USA > Vermont > The Lake Champlain and Lake George valleys, Vol. I > Part 26
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point, Breymann's ammunition gave out. He was compelled to retreat, leaving his guns on the field of battle. As his men hurried in the general direction of Burgoyne's camp in the gathering dusk, his detachment was saved only by darkness. It became clear that the British commander should have sent Breymann with Baum and not after him.
The American victory at Bennington was a heavy blow to Bur- goyne. He had failed completely to capture the valuable patriot stores. He now was forced to wait until sufficient food could be transported over his long lines of communication to make a further advance possible. This additional delay was of great importance to the American cause. In the second place, the British Army had been seriously weakened by the bungled expedition. Eight hundred and fifty men had been irrevocably lost one way or another, and Bur- goyne's effective troops now numbered only about four thousand, three hundred and fifty. The desertion of the Indians, which had started previously because of their resentment at Burgoyne's efforts to control them, now became general. Even Saint-Luc de la Corne went home in disgust, and only eighty savages remained. Furthermore, any possi- bility that there might be a Tory uprising was considerably lessened, while some of the loyalists, already members of the British Army, became discouraged and melted away. The main loss of the British, however, was in their morale. Although the regulars retained much of their self-confidence, it was a rude jolt for them to discover that the American militia was capable of defeating trained soldiers. Burgoyne and his officers now beheld grim reality rather than rose-colored illu- sions. There was little of balm, or of Baum, for the British com- mander after the Bennington affair. Discounted in every way pos- sible, the battle was a serious check to the British campaign. As time continued on, it was to loom higher and higher on the military hori- zon. In the third place, as the morale of Burgoyne's army was deflated, the spirit of the American militia and populace took on new vigor. Some of the prestige lost at Ticonderoga had been recovered. In the fourth place, St. Leger was now forced to shift for himself. In any case, the long list of inexcusable errors of omission and commission charged up to Burgoyne, Skene, Baum, and Breymann was discredit- able to the British from all points of view.
The American militiamen, instead of following up their successes by closing in on Burgoyne's camp, filtered away to their homes as
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rapidly as they had arrived. Stark himself was in poor health, a fact which undoubtedly hindered aggressive tactics. In any case, the victors of Bennington failed to make any whole-hearted effort to con- tinue their campaign, an omission that was natural for militia, yet thoroughly unfortunate from the patriot point of view.
While the battle of Bennington was being fought, St. Leger con- tinued his siege of Fort Stanwix, and Gansevoort persisted in his stubborn defense. Even though the British threatened Indian atroci- ties unless the garrison yielded at once, the Americans refused to surrender. Finally, Gansevoort decided to send for relief, Lieutenant- Colonel Marinus Willett and a companion volunteering for the dan- gerous mission. Their efforts were crowned with success, and they continued down the Mohawk Valley until they met Benedict Arnold. On August twenty-first, the relieving force penetrated as far as Fort Dayton, but halted at that post to await reënforcements. On the twenty-second, however, word arrived that Fort Stanwix was in grave danger, and Arnold decided to press on regardless of the fact that he was outnumbered by St. Leger. The British commander had, by zig- zag trenches, approached within a hundred and fifty yards of the fort, a fact that constituted a great source of danger to the garrison. Sup- plies were running low, nothing had been learned of Willett's success, and it began to permeate the minds of the American officers that it might be best to accept St. Leger's terms. From this fate, however, they were saved by Arnold.
