USA > Connecticut > History of Connecticut, Volume II > Part 4
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From its very beginning, the Republicans became the party around which anti-slavery and anti-administration forces could rally. As the principles of the new party were charted by members who represented, according to the Springfield Republican, "the cream of the old Jackson Democratic party and of the Whig Party,"43 anti-foreignism and anti- Catholicism were eschewed. The administration was charged with having "fallen under the influence and control of the Nullification Party," of having "set up a sectional test of fidelity to the government," and, contrary to the wishes of the people, had abrogated the Missouri Compromise by passing the Kansas-Nebraska Bill.44 The party which
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HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
was to support coercive force to render the union inviolable, in its formative period, according to Gideon Welles, stood for a strict con- struction and adherence to the constitution, defended the rights of states, and opposed the unauthorized assumption of powers by the Federal government along with support for the rights of man and opposition to the extension of slavery.45
The time had not yet come, however, when the Connecticut electorate would give unqualified support to anti-slavery principles. The 6,670 votes cast for Gideon Welles, the Republican, constituted 10 per cent of the total vote cast in the state election of 1856. Although he did not receive a popular majority, Ingham, the Democratic candi- date, polled almost 7,000 more votes than his nearest rival, Governor Minor, the Know Nothing candidate. A coalition of the Know Nothings and Republicans awarded again the office of Governor to Minor. The Republicans failed in their most cherished objective: the selection, as a replacement for Isaac Toucey, of a Senator who would be less favorable to the administration. The Republicans were not able to force the selection of a compromise candidate and were forced to accept James Dixon, who was not in sympathy with their objectives. In spurning the temptation to fuse with the Know Nothings before the election by endorsing the Know Nothing candidate and in selecting their own candidate instead, they had established the identity of the party.46
Affairs in Kansas kept the slavery issue alive. The Kansas-Nebraska Bill had hardly been signed when the energetic Eli Thayer of Worcester, Massachusetts, combined principle and profit as he began the New England Emigrant Aid Society to encourage settlement of the Kansas territory. Kansas meant different things to different people. To many New England farmers, it represented an opportunity to acquire land at comparatively small cost. For many, who regarded slavery as a great moral wrong, it was a chance to oppose the extension of slavery. The organizers of the Emigrant Aid Society were intent on making a profit as well as interested in checking the growth of slavery.47 Even so, less than 1,500 emigrants were dispatched to Kansas in the first year of the Society's existence. Its importance, particularly to Connecticut, should not be judged solely by the numbers it sent to Kansas. Kansas became a meeting ground for opposing forces: some con-
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THE RISE OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY
testing for land, some for political advantages, some for opposing solu- tions to the slavery question. "Bleeding Kansas" became a symbol in the contests and the Emigrant Aid Society was the agency through which Connecticut residents demonstrated the viability of Puritan virtues.48
The Emigrant Aid Society was accepted in part because of the prominence in it of Congregational ministers. Because of their previous determined opposition to Garrison, their willingness to support the society made it seem moderate. Since the society was not dominated by abolitionists, a larger group considered it a desirable agency through which they could express their moral opposition to slavery. Horace Bushnell was a director of the society and Henry Ward Beecher col- lected funds to purchase rifles for the prospective immigrant. Although Leonard Bacon was not a member of the society, he spoke on the Kansas issue, and, in October 1855, opened his home for a meeting at which a director of the society spoke. Meanwhile, the Independent continued its relentless crusade against slavery and extended its criticism to President Pierce's policy in Kansas.50 Opposition to slavery and interest in making Kansas free was not confined to the ministers. Benjamin Silliman, the Yale chemist, was also a director of the society and was responsible for organizing and outfitting a group which left New Haven for Kansas.51 Yet, the degree to which the ministers were responsible for the society's effectiveness is suggested by the fact that the Democrats held "those damned ministers" responsible for Buchanan's defeat in Connecticut.52
In 1856, party alignments were determined by relative positions on the issue of extension of slavery into the territories. The Know Nothings, or Americans, split on the question, and the Connecticut delegation withdrew and with other state delegations formed the North American wing of the party, which, after political jockeying, endorsed John Frémont, the Republican Presidential nominee. In an effort to unite the northern and southern wings of their party, the Democrats chose James Buchanan and endorsed the party's position on the Com- promise of 1850 and the Kansas-Nebraska Bill.53
