USA > Connecticut > History of Connecticut, Volume II > Part 11
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1878, however, 65 percent of the dividend paying stock was owned out- side the state20 and investments by Connecticut residents did not in- crease in proportion until toward the end of the century. This circum- stance may be relevant to the willingness of the state to pass the restrictive legislation embodied in the. law of 1878. This denied the railroads the privilege of increasing their capital stock without special permission of the legislature based upon an investigation by the com- missioner.21 The securing of permission may have been related to the possession of influence in the Assembly. It is to be noted that an applica- tion of the Housatonic for an increase of $600,000 was denied at the time the New Haven was straining to gain control of the line.22 Never- theless, the fact remains that the state was slowly, perhaps reluctantly, discarding laissez-faire philosophy and was beginning to regard the railroads as public carriers which should assume their responsibilities to the public.
Customarily, railroads had charged more for short hauls than for long ones. In justification of this practice, the railroads pointed to the cost of make-up and switching which was involved when cars were added between terminal points. The practice continued without re- straint until 1885. The Commissioner, whose powers were indeed limited, had failed to make any recommendation on this point. It had, however, been raised as the public confidence in the railroads was moderated, but in 1883 and 1884 the influence of the railroad lobbyists was sufficient to prevent the passage of bills to control short hauls. In 1885, it was provided that freight charges for short distances were not to be more than for a longer distance.23
The state's regulatory efforts were not directed solely toward the financial operations of the railroads, but were equally concerned with those operations which intruded upon the day-to-day life of its citizens, or endangered their safety, or promoted better service. Connecticut pioneered in the establishment of standard times and uniform schedules in the operation of the railroads. The Winchester Observatory of Yale University transmitted automatically, twice daily, over the telegraph lines, the exact time. By 1881, standard time had been adopted by a number of the roads of the state, including the New York, New Haven, and Hartford. At the Commissioner's request, the meridian of the City
PROPERTY OF HOLMES SCHOOL DARIEN, CONN.
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HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
Hall of New York City was established as the standard time for the state of Connecticut.24 It was intended that the standard would be adopted by all roads, but there was determined opposition by some lines. The requirement was suspended on the promise that alterations would be made as soon as arrangements could be perfected.25 All but two of the roads had complied with the provision by 1883 and had begun posting regular schedules.26 When the seventy-fifth meridian was adopted as standard time, Connecticut repealed the law designed to regulate local time and accepted the standard, which by 1884, it was reported, had been accepted by 95 percent of all of the cities in the country with populations of more than 10,000.
As the railroads were altering the economic life of the state they were challenging established customs and intruding upon the quiet of the Connecticut community. The shrill steam whistle soon lost the appeal of novelty under such circumstances as those in Danielson, for example, where the engineer would bear down heavily three times as his train crossed each of three intersections within eight rods of each other. It was claimed that the whistle affected the nervous system, and not only disturbed the comfort, but retarded the recovery of invalids. A measure of relief was provided in 1881, when the head of any town or city was authorized to petition the Railroad Commissioner to dispense with whistles within city limits. In those cities where the petition was allowed, the bell was substituted for the whistle.27 By virtue of the re- lief which this offered and as people became more accustomed to the warnings of the approaching iron monster, complaints about the whistle lessened perceptibly.
Yankees could easily modify their standards of comfort and peace of mind to accommodate economic realities, but to tolerate violations of the accepted proprieties of the observance of the Sabbath was more difficult. This impinged on deeply seated beliefs and forces were mar- shaled in opposition. The General Conference of Congregational min- isters, in 1885, condemned the running of freight trains on Sunday, and other denominations gave their support.29 The handling of freight be- tween sunup and sundown on Sunday was accordingly prohibited in 1887, except that allowance was made for cases of necessity or mercy. Mail trains were permitted before 10:30 A.M. and after 3:00 P.M.30
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THE POWER OF WEALTH AND INDUSTRY
Apparently somewhat to the surprise of the railroads and of the propo- nents of the act, the law worked. Only two violations were reported in 1891. As the force of Puritanism weakened in the face of the develop-
(Courtesy Danbury Chamber of Commerce)
DANBURY-SURGICAL PRODUCTS DIVISION, AMERICAN CYANAMID
ing cultural and social forces of the nineties, petitions for exceptions to the rule increased and opposition decreased.
