USA > Vermont > The Lake Champlain and Lake George valleys, Vol. I > Part 25
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The consensus of opinion among writers has been that Burgoyne's choice of routes was a blunder and that he should have taken the
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Lake George route. I personally believe that this conclusion is open to doubt. There is no disposition here to picture the Wood Creek route in any but drab colors, yet there has been a tendency to overlook
(Courtesy of Chamber of Commerce at Keeseville)
VALLEY OF THE AUSABLE ABOVE BURGOYNE'S FORD, WHERE BURGOYNE'S ARMY CROSSED ON THE MARCH TO SARATOGA
the dangers and shortcomings of using Lake George. After return- ing to Ticonderoga there is no reason to believe that Burgoyne would
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have advanced with less lethargy than usual. If he had proceeded by the questionable road along the lake shore, although it was relatively free from swamps, it would have been almost as suitable as the Fort Ann wilderness to the defensive tactics of the Americans because of the steep mountains and dense forests. If he had advanced by water, he would have been delayed considerably while transporting his boats to Lake George. In either case Schuyler could be depended on to make the dangerous route from Fort George to Fort Edward decidedly unattractive. All other things being equal, Burgoyne was confronted with overwhelming difficulties, either route he selected. His final defeat at Saratoga must be explained by other factors than the choice of routes.
More important in deciding the outcome of the campaign was his decision to take along his entire army and the unusual total of forty- two guns. Haste was essential, as every day's delay was bound to strengthen the American defense. Under these conditions, the trans- portation of so much artillery was a mistake. Also, a small, compact, flying column would have been more effective than a large unwieldy army. Such a force, composed of Indians and Canadians, would have been devastating in view of the low morale of the American troops immediately after the battle at Fort Ann. It is true that Burgoyne had an insufficient number of followers in those two contingents for such an undertaking, but even a flying column of British infantry would have been preferable to advancing with the entire army.
One difficulty confronting Burgoyne was lack of provisions. The Americans as a rule destroyed what they could not take away with . them. He was now far from his base of supplies, much of which had to come a distance of three thousand, six hundred miles across the Atlantic Ocean, over the St. Lawrence and Richelieu rivers, and through Lake Champlain. It was this lack of provisions that later forced him to attempt the disastrous attack on Bennington. Nor was his situation rendered more attractive by Schuyler. Under the direction of the American general, huge rocks were rolled into Wood Creek, bridges were burned for miles around, and, of more importance, a thousand axmen were busy at work felling the enormous trees of the virgin forest across streams and trails to impede the British. Schuy- ler's operations were so thorough that Burgoyne used twenty-four days to go a distance of twenty-six miles, traveling at the rate of
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approximately a mile a day. Of course, the British commander could have proceeded much faster if he had felt that haste was necessary; but the American obstructions were both effective and discouraging. It was necessary for Burgoyne to build forty bridges, one across a swamp two miles long. When the army arrived at Fort Edward on July thirtieth, the soldiers were exhausted. This long delay was of vast importance to the patriot army because fresh troops were constantly pouring in, so that when the time finally arrived for a deci- sive battle, the Americans were ready. Without this delay, the vic- tory at Saratoga would not have been possible. Full credit for this goes to General Schuyler. By the time Fort Edward was reached the music of the thousand axes and the whines of millions of mosquitoes, had more or less drowned out Burgoyne's bands.
Prior to July twelfth, Schuyler would have been at the mercy of a British flying column, but on that date was strengthened by the arrival of the remnants of St. Clair's army that had marched from Castleton by way of Rutland, Dorset and Manchester, and also by the appear- ance of General Nixon and six hundred troops from Peekskill. With these additions he had a total of forty-four hundred men. At about the same time, Schuyler received further strength by the arrival of Generals Lincoln and Arnold, who were New Englanders and, there- fore, expected to neutralize the commander's unpopularity with the soldiers from their section.
This was Arnold's first contact with the Burgoyne campaign. Following February, 1777, when in spite of his great accomplish- ments, Congress had seen fit to promote five lesser figures, including St. Clair and Lincoln, over his head to the position of major-general, he had suffered miserably from his sensitive pride. Unusual bravery while fighting one of Howe's raiding parties in Connecticut had shamed Congress into giving him his proper rank, however, and he was now sent by Washington to Schuyler's camp to help with the militia.
