USA > Connecticut > History of Connecticut, Volume II > Part 26
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(Courtesy Mills Coll., Conn. State Lib.)
NEW LONDON HARBOR LIGHT (1935 PHOTO)
the impact of the economic decline on the individual citizen. The Citizens Bank and Trust Company of New Haven and the Commercial Trust Company of New Britain failed in December, 1930. By Fall of 1932, 15 State banks, two private banks, and one industrial bank had failed with the greatest number of these failures occurring in the fall and winter of 1931 and 1932.9 Three additional State Banks failed in 1933, and two of the earlier failures were absorbed by other banks. By 1934, there were 16 banks still in the process of liquidation with liabil-
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HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
ities of $67,000,000 against $60,000,000 in appraised assets. Nine others were absorbed by other banks, and still others decreased their capital stock.10 By 1932, also, Connecticut residents were evidently calling upon the last of their resources. Only in 1931 and 1932 did the number of savings accounts closed in the state banks exceed the number of new accounts. One hundred and three thousand accounts were closed in 1931 and 183,763 in 1932. For every new account opened in the latter year, more than four were closed. The Savings Banks remained more stable, none of them discontinuing business. In 1932, however, for the only time in recent years the total amount of their deposits declined. The fact that more accounts were closed during this year than were opened suggests that the effects of the panic were being directly felt by a larger segment of the population.11
The problem of relief was accentuated by the fact that it bore unevenly on the different segments of the population and was con- centrated in the cities. The Manufacturers' Associations of Hartford County, New Haven, and Bridgeport revealed that more than 40 per- cent of the potential work force in their respective areas were without jobs. The Russell Sage Foundation in two separate studies, one in 1931 and the other two years later, indicated that the unemployed of New Haven had almost doubled in the two year period. Of even more im- portance was the fact that the total man hours worked in 1932 was only 30 percent of the total man hours worked in 1929.12 On the other hand, the rural areas were comparatively unaffected. The Relief Commission reported in 1932 that 50 of the 169 towns had no relief problem. The number of unemployed in the rural industrial areas was frequently greater than in the more urban areas because of the lack of industrial diversification. However, the rural nature of these areas enabled the inhabitants to secure more easily the necessities of life and lessened the impact of the depression upon them.13 While there were relatively few white collar workers unemployed, the difficulties of supplying work for them and their difficulty in adapting to a different type of work made assistance to them more difficult. As unemployment increased, opinion discouraged the employment of the married women and an effort was made to place men in the available jobs. A contrasting force was the need of industry to reduce the costs of production and the lower wage
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THE NEW DEAL IN CONNECTICUT
scale which prevailed for women increased their opportunities of employment, but unhappily reduced the total fund of wages. Signifi- cantly fewer women than men lost their jobs in the factories and increasing numbers of women were employed in the social and educa-
HIC
(Courtesy Conn. Devel. Comm.)
