USA > Connecticut > History of Connecticut, Volume II > Part 41
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The Politics of Finance
Bitter partisan controversy erupted over Ribicoff's proposal to divert a portion of the motor vehicle fees to finance operations usually charged to the General Fund. The issue was purely political from beginning to end. The Governor had announced during the campaign and had reit- erated after the election that there would be no increase in taxes. When it became apparent that the State could not continue to provide the services to which it had obligated itself without increased general funds, the Governor proposed to balance the budget by the diversion of 22 million dollars from the income received from motor vehicle fees which were ascribed to the Highway Fund. There was merit in the charge that the plan was conceived solely to keep an election promise. As a matter of fact on another occasion the Governor had opposed a diversion of funds. Republican opposition, on the other hand, was equally partisan and had a ring of sincerity only for those who had short memories. The party could not have been opposed to the principle of diversion, because as late as 1949 it had proposed the diverting of 11 million dollars in sales tax which had been earmarked to pay installments on Veterans Bonus Bonds. Ten years earlier a Republican Governor had proposed the diversion of highway funds. Nevertheless, they made opposition to diversion their major legislative effort of the session. They marshalled support from those high in business and finance who expressed their fear of the "dangerous precedent." Many small town legislators disliked diver- sion, because it was feared that the loss of revenue from the highway fund would delay the improvement of the secondary roads. These legis- lators saw reason to support diversion, however, when the Governor announced that the temporary increase of $9.50 per pupil in state aid to education could be continued only by diversion. Ribicoff gave the Republicans the alternatives of accepting the proposal of devising a tax program of their own, or of assuming responsibility for the deficit which was almost sure to result if additional revenues were not forthcoming. The GOP offered ineffective opposition in the Senate, but took a deter- mined stand in the House. The votes were evenly divided on three roll calls: one to recess, one to amend the bill, and one on the passage of the bill. Each time, William O'Brien, the Speaker of the House, cast the
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deciding vote. Once again the Democrats' had successfully imposed party discipline. The Republicans were becoming more practiced: One Repub- lican was sick, another was attending a convention. The Courant re- garded the whole thing "as a matter of semantics, it is borrowing from Peter to pay Paul." 12
The political gain or loss must remain a matter of conjecture at least until the 1962 Gubernatorial election. Serle Pinney, the House Minority Leader in 1959 and presently the Chairman of the Republican Party, indicated the Republican position when he scoffed at the Gover- nor's financial gimmicks. Diversion remained an issue in the 1961 session. The Republicans spoke again and again of the horrors of diversion. They had regained control of the House and successfully blocked the con- tinuance of diversion. An increase in taxes became a foregone conclusion. Even with the increase in taxes it was anticipated that a deficit would exceed twenty-five million by the next biennium. Whether Governor Dempsey, who had succeeded Ribicoff as Governor when he accepted the position as Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, could over- come the political liability of the fiscal situation remained was a question as he prepared for his campaign.
Interstate Highway System
Closely bound to the discussion of diversion and indeed a part of the same bill was the proposal designed to accelerate the State's high- way building program. Governor Ribicoff had proposed a "stepped up" highway program to the 1958 special session of the Assembly as an aid to recovery from the economic depression which then prevailed. The 30 million dollars granted by the Republican dominated assembly was a far cry, however, from what the Governor believed to be necessary, and in his inaugural in 1959, he asked that the Assembly take advantage of the Federal aid which was then anticipated and issue bonds to the extent of 346 millions to finance the program. The Governor held that by the use of Federal monies the final net cost to Connecticut, exclusive of interest, would amount to only 28 per cent of the total. There was logic in the Governor's argument that such construction represented a capital improvement and should be paid over a long period of time. There was
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appeal in his suggestion that if the roads were built in the immediate future the State would avoid the higher prices which would result from the spiraling costs. The proposal was contrary to the Republican tradi- tion of financing highways on a pay-as-you-go basis. Although for politi- cal reasons the GOP was bitterly opposed to diversion, it does not appear that their heart was in their opposition to the highway program. They expressed doubt that Federal monies would be available, and they raised questions as to the conditions under which the State would assume responsibility for the bridges of the Greater Hartford Bridge Authority, as required in the bill. When an amendment provided that the bridges should be financed out of funds collected from tolls, the opposition seemed to disappear. Significantly, among the strongest supporters of an improved highway system were some of the leading Republicans of the state. Thirty-eight million dollars were allocated for bond payments necessary to transfer the five bridges of the Hartford area to the state and the remainder of the funds granted were earmarked for the inter- state system and the federal aid highway program. In the passage of the act there stood out one important political fact, that of intense citi- zen interest in the provision of roads which was not properly evaluated until Governor Dempsey dramatized it in 1961. The needs for highways were believed to be so great that Connecticut citizens were quite willing to support whatever method of financing would build the most miles of highway in the shortest possible time.13