The Democrats, who in their platform attacked nativism, sought to cause a defection of the Know Nothings from a support of the Re- publican ticket by reviving the religious issue. Frémont was alleged to be a Catholic. The story was apparently based upon the fact that Fré-
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mont had been married by a Catholic priest. No doubt all were not enthusiastic about the Pathfinder, yet even for Congregational ministers there were issues more important than Catholicism. Some discounted the allegation of Frémont's Catholicism; others, such as the minister from Monroe, voted for him even though not fully satisfied that he was not Catholic and fearful of the consequences of a Catholic President. Slavery was a more important issue.54
The national campaign was carried on amidst the heat of the slavery controversy. Charles Sumner had delivered his "masterly tirade" against Kansas on May 19 and 20, and emotions reached new heights when, two days later, Preston Brooks "expressed his contempt for both the man and his words by beating him over the head with a gutta-percha walking stick."55 Meanwhile the Emigrant Aid Society was enlisting support by sending speakers into the eastern states and the Republicans coun- tered Democratic efforts by bringing the Free Soilers, Andrew Reeder and Charles Robinson, to speak in Connecticut.56 The election was a spirited one. True to the prophecy of the Republicans, Frémont polled a total of 42,715 votes to 34,995 for Buchanan. Fillmore, the presidential candidate nominated by the pro-slavery segment of the Know Nothings, received a mere 2,615 votes. The relative strength of the anti-slavery Know Nothings in Connecticut was concealed by their coalition with the Republicans.57
The tenuous nature of the successful coalition was revealed as preparations were made for the forthcoming state election. The Know Nothings were faced with a dilemma derived from a fear that they could not retain power independently of the Republicans and a fear that continued cooperation would mean the submergence of their party's principles.58 In solution, they attempted to secure a dominant position in the coalition, but met with sharp resistance from the Re- publicans. A compromise, by which the Know Nothings agreed to dis- solve their state chapter and both parties agreed to break with all incompatible political antecedents, achieved coordination in the nam- ing of a state ticket for the 1857 campaign which included two Re- publicans and three Know Nothings. Among the latter was Alexander Holley, the nominee for Governor. The struggle for power within the union, and even among the Know Nothing factions, came to the surface
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THE RISE OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY
when a Know Nothing Council met in February. This endorsed the union candidates, but adopted anew the nativistic principles contained in the Know Nothing platform of 1855. This tactic was intended either to drive the Republicans from support of the union ticket or to secure an appearance of their subservience to the Know Nothings, and in either case to maintain the power of this Know Nothing faction in the Union organization. The Courant, which had been an organ of Know Nothingism, condemned the Council meeting and the continuation of the American Party, but continued to support nativistic principles. The editor of the Courant was the brother-in-law of Holley, the gubernatorial candidate. Unlike the Know Nothing fac- tion, he was not willing to sacrifice the union of the two parties and Holley's chances of election. The Hartford Evening Press, which had been established in 1856 as the organ of the Republican Party, also, came to support the union ticket after Joseph R. Hawley, who had been associated with the Courant, replaced one of the Press editors. The presses of the two groups were thus reconciled and consistent in support of the union candidates. Although the Republicans were distressed at the corrosion of the Press by Know Nothingism, the union campaign proceeded under the guise of harmony, however thin.59
Events on the national level provided a common ground upon which all factions could unite against the Democrats. The Dred Scott case again focused the public's attention on the slavery issue. Buchanan's interest in the case apparently was motivated by a desire to settle the slavery question by legal means, but the assumption, later confirmed, that he was meddling in the politics of the court gave strength to fears that there was a conspiracy afoot to validate slavery in the whole of the United States. Politicians seized upon the decision for their own politi- cal advantage. The Union Party's State Committee portrayed the de- cision as an attempt to establish an aristocracy and as a mortal blow against free labor. Whatever the ethics of this attack, Holley, the Union candidate, defeated Ingham, the Democratic candidate, but only by 546 out of a total of 62,858 votes. Gideon Welles wrote some years later that the Dred Scott case was a decisive factor in the Union success in 1858. The Federal Relations Committee of the General Assembly held that the Court had decided nothing authoritatively beyond the fact that
BUNCE
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(Courtesy Conn. Devel. Comm.)