The main English weakness lay with their Indian contingent. We have already seen how their ardor had been dampened by the great loss of life at Oriskany, and their spirits depressed by the capture of their blankets and supplies. Futhermore, the redskins were restless individuals unsuited to long drawn-out actions. Arnold suspected that the savages would by this time be sick of the siege of Fort Stanwix, and hit upon a ruse to strike St. Leger in his most vulnerable spot. It happened that, among the prisoners, there was a half-wit named Hon Yost. Everyone acquainted with Indians was aware of the reverence felt by them for such unfortunates. Arnold now told the prisoner that if he would go to St. Leger's camp and frighten the Indians by exaggerating the size of the relieving force, his life would be spared. This idea delighted Yost. His clothes were filled with bullet holes to make the enemy believe that he had escaped at the hazard of his
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life, and his brother, Nicholas, was retained as hostage to insure Hon's good behavior. An Oneida Indian was also sent toward St. Leger's camp at the same time to corroborate the Dutchman's story. Once inside the British camp, Yost carried out his mission with com- plete success. When the Indians asked him about the size of Arnold's forces, he pointed to the leaves on the trees. They looked upon his story as a warning from the Great Spirit and prepared to leave the British camp. Soon the Oneida appeared and played his part well. He told them, among other things, that Arnold had no desire to fight the Indians but only the British and the Tories. Soon panic existed everywhere among the red men. They even stole liq- uor and clothes from the officers' tents. Without the savages, St. Leger was help- less and was forced to re- treat at once. The red men, by spreading wild ru- mors, caused their white al- lies to throw away their packs in order that the In- dians might plunder them. Fort Stanwix had been re- lieved without a battle by this ruse of Arnold's, and Gansevoort was free to come out of his trap at will. An effort was made to pursue St. Leger, but a heavy rain made fast marching impossible and the British retired in safety. MONUMENT COMMEMORATING THE BATTLE OF BENNINGTON Leaving seven hundred men to garrison Forts Stanwix, Dayton and Johnson, Arnold returned in triumph to the main army on the Hudson with twelve hundred troops. In a period of only twenty days he had succeeded in upsetting St. Leger's dangerous plans, and preventing a general Tory uprising along the Mohawk. This was of great importance in determining the approaching battles of Saratoga.
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The Americans were free to devote their entire attention to "Gentle- man Johnny," and were in little danger of a major diversion, thanks to St. Leger's retreat and Howe's incompetence, buttressed by Ger- main's error of omission. It is true that St. Leger was free to move down the St. Lawrence and Richelieu rivers and over Lake Cham- plain to Burgoyne's assistance, but it was an extremely long journey in those days and it was very doubtful whether he could arrive in time to be of much value. In any case, within only a few days after the devastating blow dealt him at Bennington by Stark, the British commander was now groggy from this new catastrophe which had fallen upon St. Leger. It was clear that if Albany were to be taken he would have to capture it alone and unaided.
At about this time, however, luck began to smile upon the red- coats. From now on the patriot army was not to be commanded by Schuyler but by Gates. In spite of the fact that the New Yorker had conducted the defensive warfare, following the surrender of Ticonderoga, with great brilliance, he was overdue for a fall. Con- sidering the rabid sectional feeling existing at the time, the ceaseless intrigue of the scheming Gates with the politicians, and the constant pressing of trumped-up charges of treason centering around the story of the silver bullets, he had already retained the command longer than could have been reasonably expected. The fall of Ticonderoga demanded scapegoats, and Schuyler and St. Clair were obviously suita- ble victims of the unbridled fury of the populace. Thus at this critical juncture, the American Army was deprived of its able commander and the British were relieved of the necessity of crossing swords with him, thanks to the unwitting cooperation of the American Congress. According to Ira Allen, this move inspired New England with hope and confidence; but in the light of our present knowledge of Gates, this faith was misplaced. The new commander, a selfish bombastic snob, whom Hoffman Nickerson has fittingly compared with Dickens' "Uriah Heep," was certainly not the one to have charge of Ameri- can destiny on the battlefields of Saratoga. Although his intrigue had won for him the command of the army, his laurels were destined to be won for him entirely by his subordinates, while he himself has been famed for the doubtful distinction of winning the decisive conflict without once appearing in person on the field of battle.
Gates' appointment occurred as early as August fourth, but he apparently was in no hurry to assume the responsibilities of his new
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office for he did not arrive in Albany until more than two weeks later, August nineteenth. Although welcomed cordially by the man whom he displaced, he treated Schuyler with scant consideration, not even inviting him to his first council of war. At first, he found the army weakened by the absence of Arnold's detachment that had marched to Fort Stanwix, and of Lincoln's command which had departed to join Stark at Bennington. In the first week of Septem- ber, however, he was strengthened by the return of Arnold and also by Daniel Morgan and his famed riflemen. There never existed a hardier or more fearless fighter than this great Virginian. Many are the legends concerning his unusual feats, including his famous march with Arnold through the Maine wilderness. The number of his men was small, but better ones have never been found, and they were experts with their Kentucky rifles. To augment this force, there were added to it two hundred picked New Hampshire settlers under Dearborn. Gates had reason to feel thankful for the presence of Morgan, Dearborn and their able warriors. He was not successful, however, in obtaining help from Stark. He did his best to win the goodwill of that sulking officer, but tact and entreaties were of no avail. Stark insisted upon pursuing his own stubborn counsels. Nevertheless, in spite of the refusal of the bitter New Hampshire leader to cooperate, Gates' forces numbered over seven thousand in all. At this time General Lincoln was stationed at Pawlet with two thousand men, contemplating movements in Burgoyne's rear.
