USA > Vermont > The Lake Champlain and Lake George valleys, Vol. I > Part 9
Note: The text from this book was generated using artificial intelligence so there may be some errors. The full pages can be found on Archive.org (link on the Part 1 page).
Part 1 | Part 2 | Part 3 | Part 4 | Part 5 | Part 6 | Part 7 | Part 8 | Part 9 | Part 10 | Part 11 | Part 12 | Part 13 | Part 14 | Part 15 | Part 16 | Part 17 | Part 18 | Part 19 | Part 20 | Part 21 | Part 22 | Part 23 | Part 24 | Part 25 | Part 26 | Part 27 | Part 28 | Part 29 | Part 30 | Part 31 | Part 32 | Part 33 | Part 34 | Part 35 | Part 36 | Part 37 | Part 38
Dieskau attacked with bravery and determination, but with little success. The Canadians and Indians seemed to be continually out of control, scattering through the woods without direction, and his force of French regulars was entirely too small to carry the English bar- ricades. For over four hours the terrific fighting lasted as Dieskau conducted repeated assaults, but whether he directed them against the center, left, or right, his efforts ended in failure. Johnson's inex- perienced men continued to hold their positions. The English, as well as the French, had difficulty with their red allies who did little except to utter a few war whoops, but they were not as dependent upon the assistance of the Indians as was Dieskau. William Johnson was wounded early in the engagement and retired from active duty, but that was no consolation to the French because the command of the English army was now in the hands of General Lyman, a brave and experienced leader.
While Dieskau was attempting to rally his men, he recklessly exposed himself within a short distance of the English lines and was wounded in the leg. Two Canadians came to his assistance, but before he could be carried out of danger one of them was killed and fell across him. His adjutant, Montreuil, then tried to help him, but Dieskau by this time was so upset by the behavior of his Canadians and Indians that his own safety, for the moment at least, seemed of secondary importance. He refused to be moved, directing Montreuil instead to attempt another assault in a last supreme effort to over-
78
LAKE CHAMPLAIN AND LAKE GEORGE VALLEYS
whelm the English. It was now about four o'clock in the afternoon, and the fortunes of France, which had glittered so brightly in the morning had slowly but surely grown dim. As the hours of battle had passed, Johnson's amateurs had been growing stronger and stronger as they had acquired self-confidence. Dieskau and Mon- treuil now had little chance of snatching victory out of the very jaws of defeat. Before the adjutant had a chance to carry out the wishes of his wounded general, the English advanced from behind their barricades and charged upon the French force with hatchets and other weapons suitable for hand-to-hand encounters. The remnants of Dieskau's army turned and fled.
In this confusion the wounded French general was left on the field of battle, and it was Johnson's men rather than his own who ultimately carried him away. Before he was captured, a Frenchman, who had left Canada ten years before and who was now serving in the English army, saw him and fired at him, giving the general another wound. Why this renegade fired on the helpless commander has been explained by the story that when Dieskau saw the soldier approaching he started to draw out his watch to give to the man. The other decided that Dieskau was reaching for his pistol, and shot him in what he supposed to be self-defense. Several of the English then fell on the French leader, and stripped him. Eight of them finally carried him on a blanket to the enemy camp. Whatever else can be held against Johnson he was now magnanimous toward his foe. The British com- mander refused to have his own wounds dressed until medical assist- ance had been given to Dieskau.
Johnson's Mohawks did not feel so kindly disposed, however. In the morning engagement, several of their number had been killed, including three of their chiefs. They particularly mourned the pass- ing of Hendrick and now wanted to get revenge. They insisted that Dieskau should be turned over to them for their entertainment and torture. In spite of their love and respect for Johnson, they argued with him vigorously on at least two occasions, but naturally he was not cold-blooded enough to turn his unfortunate prisoner over to them for their fiendish enjoyment. Finally they departed seemingly satisfied, but Johnson showed how little he trusted his red allies by sending a captain and fifty soldiers to guard Dieskau's tent. Even in spite of this precaution, the Mohawks almost succeeded in killing him
79
BATTLE OF LAKE GEORGE
the following morning. The sentinel on guard allowed an Indian, who was apparently unarmed, to go inside the tent. This savage suddenly drew a sword and darted forward to stab his intended vic- tim, but was prevented by an English officer. Thanks to Johnson's precautions, Dieskau survived and was later carried on a strongly escorted litter to Fort Lyman, finally being sent to England.