The railroads endangered more than idyllic notions of the Con- necticut way of life. Railroading was hazardous to the public and to the employee alike. Railroad managers, ever aware of the relation of casualties to public reaction, were successful in keeping accidents to passengers at a surprisingly low rate. There were seldom more than one or two fatalities a year, and, generally, less than 20 injuries. However, citizens who were not passengers were frequently victims of railroad
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HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
accidents. As the population and the railroad traffic increased, there was a proportionate increase in accidents to those to whom the railroads referred as "trespassers." These were all who crossed a railroad track, even at a crossing. Casualties of "trespassers" reached a high of 350 in 1889 and continued at approximately 200 for the remaining years of the century.33 Most accidents were at grade crossings. Despite laws as early as 1849 restricting new crossings at grade level, the danger per- sisted. Notwithstanding the fact that the elimination of grade crossings was considered the most pressing problem of railroading, particularly in the Greenwich and New London area, the Senate adjourned in 1887 without taking action on a bill passed by the House which was designed to reduce the number of such crossings two per cent each year.35 An empty gesture toward safety was made in 1889 by legislation requiring railroads to remove one crossing for each sixty miles of track. Only four roads in the state were obliged to remove any. Yet, complete responsi- bility for the multitude of crossings should not be assigned to the rail- roads. Farmers, for their own convenience, supported the existence of the many crossings, and pushed through a bill which made the existence during a five year period of a private or farm road prima facie evidence of its legality.36 The Assembly generally, however, seemed to concur with the judgment that the desirability of eliminating grade crossings as fast as practicable was hardly debatable. It was provided that the construction of these crossings would be permissible only with the permission of the Commissioner, and under his direction grade cross- ings were to be diminished as new highways were constructed.37
Injuries to employees mounted at an unbelievable rate. For the selected years 1874, 1879, 1884, 1889, 1894, and 1899, there were 16, 8, 26, 30, 23, and 30 fatalities, while injuries increased from 19 in the first of these years to 320 in 1889, and continued at 165 in 1899.38 As rail- road managers strove for greater and greater profits, traffic was in- creased without a corresponding increase in motive power or in labor force. Workers, anxious for extra pay, worked beyond the point at which operation was safe.39 The railroad managers evidenced scant con- cern for the welfare of employees. The coupling of trains was easily the most hazardous duty of the employees. As accidents mounted, the com- panies were pressed to have safe couplers installed on freight trains.
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The Hartford Courant could not think of anyone who would oppose automatic couplers except the owners of the railroads and the under- takers.40 The railroad managers blandly pleaded the impracticability of legislation41 designed to enforce the installation of automatic couplers. Legislation did no more than indicate the attitude of the state. Despite the urging of the railroad association, newspapers, and the legislature, an efficient coupler was not forthcoming during the century. The key to this failure was probably not exclusively technical inability. Efforts to develop a coupler might have been intensified except that by law the railroads were not liable for injuries to their employees where there was contributory negligence. An attempt, in 1882, to write a liability law without reference to the negligence of the employee, was blocked by the railroads. The railroads claimed that the inherent risk was re- flected in the compensation paid. Although the railroad strikes which had seized the country in 1877 had not had any impact on Connecticut, where the relative compactness of the systems permitted the workmen to live at home and so made the wage less inadequate,42 the railroad argument was specious so long as the supply of laborers exceeded the demand. That many standards prevailed in different states was, also, a thin excuse for delay.43
Technical developments progressed at a faster rate. As the dura- bility of steel was proved, steel rails were substituted for iron. By 1880, it was reported, 72 per cent of the rails were of steel and virtually all of the iron rails had been replaced by the end of the century.44 The Wash- burn Car Wheel Company of Hartford began the manufacture of wheels with steel rims in 1869. Within a few years, paper filled, steel rimmed wheels became standard equipment. The importance of steel in the building of bridges had just been proved in 1878, and its importance to bridge construction in Connecticut was immediately realized.45 Block signals were introduced on the New York, New Haven, and Hartford line in 1887, and the practicability of a continuous braking system was recognized by the next year.46
As these changes occurred, Connecticut had entered a new stage in railroad consolidation. After the New York and New England as- sumed management of the defunct Boston and Hartford in 1875, the New England cleared the title to the old Hartford, Providence, and
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HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
Fishkill by 1877; extended the line beyond Waterbury to the Hudson in 1881; provided a connection for East Hartford for Springfield over the Connecticut Central; and purchased, in 1880, one-half interest in the New England Transfer Company, which operated a steamer be-
(Courtesy Conn. State Lib.)
