USA > Vermont > The Lake Champlain and Lake George valleys, Vol. I > Part 30
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CHAPTER XVIII
The Champlain Valley in the War of 1812
Relations between the United States and England continued to be stormy after 1783. The insolence and aggression of our former Mother Country, while attempting to maintain her position as mistress of the seas, led to repeated crises. Ill feeling was not decreased by the inciting of Indians against American frontier settlements so that the valuable fur trade should continue in British hands. In spite of bitterness between the two nations, however, year after year passed without resort to war. Throughout a long period of abuse at the hands of both England and France, the infant American republic exercised great patience. Yet in 1812, at a time when our grievances were less acute than usual and events in Europe pointed to an early solution of the problems, war was finally declared. Under the cir- cumstances it was a needless war. England did not wish to fight and two days before Congress declared war, Lord Castlereagh announced that the Orders in Council, which had interfered with American com- merce, would be repealed. Since there was no cable in those days, this last development was not known in Washington in time to avert war.
To understand why our country lost patience and decided to fight when relief was at hand, we must inquire into our domestic politics, for the conflict was primarily a party war. The aristocratic elements of the population, constituting the Federalist party, looked upon Napo- leon Bonaparte as anti-Christ, and endorsed Pickering's toast: "The world's last hope-Britain's fast-anchored isle." The ships halted on the high seas by England, and the sailors impressed, were pri- marily Federalist, but the commercial barons of New England were willing to endure some insults so long as they could make money. On the other hand, the Republican party was rabidly anti-British.
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The lower classes that constituted this party, particularly the frontier population, had no lucrative trade with the English to make them forget insults to the flag. The Republicans were rabid nationalists and, although their President was Madison, their real leaders were the two great "war-hawks," Henry Clay and John C. Calhoun. Clay announced that "the militia of Kentucky alone are competent to place Montreal and Upper Canada at your feet;" while Calhoun exclaimed : "So far from being unprepared, Sir, I believe that in four weeks from the time a declaration of war is heard on our frontier, the whole of upper Canada and a part of lower Canada will be in our power." In addition, their eyes were on Florida. Thus it was that when the war resolution was introduced in June, 1812, the Republicans' Congressmen representing the planters and farmers of the South and West, voted for war with England; while the Federalist spokesmen of the commer- cial Northeast were opposed. The War of 1812 was, therefore, pri- marily a party war, and continued to be assailed by the Federalists until the Peace of Ghent. They refused to support it either with money or with men, at least to any really important extent.
Both New York and Vermont shared the opposition of their sec- tion to the war. From the passage of the Embargo Act, which had shut off foreign trade, there had been widespread smuggling in the Cham- plain Valley. Lawbreaking had become customary, with numerous sensational affairs taking place between smugglers and customs offi- cials. After the Nation finally drifted into war, New York and New England refused to let their militia serve outside their own boundaries, denounced the conflict openly, and even sold food sup- plies to British armies in Canada. The strength of popular opposi- tion to the war in New York is partly indicated by the fact that DeWitt Clinton, the most powerful political figure in that State, joined the Federalists. In November, 1812, he was the presidential candidate opposed to Madison's war policy and won eighty-nine elec- toral votes, compared with his opponent's one hundred and twenty- eight, receiving all his support from the New England and Middle Atlantic States. It is interesting to note that this New Yorker did not win Vermont's voter. It is understandable why this relatively new State, primarily an agricultural community, was not so thor- oughly steeped in Federalist doctrines as its neighbors, yet we can- not be very much surprised to see the Republicans overthrown in
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the following year, 1813. Some wavering was to be expected between political faith and sectional feeling, and a New Yorker named Clin- ton was bound to complicate the issue somewhat.