Failure to Provide for Constitutional Convention
One of the more important issues before the Assembly was again the calling of a constitutional convention. In view of the political im- broglio which erupted in 1950 over the suggestion that a commission be named to draft a constitution and submit it directly to the people, it was recognized that if the constitution were to be revised it would have to be accomplished through the method of the convention. Inas- much as "all political power is inherent in the . . . people and that they have at all times the undeniable and indefeasible right to alter their form of government in such manner as they may think expedient," it was assumed that they should be given the opportunity to indicate
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through a referendum whether or not a constitutional convention were desired. The leadership of the Democratic party did not impose party discipline in the House, as it had in other legislative measures, to assure the passage of the bill authorizing the referendum. The Republicans added an amendment which would have required the convention to consist of the same number of representatives from each town. The proposal was distinctly favorable to the control of the Convention by the GOP. Inasmuch as the proposal denied the Democrats the oppor- tunity to achieve a balance in representation in the convention to make possible a subsequent increase in the House of the proportion of repre- sentatives from the larger cities, they deleted the amendment when it reached the Senate. In their inability to compromise their differences, the parties refused to permit the electorate to decide if a constitutional convention should be called. The issue was submitted to a bi-partisan commission for study. The report submitted to the 1961 General Assem- bly failed to bridge the gap between political theory and practical poli- tics. With the Republicans again in control of the House and the Democrats in control of the Senate, it proved impossible to agree upon the conditions under which a constitutional convention might be held and equally impossible to secure agreement on proposed constitutional amendments which would have altered the Senatorial districts and the size of the House. The reform of the basic structure of Connecticut gov- ernment either by a constitutional convention or by any significant alteration in the basis of representation remains the political issue it has been for over 100 years.14
The Strain On Party Discipline
The unity which had characterized the Democratic forces during the session was strained in the course of legislative procedures. Some members had defied the wishes of the party leadership and had re- quested an increase in pay for the members of the Assembly. The rank and file were in a strong position. Their support was needed particularly in the House to effect the party's legislative program. When the move for increased salaries gained the support of some Republican members, the Democratic leaders agreed to an increase in the legislators' pay from
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$600 to $2500 for a legislative term to be effective in 1961 and also reluctantly agreed to a grant of $500 for expenses during the 1959 ses- sion. Although this was of personal benefit to many legislators, it was not of political advantage to them. The Governor's austerity program had eliminated from consideration many of the pet projects by which legis- lators customarily appeal to their local constituency and some members of the party were disgruntled as a result. During a discussion of the 57 million dollar bonding program which had gone on in the House for five hours, GOP Representative Lucy Hammer proposed an amendment adding $800,000 to the total bond issue to finance a land purchase for the New Haven State Teachers College. The Majority Leader, Samuel Google left the floor to check the proposal with the party leaders. Bailey was not immediately available, but with the approval of the Governor, Google accepted the amendment on the erroneous assumption that it would gain some Republican votes for the amended bill. However, the vote on the bill was along strict party lines. Many Democrats were furious at Google. They had been denied monies for local projects, and yet in a moment of decision Google, with the approval of the Governor, had agreed to an expenditure of $800,000. John Bailey was visibly upset by the agreement and by this intrusion of the Governor into an area usually reserved to the Party Chairman. Late on the night of May 28, after the House had adjourned, the Democrats gathered in caucus. Bailey sought to restore party harmony by assuring the members that the bonds for New Haven would never be authorized during the coming biennium by the Bonding Commission. They were ultimately authorized in 1962. The party rallied behind Google and excused his action, but to the discomfort of the New Britain lawmaker, there was criticism from the press in New Britain and from the President of the State College in New Britain for favoring the New Haven institution while doing noth- ing for the college in his own city. Left unexplained was why $800,000 was provided for the purchase of the property when only $350,000 was recommended for this item in the Governor's budget.15
