the season to invade New York. As a result, Burgoyne's cam- paign did not come until 1777, the following year. By that time, the American army had a chance to successfully oppose him; an oppor- tunity which they did not possess in 1776. This year's delay was of immense importance to the patriot cause. But for the activities of Benedict Arnold on Lake Champlain, the English would undoubtedly have obtained control of all of New York and separated the thir- teen Colonies in two in 1776, dealing with the divided American forces at their leisure. In that case there might never have been an important American victory at Saratoga and possibly, not even a battle. Furthermore, the alliance with France might have been a mere dream and American independence a vain hope, for they were both greatly dependent upon the battle of Saratoga.
In the words of one historian :
"The battle of Lake Champlain was the first important naval engagement of the Revolution, and although it must be counted an American defeat, yet like the defeat of the American army at Bunker Hill, it was more than half a victory. It is true that the British loss was not so great as in the famous Massachusetts engagement, but the masterly skill displayed by Arnold against overwhelming odds, the steadiness and courage shown by rank and file, demonstrated alike to friend and foe that the Americans were at least the equal, man for man, of any fighting force in the world. Seldom has the personality of a commander so dominated an entire body of fighting men as did the gallant spirit of Benedict Arnold, which seemed to possess the officers and men of the little American fleet in the battle of Lake Champlain."*
*Crockett, Walter Hill: "A History of Lake Champlain."
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The importance of Arnold's fleet and the fierce battle at Valcour Island in the events leading up to the battle of Saratoga has been vividly portrayed by the great naval authority, Captain Mahan: "That the Americans were strong enough to impose the capitulation of Sara- toga was due to the invaluable year of delay, secured to them in 1776 by their little navy on Lake Champlain, created by the indom- itable energy, and handled by the indomitable courage of the traitor, Benedict Arnold. That the war spread from America to Europe, from the English Channel to the Baltic, from the Bay of Biscay to the Mediterranean, from the West Indies to the Mississippi, and ulti- mately involved the waters of the French peninsula of Hindustan, is traceable through Saratoga, to the rude flotilla which, in 1776, antici- pated the enemy in the possession of Lake Champlain. . . . Consid- ering its raw material and the recency of its organization, words can scarcely exaggerate the heroism of the resistance which undoubtedly depended chiefly upon the military qualities of the leader. . . . The little American navy on Lake Champlain was wiped out, but never had any force, big or small, lived to better purpose or died more glor- iously; for it had saved the lake for that year. Whatever deduc- tions may be made for blunders and for circumstances of every char- acter, which made the British campaign of 1777 abortive and disas- trous, and so led directly to the American alliance with France in 1778, the delay, with all that it involved, was obtained by the lake campaign of 1776."
Also extremely interesting is the comment of that great British historian, Sir George Otto Trevelyan: "He (Arnold) lost them a squadron which, but for his personal exertions, would never have been built; and he had lost it to some advantage. . . . Carleton had unduly delayed his onward movement out of respect for the prepara- tions which the Americans were making for his reception. . . . . Gunboats and galleys, in Arnold's view, were made to be expended just as much as cartridges ; and any fate would be better for his ships than to skulk away in front of the British advance until they were hunted up against the shore at the head of Lake George, and were trapped and taken, like so many wild fowl, in a decoy. For most assuredly, even at that late season of the year, Carleton would not have halted short of Albany, or New York itself, if the Americans, whether on lake or land, had made the ignominious confession that they were afraid of fighting. . It was something to know that"
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a leader existed who was eager to hurl himself at the enemy, and fight an almost desperate battle as vigorously and obstinately as if victory were not a bare chance, but a cheerful probability. Arnold's example aroused an outburst of enthusiasm and martial con- fidence throughout the states, and most of all among those of his countrymen who were nearest to the danger."
In the words of Sparks: "Arnold was sent out to meet the enemy. Whether he should fight or not, it is true, was left to his discretion. He chose the former, and was beaten; but not until he had main- tained a combat for half a day, against a force nearly double his own, and caused the enemy to retire. This fact is enough to prove that his position was judiciously chosen, and that the action on his part was skillfully fought. . .. .. With consummate address, he then pene- trated the enemy's lines, and brought off his whole fleet, shattered and disabled as it was, and succeeded at last in saving six of his vessels,"- and it might be added, most of his men.
