USA > Vermont > The Lake Champlain and Lake George valleys, Vol. I > Part 28
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Burgoyne soon judged that the wise policy was to defend the strong Schuylerville position. While he halted here to camp, he sent Sutherland and some of his troops toward Fort Edward to con- struct a bridge under the direction of Twiss. His own position was much stronger here than it had been on the battlefields to the south, for there was much open ground which could be swept with artillery fire, and his regulars could use their normal methods of fighting. This fine defensive position was of little advantage, however, for it could not keep his men from starving, and the only sensible thing was further retreat while there was yet time. Finally, Gates arrived in front of the British position, having advanced in tardy fashion, although with less slowness than had characterized the British movements. The American commander mistakenly decided that Burgoyne's main army was moving north and that the force before him was only the rear guard to check pursuit. For once he deter- mined to be bold and attack. Burgoyne correctly guessed Gates' intentions and ordered Sutherland back from Fort Edward to reënforce him, leaving only a small guard for the unfinished bridge. Some of the American subordinate officers were not so sure that Gates was correct in his belief that the main British Army had moved away, and luckily he took their advice and sent out Wilkinson to reconnoiter. But for this, the American Army would have been in
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great peril under the circumstances. As it was, warning came just in time. Deserters gave information that Burgoyne's main body was ahead, and the advancing divisions of the American Army were halted in time, although this was difficult to do because Gates was far to the rear. Soon the fog lifted, and the entire British Army was revealed under arms and waiting. Thus the margin was narrow indeed by which Burgoyne failed to inflict possibly great damage on Gates. The British commander was also confronted with another cruel blow, for an American detachment had destroyed the unfinished bridge at Fort Edward.
On the evening of October eleventh, Burgoyne called a meeting of his officers to consider the acute situation. Riedesel made the most interesting suggestion: that the baggage should be abandoned and that the army should move up the west side of the Hudson to a point not far below the present site of Glens Falls, where the river could be forded to the opposite shore. Burgoyne, however, could not be induced to part with his guns and supplies, so the council broke up without any decision. On the afternoon of the twelfth, the discus- sion was renewed. Burgoyne was now almost entirely surrounded by a greatly superior enemy. Food supplies could not possibly last beyond the twentieth, and retreat threatened many dangers. On the other hand, news had arrived that Clinton had captured Fort Mont- gomery. Burgoyne submitted five proposals to his officers. First, there was the possibility of remaining where he was, but that was plain suicide. Second, he could attack, but such a move would clearly not be very wise. Third, he could retreat with baggage and guns and force the ford at Fort Edward, but how soon the army would starve to death after that was an unpleasant thought. In the fourth place he could follow Riedesel's suggestion of abandoning his encumbrances and retreat rapidly by night. His fifth idea was to suddenly strike toward Albany if Gates moved farther to the west. The British offi- cers favored the last plan, but Riedesel protested so strongly that it was agreed to adopt the fourth scheme. It was decided to begin the retreat at ten o'clock but this move, for some reason or other, was postponed. This delay was of great importance to the Americans, for during the night the patriots succeeded in completing the encir- clement of the British, the final touch being achieved by Stark. When the morning of October thirteenth dawned, Burgoyne found his
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retreat cut off. A council of British officers held that day decided unanimously to seek honorable terms for surrender.