Insurance Taxes
The most notable exception to the Governor's avowal that there would be no increase in taxes was an assessment against the insurance
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companies. The industry agreed for the tax on interest and dividends to be increased from one and one-quarter to two and one-half per cent for the 1959-61 biennium and then gradual reduction was to be begun with an eventual elimination in 1972. The tax on premiums and annuities was increased from one-quarter of one per cent to one per cent for the forthcoming year and then was to be gradually reduced until it was eliminated in 1963. It was estimated that the agreement with the insur- ance companies would net the state approximately $5,000,000 in two years. Other legislation of advantage to the industry was passed which at least in part compensated the companies for the increase in taxes. The bill permitted Connecticut chartered life insurance companies to buy common stock in certain pension, retirement, profit sharing portfolios, thereby removing an eight per cent limitation of the total of the ad- mitted assets and removing an advantage enjoyed by the trust com- panies since 1950. The Courant endorsed the legislation as being of benefit to free enterprise and to the nation's stock market.16
The Legislative Balance
There was a sense of history in the air as Connecticut's legislators assembled for the adjournment ceremonies shortly after the midnight of June 3. The Governor reminded the assemblage that it had legislated "not only for the moment but for the benefit of many generations to come." The changes in the minor courts, the elimination of county gov- ernment, and the reorganization of the Departments of the state govern- ment were notable achievements. The provisions for the highway program were both imaginative and daring. The provisions for retarded children was recognition of a sorely neglected social problem. The first Democratic controlled Assembly in 83 years had achieved more than it had dared hope for when the session began, yet its failure to enable the people to make the decision on the calling of a constitutional convention was a failure in an objective long associated with the Democratic Party. The changes were many and some of the reforms significant, but in achieving its successes the party had introduced some fiscal practices which might become political liabilities. These, however, were not imme- diately discernible in 1959. The Democratic leadership had completely dominated the entire session. The Republican leadership was no match
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for the well coordinated Democratic team headed by John Bailey and Abraham Ribicoff. They had added to the prestige they had achieved by a smashing political victory by achieving too a comprehensive legis- lative program. Their dominance of Connecticut politics was sure to attract national attention.
President Makers
The Democratic Party in Connecticut was catapulted to a new posi- tion of importance in national politics with the election of John F. Ken- nedy as President in 1960. Governor Ribicoff had identified Kennedy as a possible winner as early as the 1956 National Convention when he served as a floor manager for the Massachusetts Senator in his effort to secure the nomination for Vice President. Their relations remained close, and, as the preliminaries of the 1960 Presidential campaign developed, it became clear that not only Ribicoff, but John Bailey and others of the Democratic leaders in the State, were to play important roles in the effort to nominate and elect John F. Kennedy. Ribicoff made frequent public appearances for the presidential hopeful, and in the contest for delegates Bailey was reported as particularly adept in dealing with party leaders. As Chairman of the Platform Committee, Chester Bowles was given the responsibility of presenting to the American people the idea and the ideals by which the Democratic Party and its candidate would be identified. Once Kennedy's nomination was assured and the cam- paign was begun, Connecticut Democratic leaders appeared to serve with other national leaders as a part of the strategy team and separately in the areas of their greatest competence: Bailey as consultant on organ- izational problems, Ribicoff as a spokesman for the nominee, and Bowles as an advisor in the area of foreign affairs. Their services together with the 90,000 plurality returned for Kennedy in Connecticut assured state Democrats important positions in the national administration. Bowles was named Undersecretary of State; Ribicoff Secretary of Health, Edu- cation, and Welfare; and Bailey as Democratic National Chairman.
The Ribicoff Record
Abraham Ribicoff symbolized to a remarkable degree the spirit of moderation which characterized Connecticut at mid-century. While con-
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juring up the image of a progressive leader, he approached public issues, particularly those which necessitated new taxes, with a measured caution. In concepts and ideas, he was the beneficiary of the programs articulated by Wilbur Cross and Chester Bowles. The end results of his efforts were somewhere between the objectives of these Democratic predecessors. In the art of achieving goals, his only peer was his colleague, John Bailey. If Ribicoff did not undertake programs advocated by the liberal ele- ments of society, it could be contended that the reforms achieved repre- sented the limits of acceptance of the Connecticut community. As he trod "the middle of the road" and collected votes, he committed his party to the same path, robbed it of the virility of its liberal wing, and thereby hastened the drift of Connecticut politics toward dead center. A dichotomy between these realities and appearances seemed to increase as his image grew to national proportions.