On July twenty-seventh there occurred an event of tremendous importance, destined to materially affect the outcome of the war for independence. Near Fort Edward there lived a widow by the name of Mrs. McNeil, who happened to be a cousin of General Fraser. To her house went a beautiful Scotch miss by the name of Jane McCrea to await the coming of the British redcoats and her sweetheart, David
C & G-17
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Jones, who was an officer in Burgoyne's army. Her thoughts were pleasant ones, mainly concerned with her approaching wedding as she prepared her clothes for the occasion. Romance was in the air. The fateful day of July twenty-seventh arrived, clear and warm. La Corne's redskins, in the meantime, had become more and more thirsty for human blood, and their eyes glittered in anticipation as they glided through the forests. Nearer and nearer to Mrs. McNeil's house they came. Inside, Jane was dreaming of her loved one; but cruelty and death dashed out of the shadows, and her fond hopes burst like a punc- tured balloon. Within one moment, happiness changed to horror as the two women became the prisoners of the red men.
Jane was placed on a horse, but old Mrs. McNeil was so fat that she was compelled to waddle along as best she could on foot. The result was that the widow and her captors speedily fell behind the others, and were not present when David Jones' sweetheart met her untimely end. It seems that a quarrel arose among the Indians accompanying Jane McCrea. Ultimately, one of the red men shot and scalped her. Possibly she was raped. In any case the savages stripped and mutilated her body and crushed her head with a toma- hawk, after which they continued on to Burgoyne's camp. Mean- while, Mrs. McNeil toiled along in the same direction unaware of the dreadful end of her young friend. She, herself, apparently was occupied with her own problem because the Indians had seized all her clothes. Entirely nude, she was taken to General Fraser. Not being able to find any women's clothes large enough to fit his huge cousin, he eventually was forced to cover her with his officer's great coat. Later, Jane's scalp was brought in. The long, beautiful hair was at once recognized by friend and sweetheart. Great was the shock at this sudden disclosure; still greater were the consequences. Bur- goyne forced the Indians to hand over the murderer and planned his execution. La Corne interceded, however, prophesying that, if this red fiend were to be killed, Burgoyne's entire Indian contingent would desert and return home, and might even commit outrages along the Canadian border, so great was their thrist for blood. Faced with this prediction, the British commander pardoned the murderer.
Beyond the fact that Jane McCrea was the promised bride of one of the British officers, there was nothing unusual about this incident. For over a century and a half English settlers in North America had
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been well acquainted with the red man and his scalping knife. Even when massacres had not been conducted in wholesale fashion, indi- vidual scalps had always been taken promiscuously. In the French wars, women had been murdered in great numbers. Even though the Revolution was a family quarrel among Englishmen, the scalping of Jane McCrea was only one of many such incidents. At first this example of Indian barbarism did not exert such a profound effect on the American settlers, so stunned were they by the easy English suc- cesses up to this point in the campaign. As time went on, however, the event gathered momentum gradually until it reached enormous proportions and the murder of Jane McCrea became one of the famous incidents in our history. It was to have a tremendous bearing upon the outcome of the battle of Saratoga, which was destined to be the turning point in the quest for American independence. As can be readily discerned, there were certain dramatic qualities in Jane McCrea's story. The incident was told and retold, and details were added to and exaggerated in the repeated versions. Soon the tale pene- trated even to the remote farms and hamlets. It came at the proper psychological moment, from the patriot point of view. Americans who had been overcome with defeatism and oppressed with misfor- tune threw off their shackles, and forgetting petty jealousies and quar- rels, set out for the patriot camp, determined to avenge the death of Jane McCrea and prevent similar atrocities in their own households. The name of this beautiful Scotch miss became the rallying point at Saratoga. She was scheduled to have a much larger part in deter- mining Burgoyne's destiny than was another lady, his mistress, upon whom he lavished so much of his attention.