It was evident to England that the Northeastern States were inclined to be friendly to her, and as early as 1809, the Governor of Canada sent an emissary named John Henry to do missionary work among the New England Federalists. He was at first very much pleased with the discontent which he found at Burlington and other Vermont towns, and felt that the State would follow the lead of Massachusetts in resisting the administration at Washington. Later, however, after a more thorough survey of public opinion, considerable patriotic sentiment was revealed and he finally decided that the Ver- monters could not be relied on to assist him. British efforts to detach the New England States failed, although much of the population remained very cool toward Mr. Madison's war. This opposition to the war on the part of so many New Englanders, however, should not blind us to the fact that a large number of settlers from Vermont and northern New York rendered valuable service to their country's cause. Perhaps the danger of invasion by the British tended to increase their ardor.
Contrary to Calhoun's proud boast, his country was unprepared for war. In addition to all the weaknesses so characteristic of revo- lutionary days-such as the dependence upon militia and the absence of cooperation among the states-there were other defects. The generals were inexperienced and unfit, while Congress failed to unify the command under one leader. As a rule, the contractors who sup- plied food, clothing and ammunition to the armies were dishonest parasites. When the war started there were only five thousand Brit- ish soldiers in Canada, but so crippled was Madison's administration by dissension and glaring weaknesses that it was never able to destroy them.
Lake Champlain once more occupied a position of importance in the strategy of the contending powers. As in previous wars it not only represented the natural route for an American invasion of Can- ada, but also for a redcoated attack on the United States. In spite of the lack of preparedness on the part of our country, the govern- ment decided to attack Canada at four points; at Kingston, where Lake Ontario narrows to the river; at both the eastern and western
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ends of Lake Erie; and from Lake Champlain down to the St. Lawrence River and Montreal. In spite of all the weaknesses so evident in the American Army, the government was serenely confident of easy success. Considering the manpower available it did not seem as if the enemy troops in Canada, which during the entire war never exceeded seventeen thousand in number, could be a serious obstacle to American nationalism. The million or more male white citizens of military age who inhabited our country in 1812 certainly made the war unequal from the numerical point of view. The administration can be pardoned for its misplaced confidence in an easy victory. None of the expeditions, however, worked out as planned. Each one of the four American plans failed because of quarrels among generals, lack of teamwork among the armies, the opposition of the anti-war party, or the refusal of the militia to leave their own states. On August 16, 1812, William Hull, Governor of Michigan Territory, in a panic surrendered Detroit, without striking a blow, to seven hundred British troops. On the Niagara frontier, a small American force under Gen- eral Van Rensselaer crossed the Niagara River, attacked Queens- town Heights, and with success repulsed repeated attacks by the Brit- ish and by savages under Joseph Brant, the Mohawk chief. General Brock, the most celebrated soldier in Canada, fell mortally wounded while leading an assault on this American force. The affair ended in disaster, however, due to the refusal of the remainder of Van Rensse- laer's militia to go to the aid of their heroic comrades, claiming that they were not obliged to leave the soil of their own country. Such was the disgust of the American general that he resigned his com- mand. When we consider the results of the Champlain Valley sec- tion of the campaign, we find them fully as disheartening. About the first of September, General Bloomfield had a force of eight thousand troops at Plattsburgh, while additional detachments were stationed nearby. Later, Major-General Henry Dearborn arrived to assume command. On November sixteenth he moved toward Canada with three thousand regulars and two thousand militia. When he approached Lacolle he met a force of British, Canadians and Indians under De Salaberry. On the twentieth, at dawn, occurred a strange episode which was, at the same time, the major event of the campaign. A detachment of troops under Colonel Zebulon Pike, who later dis- covered Pike's Peak, surrounded a British blockhouse. In the mean-
(Courtesy of the Champlain Valley Council)
COMMODORE MACDONOUGH'S VICTORY AT THE BATTLE OF LAKE CHAMPLAIN
Fought in Plattsburgh Bay, September 11, 1814. Last naval engagement between English speaking people. (From a painting by J. O. Davidson ). This painting is displayed in the foyer of the City Hall.