Year after year, Lake Champlain's waves beat against the shore- line and often with the same wild abandon that marked the events of 1776 when Arnold forced the British lion to saunter back toward Canada, licking his wounds and with his appetite only partly appeased. Time has obliterated many of the memories connected with the his- toric waterway. True lovers of the Champlain Valley, however, can- not afford to forget the details concerning the spirited defense of the lake conducted by the patriots at Valcour Island and afterwards. In all the long history of old Champlain there does not exist any action more courageous. Often as I have sat in a flat-bottomed boat seeking to tempt finny treasures to approach my hook, my thoughts have been primarily with the past, and particularly with Lake Champlain's first naval battle. When the rumble of the Montreal train fades slowly away in the distance and the only sound is the lapping of the water, and the flapping of the fish at my feet, there comes a pleasant expec- tancy that at any moment the "Royal Savage" or the "Congress" may sail into view around the distant headland. They never appear except in fancy, it is true; but Lake Champlain would be lonely without their memory.
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CHAPTER XIV
The Capture of Ticonderoga by Burgoyne
Although Arnold's naval campaign had averted a British invasion in 1776, the following year was destined to witness a more formida- ble English effort to win control of the Champlain Valley and pene- trate to the Hudson. There was some apprehension at Ticonderoga that the redcoats might attack during the winter while the American garrison was at a minimum, but no such move was made. At that time, the condition of the patriot soldiers was wretched, and they burned up a formidable barricade for firewood. Their morale was so low that they could not have withstood a determined assault. Carleton and his fellow-officers, however, realized that military cam- paigns in the north country in the winter time were apt to be terrible affairs, as amply illustrated by the events of the French wars. ' The Canadians and Indians were accustomed to the privations and suffer- ing attending such expeditions, but the British regulars were of little use in the frozen wilderness. Carleton wisely decided not to molest the garrison under these circumstances.
In the French wars, it had been generally found that English gen- erals, regardless of past successes on the famed battlefields of Europe, were worthless when transferred to the wilderness of North America. Of course, there were certain exceptions to this rule, but Braddock, Loudoun, Abercrombie, Webb and others of their stripe were good samples. The same situation was to persist during the Revolution, although not to so great an extent. One of the exceptions in this war was Carleton, the British Governor of Canada. He understood the situation in America with great thoroughness, and comprehended the problems of wilderness fighting. He was not only an extremely able commander but a fine gentleman as well. He had his share of criti- cism, but much of it was undeserved. For example, after the Val-
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cour Island episode, he was exceedingly kind to his prisoners, caring for the wounded as if they were his own, praising their bravery, giv- ing them grog, and offering to send them home if they promised to remain neutral until formally exchanged. The Americans were so enthusiastic over their treatment by Carleton that they were not allowed to land at Ticonderoga for fear that their stories might undermine the morale of the garrison. For his kindness, the British commander was bitterly criticized by some of his compatriots; but if the other English generals had followed his generous example, that policy would unquestionably have been more effective, from the Brit- ish point of view, than the hiring of German mercenaries and the use of Indians to terrorize the frontier. Carleton was also bitterly criti- cized for his failure to lay siege to and capture Ticonderoga after the destruction of Arnold's fleet, but many of the fault-finders never visited Lake Champlain in the winter time and explained how men, unused to the wilderness, could have survived the cold while waiting for uncertain supplies of food and clothing to trickle over the many long miles of snowdrifts stretching from Montreal. It is doubtful whether the English government could have found in its whole army a general better equipped to succeed in conquering the Champlain Valley. In accordance with British practice of having mediocre com- manders, Carleton was displaced as the leader of the Canadian Army to make room for "Gentleman Johnny" Burgoyne.
Burgoyne was an unusual individual. He had many talents, and was proficient in certain fields. He had had military experience on the continent, was a member of Parliament and an author. Hand- some, and possessed of a winning personality, he was hard to resist. He has been accurately described as a dandy and "the spoiled darling of good fortune." Destiny seemed to smile on him and he was cer- tain of it. Achievement followed achievement without great effort, as he devoted himself to the frivolities of society and to dissipation. In London he might properly be called a social lion; in the Ameri- can wilderness he was much the same, although transplanted in an unfriendly environment. What he might have accomplished in New York State in 1777 if he had energetically devoted his entire ability to the suppression of the rebellion instead of living in an artificial world of his own creation-hampered by his easy accomplishments in the past and fettered by over-confidence-it is difficult to decide.
