USA > Vermont > The Lake Champlain and Lake George valleys, Vol. I > Part 24
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Even then, St. Clair was unaware of the size of the British Army, although it was obvious he was in danger. It did not take him long to decide to evacuate Mount Hope, however, for that post was over a mile away from the main garrison, and could not withstand a deter-
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mined assault. There can be no argument over this step even though it did give the British control of the route to Lake George. St. Clair was soon to have to make decisions, however, which were not so easy, especially when he learned from a prisoner and some deserters the exact size of the opposing army. Unless Burgoyne should follow Abercrombie's rash example and destroy his own army in a prema- ture assault against the American barricade, St. Clair now realized that he had but a thin chance of defeating the efforts of the British. He realized that his forces were far from being adequate for the business at hand, provided that all other factors were equal. Nothing would be worse than to be caught like a mouse in a trap and lose his army. On the other hand, public opinion certainly would not sanc- tion the surrender of their highly important fortress without a fight. Ticonderoga bulked large in the patriot mind, and any general who had the ill fortune of having to surrender this prized post, even after a stubborn defense, was doomed to face a wrathful populace. With the line of retreat to Lake George lost by the evacuation of Mount Hope, St. Clair could not move in that direction anyway. Some writers have expressed the opinion that the American garrison should have been moved from Ticonderoga to the southern end of Lake George prior to Burgoyne's arrival, but even if it had been politically expedient it would have been unwise from the military point of view. At that time the defenses at Fort George were weak, and even if they had been strengthened the British would have been free to use the eastern route to the Hudson by way of Skenesborough and Fort Ann. In any case, St. Clair was now faced with the alternatives of evacuat- ing the fort without a fight, or of fighting and probably losing his army. It was a choice between the frying pan and the fire.
Within a short time, however, the decision was made easy for him, although the consequences to the unfortunate commander were not any less. When the sun rose on the morning of July fifth, great activity could be seen on the summit of Mount Defiance and it was obvious that a battery was being erected there. British redcoats were noticed moving to and fro. Burgoyne's officers had speedily discerned the glaring weakness of the American position, and after only a casual examination, Lieutenant Twiss, the chief of engineers, had recom- mended the erection of fortifications there. There was now but one thing that St. Clair could do and that was to retreat while there was
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still an avenue of escape. Two routes were yet open, one by way of the southern extremity of Lake Champlain toward Skenesborough, and the second by way of Mount Independence toward Castleton, Vermont. St. Clair promptly called a council of war, and found his officers to be unanimously in favor of retreat. However, evacuation during that day was not advisable because it would be noticed at once by the enemy on Mount Defiance, and Burgoyne would undoubtedly take prompt action to intercept the American Army. It was decided to wait for the night to hide the movements of the patriot soldiers.
It was not the best of nights for such an enterprise, because the moon insisted on brightening the landscape. There was not enough darkness to cover St. Clair's operations, but at least it served as a veil. Making the best of an unfortunate situation, the American forces began to move from Fort Ticonderoga across the bridge to Mount Independence. In order to prevent intelligence of his plans reaching the British, St. Clair did not take his men into his confidence, and many of them thought that they were now to attack the enemy instead of retreating. His bad luck was not yet at an end. When he reached Mount Independence he found the commander of that post, a French adventurer named Roche de Fermoy, asleep, and his men not prepared to move. No orders had been given at all. Finally, the situation was remedied, and the retreat began over the two routes still open. Artillery, stores of various kinds, and the sick were loaded on boats and sent up Lake Champlain toward Skenesborough with a guard of from four to six hundred soldiers. The bulk of St. Clair's army headed toward Castleton. At this point Fermoy again became the villain of the drama by setting fire to his quarters and indicating to the British the movement of American troops. Both Riedesel and Fraser took prompt action. It was not long before the latter was leading his troops across the bridge toward Mount Independence. Cannon had been left behind under American soldiers to protect the retreat, but when Fraser approached he found the gunners dead drunk. Burgoyne now decided to take personal charge of the pursuit toward Skenesborough while Riedesel and Fraser were told to follow the main American force.