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time another detachment, composed of New York militia, approached the same place. In the dim morning light, each American force believed the other to be composed of British troops. For half an hour these two detachments fought fiercely without realizing that they were supposed to be friends. Finally the stupid error was dis- covered but it was too late, for De Salaberry was seen approaching with an overwhelming force. For a time it seemed that the Ameri- can detachments would be completely annihilated, but by a fierce attack they managed to open an avenue of escape, although they left great numbers of dead and wounded on the field of battle. Dear- born's army was naturally disheartened by the events of the day and retreated to Plattsburgh. The commander was charged with incom- petency and in the following year was superseded. Considered as a whole we must regard the military campaigns of 1812 as exceedingly clumsy in execution and entirely barren of favorable results. Ameri- can losses of men and material far exceeded those of the British. The events of the year indicated that the Madison administration was not justified in believing the conquest of Canada could be accom- plished by a holiday parade.
The campaign of 1813 was, in general, to be more successful from the American point of view. In the West, Captain Oliver Perry won a brilliant naval victory on Lake Erie in September, while in the fol- lowing month, General William Henry Harrison won back all that Hull had lost, by defeating the enemy severely in the Battle of the Thames. Tecumseh was slain and Proctor, the British commander, barely escaped capture. On Lake Ontario and Niagara River the strife swayed back and forth. In April, an American force captured Toronto with its great military stores. Returning from this raid, the Americans, led by Winfield Scott, captured Fort George near Niagara and held it until December. At this time all possible troops were withdrawn from the Niagara frontier with the result that the British recovered their earlier losses, and the entire countryside was terrorized by Indian warfare. Also, in 1813, occurred the fine defense of Sackett's Harbor, which contained the main American military supplies on Lake Ontario. The garrison was composed of New York volunteers under General Jacob Brown, Prevost with a strong force not succeeding in conquering them. The most con- spicuous failure of 1813 occurred in the Champlain Valley. On July
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thirtieth, General Wade Hampton assumed command of the Ameri- can troops there. On September nineteenth, he left Cumberland Head with a force of four thousand men for an attack on enemy posts on the Richelieu River. After advancing by way of Chazy and Cham- plain as far as Odelltown, Quebec, he found that the water supply there was short because of drouth. He then retired to Champlain; from whence he advanced to Chateaugay Four Corners. Here he loitered for tweny-six days. On October twentieth he crossed the border only to be beaten by a small body of enemy troops. Then it was finally decided that since winter was near at hand further advance was undesirable and the entire army returned to Plattsburgh. Altogether the matter was a distinctly inglorious affair. In fact, the war as conducted in the Champlain Valley for the first two years of the conflict leaves much to be desired.
The next year, 1814, was to be of greater importance than its immediate predecessors. England had finally succeeded in ridding herself of the Napoleonic menace and the French Emperor abdicated on April eleventh. England was now free to direct her entire atten- tion to America. Across the seas came her best armies and navies to crush the young republic once for all. Unless the United States improved considerably in fighting ability, the Mother Country was destined to succeed. In the south the redcoats pressed onward until stopped by General Andrew Jackson at New Orleans in January, 1815. On the Atlantic coast, New York was blockaded, Washington was burned and Long Island was ravaged. The most threatening of the British expeditions, however, resulted from the reinforcements sent to Canada. On the Niagara frontier the fighting taking place in 1814 was terrific, with the Americans under Generals Brown and Scott giv- ing fine accounts of themselves at Chippewa Creek and Lundy's Lane. In the Champlain Valley, the British were also destined to fail, their strategy not succeeding at any point.
The projected conquest of Lake Champlain was to be accom- plished by a combined attack by land and water. The army, under the leadership of Sir George Prevost, contained from fourteen to fifteen thousand British veterans, many of whom had served under the Duke of Wellington in the Napoleonic wars. Without doubt it was the finest British Army ever sent to America in any war. Prevost accomplished the crossing of the Canadian wilderness without great
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difficulty, although his army was twice as large as Burgoyne's. The naval forces were under the command of Captain George Downie and, when complete, included sixteen vessels, aggregating 2,402 tons, with over nine hundred men and ninety-two guns. The commander's ship, the frigate "Confiance," was far superior to anything the Ameri- cans had to offer.