Gates decided to bluff and called for an unconditional surrender. Again the British council met and took unanimous action, this time with the result that the American terms were turned down. Burgoyne countered by insisting that his troops be allowed to march out with the honors of war before laying down their arms. In addition he asked that, instead of being treated as prisoners of war, they should be allowed, after surrendering their arms, to return to England on con- dition that they should not serve again in America during the war. Meanwhile the armistice was continued. On the morning of the fif- teenth, Burgoyne was surprised to receive Gates' acceptance of his proposals, limited only by the condition that the ceremony be com- pleted that afternoon. This easy diplomatic victory caused the Brit- ish commander to believe that Gates' unexpected assent was caused by news of Clinton's approach. He decided to play for time and told Gates that he needed a longer time to carry out the terms of the surrender; but again the American commander agreed. The truth was that, although Burgoyne had received false reports dur- ing the night of October fifteenth that Clinton was probably now in Albany, there was little to hope for from that harassed general. The British general did not know this, however, and Gates was not sure. In any case, on the morning of October sixteenth, Burgoyne, clinging to his vain hope, continued to play for time. He wrote to Gates that he had heard that the latter had sent away part of his army, a situa- tion which changed the agreement of the day before, and demanded that two of his officers be allowed to count the patriot troops. This new demand disconcerted the Americans, who had also heard rumors from the south. Finally, Wilkinson was sent to the British camp, and this young officer informed Burgoyne that no such violation of the agreement had taken place. He demanded to know what the British intended to do, and "Gentleman Johnny" responded with a refusal to sign the treaty. Wilkinson agreed that the armistice should end in one hour and uncomfortably started back to the American lines. Negotiations were renewed, however, and Burgoyne finally gave in.
On the morning of the seventeenth the formal surrender of the British Army took place. When Burgoyne met Gates he is reported to
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have gracefully said: "The fortune of war, General Gates, has made me your prisoner." The reply of the American commander was equally courteous, and consisted of the following promise: "I shall always be ready to testify that it has not been through any fault of your Excellency." The British soldiers laid down their arms and soon were marching away to the southward. Gates had ordered his men not to taunt the vanquished, and the patriot militia, as a rule, stood in silence watching their defeated foes fade away into the distance. As the redcoats and Germans passed the tent where Burgoyne and Gates were in conference the two generals stepped out. The British gen- eral, with ceremony, drew his sword and handed it to his successful adversary; but Gates courteously returned it. Not everything was orderly, however, when the defeated legions passed beyond the American troops. Some of the more exuberant farmers were anxious to massacre the Indians who remained, probably to avenge Jane McCrea; while other Americans insisted that they would tar and feather Burgoyne, himself. It was necessary for Gates to send along guards to prevent such outrages. Burgoyne reached Albany in safety where, with his usual self-indulgence, he spent ten days enjoying the pleasant hospitality of the Schuylers, even though he had burned their Schuylerville mansion.
The British commander was finally allowed to return to England on parole in the spring of 1778, arriving there much sooner than many of his men. According to the agreement at the time of the surrender they were all to be sent home; but the American Congress refused to live up to this promise. Many of them remained prisoners in this country until the end of the war. On the other hand it should be reported that the British failed to live up to their side of the treaty. As was to be expected, Germain made every effort to use Burgoyne as a scapegoat. The unfortunate general was denied an audience by the King, his demands for a military inquiry into his conduct were promptly refused, and an attempt was even made to deny him his seat in Parliament. By dint of hard labor, however, he finally man- aged to gain a hearing and had the testimony printed. He engaged in politics and found a mistress in the person of an opera singer, by whom he had four children. He died on August 4, 1792, and was buried beside his wife in Westminster Abbey.
Phillips and Riedesel were both paroled, later exchanged, and finally returned to the fray. The former, assisted by Arnold, ravaged
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Virginia until he finally died of fever at Petersburg. Riedesel ulti- mately returned to Canada and continued to command the German troops for the duration of the war. Afterwards he returned to Europe, where he died in 1800. Much of his advice to Burgoyne had been good; he had fought with bravery; and his lovely family had lent a pleasing touch to Burgoyne's army.