ROBERTSVILLE-UNION CHAIR FACTORY
tween the Pennsylvania Railroad in Jersey City and the Harlem River terminal of the New Haven.
Meanwhile, the New Haven and Hartford line did well. By 1876, the bonds which had come due had been paid off, the road had no funded or floating debt, and the dividends were limited to ten per cent. The surplus was to go back into the company. The Airline from Willi- mantic to New Haven was eventually completed in 1876. After a pool- ing arrangement with the company proved unworkable, the New
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THE POWER OF WEALTH AND INDUSTRY
Haven leased the company for 99 years. Control of the Northampton, New Haven road (the old Canal Road) was gained in 1887.47 The main danger to the road came from attempts to tap the New Haven markets.
Characteristic of the seventies and the eighties were the attempts to construct roads parallel to existing lines. The old New York and New Haven in 1868 had blocked the construction of a road from New York to New Haven, but in the railroad battles of the last century, one vic- tory did not win the war. It was to check such competition that control had been gained of the Airline and the New Haven and Hartford. For the same reason controlling interest was purchased in a projected line from Hartford to Saybrook. Through the legislature and the courts the proposed Hartford and Harlem Road was checked.48 Until this time the New Haven had sought to direct the traffic over its lines and to acquire new lines only when forced to do so by competition. Its policy was changed to embrace aggressive tactics which were to result in the in- corporation of the New York and New England into the New Haven system to complete the monopoly.
The last phase of railroad development in Connecticut occupied the years from 1887 to 1896. The strangling of the New York and New England began in 1888 when the New Haven began to divert the traffic from the New England. Despite the protests of the New England, every effort was made to reduce it to insolvency. In the bitter war, the New Haven gained control of the Housatonic in 1892. Gradually all of the roads around the New England were brought under the control of the New Haven, until by 1892 the eastern half of the state had been brought under control. There remained only the task of shutting off the flow of New England traffic into New York over the route of the New York and Northern route. This was accomplished in cooperation with the New York Central. The New Haven and the New York Cen- tral had an agreement not to compete for the New York traffic. By agree- ment, J. P. Morgan bought up the stock of the Northern, foreclosed on the company, reorganized it and sold it to the New York Central. The New England was completely cut off from New York and went into bankruptcy on December 27, 1893. Morgan continued buying stock for the New Haven, and the Vanderbilt interests entered the market to constitute a minority interest in the company. The New England was
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HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
reorganized in 1895 and Morgan offered his interest in it to the New Haven. The consolidation did not evoke the popular outcry against monopoly which was expected. The hope of checking speculation in railroads and the desire for better service overbalanced the objections.49 Railroads were to enter a period of unified control.
A favorable climate for the development of industry prevailed in Connecticut in the nineteenth century. With the growth of the rail- roads, there emerged a transportation system which would allow the state's industries to take advantage of the state's position as the gate- way to New England and the nearby markets. The banks and insurance companies held large surpluses of capital sufficient to finance an expand- ing industrial system. To the ingenious abilities of the native popula- tion were being added those of foreign immigrants in numbers to create a surplus of laborers. Of equal importance were the very favorable cor- poration laws.