MIDDLETOWN
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Scott could not sue in a Federal court. In a joint resolution of both houses, the Assembly charged the court with partisan purposes and re- quested the Connecticut Congressional delegation to oppose any legisla- tion to admit another slave holding state to the Union.60
The attention of the public was diverted from the perennial ques- tions of nativism and slavery by the panic of 1857. The economic expan- sion stimulated by the growth of manufacturing and the extension of the railroads slowed perceptibly in the Summer of 1857 and came to a rocking halt in the Fall of that year. Unwarranted expansion of rail- roads, extensive speculation in real estate, chaos in the banking system, and a decline of foreign trade contributed to the unfavorable condi- tions. A fall in the stock market was followed with the failure of a num- ber of prominent business concerns. When a shipment of gold from California did not arrive in the East as scheduled, the Federal govern- ment entered the money market, but was unable to reverse the financial difficulty. Eighteen banks in New York suspended operations on Octo- ber 15, and other banks throughout the nation followed.61
Connecticut was not free of the circumstances which produced the general catastrophe. In order to provide the currency necessary for the expanding economy, legislation which limited the issue of bank currency to 100 per cent of capital stock had been repealed in 1855, and private banks had been authorized to issue currency to the amount of one and one half times their capital stock. Under this provision, banking facili- ties had expanded rapidly during the decade. In the Spring preceding the crash, for example, the Assembly had incorporated nine new banks. Among these were certain fraudulent ventures such as the Granite Bank of Voluntown. An indication of its duplicity was its issue of notes before its stock subscription was complete and, also, its failure to identify a place of business. When the panic struck, Connecticut banks suspended specie payment on October 14, and the bills in circulation were reduced within six months from ten to four million. Connecticut financial insti- tutions weathered the storm comparatively well, however. Specie pay- ment was resumed after only two months and only 16 banks in the state failed to pay their usual dividends. 62
The panic was shortlived, but it left its imprint upon the awareness of political leaders. As the Republicans emerged as an independent
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HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
political force in the elections of 1858 and 1859, they turned to one who was experienced in finance and who enjoyed the confidence of business leaders. William A. Buckingham was to begin, in 1858, a tenure of office which would extend through the American Civil War. The Americans and the Republicans continued to hold each other in mutual distrust. The Know Nothings had long since been bankrupt of political issues, while the Republicans were the apostles of issues which moved men emotionally, opposition to slavery and to the national administra- tion. Those among the Know Nothings who objected to straight Re- publican principles made one last feeble effort in 1858 to run a state ticket. These few last mourners among the relatives had not admitted that as a political issue nativism was dead and that the Know Nothing Party was buried with it. In 1859, the Know Nothings were no more than an irritant in the harmonious workings of the Republican Party. It was becoming increasingly difficult for the Democrats in Connecticut to defend the national administration. The Kansas issue was kept alive by anti-LeCompton meetings held throughout the state. The defections within the Democratic national party made the position of the state ticket even more untenable. It was reported in both 1858 and 1859 that Stephen A. Douglas, who opposed the admission of Kansas under the LeCompton Constitution, was anxious for the defeat of the Demo- cratic ticket headed by James T. Pratt. The schism between the Buchanan and Douglas factions was further widened in 1859 by rumors that the President was removing Douglas men from office. Nevertheless, administration men retained predominant influence within the Demo- cratic party. The balance of strength between the two parties made Connecticut something of a political weathervane of national political winds. Buckingham's defeat of Pratt in two successive campaigns was indicative of the course of events. 63
The fateful year of 1860 was begun amidst the emotions en- gendered by John Brown's raid on the federal arsenal at Harper's Ferry. The state could not remain unconcerned about the actions of this native son. Although it was difficult for Connecticut to endorse insurrection, Brown's bold stroke elicited sympathy from many. Leonard Bacon entered a plea in Brown's behalf during his trial on the grounds of an apparently deranged mind. Brown became a martyr to a cause, but
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both political parties considered it necessary to condemn Brown's raid. The Democrats wished to maintain, if not to improve, relations with Southern Democrats. The Republicans, accused by the Democrats of complicity, considered it necessary to disavow sympathy with such tactics. The impact of John Brown's raid on the developing intensity of the anti-slavery attitude should not be underestimated, yet there were other immediate factors operating as determinants of reaction.64