Even though the main engagement of the day had been decided, the shedding of blood was by no means ended. Not being pursued far by Johnson's men, the remnants of Dieskau's army meandered slowly southward, the Canadians and Indians stopping to plunder and scalp the dead. Ultimately, a large group of them halted near Bloody Pond for rest and refreshment. While there, they were attacked by a detachment of fresh colonial troops from Fort Lyman under the leadership of Captain Folsom and Captain McGinnis. Although the Canadians and Indians were superior in numbers, they were exhausted by the previous events of the day and soon broke and fled. On this occasion the bodies of the dead and dying were rolled into the pond, the survivors walking over the corpses, according to tradition. After this incident, which is only one of several bloody events that made the name of the little pond singularly appropriate, the detachment from Fort Lyman continued on toward the lake and helped in the defeat of other remnants of Dieskau's army.
General Lyman was strongly in favor of pursuing the enemy. Under the circumstances this was undoubtedly the correct thing to do. Five hundred of Johnson's army had stood still all day and thus were physically ready to lead an advance. Boats were available for the transportation of a fairly large force over the waters of Lake George. It was also known that there was a shortcut over the moun- tains on the east side of the lake to South Bay, where Dieskau had had to leave his canoes and provisions and where the retreating enemy could be intercepted. If Johnson had promptly taken these measures, the French force would probably have been completely annihilated. The French Indians and Canadians had been of little assistance to the little band of regulars so far, and would have been of even less value now as, exhausted by all the marching and fighting that had taken place, they painfully made their way toward South Bay. With the extinction of this force, Johnson could have taken possession of Ticon- deroga and Crown Point. General Lyman's advice went unheeded,
80
LAKE CHAMPLAIN AND LAKE GEORGE VALLEYS
however, and Johnson decided to remain in the comparative safety of his camp and proceed with the construction of Fort William Henry.
There are many reasons why the English commander failed to fol- low up his victory. When Dieskau was captured, he told Johnson that he had more troops near at hand and there is evidence that this story was accepted as the truth. In fact, the English leader wrote that he expected an additional attack from the enemy. His stores were deficient, and there were not enough boats to transport his entire force. It should also be remembered that Johnson was an amateur in the ways of warfare. The experiences of the day must have been harrowing to him in spite of his eventual victory. His wound cer- tainly did not increase his eagerness for further action. On the other hand, he was notoriously governed by the green-eyed goddess of jealousy, and certainly was not inclined to allow a subordinate to lead a pursuing expedition. The main engagement of the day had been admirably executed by Lyman, and Johnson would have felt particu- larly unhappy if his second-in-command should gain further prestige. In addition, the number of the enemy stationed at Crown Point and Ticonderoga was unknown to the English. Thus it is easy to under- stand Johnson's failure to pursue the fleeing remnants of Dieskau's army, even though we now know that he made a mistake. It is much easier to say what should have been done after a battle is over than during the heat of conflict. Johnson had no desire to duplicate the tragedy that had overcome Braddock so recently, and which had made such a deep impression upon the English mind.
Few battles have been surrounded by so many conflicting details as the battle of Lake George. No two authorities are in complete agreement and occasionally one contradicts himself. A good example is the size of Johnson's army, which was estimated as low as twenty- one hundred whites and three hundred Indians by Wraxall, and as high as five thousand, by A. W. Holden. There is also disagreement regarding the size of Dieskau's force, some writers evidently assum- ing that he did not leave any of his men behind him at Ticonderoga when he started for Fort Lyman. There is, in fact, startling disagree- ment over almost everything connected with the battle. The reason for much of this is that careful accounts were not often kept in those days and that chronicles were written down at a later date when memories were dim and fact was giving way to fancy. The number
81
BATTLE OF LAKE GEORGE
of lives lost on that bloody day is unknown. It has been claimed that Dieskau's losses were as high as one thousand men and the English losses as low as two hundred and sixteen killed and ninety-six wounded. Both of these figures are fantastic, even though supported by reliable authorities. The slaughter of the English in the morning engagement was so terrific that their minimum loss quoted above was impossible for the entire day, and what is more likely, referred to the casualties suffered on the Bloody Morning Scout. It is also hard to believe that much of Dieskau's army was annihilated, particularly in view of the fact that it was composed largely of Canadians and Indians who did not fight any too fiercely. I am personally inclined to agree with those who estimate that the French loss was about four hundred and fifty and that the English sacrifice was slightly more than four hun- dred lives. In any case, however, there is no reason to wander end- lessly through the wilderness of distorted details and twisted facts. We know that there were severe losses suffered by both armies. We also know that Dieskau failed to rout the English from their posi- tion and that Johnson failed to capture Crown Point. After all, these facts are the important ones.