The extremely liberal capitalization requirements encouraged the beginnings of new businesses. The laws had been amended for special purposes so frequently that, in the opinion of Governor Hubbard, they had become "relaxed and unguarded." It was possible for a company to be formed "with any amount of nominal capital, by parties which are utterly bankrupt, and to commence business with nothing at all, or only a minimum percentage paid in." Corporations were permitted to come into existence even though they were bankrupt from the begin- ning. In the absence of cash, capital requirements were oftentimes met by entering personal property or real estate at ridiculous or fraudulent valuations or by the conveyance of patent rights of uncertain value.51 The Governor supported his report of these conditions by calling atten- tion to the 79 corporations chartered in 1877. In general the stock- holders of these companies were non-residents of the state of Connecti- cut, but it seems reasonable to assume that there was an uncertain num- ber of Connecticut companies enjoying the same liberalities.52 A hesitant legislature would not act until the recommendations of the Democratic Governor Hubbard were endorsed a year later by the Republican, Charles B. Andrews.53 A Board of Commissioners, appointed to investi- gate the corporate laws of the state, reported in 1880. The independ- ence assumed by business organizations in relation to a government in-
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THE POWER OF WEALTH AND INDUSTRY
vestigation is suggested, perhaps, by the fact that less than 17 percent of the existing corporations replied to the committee's inquiry. The Assembly accepted the commission's recommendation that the capital requirement must be subscribed in full before any company com-
(Courtesy Mills Coll., Conn. State Lib.)
RIVERTON-LAMBERT HITCHCOCK CHAIR FACTORY, PHOTO 1935
menced business, but went beyond the commission in requiring that at least 20 percent of the stock must be in cash. The commission would have accepted real or personal property in lieu of cash.54 A two-thirds majority of the stockholders was required to alter the capitalization of the company, whereas formerly the companies were permitted to in- crease or decrease capitalization at will.55 The next year, the Assembly moved to rectify partially a defect in the original law by requiring that 20 percent of any increase should be paid for in cash and that surplus
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HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
earnings or property should be estimated at their actual value. It was later recognized that to require a two-thirds vote of directors for a stock increase was scant limitation since there were usually so few stock- holders. It came to be required that such increases must be authorized by the General Assembly.56 Many of the companies organized under
(Courtesy Conn. Devel. Comm.)
THOMPSONVILLE-SCENE IN BIGELOW-SANFORD CARPET COMPANY, INC. PLANT
these requirements were marginal, but some lived and extended their operations beyond their original purpose until this prerogative was specifically limited by the law of 1880.57
The manufacturing industries of the state increased steadily dur- ing the period 1870 to 1900, until by the end of the century Con -- necticut was characterized as the "Lancashire of New England."58 The gross product of the manufactures of the state had more than doubled,
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THE POWER OF WEALTH AND INDUSTRY
increasing from 161 million in 1870 to almost 353 million by the end of the century. A continuance of an upward trend was suggested by an increase of over one hundred million in the last decade of the century. More industries were secured by patent in Connecticut than in any other state. One patent to every 796 persons had been issued in 1890, and one to every 1,203 in 1900. Nearly one-fourth of the state's total population of 908,420 was engaged in manufacturing. The number of manufacturing establishments in the state had increased 78 percent or from 5,128 in 1870 to 9,128 in 1900. The large growth did not indicate that Connecticut had abandoned the traditional small shop. There were 92 foundries established in the last decade, 31 fur hat establishments, 17 hardware, and 16 bicycle companies, for example. Of the total number of manufacturing establishments, half were the so-called hand or neigh- borhood trades and their production amounted to $31,704,463 or nine percent of the total.59
The story of Connecticut industry, however, was not one of un- interrupted success, and economic historians have, perhaps, erred in concentrating on the successes. For each business which succeeded, there were uncounted numbers which failed. An indication of these is in- cluded in the report of the Commission on Joint Stock Laws. Of the 2,131 companies to which the commission sent letters, 1,246 were "out of existence or had ceased to transact business."60 Of the 6,822 establish- ments in business in 1890, 27 percent, or 1,847, were not in operation in 1900. There was, nonetheless, no lack of confidence in the viability of the industrial system. For those who failed, some 4,000 new establish- ments hoped to succeed.61
