USA > Connecticut > History of Connecticut, Volume II > Part 30
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War Boom and Its Problems
War contracts began to flood the manufacturers of the state by the Fall of 1940 and required enlargement of facility and labor force. Pratt and Whitney began its fourth major plant expansion in September in antici- pation of a $17,000,000 contract. In contrast, fifteen months earlier, a $300,000 order was considered newsworthy. The "unwise experiment" of the last several years had not undermined the industrial economy as Bald-
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win had feared, rather the state was fast becoming "the arsenal of the nation." By November it was claimed that Connecticut was the leader in the production of arms, ammunition, airplane engines, and propellers.8 Workers from other states came to Connecticut at the rate of 200 a day and these flocked to Connecticut cities. In Bridgeport, for example, the number of workers increased from 34,000 in February, 1940, to 45,000 in February, 1941. Nevertheless, it was largely because of the lack of skilled workmen that Sikorsky found that it could not expand as quickly as antici- pated and by January, 1941, was nine months behind in plane deliveries. To improve the skills of the labor force, United Aircraft, in cooperation with the state, introduced an intensive job training program to supplement that already begun by the trade schools of the state.9
The boom, however, was viewed with caution, and, some of its social consequences with concern. War earnings were reflected in increased spending. Connecticut residents had not forgotten the thirties, however, and savings, too, showed sharp rises. The rush to open Christmas Club accounts in Bridgeport was so great in 1940 that the clubs were closed to new applicants ten days after they were opened. Industrial leaders, who recognized that they had to engage in defense production if they were to receive new materials, were apprehensive of the new taxes they would be forced to pay on their expanded facilities. There was a certain Yankee cau- tion about revealing to inquiring reporters the extent of the boom in one's own community. A resident of Derby replied only, "We aren't getting any more than our share." Some cities, such as Bridgeport, were cautious as a result of experiences after World War I when they were left with deserted factories, unemployment, and depressed real estate values. Trailer camps, like those in East Hartford, presented new problems. Stories of Negroes sleeping in warehouses were disquieting, as were those of workers bivouac- ing in cars. Of even greater concern were the workers with families which placed an ever increasing strain on the housing and public facilities of the cities.10
The housing situation had become critical. The vacancies in the prin- cipal cities were all but exhausted by the Fall of 1940. Rents were sky- rocketing and speculators were exacting their profits. Local defense coun- cils were warned that conditions would become worse and were urged to prepare to take necessary action. There were wide differences of opinion
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HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
as to the housing needs of the state. The Federal Housing Coordinator denied emphatically that the Federal Government was inclined to build the 9,100 units which the Navy had estimated were needed in Connecticut. Even after the requests were scaled down to 6,000 for Connecticut's largest cities, the completion of the first units were delayed until the Summer of 1941. Ironically, Bridgeport, where the need was the greatest, dragged its heels on defense housing. Jasper McLevy, the Socialist Mayor, whose sense of economy oftentimes determined him to oppose even mildly liberal programs, aligned himself with those who regarded federal housing as a "humbug." He seems to have obstructed defense housing beyond a justifi- able point in view of the pressing needs. The Mayor simply did not want the Federal Government in Bridgeport "squandering the public money.' The Mayor's argument that federal housing would over-house the city was not self-evident to inquiring reporters who noted from 60 to 75 newly evicted tenants looking for low cost housing as a result of landlords' boost- ing rents beyond the point the tenants could pay. Although the speculators were having a field day, the Mayor delayed naming a rent control board until August 7, 1941, and then only under pressure from Bridgeport citizens and Federal authorities.11
A State on the Alert
The social issues attending war production were subordinated to national defense when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. All municipal fire and police departments were instructed to be prepared to meet an extraordinary emergency, and special police were placed on the New Haven Railroad. Manufacturing plants engaged in defense contracts took immedi- ate steps against sabotage; attention focused on the 130,000 aliens reported in the state and particularly on the 800 of these who held permits. At their drinking places, it was claimed, information was exchanged freely. With fears rampant, the employees of liquor stores were required to declare their citizenship. Overzealous patriots, however, were discouraged by the Mayor of Hartford and urged to leave the apprehension of the enemy to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Cities and towns took on the air of a combat area as artillery and anti-aircraft guns rolled through the streets. Three-inch guns and powerful search lights were hauled into place to protect industries such as Pratt and Whitney. The air alarm system was