The battle of Lake George was not only a conflict between armed forces but, also, a battle of errors. Johnson had tarried too long at Albany; he had advanced northward too slowly; and he had neglected to fortify his camp until almost too late. It would have been too late if Dieskau had had proper control over his Indians and Canadians. In fact, the appointment of Johnson to command the English army was an error. Williams' failure to send out scouts and exercise pre- cautions, when setting out in the morning in the direction of Fort Lyman, was inexcusable. Probably the greatest of English blunders, however, was the failure to pursue the enemy after the battle. On the other hand there were a number of French errors. Before he left Ticonderoga, Dieskau should have known from his Indians or scouts the position and size of Johnson's army. He should not have set out rashly, with only a part of his force, on the information given by an English prisoner. When he finally did find out about Johnson's pres- ence at Lake George, he was very rash to attack. Probably his great- est mistake was the method of dealing with his Indians. He was not adapted by personality or temperament to work in harmony with the
C & G-6
82
LAKE CHAMPLAIN AND LAKE GEORGE VALLEYS
red men. He was too unbending and too exclusive in his relations with them. He failed to mix and to yield to their habits and customs. All Indians were ruled by impulses and emotions and would follow anywhere a leader who could and would win their affection by making advances to them and seeming to be one of them; but Dieskau, by his coldness, destroyed the possibility of winning their respect and confidence. Both generals failed in their undertakings, due largely to their errors of omission and commission. Johnson was frightened into abandoning his campaign to Lake Champlain, thus leaving Fort St. Frederic in French possession, while Dieskau utterly failed to dis- lodge the English army and emulate the victory over Braddock.
The main importance of the battle of Lake George was psycho- logical. Coming as it did on the heels of Braddock's terrible tragedy and other unfortunate episodes, the news of Dieskau's defeat caused great rejoicing and a sharp increase in confidence among the English colonies where pessimism had previously been rampant. It also proved to the French and their allies that they had underestimated the fighting ability of their foe, and that all English armies were not as easy to defeat as Braddock's force had been. Dieskau, himself, testi- fied concerning the behavior of Johnson's inexperienced soldiers that in the morning they fought like good boys, about noon like men, and in the afternoon like devils. The greatest importance of the success- ful English defense, however, arose from the partial restoration of English prestige in the minds of the Iroquois. Red men held little respect for poor fighters, and there was always the possibility that they might become tired of English lethargy and incompetence and either remain at home sulking or join the enemy openly. If the Iro- quois should become alienated, the cause of England might receive the fatal blow, so far as North America was concerned.
Another result of the battle was the influence it had over the for- tunes of William Johnson. Although the English victory had been won almost entirely by Lyman and his other subordinates, Johnson grabbed the golden fruit of victory for himself-while the others received only crab-apples ! In his fawning way, he had named Lake George as well as Fort Edward and Fort William Henry in behalf of royalty. He now entirely failed to mention the name of Lyman in his report of the battle and gave but little credit to his other officers. None other than William Johnson, himself, was responsible for the
83
BATTLE OF LAKE GEORGE
brilliant success of British arms; at least according to his account of the engagement. His reputation was further distorted by the exag- geration of Wraxall and others who continued to build up the myth of Johnson's military genius. By these means, our self-worshipping com- mander won a baronetcy, a gift of five thousand English pounds and other rewards; while Lyman and the other real heroes were allowed to slumber in comparative obscurity.