The industries were redistributed throughout the state's 61 towns, although they were more concentrated in the six largest cities, those with populations over 20,000. The six cities, New Haven, Bridgeport, Waterbury, Hartford, New Haven, and New Britain, produced 48 per- cent of the state's gross product and constituted 39 percent of the state's population. The gross product of three of the cities, Waterbury, Bridge- port, and Hartford, had increased at a faster rate than that of the state as a whole, while that of New Haven and Meriden had increased at a slower rate.62 The concentration of the brass and copper industry along the Housatonic and Naugatuck rivers enabled the three towns of An-
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HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
sonia, Derby, and Shelton, which had a combined population of 26,183, to fabricate products which had a greater dollar volume than products made in New Britain and Meriden combined. Torrington shared in the benefits of the brass and copper industry. There were other towns which were centers of specific industries: Naugatuck of rubber, Nor- wich of cotton goods, Danbury of hats, and Manchester of silk.63 Items of machinery, materials of war, and articles to enable modernization all contributed to the increased gross product, but textiles remained throughout the period of first importance in the industrial history of the state. 64
The gross textile product for the period amounted to approxi- mately $50,000,000 a year. The cotton mills were clustered along the streams that flowed into the Thames. In Norwich, Thompson, Putnam, Plainfield, Killingly, and Windham were located more than 70 percent of all of the cotton mills in the state. The number of spindles increased during the period until, in 1900, there were more than 1,000,000 in the state.65 Among the more prominent companies were the Ponemah Mills, which had rebuilt the great mills at Baltic, and the Grosvenor-Dale Mills of Thompson. A significant trend was the increase in the dyeing and finishing of textiles.66 A closely allied industry, that of thread manu- facture, was dominated by the Willimantic Linen Company, which gained international recognition for its products at the centennial ex- position at Philadelphia in 1876. The company changed its name to the Willimantic Thread Company, and, in 1898, combined with the American Thread Company.67 The gross product of the woolen manu- factures exceeded that of cotton by approximately 50 percent or by about 22 million dollars. The largest and most modern woolen mills were located at Rockville, Stafford Springs, and Broad Brook. Silk kept pace with the other textiles by increasing its gross product to 12,000,000 by 1900. The industry was concentrated in the Cheney Mills at Man- chester, but smaller mills could be found up and down the Connecticut Valley.68 Although Connecticut ranked sixth among the states in the production of textiles, the gross product had begun to level off, and textiles were producing a lesser percentage of the state's total. They constituted approximately 27 percent of the total production in 1880, but only 14 percent in 1900. This was occasioned by the greater di-
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THE POWER OF WEALTH AND INDUSTRY
versification as new products were introduced in response to the demands of a mechanical, urban civilization.
The brass industry, which had started in Torrington and Water- bury and had moved up the Naugatuck Valley, had begun to rival
(Courtesy Conn. Devel. Comm.)
NAUGATUCK-SCENE IN UNITED STATES RUBBER COMPANY SYNTHETIC RUBBER PLANT
textiles as the leading industry in the state.70 The technique of rolling brass introduced in the early part of the century in connection with the clock industry had become an article of commerce in the latter part of the century until it alone grossed upwards of 29 million dollars in 1900.71 The brass industry, through the utilization of a more highly skilled labor force, was able to gross a larger product than the textile industry with a smaller capital investment. Brass castings and brass
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HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
ware, which combined had a capital investment of slightly over 13 mil- lion dollars, grossed a product valued at $18,739,585, while cotton goods, with an investment of over 27 million, grossed a product of only 15 and one-half million. The comparison is even more striking when it is noted that the brass industry had invested slightly less than three
(Courtesy Stamford Historical Society) STAMFORD-FIRST IRON FOUNDRY, BUILT IN 1830; LATER THE FIRST WOOLEN MILL, AND AFTERWARD THE DIAMOND ICE COMPANY
million in implements and machinery and the cotton industry had over 10 million invested in these components of production.72 The leading name in this industry continued to be that of the Scoville Manufactur- ing Company, which had added daguerreotypes, plates, and brass shells to their rapidly diversifying line. Also, the Coe Brass Company had been identified as the most important rolling plant in the country.73 "The hold of the Naugatuck Valley brass workers . . was to remain unshaken for an indefinite time to come."74
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