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THE HOME FRONT IN WORLD WAR II
placed on a war basis with more than 800 citizens manning 166 observa- tion posts to scan the skies for enemy aircraft. Steps were taken to estab- lish air raid shelters and Connecticut cities practiced blackouts.12 Industry announced intent to further increase production capacities and the state labor commissioner issued an urgent call for skilled workers engaged in non-essential pursuits. Immediately after the news of Pearl Harbor a long- shoremen's strike was called off at New London. Local draft boards were alerted to be ready to register all between the ages of 19 and 65 if Congress should so rule and the tempo of the draft was increased to meet the expected demands.13
Conversion of Industry
The Connecticut Manufacturers Association had announced in the Spring of 1942 the readiness of Connecticut industry to convert as necessary to war production, and much of the industrial capacity was soon converted. The International Silver Company was the first to convert completely, stop- ping the production of silverware by 1943 and producing in its stead more than 100 different products which included shells, rifle parts, incendiary bombs, surgical instruments, cartridge clips, and mess kits. Hundreds made a partial conversion. General Electric of Bridgeport, for example, trans- formed its washing machine division to war production, and Bigelow- Sanford turned to the manufacture of blankets and cotton duck. Some, such as Landers, Frary, and Clark of New Britain, were forced into war production by government orders to discontinue the manufacture of electri- cal appliances. In contrast, even though the Government had published a long list of items "from aircraft cannon to crow quill pens" in October, 1941, and had invited small manufacturers to try their hand at the new products, adequate work for the small manufacturers continued to be a matter of concern to the Manufacturers Association in the state. Those not engaged directly in war production suffered from a scarcity of materials. In a special study of the Bigelow-Sanford Company, however, Ewing con- cluded that "it is not to be supposed war production was an unqualified success." Mechanics were frequently not sufficiently skilled in the new production to maintain proper controls. Some blankets from Bigelow-San- ford, for example, were overweight and others were underweight; and it was charged that government inspectors would accept the former, but
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HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
not the latter. Not all manufacturers fared easily, nor shared equally, in the expanded war economy.14
There were those accused of making excessive profits. Carl Vinson charged that United Aircraft was making a profit of 27 per cent. The com- pany was quick to draw the distinction between gross and net profits and to point out that the latter had been seven per cent in 1940, five per cent in 1941, and was expected to decrease further in 1942. The Hartford Courant lamented that it was "a great pity that consciously or uncon- sciously it [the Naval Affairs Committee] should have led the less intel- ligent part of the public to believe that the corporation's excellent per- formance was rewarded with undue profits" and warned that no one read- ing a financial statement should be deceived by gross profits. The Courant placed a greater emphasis on the quantity of supplies needed and on the speed with which they were required than on profits and concluded that United Aircraft, in supplying the necessities of war, did a truly "superb job." 15
War Time Programs and Controls
To preserve the necessary supplies, the Federal Government rationed critical materials through a new Office of Price Administration. Governor Hurley appointed Chester Bowles, who had earned enough money in adver- tising to get out of it, as head of the Office of Price Administration in Connecticut. Warm and forceful, courageous and ambitious, a graduate of Choate and Yale, this grandson of Samuel Bowles, who founded the Spring- field Republican, approached his assignment with a determination to accomplish a vital part of the war effort. Despite the view that the ration- ing of tires and cars was temporary, local rationing boards were established within a month after Pearl Harbor. The vast majority of Connecticut citi- zens accepted the regulations and abided by them honestly; but the change of habits enforced by rationing, such as boarding a bus rather than driving one's own car, was not accepted without some grumbling. Then too, there were the hoarders, the chiselers, the bootleggers, and others who sought to make a fast dollar out of the citizens' distress. As regulations and admin- istrative machinery became established, violations were held within bounds. Effective rationing required that supplies be preserved for military use while sufficient amounts be provided for essential home front activities.