As was the case with the English, the Americans had to prepare to fight both by land and by water. When complete their fleet aggre- gated less tonnage than that of the enemy, and contained less men, guns and ships. In command was Lieutenant Thomas Macdonough. When he took charge of Lake Champlain in September, 1812, the American naval force there consisted only of two gunboats and these were in a poor condition. Realizing that control of the Champlain Valley rested largely on the maintenance of naval supremacy, he made strenuous efforts to strengthen his fleet. He encountered adversity in 1813 when a subordinate, Lieutenant Sidney Smith, disobeyed orders by taking part of his ships down the Richelieu River. Fight- ing the British and, at the same time, a fierce south wind, Smith was severely beaten, but this failed to discourage Macdonough. Before he was prepared to fight, the British tried to tempt him to gamble, but were not successful. Although Colonel John Mur- ray raided Plattsburgh, inflicting considerable damage, and although later another force bombarded Burlington, the young American com- mander refused to be lured into error. During the winter of 1813-14, his fleet was in winter quarters at Vergennes on Otter Creek. This was a fine position, being far enough up the narrow and crooked stream to be safe from attack from the lake. To prevent a possible British attempt to bottle up the American fleet in the river by sinking boats at the mouth, Fort Cassin was erected at the entrance and named in honor of Lieutenant Cassin, an American naval officer who repulsed an enemy attack on the fleet. Vergennes was a regular beehive of activity during these winter months. Macdonough made full use of the eight forges, blast furnace, air furnace, rolling mill, wire factory, and grist, saw and fulling mills located here, as well as the iron obtained from nearby Monkton, and the timber from the surrounding hills. During the following summer the American fleet guarded the mouth of the Richelieu to prevent British ships entering the lake, but the enemy, realizing that for the time being Macdonough
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was probably too powerful for them, made no move to advance, being content to build additional ships at Isle aux Noix.
Meanwhile, let us examine the land forces collected by the United States to face Prevost's fine army. Immediately we come once more to the old story of incompetence and inefficiency so characteristic of our Nation's military conduct of the War of 1812. It is true that the appointment of General George Izard to the command of the American troops was a good choice, but when he arrived at Lake Champlain on the very eve of the English invasion he found every- thing in a deplorable condition of unreadiness and inefficiency. His six thousand men were vastly inferior to the British in both num- bers and experience. While he was struggling to improve his army and strengthen the fortifications at Plattsburgh and Cumberland Head, American chances of victory received a stunning blow. In spite of the fact that Prevost's intentions were known, Secretary of War Arm- strong suddenly ordered the harassed Izard to lead four thousand of his troops to the Niagara frontier to assist Jacob Brown. Izard pro- tested vigorously but in vain. Although he felt certain that his depar- ture would result in the speedy capture of the American fortifica- tions, he reluctantly obeyed orders, but halted at Lake George two days in the hope that they might be revoked. Then, advancing by way of Schenectady and the Mohawk Valley, he finally arrived at Sackett's Harbor in September. With the unfortunate departure of these troops, Brigadier-General Alexander Macomb was left with the unenviable duty of defending Plattsburgh against Prevost's vet- erans. In alarm, he asked for reinforcements. Governor Chitten- den, of Vermont, did not consider that he had the necessary authority to order the militia of his State into service in New York, but did the next best thing and called for volunteers. They responded quickly, and by September eleventh a large number of Vermont militia were in Macomb's camp. At the same time New Yorkers rallied to the colors. Yet when Prevost approached, the American force consisted of less than four thousand assorted regulars, militia and volunteers.
