USA > Vermont > The Lake Champlain and Lake George valleys, Vol. I > Part 27
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was wise for him to remain in the woods on some rising ground until Learned blundered into him near dusk. If he had used the full weight of his column at Freeman's Farm, the affair might have had a different ending. Furthermore, if Burgoyne had continued his attack the next day he might have defeated Gates' entire army, in spite of the rise of American confidence, because everything was in confusion in the patriot camp. Ammunition was nearly exhausted, while certain food supplies, including flour, were entirely lacking. Arnold's col- umn had no ammunition at all served out to it, while the bulk of the force did not even have bayonets. In any case Burgoyne did not continue his advance the next day, and this delay was the most impor- tant result from the American point of view. And in justice to Gates it must be agreed that when a policy of delay was essential to the patriot cause, he himself was fairly well qualified for the position he held.
On September twentieth, the landscape was again covered with a heavy fog as the night changed to day. Into the thick gloom peered the American militia, expecting at any moment to hear the redcoats advancing, but the looked-for assault did not materialize. When the fog finally lifted the enemy was not to be seen. Although Burgoyne had intended to renew the fray when the weather cleared, he later changed his mind. He and his center column had been so battered and astonished at the fighting ability of their opponents that they were content to halt for a time. Six hundred men had been lost, while three-fourths of the artillerymen attached to the center had been killed or disabled by the American sharpshooters. That smooth liar, Wilkinson, for some reason or other, reported that the British decision not to renew the assault on the American position was due to the insistence of Fraser. The truth is, however, that Fraser urged the attack, while the decision to delay was Burgoyne's own idea.
Before the dawn of September twenty-first, the British com- mander received a message from Sir Henry Clinton which caused him to delay further. Although it actually was vague, its wording was such that Burgoyne was led to believe that a British Army was to ascend the Hudson after all. Unfortunately for "Gentleman Johnny," he misinterpreted Clinton's intentions, for the latter did not mean to convey that impression. This message was of extreme impor- tance, however, because it caused Burgoyne to decide to entrench
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where he was until his ally should approach. Already the leaves on the trees were changing color, but the British commander, with his misplaced faith, did not advance. Meanwhile news penetrated to his camp, with Gates' assistance, reporting the aggressive movements of Lincoln's units in the north, and this did not make him any happier.
As was to be expected, the American commander approved Bur- goyne's decision to delay. Each day his army was strengthened with reënforcements and each evening the American defenses were stronger than before. Thanks to Schuyler, the lack of ammunition was remedied. At the same time that Gates. was being strengthened, his opponent was undergoing constantly increasing difficulties. The Brit- ish pickets served as unwilling targets for Morgan's keen-eyed rifle- men. At night the redcoated army was habitually kept awake by prowling bands of American scouts, and by hungry wolves from the Adirondacks, howling when not feasting on the dead. The Canadians and Indians remaining were by this time completely worthless, while desertions among the redcoats and Germans were increasing. Finally, the nights were gradually becoming colder and the food supplies were rapidly diminishing.
By this time a major quarrel among American generals was over- due. One now broke out between Gates and Arnold and seriously threatened to interfere with American success around Saratoga. The dispute has been interpreted in many different ways, largely due to the unpopularity of these two generals with historians. Enough has been said about Gates' repulsive character to explain why those recorders of the past, who have written with their emotions rather than their intellects, have been inclined to paint his life with varying colors. We are also amply acquainted with the efforts of historians who have since conceived it to be their patriotic duty to tar and feather Arnold from one end of his life to the other because of his later treachery. Before the Burgoyne campaign, the two generals had been friends. Gates had, on occasion, spoken highly of Arnold; and the latter, although contemptuous of the other's methods, had not been unduly irritated by that flabby personality. At the same time Arnold had been very friendly with Schuyler. In all probability the conqueror of the Maine woods respected the cold, steadfast, methodical Schuyler more than the scheming, selfish, undependable Gates. In any case, as the controversy between Schuyler and Gates developed over the com-
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mand of the northern department, it became increasingly difficult for Arnold to remain friends with both. Gates was even at this time planning and scheming to displace George Washington, and Arnold was a favorite of the commander-in-chief. Gates had good reason to believe that Arnold could not be depended on to help him succeed by this intrigue; for Washington had on many occasions demon- strated his faith in Arnold and had helped to pry from Congress the proper rank for this dissatisfied general. In addition to the fact that Arnold was very friendly with both Schuyler and Washington, he offended Gates in another way, because he became closer and closer associated with the New York faction among the officers. By the time the first battle was fought on September nineteenth, Gates had developed considerable coldness toward the commander of his left wing.