The future historian is likely to find Ribicoff a study of contrasts. While assuming the posture of being above politics, he played the game with a stark realism seldom equaled on the Connecticut scene. He called for austerity in fiscal affairs, but recommended ways and means, which, to his opponents at least, reduced the plea to a political verbalism. When his party was not in control of the Assembly, he appeared as the para- gon of bi-partisanship. When it was, he was capable of being beliger- ently uncompromising. He was responsible, to a great degree, for the rise of John Dempsey within the Democratic party, yet after the announce- ment of Ribicoff's nomination to Federal office, for the announced intent to avoid appearing presumptuous, he held the gubernatorial reins so tightly as to jeopardize Dempsey's opportunity to emerge in his own right as a worthy successor. Abraham Ribicoff led his party to the great- est victory in the history of modern Connecticut, but in the process he incurred liabilities which the electorate, it would appear, will balance.
NOTES -CHAPTER XXXVIII
1. Hartford Courant, Mar. 1, 1959.
2. Ibid., Mar. 8, 11, 12, 13, 15, 1959.
3. .Ibid., Mar. 13, 15, 17, 20, 25, 26, . 1959; Journal of the House, 1959, Part 1, pp. 611-644; Journal of the Senate, 1959, Part 1, pp. 516-19; Public Acts, 1959, pp. 35-118.
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4. Hartford Courant, Apr. 19, May 10, 1959.
5. Ibid., Jan. 16, May 20, 21, 28, June 11, 1961.
6. Journal of the Senate, 1959, Part 2, pp. 726, 870, 1066; Journal of of the House, 1959, Part 2, pp. 1050-70; Public Acts, 1959, pp. 442-89; Hartford Courant, Apr. 19, May 3, 7, 9, 1959; interview with Secretary of State Ella T. Grasso, Jan. 31, 1962.
7. Hartford Courant, Mar. 3, 4, June 2, 1959.
8. Journal of the House, 1957, pp. 38, 1724; Report of the Legislative Council, 1958, p. 82.
9. Digest of Administrative Reports, 1959-60 (Hartford, 1960), p. 187; Public Acts, 1959, pp. 425-39; Hartford Courant, Mar. 3, 6, 11, Apr. 2, 17, May 1, 16, June 3, 1959.
10. Digest of Administrative Reports, 1959-60, pp. 111, 115, 147, 279; Public Acts, 1959, pp. 648-60, 758-71, 907, 1280-81; Public Acts, 1961, pp. 37-38, 64; Journal of the House, 1959, pp. 92, 302, 306, 493, 740, 775, 778, 786, 939.
11. Public Acts, 1959, pp. 437-39, 747-49, 1325-27; Digest of Adminis- trative Reports, 1961, pp. 200-201; Hartford Courant, June 4, 1959, Feb. 10, 1962.
12. Journal of the House, 1959, pp. 984-96; Hartford Courant, Apr. 1, 5, 17, 19, 26, May 1, 3, 5, 6, 16, 31, 1959.
13. Ibid., Apr. 4, 17, 28, May 5, 1959; Journal of the House, Special Ses- sion, 1958, pp. 16-19, 80, 144-451; Journal of the House, 1959, pp. 40-41, 449-51, 466, 959, 977, 996, 1238; Public Acts, 1959, pp. 219-20; Digest of Administrative Reports, p. 227.
14. Journal of the House, 1959, pp. 204, 257, 380, 470, 518, 1463; Journal of the House, 1961, pp. 772, 1045, 1253, 1408, 1424; Journal of the Senate, 1959, pp. 245, 277, 338, 1236; Journal of the Senate, 1961, pp. 135, 587, 681, 839, 912, 938; Hartford Courant, May 3, 5, 24, June 2, 1959, June 11, 1961.