Since Lincoln's movements were to have an important bearing upon the maneuvers of the contending armies on the Saratoga bat- tlefields, it would be well to consider his efforts in their entirety, even though encroaching upon the next chapter from a chronological point of view. This general, realizing that he was too fat for rapid and effective movements, decided to remain where he was with five hun- dred men, dividing the remainder of his army into three sections of a similar size. One, under the command of Colonel Woodbridge, was scheduled to move against Skenesborough, Fort Ann and Fort Edward in that order; a second, and the most important, under John Brown of Pittsfield, was to move against Ticonderoga on the western side of the lake; while the third, under Colonel Johnson, was to support Brown's scheme by a diversion against Mount Independence on the Vermont shore. At daybreak on September eighteenth, Brown suc-
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ceeded in capturing possession of the landing at the foot of Lake George, including stores and American prisoners, and seized Mount Defiance, as well. He soon controlled practically all the western shore around Ticonderoga except the main fort, and summoned the garrison to surrender. This demand was based very much on bluff, however, and the British commander refused to yield. After he and Johnson had hammered away at the enemy positions without result they retired on the twenty-second, the latter moving eastward and the former embarking on Lake George. Brown's intention now was to obtain possession of Diamond Island, which the English used as an important supply dépôt. He hoped to surprise the garrison the morn- ing of the twenty-third, but the wind was so strong that he considered it was dangerous to move forward, and the attack was not made until the morning of the twenty-fourth. By that time, however, Captain Thomas Aubrey, who was in command of the British post, had received news of Brown's intentions. The guns manning the breast- works erected on the island eventually proved to be conclusively superior to those in Brown's flotilla. Ultimately, the Americans were forced to retreat across the lake to Van Wormer's Bay, where they burned their boats that they might not be captured by the English, and retreated over the mountains, reaching Lincoln's camp in safety. These aggressive tactics in Burgoyne's rear, while failing of complete success, nevertheless were unpleasant to the British, who were hope- lessly dependent upon their line of communication to Canada. The work of these units of Lincoln's army also tended to hearten the soldiers of Gates' army. Perhaps of the most importance, Brown had managed to pick up information that Burgoyne now had only four weeks' provisions left. In the meantime, Lincoln had been receiving urgent requests from Gates for his presence on the Hudson. He responded by recalling Colonel Woodbridge's detachment that had set out for Skenesborough, and arriving in person at Bemis Heights on the twenty-second with Brown finally following on the twenty-ninth of September. By that time the first battle of Saratoga, fought on Freeman's farm, was over.
CHAPTER XVI
The Battles of Saratoga
The Burgoyne campaign, which was destined to play such a large part in the quest for American liberty, was now rapidly approaching a crisis. It was September and the British would soon be forced by the approach of cold weather either to make a supreme effort to reach Albany or to retreat. Knowing "Gentleman Johnny's" pride and love- of-self, it was too much to expect that he would do the latter. On the other hand, if he moved much farther toward Albany he was certain to encounter the American Army. Thus it was that an impor- tant engagement loomed around the corner, a battle destined to alter the paths of world history and to throw off the shackles that fettered American liberty.
Gates finally decided to advance northward. If Burgoyne should happen to retreat, the American Army would be better situated to interfere with such a movement; while if the British should decide to advance, the patriots would be able to select a much better defensive military position than they could find on the Mohawk. In any case it might be better for the morale of the soldiers to advance after so many retreats in the past. Accordingly, Gates set out northward on September eighth, finally halting on Bemis Heights, so named because a man named Bemis kept a tavern there. Here, under the supervi- sion of Thaddeus Kosciuszko, the Polish engineer, fortifications were now erected commanding the Hudson. These preparations were begun none too soon. As early as the twelfth, reports were confirmed that Burgoyne was on the move, while on the following day the British commander sent part of his army across the Hudson, a decision pos- sibly as important and as far-reaching as Cæsar's crossing of the Rubicon.