Concerning the events of that day, it is clear that Gates had some good reasons for not pursuing aggressive tactics against Burgoyne ; while on the other hand, Arnold had some good arguments for taking the opposite course. This may have constituted only an honest dif- ference of opinion. After Gates finally did give permission for Arn- old to attack, there were also good arguments for and against sending additional troops into the fray. In addition, the commander's deci- sion to recall Arnold at the critical moment could have been dictated by his fear of rashness on the part of the latter, rather than by jeal- ousy. However, regardless of the state of Gates' mind concerning his subordinate officer up to this point, there is no question but that he was envious of Arnold's success on the field of battle. The events of the day actually did render him more or less eclipsed by the other. His tame policy of waiting was bound to seem unattractive, com- pared with Arnold's fiery aggressiveness. In any case, when he reported to Congress regarding the action of the nineteenth, Gates failed to speak of the units as Arnold's division, and also committed the unpardonable sin of neglecting even to mention Arnold's name. In addition, he showed his jealousy in numerous small ways.
Arnold was no more liable to back away from a quarrel with Gates than he was from a battle with the redcoats. His sensitive pride was much offended with this unfair treatment while, in his irritation, he became more and more bitter toward his superior. He possessed little of Washington's patience and sense of proportion and was unable
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to contain his anger. When he heard of Gates' failure to speak of him or his men in the report to Congress he wrote a letter to his com- mander, indignantly complaining of this treatment. He also requested to be allowed to withdraw from Gates' army and join General Wash- ington. As soon as this was known, both officers and men became alarmed. Whatever confidence they may have had in Gates, they were fully aware of Arnold's ability on the field of battle. Regard- less of this fiery general's faults, he remained a relentless, untiring, and savage foe wherever bullets flew; while in courage he was unsur-
(Courtesy of Giens Falls Insurance Co., from painting by Ferris) SURRENDER OF BURGOYNE AT SCHUYLERVILLE (OLD SARATOGA) OCTOBER 17, 1777
passed. Without him, the chances of defeating Burgoyne were less than otherwise. In spite of the fact that it was dangerous for any officer to incur the scheming hostility of General Gates, every general officer, except Lincoln, dared to sign a round robin asking Arnold to remain at Saratoga. This mark of respect from his associates caused the rebellious general to disregard the treatment accorded him by Gates, and to remain in camp, although deprived of his command. His left wing now was nominally under the personal control of Gates,
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while Lincoln was placed in command of the right column. Such was the situation existing among the American officers when the deadlock was broken by the second and final battle of Saratoga.
Meanwhile, "Gentleman Johnny" continued to enjoy himself, drinking and playing cards, while waiting for Clinton to come to his assistance. Numerous messages were sent to New York, but none returned. Finally, on October third, he was forced to put his men on short rations, so uncertain was the British food supply. It was imperative that Clinton should arrive without delay. Where was Clinton ?