15. Ibid., Mar. 5, Apr. 2, 3, May 16, 29, June 2, 1959; New Britain Herald, May 16, 1959.
16. Hartford Courant, May 16, 22, 1959; Public Acts, 1959, pp. 411-12.
Chapter XXXIX The Current Scene
J OHN DEMPSEY succeeded to the responsibilities of Governor over- shadowed by the image of the man to whom he was responsible for his own ascendancy within the Democratic Party. This native of Ireland served his apprenticeship in Connecticut politics in his adopted town of Putnam, where he served as Mayor for six terms and from which he was elected to the General Assembly for three successive terms, the first being in 1949. He was appointed Executive Aide to the Governor in 1955 and was his personal choice as nominee for Lieutenant Governor in 1958. The General Assembly went through its routine duties await- ing the departure of Ribicoff on January 17. His influence persisted. In his inaugural Dempsey paid tribute to the departed Secretary, but the substance of the message left the impression, inevitably perhaps, that Dempsey was still the Lieutenant, not the Chief of State.1
A Stumbling Start
More important, perhaps, the Democratic Party was consigned to a kind of guardianship. The absence of the master craftsman, John Bailey, was felt keenly. For a dozen years he had directed the legislative efforts of the party with consumate skill. Now, his duties as National Chair- man kept him away from his familiar post except for infrequent visits to Hartford. Arthur Healey of New Haven and the Secretary of State, Ella Grasso, were designated to run the affairs of the party in his absence. The Republicans eagerly took advantage of the situation and seized the initiative in the Assembly. Some Democrats complained that there was no leadership, and others, not easily identified, sought to take
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advantage of the transition in the party and weaken the hold of the Bailey-Ribicoff forces. The rank and file of the party had been drifting for almost a month when Bailey returned in the middle of February; and out of the emergency meetings, Dempsey emerged as the leader of the Party on legislative affairs.2
The Governor got off to a stumbling start. He indicated that he was willing to permit the people to decide if horse racing should be intro- duced in the State. In indicating his support of the democratic principle of permitting the people to decide, he appeared to support a measure which was antithetical to Connecticut's concept of morality. When it appeared that the Governor's detractors might be successful in identi- fying the racing bill as symbolic of the level of conduct of Dempsey in public office, John Bailey announced simply to a Democratic caucus that no racing bill would be presented and none was. The Governor was rescued from an embarrassing and potentially hazardous political situa- tion.3
The New Haven
Of immediate importance was legislation designed to grant assist- ance to the New Haven Railroad. The road had recovered from its depressed condition in the nineteen thirties largely as a result of the increased revenues received during World War II. In the post-war years New England's major railroad passed through a series of financial crises and managerial changes, but none had resulted in any permanent im- provements in the system. The financial condition of the road had deteri- orated to such a point by the Fall of 1960 that it was announced that, if assistance were not forthcoming, the road would be forced to curtail its services and possibly to go into bankruptcy. Meanwhile the company continued operating with loans from private sources and from the Fed- eral Government. A committee, which had been named by the executives of the states of New York, Massachussetts, Rhode Island, and Connecti- cut, recommended in January, 1961, the repeal of the Federal excise tax, a ten per cent increase in commutation fares, and immediate tax relief by the respective states. The Governor asked that the road "be given immediate assistance" and endorsed the proposal to repeal the gross revenue tax on the railroad.4
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There developed a strong sentiment that any relief should be re- flected in improved services by the road. The Governor favored this, but the conditions under which tax relief should be granted were first detailed by Nicholas B. Eddy of New Hartford, and he gained the sup- port of the Hartford Courant. "It is silly for the State to grant tax relief," editorialized the paper, "without some assurance that these mon- ies will be used to strengthen the road." In addition to improved mainte- nance of the road beds and rolling stock, Eddy suggested that the executive salaries be reduced and that the railroad assure the public that at least 50 per cent of the trains run on time. Eugene S. Loughlin, chairman of the Connecticut Public Utilities Commission, criticized the line for many of its management decisions, but held that bankruptcy was not the answer to the problem. The President of the New Haven, George Alpert, made a grandiloquent appeal that Connecticut act to save the line and urged that Connecticut take the lead in granting relief. Despite his urging and that of the Governor, the Assembly moved pretty much at its own pace. Sentiment developed that Connecticut should not rush to grant tax relief before it was known whether other states would also.5
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