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It is true that there was not much else for Burgoyne to do if he was to capture Albany. The fortified position of Gates' army con- trolled the Hudson, and it certainly would be highly dangerous to proceed southward without capturing the menacing works. Since the British Army was located east of the Hudson while Bemis Heights was on the opposite side, to cross the river was the only way to dis- lodge the Americans. Furthermore, there was much to lose by delay for every day would see the patriot works strengthened, and it would be suicidal for cold weather to catch him this far south far from his base of supplies and without shelter for his men, particularly after Lake Champlain had time to freeze. Yet, when Burgoyne ordered his units to cross the Hudson on the thirteenth, he was gambling with destiny. His lines of communication were now doomed to be cut off, and he was dependent upon the supplies which he had on hand. In case he should find it necessary to retreat toward Canada, the recross- ing of the Hudson was bound to prove an obstacle. Moreover, he was operating more or less in the dark, not knowing the true strength of the opposing army. There was no other decision for Burgoyne to make; he had to take a chance. In any case, his move was not hope- less by any means. It is true that his Germans had been battered at Bennington and that St. Leger's Indians had proven unstable around Fort Stanwix, but he had had no cause to lose confidence in his regulars. They had conducted themselves with credit and, although stubbornly resisted at Hubbardton and Fort Ann, had ultimately triumphed. The capture of Ticonderoga had been so easy, and American blunders so simple and obvious, that he had little reason to doubt the ability of his redcoats to deal adequately with the enemy in front of him. Although it is historically incorrect to say that when he crossed the Hudson "he burned his bridges behind him," nevertheless it is figura- tively accurate; and in any case he did actually break up his bridges.
Because of the desertion of his Indians and the accuracy of Mor- gan's sharpshooters, Burgoyne was not well informed concerning the American position, and made his way southward in an extremely leisurely and cautious manner. At this time he had only about eight hundred auxiliaries, but still retained fifty-five hundred regulars. Gates' army now numbered between six and seven thousand partisans. Stark arrived on the eighteenth, but that was of no assistance to the
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American cause. On that exact day, the two-month term of the New Hampshire militia expired, and no amount of persuasion by Gates and other generals could keep them from going home. An important battle was in the air and was almost ready to begin, but this fact did not trouble their consciences. The American lines were two miles in length, the most exposed point being guarded by Fort Neilson. The right wing, under the personal supervision of Gates, occupied the hills and flats near the Hudson; the left wing under the command of Arnold, including the units, among others, led by Poor, Morgan and Dearborn, was posted on the hills three-quarters of a mile west of the river; while the center was dominated by Learned's brigade. The left wing of Burgoyne's army, numbering eleven or twelve hundred men, together with the artillery, was sent down the river road under Riedesel and Phillips. The center, also containing about eleven hun- dred soldiers, was led by Hamilton, although accompanied by Bur- goyne, himself. The right wing, under the command of Fraser, was by far the strongest of the three columns. The difficulty with the British advance was that the center and right wing were ordered to march through the woods, where they were bound to get out of touch with each other. The movements of these two columns were to be regulated by the firing of signal guns, and when the proper time should arrive for a general assault on the American position, three heavy guns were to be fired as a signal.
The morning of September nineteenth had dawned cold and foggy. When the atmosphere cleared, a white hoar frost, sparkling in the sunlight, gave evidence of an early northern winter. Across the whitened ground the sound of beating drums was clear and ominous. After leisurely preparations, the three British columns began to march. Here and there the American lookouts from the tops of trees could discern bright scarlet uniforms as the regulars moved to carry out Burgoyne's orders, while the glitter from moving arms dazzled the eyes of patriot marksmen.