General Clinton was in an unfortunate position. There is no question but that he appreciated the importance of aiding Burgoyne. Over and over again he had opposed Howe's decision to leave for Philadelphia, and he continued to feel that the principal object of the British should be to make certain that Burgoyne should reach Albany. After Howe's departure, his failure to move northward was due to the fact that he had an insufficient number of troops. He had been given the important duty of guarding New York City, the British base in America, and could not afford to gamble too heavily with the dice loaded against him. Even without detaching part of his army in Burgoyne's favor, the Americans around New York were dangerous to his command. He sent a message to "Gentleman Johnny" acquaint- ing him with his lack of troops, but the message never reached its destination. Reënforcements were expected at New York, however, and when they should arrive, he had every intention of moving to the north. These did not reach America until September twenty-fourth, after a three months' voyage, but they raised Clinton's forces to approximately seven thousand troops, so at last he now felt able to ascend the Hudson.
Finally, on October third, the day on which Burgoyne placed his army on short rations, Clinton embarked up the river with three thou- sand men, feeling that it was essential to leave behind a force large enough to defend New York City in any emergency that might develop. As was very evident, time was now running short so far as the Burgoyne campaign was concerned, and "Gentleman Johnny" was pardonably coming to the conclusion that no assistance was to appear. Sir Henry Clinton was one of the best of the British generals of the Revolution-far stronger than either Burgoyne or Howe. He has
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been criticized too much for his failure to help the northern army. The lack of British success more properly should be blamed on Howe and Germain. Opposed to Clinton up the Hudson was Major-General Israel Putnam, who was brave, experienced and picturesque, but not an expert military student. Throughout the summer the size of his army had fluctuated back and forth, larger when a move from Clinton was feared, and smaller when such an effort seemed unlikely. At the end of September the American garrisons numbered only a thousand continentals and four hundred half-armed militia. On October fifth, Clinton forced the rebels to evacuate Verplanck's Point, three and a half miles below Peekskill, but on the same day he received an unpleas- ant message from Burgoyne which stated that his provisions would only last until October twenty-ninth, and which asked whether he should attack or retreat. "Gentleman Johnny" announced his inten- tion of doing the latter unless he should hear from Clinton by October twelfth.
By feints, Clinton managed to work Putnam out of the proper position, weakening the garrisons at Fort Montgomery and Fort Clinton. Without opposition from the patriots, who considered it too difficult for troops, he easily occupied the Timp (a precipitous climb of eight hundred and fifty feet above the Hudson), after landing on the morning of October sixth under cover of a heavy fog. During the day other movements followed, culminating at the end with the sur- render of both Fort Montgomery and Fort Clinton. Putnam had been outmaneuvered. On the seventh, proceeding in Burgoyne's direc- tion, Clinton occupied Fort Constitution, near West Point, without opposition. The patriot barrier in the Highlands was now pierced, and the British Army was now free to hurry to Albany. But also on October seventh, Burgoyne was already engaged in his second battle with Gates.
Meanwhile, what had happened in the north? Gates had con- tinued to wait, realizing that Burgoyne could not remain cut off from his supplies forever. Reinforcements had increased the size of the American Army, while even Stark was now active. Having captured Fort Edward, he was moving down the Hudson with a thousand New Hampshire troops. On the other hand, the British situation did not improve. Sickness increased, supplies diminished every day, the nights grew colder, and the morale of the discouraged army
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was worse and worse. There had been some hope that Burgoyne would receive reinforcements from the north under St. Leger, but even this failed to materialize. St. Leger did penetrate as far as Ticonderoga, but decided not to advance farther, probably because of the numerous patriot detachments moving in all directions.
On October fourth, Burgoyne called a council of war to deter- mine the proper course to pursue. To his generals he presented a plan whereby eight hundred men would be left to guard the British position, and the remainder of the army would attack the left and rear of the American Army. From most angles this idea was fool- hardy. To carry out the maneuver it would be necessary to advance through the woods a considerable distance, a move exceedingly difficult for soldiers and officers unused to wilderness warfare, and one which the experiences of September nineteenth should have discouraged. This plan also left the British stores in a precarious situation, where they could easily be seized by the enemy. Riedesel, Fraser and Phillips all opposed the idea and the meeting ended without its ratification. When the generals met again the follow- ing day, October fifth, Riedesel proposed retreat. With this pre- scription Fraser agreed, while Phillips was undecided. Burgoyne, however, would not listen to such a disgraceful solution of his difficulties.