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The decision as to what was essential travel, for example, often was based on interpretations which provided the unscrupulous with opportunity for special privileges. Within a short time the public responded to the appeal to share rides, organize car pools, and establish pick up points. Even so, there remained lingering doubts as to the necessity of it all. When the Hartford Courant noted "the emphasis ... on the necessity of keeping automobile transportation going," it wondered editorially "whether every- thing possible has been done to relieve the situation or whether the home front is being used as a guinea pig." 16
War Bonds, Metal Drives, Price Controls
Although Connecticut residents decried compulsory measures, they responded to those appeals to voluntary cooperation which accorded with previously established tenets. Residents of Hartford readily overcame any fear that the pay roll deduction plan for the purchase of war bonds would "revolutionize their trend of thought and practice in business" and sub- scribed to the method. The purchase of war bonds appealed to the average Yankee's sense of thrift, and industrialists supported the plan as a check on inflation. By the second month of the program, the state exceeded by ten per cent its quota of $16,500,000 for series E bonds, and exceeded its quota in every war loan drive. Thereafter, by June, 1946, the sale of Series E, F, and G bonds totaled $1,100,000,000. On the other hand, Connecticut residents did not remain convinced, if they were ever so, of the necessity of the scrap metal drives. Scrap dealers, on the ground that it constituted a form of licensing, refused to distinguish from that material which was useful to the war effort and that which was collected for profit. Farmers warned those who tended to hold scrap for profit of "a little Yankee trait which induces farmers to hold out for higher prices for themselves." Indus- trial salvage committees were established throughout the state, and house- hold scrap campaigns were conducted. Neither achieved the established quota during the first year. Whereas account of similar collections consti- tute some of the drama of previous military conflicts, there is little evidence that they served anything other than morale purposes. While industrial scrap was of greater value, the conversion of a flattened tomato can into a B29 required too much gullibility of the practical Yankee. 17
An even broader basis for resistance to government regulations was
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provided in the efforts to control prices. When they soared in the first weeks of the war, Congress pushed through authority to regulate them, and the control system was in operation by the Spring of 1942. The effective date of the law was followed by weeks of educating the public and inform- ing the merchants of its intricacies. When a nation wide spot check was made in the Fall it was found that a majority of Connecticut merchants were abiding by the law. However, 29, including Brown Thompson, First National Stores, and Popular Markets were cited for non-compliance. Some testified that the corrections had been made long before the charges appeared in the press and others denied the allegations flatly. Consumers who were willing to pay premium prices for meats and poultry encouraged black market dealings in these products. Some Connecticut farmers did not resist the temptation to sell out-of-state on the black market. As the Easter season approached in 1943, the state was threatened with a shortage of fowl and black market sales increased alarmingly. The OPA cracked down. The most severe penalties assessed were those against a Hartford and a Bridgeport company. The latter was fined $20,000. Ironically, one of the proprietors of the Hartford company had fled the Nazis only five years previously, and, for making false invoices and demanding cash bonuses from small retailers under threat of cutting off their meat supply, was given a jail sentence. This was later suspended when it was pointed out that others were only fined for similar violations. Such practices aroused the sensibilities of the poultry dealers. In fear that "all would swim in the water" muddied by a few, they formed the Connecticut Live Poultry Asso- ciation which pledged its support to the eradication of the black market. Members agreed, too, to suspend sales for six days in order to conserve poultry over the holidays.18
A most critical test of the rationing procedures and of the OPA came in the winter of 1943 when the state suffered one of its most severe winters in years. A bitterly cold January was preceded by a most severe ice storm. As the mercury hovered at sub-normal temperatures, complaints that deal- ers refused to honor the rationing stamps grew louder. The business ethic ran counter to the public interest. Oil dealers insisted that they must take care of their regular customers while the OPA encouraged them to supply oil to those in need. The fear was compounded by the conflicting state- ments issued and the tendency of the Governor to act independently of