The Democrats attempted to capitalize on the desire of Connecti- cut merchants and manufacturers to continue their lucrative trade with the South, a trade which was considered necessary to the continued prosperity of the state. Connecticut manufacturers were invited to meet at Meriden on January 18, 1860, ostensibly to discuss the effect of the growing political turbulence on trade. The Republicans, learning that the Democrats were behind the meeting, packed the house. Those who supported the administration's position on the extension of slavery in the territories and those who would, perhaps, have compromised the political differences between the sections for their own economic well- being were outnumbered and withdrew from the convention. The Republicans identified them as pro-slavery men and as second-rate manufacturers.65
The state campaign of 1860 is more memorable for campaign techniques than for new political issues. Both parties denounced Brownism. The Democrats attempted to play down the slavery issue, denounced the franking privilege, and supported cheap postage. The Republicans reaffirmed their stand on national issues, gave attention to the mounting demand for a protective tariff and for a homestead law. The Republicans renominated their entire state ticket. The Demo- crats dropped Pratt and returned to a former favorite, Thomas H. Sey- mour, whose candidacy stimulated the Republicans to energetic efforts. Both national parties poured money and speakers into the state. In March, Lincoln appeared in Hartford, New Haven, Meriden, Middle- town, Waterbury, and Norwich. Campaign clubs were organized throughout the state. The most colorful of these were the "Wide Awakes," which began with a chapter in Hartford and grew to include 10,000 members throughout the state. They warred with their counter- part, the Democratic Seymour clubs, until election day. Buckingham
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HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
was elected by a mere 541 votes, which represented a decrease in the previous year's small margin. The substantial Republican majorities in both houses of the General Assembly were, perhaps, more indicative of the temper of the people. 66
As the national party was torn asunder on the slavery issue, Con- necticut Democrats quarrelled among themselves for the control of the party and further reduced their fading chances of success in the presi- dential election of 1860. Administration Democrats, blinded perhaps by the Federal patronage which they had enjoyed, had lost touch with political reality. Not only were they stunned when the southern dele- gates walked out at Charleston, but also they were powerless at the Baltimore convention where Douglas forces controlled the Connecticut delegation determining three and one-half of the state's four votes. The old line Democrats, as administration men were styled, here paid the penalty for having rejected James T. Pratt the previous Spring, for he had gained control of the Douglas faction. Calls for union were ignored. Both factions were looking beyond that November to 1864. As the extent of the Democratic split was realized, the confidence of the Re- publicans mounted.67
Republicans were convinced that they had chosen a winner in Lincoln, although pre-convention sentiment had been divided as to the choice of a nominee. Bates, with the support of the Courant, was the Connecticut favorite. On the first ballot he received seven of Con- necticut's twelve votes. Lincoln increased from two on the first to only four on the third and last ballot. Other Connecticut votes were divided still among Bates, Salmon P. Chase, William H. Seward, and Cassius Clay. Yet, the Courant, which had not supported Lincoln, expressed the sincere spirit of the Republican Party when it observed, "The Convention of Chicago has but responded to the impulses of the popu- lar heart. The people want one of themselves for President."68
This note of serenity was interrupted when the State Central Com- mittee, dominated by remnants of the Know Nothing Party, omitted the name Republican in issuing the call for the electoral convention. When the Know Nothings named the chairman of the convention, a party split seemed imminent. Then Nehemiah D. Sperry, the former "high priest of the Know Nothings," promised that in all future calls
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THE RISE OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY
the word Republican would be used. Although differences between factions of the party recurred throughout the Civil War period, har- mony reigned during the remainder of the campaign.69 With the Wide Awakes taking the lead, the campaign took on a festive note as the election day approached. The electorate gave Lincoln 43,792 votes against a combined vote of 33,454 for Douglas, Breckenridge, and Bell. The margin of victory cannot, however, be attributed to a surge of Republicanism. The total Republican vote was 666 less than it had been the previous Spring but the Democratic vote had fallen 11,900. Democrats, torn by the factious spirit within their own party, simply had chosen not to vote. The relative strength of the parties remained approximately the same.70
The Republicans had advanced to a position of political leadership in the state. Although Buckingham's margin of victory had been small, the Republicans were in control of the executive offices, had a com- fortable working majority in the Assembly, and had provided Lincoln with a 10,000 majority. Out of the political chaos of the decade which was drawing to a close there had risen a new party which was in har- mony with the political realities of the time. Even after the election of Lincoln, the feeling prevailed that somehow the Union would be pre- served. Despite repeated warnings, and even after South Carolina's secession ordinance, conversation was still of the preservation of the Union.71
NOTES-CHAPTER XXII
1 Carroll John Noonan, Nativism in Connecticut, 1829-1860 (Washington, 1938), pp. 134- 35.
2 Ibid., pp. 138-39.
3 Ibid., p. 145.
4 Hartford Times, Feb. 28, 1849, quoted in ibid., pp. 140-41.
4a Ibid., pp. 141-42.