Meanwhile, what of the other two English armies which Bur- goyne expected to join at Albany? On August third, he received a message from General Howe which said nothing about any projected march up the Hudson, but brought the astounding information that the commander-in-chief intended to sail for Pennsylvania instead, leaving Sir Henry Clinton in command at New York City. What is the explanation of this strange move? The fact is that Howe had never received orders to join Burgoyne at Albany. Lord George Germain, who had charge of the conduct of the war in America, neglected to send them. He did call at his office to sign the important papers but was not satisfied with the work of his subordinate. He
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insisted on a new copy, but being in a hurry to visit in the country, did not wait until it was finished. When he returned he had forgot- ten about the orders, and they were never sent. Howe was left com- pletely in the dark so far as his part in the campaign was concerned. It can reasonably be argued that he should have known enough to move up the Hudson, even without orders from London, but he did not do so. On the other hand, if he had received Germain's orders, he would unquestionably have moved to Burgoyne's assistance.
In the meantime General Barry St. Leger with a force of about nine hundred whites, later reënforced by from eight hundred to a thousand Indians, had been attempting to complete his part in the campaign. Leaving Montreal on June twenty-third, he had moved up the St. Lawrence to Lake Ontario, arriving at Oswego on July twenty-fifth, and in front of Fort Stanwix on the Mohawk on August third. This American post was garrisoned by seven hundred and fifty men under the command of Colonel Peter Gansevoort. St. Leger undoubtedly felt as contemptuous of the task before him as did Bur- goyne. Some of the Iroquois were actively helping the Americans and others were not very friendly. Nothing succeeds like success, particularly with Indians, and the British general felt he could easily win the support of the lukewarm red men. Moreover, he expected the Johnsons, the Butlers, and great numbers of Mohawk Valley Tories to rally to his standard. In fact, the success of St. Leger's campaign depended upon the support he could obtain from these two sources. The siege of Fort Stanwix was promptly begun. On the fifth, however, the British were informed by a message from Molly Brant, the widow of Sir William Johnson, that General Nicholas Herkimer and eight hundred American militia were advancing to Gansevoort's relief. St. Leger then decided to divide his forces, and sent a party of four hundred Indians and a detachment of Tories to ambush the oncoming patriots.
On the morning of August sixth, Herkimer held a council of war. He personally was opposed to a further advance toward Fort Stan- wix since he had not received the expected signal that Gansevoort was ready to cooperate. His subordinates, however, were anxious to proceed, regardless of this situation, and hotly accused their leader of cowardice and even sympathy with the enemy. After a stormy session, Herkimer yielded and continued the advance. Sixty Oneida
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Indians led the way, then followed six hundred militia led by the com- mander in person on a white horse. After them came the wagons, while two hundred militia brought up the rear. Meanwhile the Mohawk chief, Joseph Brant, was preparing a gruesome trap for this column in a ravine between Oriskany village and Fort Stanwix. As the American force advanced, the Oneida scouts suspected nothing. Herkimer failed to halt and send men ahead to examine the ravine as was customary, but, like Ephraim Williams in the French and Indian War, marched his men straight into the jaws of death. Guns exploded on all sides and the battle of Oriskany was on. Herkimer's horse was killed and he was wounded, but he continued to direct operations amid the hail of bullets. Both sides lost heavily, and although Brant's force ultimately retreated, the Americans were unable to pursue. While the battle had been raging a section of Gansevoort's garrison had left the fort and plundered one of St. Leger's camps, carrying away many Indian blankets and important papers. Herkimer had not succeeded in relieving Fort Stanwix, but St. Leger had been halted. Perhaps of more importance, the British Indians were disheartened at the loss of lives and supplies. Mean- while, Schuyler heard of Herkimer's failure to relieve the fort. In spite of the fact that he had a force of only forty-five hundred facing Burgoyne's victorious army, he determined to send a part of his troops against St. Leger. All of his officers except Arnold disapproved, but in spite of the fact that New Englanders were spreading rumors that he was a traitor and was thus trying to weaken the American Army, Schuyler persisted. Arnold volunteered to head the expedition to Fort Stanwix, an offer that was gratefully accepted.