Among the American officers of note, Wilkinson was destined to have the longest career. The intrigue in which he engaged is truly amazing. He certainly had considerable ability or he would not have been able to bound back into popular favor and the confidence of his superiors after each discreditable performance. Numerous were the friends he betrayed, and base were his treasonable activities. His word is worthless to us, as it was to his associates. He finally died in Mexico City in 1825, while an agent of the American Bible Society. The shadow of misfortune was to pursue St. Clair the rest of his days. His unpleasant experience at Ticonderoga was but a sample of what was to come. He lost his fortune. He had the doubtful honor to find himself elected president of the last and weakest of the Continental Congresses meeting under the Articles of Confederation. Later Washington appointed him to be Governor of the Northwest Territory, only to result in his being defeated by Indians. This man of adversity lived to the age of eighty-four, not dying until 1818. Stark also lived a long life, surviving until 1822, an accomplishment considering his harrowing experiences as one of the leaders of Rogers' rangers in the French and Indian War. Schuyler was the only Ameri- can officer connected with the Burgoyne campaign to be truly fortu- nate after the Revolution. When he succeeded in winning acquittal of the charges of treason brought against him, he retired from the army and spent the remainder of his life in political office. He also prepared plans for a Hudson-Champlain canal by way of Wood Creek, and in reality was one of the leaders of the Empire State in his era.
It was Gates, of course, who, temporarily at least, reaped the greatest reward. Although he was never on the field of battle during either engagement and in spite of the fact that victory was won by others, he, as commander of the army that captured Burgoyne, was certain to receive the plaudits of the multitudes. Congress was duly impressed with the great victory and honored him by voting that a
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gold medal should be struck in his honor in Latin, the English transla- tion being, "The American Congress to Horatio Gates, the gallant leader." So sure was Gates of his own destiny that he committed an unpardonable breach of discipline by neglecting to report the defeat of Burgoyne to his commander-in-chief, General Washington, even though it was bound to influence the latter's policy. By this time he was undoubtedly certain in his own mind that his efforts to displace his superior would end in success. For a short time his intrigue did succeed and he became President of the Board of War, but he rapidly deflated as his schemes caught up with him, and he was finally forced to retire from the army. Later, in 1780, he was restored to the com- mand of the American Army in the South, but suffered the worst defeat of the war at the hands of Cornwallis at Camden, South Caro- lina. His militia broke and fled, and Gates ran with them, not stop- ping until he had arrived at Charlotte, North Carolina, fifty miles away. Although he was later acquitted by an official investigation, it was hard to live the matter down. This unattractive personality gradually faded away in the background and he died in 1806. He had an average amount of ability but his ceaseless and selfish intrigues and his unfairness have made his name synonymous with meanness and deceit.
Meanwhile, what of the man who really won the battle of Saratoga? This represented the climax of Arnold's career. The seizure of Ticonderoga by himself and Allen had been important; his penetration of the Maine wilderness had been almost without par- allel; his covering of the retreat from Canada had been well done; his seamanship and courage on Lake Champlain in 1776 had made a thrill- ing story; but it was at Saratoga that he rose to the heights. Here in the decisive battle that led to American independence, Arnold stood supreme. It is unpleasant to contemplate what would have happened without him, particularly if St. Leger had joined Burgoyne. The lat- ter was confident that he could have defeated Gates, minus Arnold. Lossing stated that but for Arnold at the first battle at Saratoga, the British would have marched to Albany. Sparks commented that: "It is a curious fact, that an officer who really had no command in the army, was the leader in one of the most spirited and important battles of the revolution."