Gates now had an important decision to make. Should he await the attack from behind his breastworks, or should he attempt to snare Burgoyne's separate detachments in the woods where the Americans could fight to the best advantage? The former policy had its merits, for it meant delay. As time went on, the size of Gates' army was bound to increase, while each day would find Burgoyne's food sup-
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ply smaller and smaller, with his lines to Canada hopelessly cut and winter threatening. On the other hand there was much to be said for the policy of fighting the British in the thick woods and ravines where the regulars could not be used to the best advantage. Thus it might be possible to severely cripple Burgoyne before he was able to bring his heavy guns to bear on the American position. Gates was inclined to remain where he was and to allow Burgoyne to attack when he was ready. With this policy Arnold completely disagreed. It was contrary to his fiery nature to allow his opponent to get in the first blow, and the isolated British units toiling through the woods seemed made to order for the methods of warfare employed by Morgan and himself. Arnold stormed, begged and entreated until finally Gates gave his grudging permission to send Morgan's and Dearborn's units out to meet the enemy.
When the first chance collision between the two armies came, it was not pleasant for Morgan. While his men were chasing a small detachment they rushed straight upon the main British lines, and the brave Virginian feared that his little force was lost. However, he soon found cause to change his mind, for reënforcements arrived and his own men responded nobly to his famous "turkey call." At about one o'clock Burgoyne formed his men at the edge of a clearing known as Freeman's Farm, and a stubborn battle was raging, one which the British declared was the hardest fought of any they had ever expe- rienced in America. For nearly four hours a constant blaze of fire was kept up. Arnold brought his entire detachment to Morgan's assistance and sent to Gates for reinforcements. The lines of battle swayed back and forth throughout the afternoon. Again and again the redcoats courageously charged with their bayonets, but only to encounter the relentless fire from the American sharpshooters. Occa- sionally, the patriots would succeed in capturing some of Burgoyne's guns, only to lose them in a new rush by the British. Reinforcements from Gates might have resulted in the complete defeat of Burgoyne, but none came. At one time it appeared that even without such aid, Arnold's division might turn the tide alone. Fortunately for Bur- goyne, Phillips arrived just in time to save the situation by a great example of personal bravery. Still later, when the British guns were without ammunition and every artillery officer was killed or wounded, the situation once more looked bad to Burgoyne, but he was again saved from an uncertain future by the arrival of Riedesel.
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In the meantime, Arnold had left the battlefront to personally entreat Gates for reinforcements. Finally he had persuaded the commander-in-chief to order out Learned's brigade. Hearing that the action was still undecided, Arnold vehemently exclaimed: "By God! I'll soon put an end to it," and galloped away to the field of battle. One of Gates' subordinates expressed the belief that Arnold might do some rash act and suggested that that general should be ordered back. The commander was not averse to the suggestion and sent Wilkinson to recall Arnold. Just at the moment when his presence on the battlefield was needed most, because of Riedesel's arrival, Arnold was recalled and the American division was deprived of his inspired leadership. Learned's brigade was sent into the woods without proper guidance and got lost, blundering into Fraser's col- umn instead of assisting their hard-pressed comrades. If Learned's brigade had been under Arnold's leadership and had reached the proper destination, there is little doubt but that an important Ameri- can victory would have followed. Gates had no one else but himself to blame for the fact that the maximum results were not accomplished.
Technically, Burgoyne was victorious in the battle fought on Sep- tember nineteenth, for his redcoats now occupied the disputed ground. Actually, it was favorable to the American cause. Once more the patriot militia had gained confidence in their ability to fight the British regulars. In fact, they had inflicted the greater amount of damage, and if Gates had not failed them by depriving them of Arnold at the critical moment, they probably would have been overwhelmingly vic- torious. Both sides had been guilty of gross blunders, and the move- ments of troops on the nineteenth did not redound to the credit of either Gates or Burgoyne. In addition to the recall of Arnold, and the American commander's failure to send further reinforcements to the harassed left wing before orders were given to Learned, Gates, if he had been wide awake, could easily have crushed Burgoyne's left wing and captured the extremely valuable British stores after Riedesel had left his position. On the other hand, Burgoyne does not deserve any praise for the manner in which he advanced through the uneven woods. The entire British advance was disjointed and lacked coordi- nation. Perhaps the reader has wondered where the strong English right wing under Fraser was during the battle. Burgoyne, himself, did not know, nor did his column. The fact is that Fraser decided it
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