5 J. Robert Lane, A Political History of Connecticut during the Civil War (Washington, 1941), pp. 7-10.
6 Ibid., pp. 7-8.
7 Ibid., p. 12.
8 Theodore Bacon, Leonard Bacon: A Statesman in the Church (New Haven, 1931), pp. 339-49.
8a Lane, Political History of Connecticut, p. 13; Noonan, Nativism, p. 148.
8b Ibid., pp. 155-56.
9 Bacon, Leonard Bacon, p. 339; Lane, Political History of Connecticut, pp. 11-13.
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HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
10 Ibid., pp. 17-18; Noonan, Nativism, p. 150.
11 Ibid., pp. 152-53.
12 Lane, Political History of Connecticut, pp. 11-34.
13 Noonan, Nativism, p. 269.
14 Ibid., pp. 268-73.
15 Hartford Times, Feb. 3, Aug. 10, 1847, quoted in ibid., pp. 169-70; also, see pp. 270-71.
15a Hartford Courant, Mar. 29, 1852, cited in ibid., p. 153; also see pp. 157-59.
16 Hartford Courant, Nov. 5, 1852, quoted in ibid., p. 162.
17 Samuel C. Busey, Immigration, Its Evils and Consequences (New York, 1856), p. 147, quoted in ibid., p. 161.
18 Ibid., pp. 142-46; Lane, Political History of Connecticut, p. 4.
19 Ibid., p. 25.
20 Ibid., p. 26.
21 Ibid., pp. 34-35; Bacon, Leonard Bacon, p. 386.
22 Noonan, Nativism, p. 179.
23 Ibid., p. 178; Bacon, Leonard Bacon, p. 389.
24 James A. Woodburn, Political Parties and Party Problems in the United States (New York, 1924), p. 56.
25 Quoted in Lane, Political History of Connecticut, p. 37.
26 Ibid., pp. 35-39.
27 Ibid., p. 43.
28 Noonan, Nativism, pp. 183-84.
29 Ibid., pp. 164 ff .; Lane, Political History of Connecticut, pp. 45 ff.
30 Ibid., p. 45; Noonan, Nativism, p. 195.
31 Ibid., p. 195.
32 Ibid., pp. 195-200.
33 Ibid., pp. 201-209; Lane, Political History of Connecticut, pp. 43-50.
34 Hartford Times, May 3, 1855, quoted in Noonan, Nativism, p. 213.
35 Lane, Political History of Connecticut, pp. 50-52.
36 Noonan, Nativism, pp. 196-97.
37 Ibid., pp. 226-28.
38 Ibid., pp. 224-32; Lane, Political History of Connecticut, pp. 52-54.
39 Noonan, Nativism, pp. 165-66.
40 Hartford Times, Aug. 20, Oct. 4, 1855, quoted in ibid., pp. 224, 232.
41 Ibid., p. 235.
42 Ibid., pp. 234-35; Lane, Political History of Connecticut, p. 55.
43 Cited in Hartford Times, Mar. 13. 1856, quoted in Noonan, Nativism, p. 239.
44 Hartford Evening Press, Feb. 27, 1856, quoted in Lane, Political History of Connecti- cut, p. 57.
45 Ibid., p. 56.
46 Ibid., pp. 57-58; Noonan, Nativism, pp. 240-48; Richard West, Jr., Gideon Welles, Lincoln's Navy Department (Indianapolis, 1943), PP. 74-75.
47 Bacon, Leonard Bacon, p. 416; Avery Craven, The Coming of the Civil War (New York, 1942), pp. 357-58, 363-64.
48 Ibid., pp. 361-64; Bacon, Leonard Bacon, pp. 417-18.
50 Bacon, Leonard Bacon, 418.
51 Ibid.
52 Lane, Political History of Connecticut, pp. 77-78.
53 Ibid., pp. 68-75.
54 Ibid., p. 75.
55 Craven, Coming of the Civil War, p. 367.
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56 Ibid., pp. 361-62.
57 Lane, Political History of Connecticut, pp. 77-78.
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