While Gates collected unmerited honors for the defeat of Bur- goyne, Arnold was carried on a litter to Albany. Completely dis-
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abled, he was forced to remain there during the fall and much of the winter of 1777-78. Knowing Arnold's restless spirit and impa- tience, it is easy to imagine his fretfulness as he was forced to remain quiet. Finally, after a rest in Connecticut, he arrived in May at Washington's camp at Valley Forge. Since he was still unfit for serv- ice in the field, he assumed command of Philadelphia after the British retired from that city in June. This was the beginning of the end. He continued to be treated unfairly by Congress ; his enemies remained active, and while in a bitter frame of mind as a result of the injustices heaped upon him, he married a beautiful Tory, Peggy Shippen. There is a limit to every man's accomplishments. Arnold had fought so fiercely and had endured so much adversity! Like Robert Rogers before him, he had had his fill; and his better self deteriorated like a wornout candle which flickers and then is no more. Arnold did not possess the patience and the breadth of vision of a George Washington. This was the crowning weakness of his make-up. Even if he had retired from the army and spent his time sulking-like Stark before Benning- ton-he might have been forgiven, particularly at a time of revolution when families fought on both sides. Instead, however, as every school- boy knows, he entered into treasonable correspondence with Sir Henry Clinton, and plotted to surrender West Point to the British. He actually did succeed in obtaining the command of that post; but the plot was discovered in time and he was forced to flee to the enemy lines. He then attempted to justify his treachery on the ground of the French alliance, feeling that the Americans by moving into the arms of the French King, were jumping from the frying pan into the fire. In any case, no purpose is to be served here by a debate as to whether this was a sincere fear or just an excuse. He later fought on the side of the British; but, once more like Rogers, his heart was not in it. He was hated by both English and Americans, and lived a lonely and despised life. Finally, when he died in London, June 14, 1801, he requested : "Bring me, I beg you, the epaulettes and sword- knots which Washington gave me; let me die in my old American uniform, the uniform in which I fought my battles. God forgive me for ever putting on any other."
Whatever alibis or excuses may be presented for Benedict Arn- old's treason, it may never be forgiven. His treachery was a great blow to his country. Some historians have wished that he could have
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been killed when wounded in the second battle of Saratoga. He has been the favorite victim of Fourth-of-July orators, while writers have hanged, drawn and quartered him without end. Perhaps the worst result of all this has been that much of the history of the Champlain Valley and Saratoga during the Revolution has been altered by the desire to crucify Arnold. It is the good fortune of Vermont and northern New York that they were connected with the glorious phase of his life, rather than with his treachery. The history of this section would be barren indeed without his exploits. From the stand- point of some phases of character, there were better men in the patriot army; but no one, not even Washington himself, had Arnold's pecu- liar ability to inspire the patriot militia with so much flame and zeal. or to lead them through such adverse circumstances. If he had not yielded to treason, he would undoubtedly have gone down in history as one of America's greatest leaders, instead of suffering for eternity the traitor's punishment. His sun had risen in a blaze of glory, only to fade swiftly into complete darkness. As we contemplate the evil end of that unusual and able general, there is a deep feeling of sor- row as we think of what might have been. This sensation is intensi- fied, when on the battlefield, we gaze on that niche in the monument meant for Arnold, but which, because of his later treachery, con- tains only the replica of his wounded leg.
Concerning the importance of the battle of Saratoga there is no question, bringing as it did an alliance with France and eventual American independence. Before the news of the outcome of the Burgoyne campaign reached Europe, Vergennes refused to be coaxed out of neutrality. When information did arrive its effect was as great as in America, where it was the greatest sensation since Lexington. Within forty-eight hours, Louis XVI and his Foreign Secretary were in conference, and the document which provided for recognition and a virtual alliance was dated December 6, 1777. Six days later, Benja- min Franklin was received, and a formal treaty was signed on Feb- ruary sixth. By June seventeenth, English and French ships exchanged shots. Spain followed Vergennes' lead in turning on England in June, 1779; while Holland came into the war in 1780. As a result of all this diversion, no English attempt was made after Burgoyne's cam- paign to systematically reconquer the former Colonies. The war changed from a civil war between Mother Country and Colonies to a
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struggle for life between the British and four enemies at once. Eng- land now decided to treat Americans as foreign foes, rather than wayward children to be welcomed home. In spite of assistance from France, Washington himself at times was not sure of the out- come; without this aid it is difficult to see how he could have been successful. It is an axiom that the battle of Saratoga resulted in an alliance with France, and that this friendship made our inde- pendence possible. On the other hand it is well to remember that Vergennes' motive was rather England's defeat than the emergence of a strong America. Credit should also be given to Franklin's diplomacy in furthering better relations between the rebels and the French court; while the ancient rivalry between France and Eng- land was another factor. The main strategic importance of the French alliance of 1778 was that it changed the balance of sea power. At the time of the final surrender of Cornwallis, which ended the war, it was French control of the sea between New York City and the British Army that permitted Admiral De Grasse to cut off the retreat of Cornwallis. Thus the conflict that had dragged on for years on land without any decisive results was eventually ended by the British loss of the control of the seas, resulting from the French alliance.