The morning of July sixth found St. Clair pushing vigorously onward across the soil of Vermont. As the day advanced the sun beat mercilessly down upon the demoralized patriots with increasing
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intensity. Passing through the town of Orwell and around the northern end of beautiful Lake Bomoseen to East Hubbardton, the American Army hurried on as far as Castleton, where it prepared for the night. In all it had traveled a distance of thirty miles under the boiling sun. At this point in the retreat, however, St. Clair was faced with an additional problem. Our old Vermont friend, one of the leaders of the Green Mountain Boys, Seth Warner, now saw fit to disobey his superior officer. He was in command of the American rear guard and instead of continuing to Castleton as St. Clair had ordered, stopped for the night at East Hubbardton. Not only that, but he was guilty of a serious military indiscretion by neglecting to post any sentinels. Meanwhile, Fraser's British redcoats and Riede- sel's lumbering Germans had forged steadily ahead under the hot sun of July sixth and part of the pursuers had bivouacked at Hub- bardton, not far away. During the night Fraser's Indians located the American position, and at three o'clock on the morning of July seventh he advanced with seven hundred and fifty men. When he arrived at Warner's camp he found the Americans unsuspectingly cooking breakfast. At twenty minutes to five, just as the sun rose, he ordered a charge. The surprise was complete, and all was confusion, but the American officers finally managed to form their men into line. Soon a terrific battle was raging.
The firing was heard by St. Clair, who was at Castleton six miles away, and also by Riedesel, who was hurrying to Fraser's assistance as fast as possible. The road from Castleton to Hubbardton was mostly uphill and St. Clair had no way of knowing the size of the attacking force. He, nevertheless, ordered two regiments to go to Warner's assistance, but they were mutinous and panicstricken and retreated instead. Meanwhile, the fierce battle at Hubbardton con- tinued for three hours. Honors were even and neither side could win a permanent advantage. Finally, when it appeared that Fraser was in great danger of defeat, Riedesel's advance guard arrived sing- ing psalms. The tide was turned. The arrival of these fresh troops, even though small in number, decided the day, and Warner felt it necessary to order his force to scatter and meet him at Manchester. Fraser and Riedesel were in no condition to continue the pursuit, how- ever. Thirty-five of their men and officers had been killed and one hundred and forty-eight wounded. In addition, they were encum-
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bered with two hundred and seventy-four prisoners. They were in a strange country without any knowledge of St. Clair's whereabouts, while the fierce fighting of the American troops had surprised and discouraged them. Finally, on July eighth, Riedesel led his forces to Skenesborough in order to obtain provisions, while Fraser followed him on the ninth. Meanwhile, St. Clair, having learned of the fall of Skenesborough, was compelled to wend his way toward Rutland, the only path now open to him.
Not only was the American retreat toward Castleton handicapped by blunders, but the same might be said about the withdrawal toward Skenesborough as well. Colonel Long was in command of the Ameri- can flotilla. He proceeded southward at an extremely leisurely pace as his soldiers thoroughly enjoyed themselves drinking wine to the music of fife and drum. No apprehension was felt because pursuit was considered impossible. This illusion arose from the fact that the American garrison at Ticonderoga had previously constructed, at great expense, a huge boom and chain across the lake and it was felt that this obstruction would delay the British for some time. Actually it took Burgoyne only half an hour to cut through and continue the chase. So secure did Long feel that he neglected utterly to plant guns on the cliffs guarding the narrow channel, where they could have seri- ously interfered with the British pursuit. The American boats eventually reached Skenesborough in safety, but Long was soon sur- prised and distressed to find the "Royal George" and the "Inflexible," aided by a north wind, arriving there soon after he did. This un- looked-for situation was too much for the patriots to digest and many of them became panicstricken and fled. Others, that remained cool- headed, managed to set fire to the boats, sawmills, forges and store- houses and, in fact, everything that would burn. As they fled through the woods toward Fort Ann, the flames spread from the buildings to the trees and eventually the whole hillside was on fire. Constantly on the alert, watching their rear to prevent Indian depredations, the glow of the flames at Skenesborough must have seemed ominous to the fleeing Americans. Burgoyne had intended to cut off their retreat by posting troops across the road to Fort Ann, but his regulars were not used to threading their way through thick forests and were unable to intercept the patriots. The British commander had to be content to order Lieutenant-Colonel Hill to continue the pursuit the next morn- ing, July seventh.