NEW LONDON
tional services. Of the total work force, a greater number of those em- ployed in the factories of the state lost their jobs than those engaged in other occupations. Unemployment was likewise heavy in the transporta- tion and communication fields and in the mercantile trades. Since these occupations were concentrated in the cities, the problems of relief were infinitely greater in the urban areas.14
There is "no satisfactory measure of the number of unemployed," wrote the Relief Commission in 1934. "We are to a great extent ignor-
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HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
ant of the magnitude of the problem which we are asked to solve." Suc- ceeding generations have remained similarly ignorant, but there is enough information to indicate that unemployment was settling upon Connecticut society. The United States Bureau of Census in 1930 re- ported that 50,890 or 7.5 percent of those normally gainfully employed were out of work. In the spring of 1932 it was reported that there were 150,000, or about 21 percent, unemployed in the state. Margaret Hogg, in a careful statistical analysis, held that 26 percent was a more realisitic estimate, and a similar study of unemployment in Meriden confirmed the conclusion. A factory-employment index, prepared by the Metro- politan Life Insurance Company, revealed that industrial employment fell steadily from 1929 through 1931, reaching a low point of 54 percent of the 1929 average in the Fall of 1932. At the same time, in a special report to the Governor, it was estimated that there was a decrease in employment of 37 percent, and a decrease in payrolls of 40 percent. Two out of every five workers, then, were without jobs, and the propor- tion in the urban industrial centers was even higher.15
The unemployment conditions were made worse as a result of ineffective labor legislation. Connecticut was "not exactly a worker's paradise," concluded William Bilevitz, who added that the Manufac- turers' Association had seen to that.16 For years wages had been low, unions depressed, and labor legislation discouraged. When W. J. Fitz- gerald assumed the post of Deputy Commissioner of Factory Inspection, in 1931, he failed to find records of any prosecutions for violations of the labor laws within recent years. Employers expressed such ignorance of the laws that it seemed reasonable to him to spend the first year warning them that thereafter the laws would be enforced. Even so it was necessary in the first year of his administration to prosecute one foreman who was charging workers for their jobs and eight others for flagrant violations of the laws governing working conditions for minors and hours of employment of women and children. The labor laws of Connecticut, in the Commissioner's view, were below the standards of those in force in many of the states.17
The widespread unemployment made the eradication of undesira- able labor practices more difficult. One of the most ironical practices in view of the general economic condition was that of witholding of wages.
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THE NEW DEAL IN CONNECTICUT
Some employers engaged in the practice because of their own financial difficulties. Others, however, simply took advantage of the "necessitous conditions of the wage earner." The ridiculous was reached when six contractors for state aid roads withheld wages from employees on proj- ects intended in part at least to alleviate the unemployment.18 The most shocking of the labor conditions were those in the needle trade industry. To escape the high wages demanded by the Amalgamated Clothing Workers and United Neckwear unions of New York City the industry in the latter part of the nineteen twenties invaded Connecticut and centered in New Haven where they had the benefit of an open shop and the encouragement of the Chamber of Commerce and the Connecticut Manufacturers' Association. At the request of the Commissioner of Labor, the Women's Bureau of the United States Department of Labor studied the situation and reported a wide variance of wages among all classes of the employees (including, in some instances, no wages at all for the so-called learner), irregular, and short terms of employment, and abominable health conditions. In some instances garments were taken home where the employee and other members of her family would work long hours for little pay. Such conditions were accompanied by labor strife which aroused the attention of the populace. Many of the es- tablished manufacturers understood the inevitably depressing effect of such practices on the general economic situation, but an official of the New Haven Chamber of Commerce defended the practice as a necessary evil without which there would be a great deal more unemployment. "The garment shops," he said, "were complementing charity and for this reason must be tolerated."19
Meanwhile, the financial inabilities of the municipalities to meet the mounting problems of relief resulted in their demanding that the state assume a greater responsibility. The difficulties in the Winter of 1931-32 were lessened somewhat by the distribution of surplus army clothing, but by Spring the cities were facing huge deficits. The Con- necticut Unemployment Commission advised the Governor that 26 towns, including 69 percent of the population, anticipated a deficit of $5,483,653. The needs of some cities were rapidly altering the idea of the independence of the towns. Municipal officials in April requested the Governor to call a special session of the Assembly to consider the
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HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
problems of relief. Governor Cross appears to have hesitated to call a special session and time was gained by the appointment of another committee, one to report especially to the Governor, which was headed by Angus Thorne, Superintendent of Bridgeport's Department of Pub- lic Welfare, and was instructed to survey relief needs. The Committee reported on October 11 that the "towns would require state or federal aid after January 1, 1933."20 A special session had been avoided. The inconvenience of a special session during an election year was thus avoided.