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the Office of Price Administration. When the Governor proposed that the merchants of the state close one day a week, the Courant warned that "the American people dislike being pushed around. .. , and nowhere is there more dislike for compulsion than in Connecticut." It suggested that another survey might be necessary before the Governor's proposal was accepted. As the OPA expressed quiet confidence that, under an emergency rationing system adopted February 1, adequate fuel could be supplied, the Governor assumed the role of the hero by informing the public of his frequent appeals to Washington to alleviate the distress. Some oil dealers, unhappily, took advantage of the situation to establish their own ration- ing system and justified their action by laying at the door of the OPA the charge of inefficiency. A basis for the charge and for the public clamor was existent in the reality that, during the sub-zero month of February, the supply of fuel was touch and go. During the Spring after the crisis had eased, public and private wood lots were opened for those who desired to cut wood to avert a similar difficulty the following year.19
Labor
New sources of labor were discovered to man the machines of war production. Governor Hurley urged municipal, state, and civil authorities to grant leaves of absences to their employees with special skills in order that they might engage in more essential industries. White collar workers joined the labor force; bank and insurance clerks became a part of the swing shifts. Children from eleven to sixteen years of age became employed in all types of enterprises, the state law to the contrary notwithstanding, over 17,000 students were reported to be engaged in gainful employment in 1943. Many were working six days a week and some as many as sixty or seventy hours. The reluctance of Connecticut industry to employ women workers was overcome as the need for workers increased. Special recruit- ing campaigns were conducted by Mrs. Ralph Lasbury in cooperation with the U.S. Employment Service. More than 5,000 women workers had been registered by June, 1942. Women were being employed at an ever increas- ing rate. By February, 1943, the number employed had increased 75 per cent within the previous twelve months to a total of more than 55,000. The ladies not only brought their skills; but their glamour, and the attendant problems. Seventy-two workers walked off the assembly line at Chance
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Vought in Bridgeport when the company banned the wearing of sweaters by female employees on the basis that it interfered with production. The Office of War Information supported the company in its stand. After two months, the ladies agreed to wear a two-piece cotton twill and returned to work. As the war progressed, women, children, and white collar work- ers continued to make significant contributions to the industrial labor force.20
Labor practices were altered to meet the demands of war produc- tion. Exceptions to the limitations on the hours of work were granted so frequently that the regulation became practically meaningless. In 1943, the Governor was empowered to extend the maximum hours of work to ten hours a day and 55 hours a week until six months after the cessation of hostilities. The seven-day work week was discontinued shortly after it was introduced by industries engaged in war production. Cornelius J. Danaher, Commissioner of Labor had opposed the practice from the begin- ning, and it was permitted only on the insistence of Governor Hurley. This experience of working every day, the Commissioner held, proved detrimental to the health and efficiency of the workers. As it became evi- dent that the war was to be of long duration, the work schedule was cut back to six days and women workers were limited to 48 hours a week. Contrary to expectation, however, there was not a marked increase in the amount of industrial home work during the war. In an effort to speed up war production, labor management committees were established throughout industry, not only to settle wage difference, but to consider methods of increasing production as well.21
The lengthened work week and the expanded work force did not avert a critical labor shortage at the beginning of 1943. By the first anni- versary of Pearl Harbor, the number of workers in representative industries in Hartford, New Haven, and Bridgeport reached 190,000. This was about twice the number employed in September, 1939, and 30,000 greater than at the time of the United States entrance into the war. Particularly acute was the need for skilled and semi-skilled workers in the ball bearing plants of the state which were producing 80 per cent of all the ball bear- ings produced in the United States. This critical item was in extremely short supply with production falling far short of the needs of the United States and the allied powers. Other critical items included radar, which