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Hill had a force numbering about one hundred and ninety. Through- out the day he toiled over the difficult ground in the direction of Fort Ann, capturing some American baggage boats on their way up Wood Creek and finally spending the night within a mile of the American fort. Early on the morning of the eighth an American spy entered his camp posing as a deserter and reporting that the Fort Ann gar- rison consisted of a thousand troops. This, of course, was an out- rageous fabrication, for even after Long, who was now in command of that post, was strengthened by a reenforcement of militia under Van Rensselaer, there was a combined total of only five hundred Americans. Nevertheless, this false information had the effect of causing Hill to give up his plans of attacking the patriot position. In the meantime, the spy slipped back into the American camp and reported the small number of men under Hill's command. The situation seemed made to order for Long and Van Rensselaer and they promptly marched out with their superior forces to crush the enemy. Hill was now in an unenviable position. Not only was he greatly outnumbered but the regulars were unable to fight from regular formation as was their custom because of the thick woods and rough ground. The Americans fired from cover as usual, and were seldom seen by the redcoats. Meanwhile, a detachment of patriots circled around to Hill's rear, cutting him off from Skenesborough. The British commander was forced to abandon his wounded as his men scrambled up a steep hill, and it now seemed as if he was facing certain doom. For two hours a fierce engagement raged. Hill's ammunition was almost exhausted, but out of almost certain annihila- tion he finally managed to escape. Long and Van Rensselaer also were out of ammunition, and when their militia heard a war whoop from the direction of Skenesborough, even though it was an amateur- ish imitation by a British officer, the Americans decided to call it a day. Returning to the fort they set the defenses on fire and retreated once more to the south. Hill, although badly battered, was left in command of the battlefield. Burgoyne had sent Phillips to his assist- ance, but the latter arrived only in time to escort the weary survivors back to Skenesborough.
This marks the end of the series of engagements centering around the capture of Ticonderoga. Up to this point, Burgoyne's army had swept relentlessly over the landscape like a gigantic red tide. The
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entire Champlain Valley was in British hands. When Hill had emerged victorious at Fort Ann on July eighth, Burgoyne was within only twenty-three miles of Fort Edward and the Hudson. It was only one week since the British Army had left Crown Point. It is little wonder that Burgoyne and his allies retained their contempt of the undisciplined, discouraged, mutinous American forces. So much had been accomplished with so little effort. In spite of the glaring weaknesses manifested in the British Army, Burgoyne's military machine had proceeded easily, thanks largely to the many American errors of omission and commission. Practically the only favorable result from the patriot point of view was the confidence acquired in some of the minor engagements, particularly at Hubbardton, from the fact that the American soldiers found on those occasions that man to man they were a match for the British regulars.
The capture of Ticonderoga by Burgoyne was a matter of tre- mendous importance. In the mind of the average American, it was as impregnable as Gibraltar. That fortress which had won its rightful prestige during the final war with France, and which was so closely associated with the celebrated exploits of Ethan Allen and Benedict Arnold, was a sort of symbol of American power. The news of its fall was as terrifying as the ringing of firebells in the dead of night. A great wave of indignation permeated the stunned popu- lace throughout the settlements. The great highway from Canada was now entirely lost, and the towns and villages of New York and New England were exposed to enemy attack. The gates of Indian hell were open wide, and the outlying settlements were now com- pletely at the mercy of Canadian savages. The effect of the fall of Ticonderoga on the American populace can be easily imagined when a leader of John Adams' temperament could exclaim: "We shall never be able to defend a post until we shoot a general." St. Clair and Schuyler were both pictured as traitors who had been paid for their shady transactions by silver bullets shot into their camp for them to pick up. Both generals were tried by court-martial but were eventually acquitted, Schuyler by a unanimous vote and "with the highest honor." Nevertheless, before they were exonerated, these two unfortunate commanders had to undergo a veritable shower of abuse and slander. Even Washington was perplexed and suspicious.