In 1932, both parties were torn by factional strife. Albert Levitt had combined the prohibition zealots and the anti-Roraback forces to form the Independent Republican Party in his effort to wrest control of the Party from the "Kaiser of Connecticut."21 The regular wing of the party could do no better than to nominate one who symbolized the "era of prosperity," John H. Trumbull. The bitter wrangling among the "old guards" and the "new guards" of the Democratic party con- tinued in the selection of the delegates to the national convention, in the choice of the national committee woman, and in the nomination of the state ticket. Cross manipulated a state ticket of his choice, with him- self as the head and Thomas Hewes as the nominee for Lieutenant Gov- ernor, over the bitter objection of the "old guard," who supported the incumbent Daniel J. Leary.22 There was no great clamor in the cam- paign of 1932 that the unemployed be aided. The Democrats, in their platform, called for direct aid to the distressed areas, which included a sales tax for unemployment relief, and old age pensions, but after an- nouncing this progressive program Cross made Roraback and machine politics the point of his attack. The Republicans, somewhat in the spirit of the national campaign, pointed to their record and their "pay as you go" policy.23
An unknown factor was the Socialist Party, which a national maga- zine prophesied would attract a large number of urban voters in protest against the failure of either party to do anything for the unemployed. It was "plain nonsense," it was reported, "to assume that the unemployed workers were going to forgive and forget."24 Connecticut's political democracy again befuddled the observers. The more than 20,000 votes for Norman Thomas represented a significant gain for the Socialists,
(Courtesy Conn. Devel. Comm.)
COLCHESTER
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HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
but it hardly represented a protest. The majority of the electorate cast its vote for Hoover for President, but returned Cross as Governor. The Republicans retained their stranglehold on the House, but the Demo- crats, for the first time since 1913, held a majority in the Senate by one vote. One analyst explained the failure of a larger protest vote for the Socialist Party by suggesting that it seemed only "a remote means of urgent change."25 It seems possible, however, that there was no great urgency felt for change.
Governor Cross in his inaugural did not issue an urgent call for aid for relief. To meet what he identified "as the most critical era of our history," the most that he would recommend were further controls of the banks, changes in the charters of the municipal governments to enable them to save interest on short term notes, and a revision of the statutes to permit the cities to borrow beyond the statutory limitation of five percent of the grand list. He warned, however, that if the state loaned money it would have to exercise greater supervisory control. He passed along without comment a recommendation of the Tax Com- missioner "that the state might guarantee, under certain conditions, bonds issued by the municipalities to meet actual emergencies." He treated similarly a recommendation of the Unemployment Commission that "the State lay a special emergency tax for relief of municipalities." Although he reported on the improved roads and parks, significantly he did not relate them to unemployment relief. In fact, the Bureau of the Budget concluded that "any such program affords but little unem- ployment relief and has no marked effect on business conditions." The state faced a deficit of from 14 to 16 million dollars and the Board of Finance and Control believed it better policy "to retrench, economize, and balance the state budget," for programs "designed mainly as a palliative to existing conditions are much better left with the people who are called upon also to support local government." The Board of Finance urged that unemployment expenditures be eliminated from the state budget and that any monies supplied for relief be identified as such.26
Cross, in retrospect, wrote that a program of direct relief "was not in immediate sight. Nothing more could be expected from legisla- tion than wider leeway for municipalities to issue bonds." Such political
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THE NEW DEAL IN CONNECTICUT
realism, it should be noted, did not deter the Governor from pushing hard for his "five point program," which included such immediately unrealizable proposals as a district court system and that a two-thirds majority in both houses be required to override a Governor's veto. This inconsistency casts doubt on his subsequent explanation for not recom- mending specific action and lends credence that he spoke as he believed when he warned the public not to look upon government "as a magic wand, which can be expected to bring fabulous aid to those who cannot aid themselves," and asked in conclusion only that the people would "supply through taxes and likewise through all possible charitable goods, the funds essential to maintain the standards of our community life."27
Municipal leaders rose in protest against the Governor's conserva- tive proposals. The deficit of the municipalities for relief had mounted to $13,000,000. It was indicated that appeals to the constituency were no longer sufficient; instead, it was time for action. The Connecticut League of Municipalities proposed first a luxury tax, and later a sales tax, as a means of securing the badly needed monies for relief. A Mayors' Committee proposed a 25 million dollar bond issue to assist the cities. The Secretary of the Hartford Community Chest proposed that the state assume 40 percent of the relief costs of the cities. Hunger marchers, led by the Communists, descended upon the Capitol and demanded that the Assembly appropriate $10,000,000 for the relief of the unem- ployed, eliminate the appropriation to the militia, and cut the salaries of the state employees. The Governor received a committee of the marchers and "held out hopes to them for help either from the State or the Federal Government," and "they left in good cheer." In the absence of any concrete assistance from the State, many of the Connecticut towns inaugurated public works programs in an effort to materially aid the workers and to preserve their morale.28