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was being developed and produced in Connecticut in increasing quantities, and forgings and castings for cannon and heavy equipment. In addition to supplying most of the chucks for machine tools for American industries, state factories were faced in 1943 with supplying chucks for the machines provided allied powers under the lend-lease program. Equally important were the brass industries of Central Connecticut, which produced one- fifth of the nation's brass. The services and the War Production Board continued to press for production and manufacturers were loathe to give up skilled and semi-skilled workers.22
In an effort to retain the requisite manpower for Connecticut indus- tries, occupational deferments were granted with comparative liberality in the first months of the war. More than five per cent of the state's reg- istrants held occupational deferments by November, 1942. Local boards, acting upon lists of critical industries furnished by higher authority, often were criticized for the deferments which they granted. As the needs of the armed services increased, the restrictions on deferments were tightened. Registrants in non-essential industries were notified to transfer into essential industries or face induction. To provide a more orderly replace- ment of those engaged in critical industries, at first Manning Tables and then Replacement Schedules were evolved. These were based on the assumption that the critical status of an individual was often in relation to his importance to the particular industry in which he was employed. Many industries, in a desperate effort to retain its manpower, included in its first lists of indispensable men "glorified titles" and others "badly needed." Eventually, a controlled hiring program was established in the central Connecticut area and was later extended to other areas where there were critical labor shortages. Industries were divided into three groups in accordance with the importance of their war effort and the need for labor. Under the plan, no employer was permitted to hire any worker except by authorization of the United States Employment Service. The introduction of tighter controls enabled the state's factories to meet the demands for production as the draft calls continued to drain potential manpower.23
Despite the shortage of labor, the production schedules were but slightly affected as a result of the differences arising between manage- ment and labor. With the beginning of the European War in 1939 indus-
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trial disputes rose sharply throughout the country, but those in Connecti- cut were not considered serious. Of the 74 work stoppages in Connecticut in 1940-41, about one-third were in industries engaged in war work. With the United States entry into the war, there was negotiated between labor and management an agreement which continued throughout the war and provide that differences would be submitted to the State Department of Labor for mediation. Labor leaders pledged labor not to strike until vic- tory was assured. The number of strikes were reduced to 40 in the first year of the war and to 23 in the second. The number of employees involved were reduced from 117,000 in the first year to 53,000 in the second and to 25,000 in the third.24 The conversion of the state's industry from peace time to war time production brought with it Federal assistance and con- trols through the War Labor Board and its predecessor the National Defense Mediation Board. To an increasing extent, employers turned directly to Washington, knowing that only action by the War Labor Board could settle their differences with management, for example in the fiscal year 1942-43, forty-two of the 159 disputes arising were settled by a Federal agency.25 Any notion. however, that the wage stabilization formulas advocated by the Federal Government would necessarily result in a general wage increase was quickly dispelled. In denying a general pay increase to 1,200 Remington Rand employees, Wayne L. Morris, writing the opinion for the War Labor Board, stated "it will not follow as publicized in the press that an application of the formula will result in a huge increase in the nation's wage bill. ... " The National Associa- tion of Manufacturers held that many industries had already granted increases equal to or in excess of that fixed by the war labor formula.26 Whereas labor in general cooperated during the war, patriotism could not completely eliminate all militancy of labor. The United Textile Work- ers, for example, sought in 1943 to have union membership included in their contract. The next year, the War Labor Board denied the estab- lishment of a Union shop at the Bigelow Sanford Carpet Works. As the war came to an end, organized labor became more active. The first organi- zation of office employees in New England occurred in September, 1944, when those at Bigelow Sanford voted to join the C.I.O.27 The willingness of management and labor alike to subordinate their individual aims to the winning of the war and the necessity of lessening the stoppage of work
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