Finally, on October seventh, the British commander decided to make a reconnaissance in force to feel out the American position, and set out with fifteen hundred picked men and some auxiliaries. To thus divide his army was a grave error and extremely risky. Also, having waited so long for Clinton, and it being obvious that he had little chance of success without that assistance, Burgoyne should not, at this inopportune moment, have changed that policy. On the other hand, it is easy to understand why the harassed, depressed, and dis- couraged commander disliked the idea of waiting until his supplies were completely gone when he would be forced to surrender his trained redcoats to an enemy, regarded by him with contempt, without much of a fight. While Fraser and the auxiliaries were sent to the westward, the fifteen hundred redcoats and Germans marched ahead in three columns, finally halting in a wheat field. Strung out over a wide area, their front was entirely open, while their flanks were men- aced by the woods. Wilkinson reported this very weak position to
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Gates, who decided to attack. The result was that instead of a mere reconnoitering move, the British advance led to a general engagement.
With good judgment, Gates ordered Morgan "to begin the game" by encircling the British right. At the same time General Poor was to turn the enemy's left, while Learned was to attack the center. The troops of Poor's brigade soon became engaged in a fierce battle with grenadiers commanded by Acland. The British were outnum- bered greatly, and the end of this conflict was not long in doubt. They were slaughtered in great numbers, their commander was dis- abled, and when Colonel Cilley climbed upon a captured gun and turned it toward the British survivors great was the delight of Poor's men. Meanwhile, Morgan and his formidable fighters fell on Fraser and the auxiliaries and sent them flying through the woods. He then came upon the British right flank under the command of Balcarres. Just as the redcoats were forming to fight Morgan, they were assailed by Dearborn, and this attack caused them to retreat in disorder. It was now clear to Burgoyne that he had made a mistake. He sent orders for the whole detachment to retreat, but his messenger fell mortally wounded without delivering them. The Germans in the center were facing Learned's brigade when suddenly into their midst plunged a horse bearing General Arnold.
As has been explained, Arnold had been deprived of his com- mand. When the engagement of October seventh began he had no authority to even fight, much less to issue orders. From the beginning of the action he watched the events of the day with more than usual impatience. He restlessly moved to and fro around the camp, bored with his lot, and eager to be off to the fray. The noise of battle seesawed here and there until this impetuous warrior could stand the strain no longer. His enemies later said that he had been drinking heavily, but the truth is that he was in such a rage over his enforced idleness that he was like an insane man. When he could stand it no longer, he hurried off to the battlefront. As soon as Gates heard of this development, he sent Major Armstrong to recall him. On this occasion, however, stronger methods than this order would have been needed to enforce calm and obedience upon the raging general. Arn- old saw Armstrong approach, guessed his errand, and rode so fast that the other could not catch up with him to deliver the message. Learned's men followed him with a will. Riding rapidly along the
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line of battle, giving orders, and brandishing his broad-sword over his head, he led the way like a madman. The Hessians succeeded in weathering the first shock, but with the second charge they gave way before the swarming Americans. Fraser tried his best to re-form the British. He was beaten, but still had a chance to retreat to the main camp. The best way to prevent the escape of the British was to dis- able Fraser, who clearly was the outstanding leader among the red- coats. Accordingly, Morgan, on Arnold's orders, detailed a crack shot named Tim Murphy to bring him down. This sharpshooter's first bullet cut the crupper of Fraser's horse, the second passed through the mane, while the third resulted in the British general pitching for- ward mortally wounded. Just before this, Fraser's aide had pointed out to his superior the fact that the Americans seemed to be aiming at him and had raised the question of retiring to another place. Fraser had bravely replied: "My duty forbids me to fly from danger," but immediately after that he had fallen. When this happened, the British lost all hope and gave way everywhere and made for their works. Burgoyne also had fought bravely, and although a marked man for the American marksmen, reached his intrenchments alive. The short engagement had resulted in a loss of four hundred among the British, while the Americans had suffered hardly at all.