In "this most critical era" the politicians seemed most concerned with translating their political power into appointments and a liquor control system that would secure political position. The majority of one in the Senate gave the Governor the opportunity, through his appointive power, to strengthen his position and that of his Party. A storm broke, however, when Cross learned that three Democratic Old Guard Sen-
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HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
ators had collaborated with the Republican leadership in deciding the court appointments of Hartford and the vicinity. Cross had to content himself with castigating the politicians in a press conference, for the Assembly approved the slate by joint resolution. Party strife reached a boiling point over the proposed method of controlling the sale and dis- tribution of intoxicating beverages. The Governor, anticipating the repeal of prohibition, appointed a special commission to recommend a plan. It called for the sale of beer in taverns, of liquor in the drug stores, and for the centralization of control in the state under the administra- tion of a bipartisan commission of three. Cross allegedly heard rumors of a proposal, which he attributed to the Republicans, that would have placed the control of beer, as in pre-prohibition days, under the County Commissioner. Cross appealed by radio to the citizenry to assist him "to win the battle against the relentless opposition of politicians who put patronage above the public welfare". Cross charged that the subsequent proposals framed by the Republicans in "secret conclave" would have enabled anyone who had $25 to receive a permit. Raymond Baldwin, one of the architects of the Republican position, denied that his party favored the county plan and sought to dismiss the issue as "just a case of who could shout the loudest." It may be conjectured whether as the law has been administered political considerations have been greater under centralized control than they would have been under local administra- tion, but, in 1933, it was the latter which the Connecticut public be- lieved portended the greatest danger. There was an outpouring of indignation in opposition to the Republican position and in support of the Governor. On April 18, after an acrimonious four-hour debate, the plan for centralized control was approved in the House and two days later in the Senate. On the last day of the session the parties stopped their political maneuvering and amended imperfections in the bill.29 While this issue was resolved, legislation for the unemployed lan- guished.
During the first hundred days of Franklin D. Roosevelt's admin- istration, public questions, which hitherto had been regarded as the province of the state, became of national concern. In Connecticut, the banking laws of the state had been revised in 1931 and additional con- trols had been recommended by Governor Cross in his Inaugural. When
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THE NEW DEAL IN CONNECTICUT
the Banking Holiday was declared by Roosevelt in March, 1933, the parties joined in bi-partisan support of legislation granting the Gov- ernor the power to implement the federal provision in Connecticut, increasing the power of the Bank Commissioner, doubling the amount of capital stock required of commercial banks, standardizing deposit and withdrawal notices and providing a basis for mergers and consolida- tion and for a system of branch banking. Of greatest concern was the payment of claims by the insurance companies during the period of the banking holiday. The legislature gave to the Banking Commissioner, under the direction of the Governor, almost dictatorial powers over the insurance companies for this period. Banking practices were stabilized as legislative provisions became a permanent part of the banking laws of the state.30
The impetus for relief for the hard-pressed towns came from the Federal Government. The State was one of six which by June 1933 had not taken advantage of the Federal Government's emergency relief construction funds by which loans were made available to those states which had exhausted their resources. Although these debts were later cancelled, at the time the proviso that they would be repaid by monies withheld from Federal Highway Aid made them unattractive to Con- necticut. This may have been a greater deterrent than the historic pol- icy of independence which the commission considered an explanation. The new jobs which would be created by a state-supported and admin- istered relief program was of potentially great political advantage to the one who held appointive power. As the parties jockeyed for posi- tion, the Federal Emergency Relief Act was passed and provided $500,000,000 for outright grants to the states. The principle of inde- pendence no longer impeded the state from taking advantage of aid. The state guaranteed the payment of municipal bonds issued for the purpose of unemployment relief. The Municipal Finance and Unem- ployment Relief Commission was created as the administrative agency in control of municipal finances and to serve as the agency for the ad- ministration and distribution of funds received from the Federal Gov- ernment. Through funds supplied by the Federal Government and in accord with the policies entailed thereby31 municipal relief was placed under the supervision of the State.