In the meantime, Burgoyne was not content with his own slow movement southward. One of his major problems was the difficulty of obtaining provisions. His lines of communication were long and delicate. He was unable to adequately protect them from American movements in his rear without leaving detachments behind, which he could not do without seriously weakening his main army. Moreover, the Americans had destroyed or taken possession of all the available food and other supplies in striking distance of his army. He knew that at Bennington there was located an important supply dépôt where stores collected from the upper Connecticut River had been gathered for Schuyler. If Burgoyne could capture these, he would be greatly
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improving his own position and at the same time crippling his enemy. Riedesel was also anxious to obtain horses for his German dragoons, while recruits were needed in the Tory detachments. The result was that the British commander sent Colonel Baum with a force of about eight hundred men, about half of whom were Germans, to seize Bennington.
This movement was unfortunate, from the British point of view, from beginning to end. To start with, Burgoyne's information con- cerning the patriot force at Bennington was inadequate. He thought that only three or four hundred militia guarded the important stores. In the second place, the proposed maneuver was an operation that required quick movement. For this purpose, the German soldiers were not suited. They were noted for their slowness, particularly the one hundred and seventy dragoons with their heavy equipment and their uncomfortable apparel. Most of the remainder of Baum's com- mand, although more mobile, failed to add much strength to the expe- dition. The Indians in particular were losing their interest in Bur- goyne's campaign, and were deserting from the army on all sides. Baum could not count upon them under pressure, and he could not even be certain of the Canadians. Finally, the detachment was directed to move along a bad road through dense forests, suited to ambush, between the main American force at Stillwater and Warner's detachment at Manchester. Considering all the facts, it is difficult to see just how the raid against Bennington could have succeeded.
It so happened at just this time that a large force of New Hamp- shire militia under John Stark was at this important military dépôt, while the durable Seth Warner and his Vermonters were encamped at Manchester. This was the same John Stark who had won fame while associated with the unparalleled Robert Rogers in the French and Indian War. His great accomplishments as a ranger leader had rightfully won him a permanent place in the hearts of all fron- tiersmen. His reputation was almost as great among the British generals as with his own. At the beginning of the war he had been eagerly active in the patriot cause and had contributed considerably to American success. In the first part of 1777, however, when Con- gress had been misled into promoting junior officers over Arnold's head in spite of his valuable services, the politicians also had commit- ted the equivalent blunder of passing over Stark. He had been furious
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at this slap in the face, caused, as in Arnold's case, by restless enemies who were powerful, and Stark had retired in disgust to his farm. Now, in the summer of 1777, Burgoyne's invasion was striking terror among the populace, and New Hampshire, thanks to the patriotism of John Langdon, was determined to do her part. The General Court of that State naturally turned to Stark to take command. He was still bitter and resentful over his treatment by Congress, while he also possessed in full measure the usual New Englander's disdain for and prejudices against New Yorkers, including General Schuyler. He eventually compromised by agreeing to accept the command of the New Hampshire militia on condition that he should not be account- able to either the American Army or to Congress, but only to his own State. Thus, at a time when a united front against Burgoyne was essential, Stark and his beloved New Hampshire insisted on fighting alone, so great was sectional bitterness. In any case, one thousand, four hundred and ninety-two of the inhabitants volunteered to serve under him. Meanwhile, Schuyler had placed General Lincoln in charge of the militia being gathered in Vermont. It happened that the New Hampshire militia was situated in Manchester at this time, and that Lincoln, in Stark's absence, ordered this force to march to the Hudson. The latter arrived just in time to find his men lined up to obey the orders of the former, and was furious. In no uncer- tain terms did he state his intention to continue to operate inde- pendently. Lincoln was in no position to force Stark's men to obey his orders, and was compelled to give in. It so happened that he had been one of the officers promoted over Stark's head, a fact that did not now make for peace. Thus it was that Lincoln more or less sanc- tioned the plan of the New Hampshire leader to march to Bennington when he had become convinced that Stark could not be persuaded to cooperate with Schuyler. As a result, when Baum finally marched away from Burgoyne's camp to capture the supply dépôt, it was not guarded by the usual small detachment, but by Stark's entire com- mand. No only were the men composing the American force rugged, untamed frontiersmen of the hardiest type, but their leader was a fierce fighter of abundant experience, licking his wounds like a maimed lion. Anyone who crossed his path was doomed to rough, resentful treatment, and Baum was headed straight for the lion's den.