Throughout the fall, Johnson remained at the head of Lake George. Shirley wrote to him, trying to prod him into action, but to no avail. He replied that his men lacked discipline and supplies; but there was nothing unusual about that situation in the French and Indian Wars, when few armies had adequate clothing and full stom- achs, and officers were elected by popular vote. Johnson's soldiers became strongly discontented at the lack of action, but even then he would not move from the confines of his fortifications. Reënforce- ments gradually trickled in, making a total force of thirty-six hundred in October, although they wore summer clothing and lacked blankets to keep themselves warm. Finally a council of war was called from which, however, Johnson was absent; due, it is said, to inflamed eyes and the fact that his wound continued to bother him. Thus, after the commander had prevented any advance against Crown Point until too late, the responsibility of making the final decision not to proceed was left on the shoulders of others. The council accepted its unwelcome duty and made the official determination not to move forward, yet Johnson detained his shivering army at the lake for more than another month. Waiting here week after week amid the slush and snows of late fall without much prospect of action, many men departed without leave to their homes and families. They exchanged the privations of the camp for the comforts of food, warm clothing, the association of loved ones, and the glow of cozy fireplaces. Finally, in the latter part of November, the bulk of the remnants of the army marched away, leaving a skeleton garrison at Fort William Henry; and Johnson set out to collect the flattery won by his accounts of the fray.
Meanwhile the French had ample time to fortify the strategic position at Ticonderoga by the construction of Fort Carillon. Previ- ous fortifications had been erected there, but, by comparison, they had been of little consequence. Now it was imperative that the French should construct something really formidable. The position was of
84
LAKE CHAMPLAIN AND LAKE GEORGE VALLEYS
great military importance because it not only commanded the little river running from Lake George into Lake Champlain, but also the route passing through South Bay and Wood Creek. Regardless of the route by which the English should decide to advance, a French fort would be in their path. Fort Carillon was laid out by the great engi- neer, M. de Lotbinière, acting under orders of Governor Vaudreuil of Canada. It is said that two thousand men were employed to build it.
FORT TICONDEROGA AS IT APPEARS TODAY
It rapidly displaced the crumbling fortification of Fort St. Frederic and became a post of great military importance. During the remainder of this war and also the American Revolution, contending armies were to wrestle vigorously for the possession of this key to Lake Champlain and Montreal, or to Lake George, South Bay and Albany as the case might be.
After all these preliminary rehearsals, war was actually declared by England the following spring, May, 1756. The activities of Brad- dock, Shirley, Johnson, Dieskau and the other commanders were but the advance notice of the approaching earthquake destined to shake not one continent, but three. The gods of war were firmly in the
85
BATTLE OF LAKE GEORGE
saddle as the four horsemen went their merry way, and Frederick the Great attempted to escape the vengeance of three women: Queen Elizabeth of Russia, Queen Maria Theresa of Austria, and Madame de Pompadour, the mistress of King Louis XV of France. The year 1756 did not witness any startling combats on Lake George or Lake Champlain, however. No armies clashed, the theatre of war being left largely to the thrilling experiences of scouting parties, particularly the colonial rangers under the command of Robert Rogers. An Eng- lish army was collected at the head of Lake George under General John Winslow with intentions of attacking Crown Point, but it never advanced and the French were willing to allow it to remain where it was, unmolested by them. The English movements were delayed by a change in commanders-in-chief, Shirley ultimately turning over his authority to the Earl of Loudoun, an unfortunate choice. Whatever prospects of success there might have been under the new leader were marred by a royal decree deciding that colonial officers should be inferior in authority to English regular officers. This situation was rapidly made worse by the contempt which the British officers mani- fested for provincials and their methods of fighting. The colonial soldiers deserted rapidly as a result and many of their officers retired and departed. Discipline was impossible under the circumstances, the camp was filthy and rotten with disease, and pessimism and resig- nation to conditions pervaded the atmosphere.