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In any case, his attention to the military campaign was neither keen nor continuous. The appointment of this friendly, likable person- ality in place of Carleton was good news to the Americans, although there is no intention here of exaggerating Burgoyne's responsibility for the failure of the 1777 campaign, as has so often been done.
Burgoyne spent the winter in England, drinking the waters at Bath and enjoying the society of the fashionable and the great. Upon request he composed a memorandum for the King and his cabinet set- ting forth his ideas for the 1777 campaign. He urged the conquest of the Champlain Valley and the formation of a junction with Howe's army on the Hudson. It is interesting to note that the Canadian Army was to consist of one thousand Indians and two thousand inhabi- tants of Canada. Burgoyne also recommended an expedition to proceed by way of Lake Ontario and Oswego to the Mohawk as a diversion. These were the ideas on which the British campaign was actually based, although there is no disposition on my part to claim that his thoughts were original. The geographical and military advantages of the Champlain and Hudson valleys were quite obvious. The campaign of the French wars had not been forgotten, and the importance of the watery avenue of conquest was vivid in the minds of men. New York State also had a large Tory population which was presumably anxious to welcome and assist British armies. In addition, the loyalty of the French in Canada to the throne of George III was in serious doubt, but would be buttressed by the presence of armies of redcoats in their midst or between them and the Americans. It was decided that Burgoyne should lead the army up Lake Cham- plain, that Howe should move up the Hudson, and that St. Leger should advance from the west along the Mohawk. When this should be accomplished, the New England States would be cut off from the other Colonies, making it possible for the two sections to be dealt with separately. Furthermore, the main gateway for any Colonial invasion of Canada would be closed while the front door to the continent of North America, as New York City might be called, would be com- pletely under the paw of the British lion. The narrow fringe of American states, spread out along the seacoast, would then have little chance of escaping the wrath of the House of Hanover. The plan was simple, and perhaps Burgoyne felt that it was too simple to require his close attention. That may partially explain why, when
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he finally did lead his expedition up Lake Champlain, his thoughts were as much concerned with his liquor, women, and personal belong- ings as they were with the enemy.
Burgoyne finally arrived in Quebec on May sixth. He had feared that Carleton would be troublesome, and the Governor had some reason to feel offended. Carleton, however, was above petty jealousy and received the blow like the great man he was. The success of the British Army depended to a certain extent on the cooperation received from the Governor, and Burgoyne was given every assistance. The new commander afterward testified that no one could have done more to help him. Carleton's patriotism was a great contribution towards his success. Burgoyne had his problems, however. He had expected to receive assistance from the French inhabitants of Canada, but they were not greatly interested in the war. They had little cause to risk their lives in the English feud, particularly without a relig- ious reason. Only one hundred and fifty could be persuaded to enlist, and their enthusiasm was so limited that there was doubt of their value in battle. Not only were Canadians lacking for Bur- goyne's army, but they were slow in supplying horses and carts for the expedition, with the result that the means of transportation were inadequate. Carleton and Burgoyne both underestimated, to their sorrow, the difficulty of obtaining the necessary horses and carts. Another problem confronting the British commander was the fact that his plans were generally known by the population of Montreal. Under the circumstances there seemed little doubt but that news of his projected campaign would penetrate the wilderness and reach the American lines.
Burgoyne's array was far from being the largest army to be assembled in this area and was not to be compared in size with Abercrombie's huge force which made its way down Lake George in 1758 to attack Ticonderoga from the south. Nevertheless, there is little doubt but that it was the most important army ever associated with Lake George or Lake Champlain, destined as it was to partici- pate in the great battles of Saratoga which were to prove decisive in the struggle for American liberty. Because of the momentous conse- quences attending Burgoyne's campaign, and because of the fact that the failure of his expedition was determined, to a considerable extent, by events that occurred before he arrived at Saratoga, the story of
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his progress up Lake Champlain and then through the wilderness to the Hudson will be discussed in greater detail than most military episodes.