Looking at the Burgoyne campaign in its entirety, one is impressed by the vast number of errors committed on both sides. If we con- template American mistakes we wonder how Burgoyne could have failed; yet if we confine our attention to British errors it is difficult to perceive how he could have succeeded. Let us first consider Ameri- can negligence and weakness. To begin with, there was the intense bitterness and hatred between states and between officers. Then there was the vacillation and weakness of Congress, with sudden and dangerous changes among commanding officers, as was the case with Gates and Schuyler. There was also considerable political intrigue resulting in injustices as in the cases of Stark and Arnold. There was the failure to have the proper fortifications at Ticonderoga, particu- larly on the summit of Mount Defiance. Either the works were too extended or there were insufficient troops. There was the glaring failure of the intelligence service that allowed Burgoyne to approach the fort without the size of his army being known. In the retreat from Ticonderoga, Fermoy, Warner and Long made stupid errors. Stark's troops got out of hand at Bennington, while their failure to
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cooperate with Schuyler and Gates might have resulted in tragedy. Herkimer walked into ambush without any precautions. In the first battle of Saratoga, Gates sent Learned into the engagement without proper guides and too late; while he recalled Arnold from the firing line at the critical moment. The famous quarrel between the generals was no help to the American cause. Later, after the second battle, Gates almost committed a blunder of the most serious type when he advanced in the fog against what he guessed was only Burgoyne's rear guard but what was actually his main army. These do not represent all of the American errors of omission and commission, but when we contemplate the untrained patriot militia this list is long enough to indicate that the British might have been pardoned for feeling confi- dent. To counterbalance these mistakes and failures, the British con- tributed, if not as many, at least more costly blunders; the militiamen were fighting for their own homes and using their favorite style of warfare; and in the third place they were buttressed by the fine defen- sive fighting of Schuyler and the inspired leadership of Arnold.
The appointment of Burgoyne was an error to begin with, so far as the British were concerned. His use of regulars for wilderness fighting would have been a mistake if he could have raised enough Tories and Canadians, but since these were unavailable he had no choice. The British use of Hessians and Indians was a major blunder because of the antagonism it aroused among the Americans. Ger- main and Howe certainly cannot properly claim much praise for their part. I insist that Burgoyne's failure to advance by the Lake George route was not necessarily an error; but it was certainly a mis- take to proceed with his whole army and so many guns. The psy- chology of the entire force was wrong, as evidenced by the contempt felt for the enemy, by the dissipation and pleasure-seeking of the com- mander, by the emphasis on everything but fighting (as can be guessed from the fact that two thousand women accompanied the soldiers ), and by the dulled sense of honor evident in the pardoning of the murderer of Jane McCrea. In addition to Burgoyne's lethargy there was the stupid decision to send Baum's slow Germans to Bennington by a dangerous route on a mission that required speed. Then there was the even more stupid decision to send the slow Breymann column to Baum's assistance. Stark's trick of disguising patriots as Tories was childishly simple yet it worked. Later when facing Gates, Bur-
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goyne used poor judgment in advancing through woods where his regulars were at their worst and he also committed other tactical blun- ders. His childlike faith in Clinton, his unwillingness to retreat while there was yet time, and his indecision, which was almost chronic, are all subject to just criticism. In the final stage of the campaign his mind seemed to be affected. In addition to all the errors committed, the British chances of success were not improved by the long line of com- munication and the consequent difficulty of obtaining supplies. Con- sidering all these weaknesses by themselves it is difficult to realize how Burgoyne had a chance to succeed in reaching Albany.
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