After a number of minor skirmishes, the British force came upon a detachment of two hundred Americans which Stark had sent out
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toward Cambridge. The patriots immediately retreated, and Baum continued on after them until, when within about four miles of Benning- ton, he saw Stark's force in front of him. He then halted, but no attack was made, the Americans finally withdrawing approximately a mile to camp. Although the British were far from their base and con- fronted by a much superior force, they made no move to retreat, so great was their contempt for the fighting ability of the rebels. Baum also made the mistake of selecting a poor position, but he felt secure because he had sent to Burgoyne for reinforcements. "Gentleman Johnny," awakened from his sleep to receive the request for more troops, now made a new blunder in misinterpreting Baum's situation, and ordered Breymann and his slow-moving Germans to march to his aid. The fact is that Baum should have been ordered to retreat, or else the relief should have been carried out quickly.
Friday the fifteenth was an extremely rainy day, and it was unwise to attack in such weather, both Stark and Baum waiting for better conditions. In the meantime, Breymann's five hundred and fifty Ger- mans, sodden with rain and forced to help the horses pull the ammuni- tion wagons and cannon over the extremely muddy road, continued slowly toward their destination. So slow was the movement of this detachment that it averaged only about a half a mile an hour, and covered only about eight miles in the entire day, an incredible and stupid performance. During the same day Warner's force, number- ing about three hundred and fifty, plodded along in the heavy mud on the way from Manchester to Stark's assistance. These troops traveled until midnight, when they camped within six miles of their destination, Warner going ahead to consult with Stark. The differ- ence in the mileage of the Germans and the Vermonters on that dark and rainy day was destined to loom large in the events to follow.
The following morning it was also raining. At this time Stark had over two thousand men at his disposal, and Baum was in great dan- ger. Much depended on the speed attained by Breymann. It was imperative that he should arrive before there was a change in the weather, but this was not to be. Shortly before noon the sun came out, to smile upon the patriot cause. As soon as possible, Stark and Warner led the Americans against Baum's position, the former prom- ising, according to tradition, "We'll beat them today or Molly Stark's a widow." Meanwhile, the German commander was so infected with
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the overconfidence felt by Burgoyne and Skene that he did not con- centrate his small force in one place, relying on his cannon and trained Germans to disperse the amateurs in front of him at their ease. His detached command was in a poor position to resist the heavy odds that numbers cast against it. Even when he noticed sections of Stark's army on their way to surround him he paid little heed, feeling certain that they were retreating. So great was Baum's trustfulness that he permitted groups of American soldiers to take positions between his scattered forces, unopposed, being completely fooled by Stark into believing that they were Tories on their way to his assistance.
It was three o'clock before the American flanking movements were approaching completion and the battle was begun. Baum was almost surrounded, and his Canadians and Indians immediately fled through the woods. After terrific fighting which lasted two hours, and which Stark later stated "was the hottest I ever saw," Baum's forces were completely annihilated, and the commander himself was mortally wounded. The American miltia had suffered little loss and they now eagerly chased the heavily equipped German dragoons as the latter attempted to run away on that hot sultry August afternoon. Stark's men went on a rampage, scattering to plunder the baggage train of the enemy. Soon disorder was in progress everywhere. The American forces were victorious but in no condition for further military action.
Meanwhile, Breymann was drawing closer, making better time than the day before. Finally reports of a battle began to come to him, some of them favorable and some not so good. He could not believe that Baum had been destroyed, but decided that the proper thing was to move forward rapidly in any case. Soon his Germans came in contact with Stark's troops. Although his men were fatigued from their hard marching under the boiling sun, the American militia was also tired, partly as a result of the fighting and partly from chasing the remnants of Baum's force. At first, Breymann's detach- ment pushed back the scattered militia, and the result looked doubt- ful. Stark, himself, was skeptical about the advisability of continuing the fight against his new enemy, but the action was finally decided in his favor. At about sunset, Warner's troops finally put in an appear- ance, and the arrival of these fresh fighters, who had meandered so slowly to the assistance of their comrades, turned the tide. At this
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