Now came the attack on the British camp itself. The first sector reached by Arnold was an important post at Freeman's Farm com- manded by Lord Balcarres. The fighting was fierce but the British held. He then decided to storm a position held by Breymann and his Germans. After two charges he swept all before him. The capture of the redoubt opened Burgoyne's main position to the exultant Ameri- cans. Breymann himself fell, killed, it is said, by one of his own men who turned against his bloody commander after the latter had butch- ered at least four Germans to make the remainder fight harder. In the last rush, however, Arnold's horse was killed by the retreating Germans, while he, himself, was severely wounded in the leg. While he lay in this condition, Armstrong finally caught up with him and delivered Gates' order to return to camp. 'With the enemy stampeded, and himself wounded, Arnold was carried from the bat- tlefield on a litter. He had broken the Burgoyne invasion while Gates had spent his time, safe at his headquarters, attempting to con- vince a British prisoner of the justice of the Revolution. As for
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the enemy, Burgoyne must either recapture Breymann's former posi- tion the next morning, or retreat. The British commander did not even consider a counter attack, so unfavorable was the situation. Under cover of darkness his men withdrew beyond the Great Ravine. The following day, October eighth, passed without a renewal of bat- tle, Gates being satisfied to delay in spite of the fact that during the previous night fresh troops had marched into position.
Meanwhile, Fraser had died as a result of his wound, after having outlived the night at the house occupied by Baroness Riedesel, exclaim- ing: "Oh, fatal ambition! Poor General Burgoyne! My poor wife!" In accordance with his last request of Burgoyne, he was buried at twilight, this ritual constituting one of the dramatic moments of the campaign. It was a calm and beautiful evening until the Ameri- cans noticed the movement of troops taking part in the ceremony. Then being able to see but indistinctly and not guessing the real nature of this action, the patriots pointed their artillery on the funeral procession. The lifeless body of Fraser was borne to its final resting place by grenadiers of his regiment, followed by Burgoyne and the other officers, while cannon balls fell round about. In spite of the artil- lery fire, the chaplain read the burial service in the usual manner, and the brilliant officer's body was lowered to its place of repose.
In three days-October eighth, ninth and tenth-Burgoyne retreated only seven miles to the present site of Schuylerville, the slowness of movement being accounted for by his insistence on taking his guns with him. Why he allowed his army to be weighted down by artillery while there was a chance to escape by rapid marching can only be explained by the fact that constant adversity had unbalanced his mind. On one occasion he completely neglected an excellent chance to overpower a force of thirteen hundred militia under John Fellows. One night he learned that these Americans were slumbering peacefully without adequate protection, yet allowed them to remain unmolested. Other transparent mistakes of omission and commission made it even more evident that "Gentleman Johnny" had completely lost his head. Furthermore, as his weary and discouraged troops dragged themselves slowly northward through the rain and mud, the situation apparently seemed as hopeless to the others. This was a far different picture than had been presented by the cocky troops as they swept down the Champlain Valley at the start of the invasion. Who would have then
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expected to see these same soldiers content to sink exhausted to the rain-soaked ground, whipped and battered, in order to gain strength to continue a hopeless retreat? Burgoyne himself, with characteristic self-indulgence, leaving his men in the rain, entered the Schuyler man- sion to enjoy the warmth, and the satisfaction of a good supper.
The reader may be pardoned for wondering what Gates was doing all this time, although it is rather easy to guess. The fact was that the American camp was in such a disorganized condition that any move was difficult. Supplies and provisions had been used up and there was no effective system of distributing new stores. Moreover, rations had to be cooked before the army was ready to move. So slow were the preparations in the American camp that Gates did not march until the afternoon of October tenth. It was this sluggishness on the part of the patriots that kept Fellows in danger, but Burgoyne did not dare to attack the latter because he naturally expected Gates to press the rear of the retreating British.
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