We have already noted that only one hundred and fifty Cana- dians could be enticed to enlist under England's banner. The num- ber of American Tories was also a disappointment to the British com- mand, only one hundred of these partisans appearing to take up arms; but it was confidently expected that when Burgoyne approached the American settlements there would be considerable additions to their strength. In the third place, the Indian contingent was less than
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RUINS OF FORT GEORGE, LAKE GEORGE
expected, and numbered about four hundred. The bulk of Burgoyne's army was composed of British regulars and hired German troops, the former numbering approximately four thousand, two hundred, and the latter three thousand, three hundred and fifty. In all, there were five separate contingents comprising the British forces, a situation that was to prove a considerable handicap to Burgoyne. The regu- lars were not destined to cause him much trouble, although they were not trained for wilderness fighting. Neither were the Tories nor the Canadian forces problems. However, his other two contingents,
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consisting of the Germans and the Indians-particularly the latter- presented difficulties.
The bulk of the Germans had been raised by the Landgrave of Hesse and the Duke of Brunswick among the people of their prov- inces, and their services sold to the English King in order that their rulers might live in luxury. Drafted against their will, and torn from kin and country, these unfortunate Germans were sent to England, poorly clothed for warfare, to fight in a war concerning which they knew nothing whatever, and to give their life-blood in order that their lords and masters might purchase bigger and better pleasures and engage in more extensive and extravagant dissipation. During the winter in Canada, they suffered considerably from their lack of clothing and from homesickness. Having no interest in the outcome of the war except to save their own necks, they were told of the hor- rible things the Americans would do to them if they were captured. In this way the British officers aroused their concern over the outcome of the campaign. The Germans were interested in killing Americans only as a matter of self-protection. They were also slow in their movements; part of which was natural and part of which was due to encumbrances of clothing and equipment. They could not be used for delicate, rapier-like military maneuvers. The hiring of mercenary soldiers in that day was a common practice, but the use of Germans in the English family quarrel tended to stiffen the American determi- nation to win, and to increase the gulf between the Mother Country and her former colonies. In spite of these factors, the Germans were important to Burgoyne. They were, in general, a courageous group of men. In addition, they were so thoroughly imbued with orthodox German discipline that they could be depended on to follow their officers anywhere. Although their slowness was exas- perating to Burgoyne on occasion, their presence was generally rather comforting. And if any other group of men were equipped like the dragoons, their movements would not be very rapid either. There were two hundred and fifty soldiers in this unfortunate group. No horses could be found for them in Canada, with the result that they were forced to serve on foot. For shoes they had huge jackboots weighing over twelve pounds a pair, while a large spur was buckled on each. Their breeches were of stiff leather, and their gauntlets, reaching high up on their arms, were of leather as well. Their scab-
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bards weighed three and a half pounds, and they carried both long swords and heavy carbines. On their heads were enormous cocked hats, decorated, each with a long plume. Down their backs trailed their hair in long queues. Certainly they could not have been rea- sonably expected to make very rapid movements.
Last, but far from least, of Burgoyne's problems was concerned with his contingent of redskins. When not drunk, they made excel- lent scouts. When the army moved up Lake Champlain they ren- dered invaluable service to the English in this respect. They were so effective that the American commander at Ticonderoga had prac- tically no knowledge of the size of the invading forces until they were within gunshot, in spite of the fact that this information was wide- spread among the lukewarm Canadians. Nevertheless, it would have been far, far better for Burgoyne if he had left them behind when he set out. Great as was the American indignation over the use of German mercenaries, it was nothing compared to the flame of wrath that swept the thirteen Colonies when the employment of the scalping knife became known. Later, when the red fiends finally began their bloody work, we shall see how a tidal wave of resentment was begun which helped considerably to engulf him and his army at Saratoga. Not only in America, but in England, as well, did the employment of Indians hinder the efforts of George III to crush the rebellion. The war was a family affair, with Englishmen fighting against Englishmen; and blood is thicker than water. Furthermore, many British statesmen, as well as large numbers of the British peo- ple, were decidedly lukewarm towards the attempts of their govern- ment to chastise the American Colonies. Certainly English public opinion was not bitter enough to countenance the scalping and tortur- ing of helpless women, children and old men. Thus, Burgoyne's use of Indians not only aroused the patriots to herculean efforts, but also caused dissension at home. The objection was not so much to the use of Indians as it was to the type of use. When employed as scouts or on the battlefield few disapproved, but when used to terrorize the countryside with tortures and the scalping knife, there were few who championed them. There is no question but that George III and Bur- goyne expected to engage the red men primarily to terrorize and bully the American Colonists into submission, and there is no doubt but that the savages did what their masters expected of them; but the
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