St. Clair certainly used good military judgment in an extremely bad situation. He clearly was not to blame for the weak condition
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of Fort Ticonderoga nor the low morale then existing among the patriots. If bigger generals than he was had spent considerable time there without appreciating the importance of the fortification of Mount Defiance, certainly he can be excused for not contradicting them in the short time he was there with his undersized army. He was correct in withdrawing from Ticonderoga before Burgoyne com- pletely surrounded him and all chance of escape should be cut off. From that point on, blunder followed blunder, but the fault does not rest with St. Clair. He was powerless to remedy Fermoy's dis- loyalty or drunken incompetence. The defeat at Hubbardton rests on Seth Warner's shoulders; while the unfortunate incidents around Skenesborough tarnish the reputation of Long and his fellow-officers. Both officers and men were mutinous and disobeyed orders on several occasions. St. Clair was practically powerless to accomplish more under the circumstances. However, I do not mean to imply that no other individual could have done better. There are many "ifs" in history. Perhaps, if the men comprising the American garrison had been dominated and inspired by a fearless, dramatic and red-hot per- sonality whom they would be willing to follow through the gates of hell (as had that valiant force that had threaded the Maine wilder- ness from the Kennebec to Quebec itself in the fall of 1775), the results might have been different. Certainly there were some Ameri- can officers who would not have been caught in the trap in the first place, and we do know that the British would have been forced to pay a steep price for Mount Defiance if ever they had obtained control over it.
As for Schuyler, he undoubtedly did his best, which, however, was not enough. His cold, aristocratic personality and his Dutch nationality were not calculated to fire the ardor of New England militia in particular. Furthermore, although brave and strong, he knew little about the fine arts of military science, and the importance of Mount Defiance would naturally be better appreciated by Burgoyne's trained military engineers. Finally, the political insecurity of his posi- tion and the sudden changes in the command between himself and Gates, prevented him from accomplishing the best possible results. Gates had guessed that Burgoyne would come by the Champlain route and deserves credit for that prophecy. On the other hand he had been present when Trumbull had demonstrated the importance of Mount
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Defiance. His alleged belief that it was too steep for the enemy to fortify with their artillery sounds like a lame excuse or gross incompe- tence.
The rumors about the silver bullets deserve additional explana- tion. The reports that American officers were paid for treachery by this method were not confined to Schuyler and St. Clair. These stories seemed to crop up every time the British were faced with an able opponent, and on each occasion were probably started and nourished by British spies and agents. Because of the suspicion, rivalry, and even hatred that existed between the various American Colonies, it was easy to find men who were not only willing to believe this slander but even eager to hear and repeat it. Schuyler, in spite of his shortcomings, was stubborn and brave, and if the British agents by spreading this gossip could succeed in having him deprived of his command or at least summoned from the campaign to face court martial, the Ameri- can Congress might, and probably would, choose some less competent general to succeed him. In addition, such slander would be sure to decrease the confidence felt by the populace in their leaders, and fur- ther demoralize the enemies of George III.
While the fall of Ticonderoga plunged Americans into the depths of despair, Englishmen were correspondingly exultant. Even those Britons who had upheld the cause of liberty against oppression by their open sympathy were now quiet and overwhelmed. The King's exuberance knew no bounds. So eager was he to break the good news to his queen that he rushed into her apartment unannounced. It so happened that her royal highness had on nothing but her chemise, and it has been said on sound authority that her ladies-in-waiting were properly scandalized by his undignified and untimely entry. In any case he could not be restrained from exclaiming to his startled audience : "I have beat them ! I have beat all the Americans." Before the capture of Fort Ticonderoga, the patriots had been conceded an even chance of achieving their independence. Now the gambler's odds were five to one that the rebellion would be curbed. Tories living in England felt that the war was practically over and began to make arrange- ments to return to America. In one way, however, the British were disappointed. They felt that, with the fall of Ticonderoga, large numbers of Americans would abandon the revolt and come swarming into Burgoyne's camp. It is true that some wavering or neutral set-
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tlers jumped off the fence into his pasture, but the great majority remained steadfast to the patriot cause,
For some time, secret aid had been coming to the Americans from France. Vergennes, who was in charge of French foreign affairs, seemed willing to embarrass England whenever possible. Although he had little reason to sympathize with rebels, he had much less love for the British, the bitter rivals of his countrymen, and opponents through so many wars. On the other hand he did not want to join in a hopeless cause. When news arrived from across the Atlantic favor- able to the American cause, he redoubled his energies in behalf of the patriots, but when reports were unfavorable he proceeded with caution. When Vergennes learned of the fall of Ticonderoga, his enthusiasm waned considerably, a circumstance that was not propitious to the cause of American liberty.