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HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
Any theoretical tenets of local responsibility vanished as unemploy- ment increased and as tangible relief through the assistance of the Fed- eral Government became a reality. When the plans for the Civilian Conservation Corps became known the Hartford Courant endorsed it as "an essential step in the emergency," but held that the Government should do nothing which would delay balancing the budget.32 Mobiliza- tion of recruits was begun April 6, and by June 19, it was reported that practically all of the C.C.C. groups were in the field.33 By March, 1937, 21 civilian conservation camps had been established in Connecticut.34 The camps were not without their problems, as shown by the conflict of the corps and the youths of Thomaston in the Summer of 1933, but in retrospect there is no doubt that the contributions of the corps were impressive. By December 31, 1936, $4,671,000 had been returned to dependents of the enrollees. There seems merit in the view of the Relief Commission, however, that the contributions of the corps "can never be computed in terms of dollars." It "had succeeded in reconditioning . . . , men who had suffered peculiarly, not from the loss of employ- ment, but in many cases from never having had employment at all."35 As the winter of 1933-34 approached, news was received that "much of the oversupply of important food stuffs and staples were to be placed in the hands of the destitute unemployed who were living on the short shrift of public unemployment relief."36 State officials overlooked the barb and accepted the produce. Physical facilities were established for food which was distributed by local relief agencies on the basis of an investigation by social workers where possible or by those trained under the supervision of the Commission. By the next summer, products valued at more than three quarters of a million dollars had been dis- tributed to Connecticut citizens; and, by the end of 1936, a total of more than 92,000,000 pounds of products.37 Concurrently, shelters. camps, and farms were established for transients. In all, nine such centers were established. A measure of the contribution of the program is revealed in the monthly average that from 1,200 to 1,300 persons were here provided for in 1934 and 1935.38
Efforts to relieve human misery were combined with the objective of providing regular employment on public works for those who were willing and able to work. This was done through the Civil Works Ad-
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THE NEW DEAL IN CONNECTICUT
ministration and its successor, the Federal Emergency Relief Adminis- tration. The emphasis was on need and the imperfections of the pro- gram of the CWA were compensated for somewhat by the speed with which the projects were begun. In four months and 21 days, 972 proj- ects had been activated; 45,000 men had gone to work; and over $11,- 500,000 had been expended, $10,000,000 of which had been provided by the Federal Government. The emphasis on the use of unskilled labor en- couraged waste and was prejudicial to the skilled worker. The program was disproportionately favorable to the residents of the smaller towns, practically 100 percent of their labor force being absorbed, in contrast to the provision of work for only one in five of the unemployed in the larger cities. A note of approval was voiced by state relief officials when the Civil Works Administration was terminated and its functions taken over by the Federal Emergency Relief Administration, primarily, it seems, because the Federal Government had skirted the state's relief officials and had aroused latent fears of the lessening of state independ- ence. The works program was greatly expanded after April 1, 1934. Despite limiting the program to the 70 towns in greatest need, over 2,700 projects were begun under FERA. As the state took a more active part in the administration of the program during this period, charges and counter charges were exchanged between the local, state, and federal officials. Accusations of political pressure and favoritism in the approval of projects, the granting of contracts, the appointment of su- pervisors, and in the hiring of labor were made against each echelon of officials.39
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