As the inevitable clash between Americans and British approached, it became more and more apparent that the outcome would be depend- ent upon naval supremacy. Although Macomb commanded an army vastly inferior to that of the enemy, his men were strongly intrenched, a series of defenses barricading the passage between the lake and the
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mountains. In time Prevost could have overpowered them, but every gain would have been costly. There was also the possibility that the constantly arriving American reënforcements would in time surround him as they had Burgoyne. Of still greater importance, however, was the indisputable fact that the capture of Plattsburgh would be of little value so long as Macdonough controlled the lake. From the American point of view, naval supremacy was fully as important. If the Eng- lish possessed control of the lake, Macomb's army would be far out on a limb, and American soil would be wide open to the British inva- sion. The result was an important naval battle. Although the main American plans for the war had been based upon military conquest, and little thought had been given to challenging the greatest naval power in the world in her most natural element, events in the Cham- plain Valley in September, 1814, once again demonstrated not only the amazing inefficiency of our military department but, also, the even more astounding success on water. From most points of view the War of 1812 was a queer episode in our history. As the opposing forces lined up for battle, it is interesting to speculate how many of the inhabitants of northern New York and Vermont who had been selling beef and other food to the British invaders at the last moment joined the American defenders.
Macdonough's ships were stationed in Plattsburgh Bay. Finally, Downie, in response to urgent requests from Prevost, rounded Cum- berland Head prepared to wage the decisive conflict on the beautiful Sunday morning of September eleventh. Soon a fierce battle was raging. The huge "Confiance" under command of Downie locked horns with Macdonough's own ship, the "Saratoga." One-fifth of the crew of the American ship was disabled by the first blast of the British guns. To encourage his men, Macdonough jumped from the quarter- deck to take a hand himself. He was knocked senseless by a frag- ment of spar on one occasion, and hurled across the deck when the head of his gun captain hit him, after it had been severed from the body by a shot; but the American commander refused to give up. With nearly all of the guns on the "Saratoga's" starboard silenced and her decks covered with blood, Macdonough turned his ship around so that he could bring his other guns to bear on the Brit- ish. The "Confiance" was far from escaping unscathed, however. Downie himself was dead, half the crew was disabled, a hundred and
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five shots had riddled her hull, her rigging was in tatters, and at last the huge British flagship struck her colors. The American com- mander's fine example had been followed by the remainder of his fleet and after two hours had passed, Lake Champlain was in friendly hands. Although some British ships escaped, the Royal Navy as such had ceased to exist on Lake Champlain. Macdonough had raised himself to a place among the leading personalities connected with the valley. In spite of the fact that Perry had won fame for the rapidity with which he had built his Lake Erie fleet, the victor of the battle of Plattsburgh Bay had built larger ships in less time. Once prepared, he had chosen the position of battle well and then in one of the fiercest of all naval battles he had exterminated a superior fleet in a short time. In a grave national crisis he had risen to the emergency.
With the destruction of Downie's fleet, Prevost found himself in a difficult position. The opening of the naval battle had been the signal for the British Army to assail the defenses of Plattsburgh. Most of this land action had centered around attempts to cross the Saranac River. At two bridges the advance of the redcoats had been halted by American regulars firing from behind their barricades, while the only British success had been achieved at a ford above Plattsburgh where Prevost was faced by volunteers and militia. A considerable number had crossed the river at this point when news arrived of Macdonough's victory. This so disheartened the British and encour- aged Macomb's militia that the redcoats were driven back. Prevost was overwhelmed by the unexpected events of the day. Now that the fleet was destroyed, Plattsburgh offered few advantages to him. He had lost two thousand, five hundred men by casualties, capture and desertion, whereas the American loss was insignificant. The vet- erans who had defeated Napoleon now became filled with panic and began a wild retreat, seeking to escape the Yankee yeomen. Through- out the night they hurried northward, abandoning the sick and wounded, and leaving large quantities of stores and munitions behind. By dawn, the panicstricken redcoats had covered ten miles, and con- tinued to retreat so rapidly that the Americans were unable to catch up with them. There is no question but that retreat was the proper move for Prevost. To remain at Plattsburgh was to risk Burgoyne's fate. On the other hand there was no excuse for the manner in which the retreat was conducted. It is difficult to explain an experienced
MACDONOUGH MEMORIAL MONUMENT, PLATTSBURGH Opposite City Hall
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