CHAPTER XV
Burgoyne Fights the Wilderness
There were two routes by which Burgoyne could proceed. He could continue on from Skenesborough and Fort Ann to Fort Edward, a distance of twenty-three miles from the former place, or if he pre- ferred he could retrace his steps to Ticonderoga and advance by way of Lake George. Although the Fort Ann route was much shorter it constituted extremely difficult traveling. There was no road through this wilderness over which Burgoyne could transport his army. Fur- thermore, much of the land was swampy in those days. The geog- raphy of this region rendered it suitable for stubborn defensive tactics on the part of the Americans, who were at their best when engaged in guerilla warfare in the wilderness. If Burgoyne decided to use the western route, through Lake George, it would be simple to retrace his steps to Ticonderoga by way of Lake Champlain. From that point he might proceed by land or by water. There was a road run- ning along the western shore of Lake George, but it presented diffi- culties. It was extremely rough throughout, and steep in many places, while on both sides it was menaced by dense forests. In fact, it was more of a trail than it was a road. If Burgoyne sailed over the waters of Lake George he would have to transport his boats and supplies over the portage at Ticonderoga, where they would be useless for a hurried retreat to Canada. Once having traversed the lake to the site of old Fort William Henry, he would be within twelve miles of Fort Edward. Between these two points there was a road, but what a bloody and forbidding past it had experienced! Following a nar- row valley with steep banks on both sides, after passing by Bloody Pond with its horrid memories, it meandered by numerous sites of Indian terrors inflicted in the past. This roadway was still admirably suited to ambush as in former wars.
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Before Burgoyne had left England he had had every intention of using the Lake George route. There was then no doubt in his mind but that this way constituted the best road to Albany. Concerning the Fort Ann route he pointed out that "the narrow parts of the river may be easily choked up and rendered impassable and at best there will be a necessity for a great deal of land carriage for the artillery, provisions, etc." King George III had personally recommended the Lake George route to him and pointed out to Burgoyne that, "if pos- sible, possession must be taken of Lake George, and nothing but an absolute impossibility of succeeding in this can be an excuse for pro- ceeding by South Bay and Skenesborough." Nevertheless, Burgoyne now decided to disregard these orders and his own former opinion and made preparations to proceed by means of the eastern route, using Lake George only for the transportation of artillery and stores.
It is not entirely clear why Burgoyne changed his mind. He claimed that the Lake George route would have meant going by water, evidently judging that the road on the western shore was of little value. He also maintained that he might have lost time besieg- ing Fort George, but this was unlikely because of the weakness of that position. Still another reason given by the British commander was that the retreat to Ticonderoga, which was necessary if the Lake George route was to be used, would have lowered the morale of his troops. As early as June thirtieth, he had issued orders closing with a terse command : "This Army must not Retreat." It is easily under- standable, because of his contempt for the enemy in front of him and because of the pride he felt in his army and his faith in his own destiny, that he should have actually disliked the idea of withdrawing to Ticon- deroga even if it was the proper military maneuver. We also know that he leaned on Philip Skene for advice, and that on this occasion his counselor suggested the eastern route. Whether the motive was selfish or not we may never know. There is no question but that Burgoyne would be compelled to build a road before he could advance farther along the Fort Ann route, and that such an improvement would tend to make Skene rich after the war was over because it connected his estate with the Hudson, while the removal of the obstructions, placed across Wood Creek by the Americans, would also be advantageous to him.
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