Confronted with dissension and wrangling within his own army and not having yet absorbed all the lessons from Braddock's defeat, Loudoun had his share of difficulties, but the French added to these problems. Vaudreuil had an annoying habit of keeping small parties of Indians on the warpath, ambushing English wagon trains, attacking smaller groups sometimes in sight of the forts, and scalping sentinels and the unwary. Although they did not seriously impede an English advance they were as pleasant to have around as a swarm of hungry mosquitoes. In addition, the great Montcalm was now very active. He succeeded in completely diverting Loudoun's eyes from Crown Point by leading an attack on the important forts at Oswego, which he captured. Although a fleet of sloops and whaleboats was con- structed on Lake George, the British plans to conquer Fort St. Fred- eric vanished into thin air. Loudoun had ten thousand men under his command between Albany and Fort William Henry, while the
86
LAKE CHAMPLAIN AND LAKE GEORGE VALLEYS
French did not have much more than half this number, but he was lost in and overwhelmed by his difficulties which were increased by the fact that the various colonial governments failed to work together in harmony. Conditions were so terrible that a great English official wrote, "I dread to hear from America." Loudoun's only outstanding success was in quarreling with the colonists and he was recalled in the early part of 1757. For two consecutive years the efforts of the English to capture Crown Point had ended in failure, and no army of theirs had advanced farther north than Fort William Henry.
CHAPTER V
The Capture of Fort William Henry
Until 1757, with the exception of Dieskau's expedition, the French had made no serious attempt to drive the English away from Lake George. Their main efforts had been confined to building Fort Car- illon at Ticonderoga and harassing the enemy with Indian raids. Such a policy had been inevitable because they lacked the numbers necessary for the expulsion of the enemy. Indeed, it was only due to the lethargy and incompetence of English generals that the French power had not been extinguished in the Champlain valley. In 1757, however, the French adopted aggressive measures in earnest. Before the wintry winds ceased to howl around the summit of Black Moun- tain, an attempt was made to surprise and capture Fort William Henry. A detachment of fifteen or sixteen hundred French regulars, Canadians and Indians was sent out under the command of Sieur de Rigaud de Vaudreuil, generally known as Rigaud to distinguish him from Pierre François, Marquis de Vaudreuil-Cavignal, Governor of Canada. Neither of these gentlemen should be confused with their father, Philippe de Rigaud, Marquis de Vaudreuil, who at a much earlier date had led expeditions against the Iroquois under Frontenac and who had become Governor of Canada back in 1703.
It was in March, 1757, that Rigaud led his detachment over the creaking ice that covered Lake Champlain and Lake George. For once, a force was advancing through these wintry wastes, adequately equipped and properly clothed and fed. In addition, three hundred scaling ladders were provided at Ticonderoga to assist it in capturing the English fort. The appointment of Rigaud to command the expe- dition had been bitterly criticized by the French regular officers, but Dieskau and others had amply demonstrated the difficulties confront- ing generals imported from the battlefields of Europe to lead Indians
88
LAKE CHAMPLAIN AND LAKE GEORGE VALLEYS
in wilderness fighting. In any case, fortune seemed certain to smile on this detachment so secretly and carefully making its way up the ice against an English force consisting of only three hundred and forty-six able men (less than one-fourth its own size). Rigaud was unable to surprise the enemy, however. On the morning of March nineteenth, long before daybreak, while yet some distance from the fort, some of his men built fires in order to keep warm. Either he was overconfident of victory, and therefore did not take the usual precautions against being discovered, or his men were not as tough and impervious to the weather as Rogers' rangers, who certainly would not have built a fire under these circumstances. In any case, an English sentry noticed the glow from the fires and the garrison was on the alert and prepared for the attack.
A story persists that a large part of the English force, which was certainly small enough when at its maximum strength, was in no condition to fight. According to reports, the Irish soldiers in the fort were drinking in honor of St. Patrick-and John Stark's rangers were giving them splendid assistance. St. Patrick's Day, however, was the seventeenth; while the French fires were discovered on the morning of the nineteenth. If this legend is true the Irish were certainly doing their celebrating in a big way, and were in no hurry to end their festivities. As for the Rangers, it is certain that their Puritan faith would not have interfered with their drinking in honor of St. Pat- rick; but if they, too, were yet intoxicated (as well as the Irish) when Rigaud was seen, the little garrison at Fort William Henry must have come close to setting some sort of drinking record. Stark, himself, has been given credit for saving the fort by his insistence that some of his men should remain sober, thus making it possible to have sentries capable of seeing the enemy fires. While the story is possible, how- ever, such a complete and prolonged carousal does not seem probable.
Need help finding more records? Try our genealogical records directory which has more than 1 million sources to help you more easily locate the available records.