USA > Connecticut > History of Connecticut, Volume II > Part 29
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The cases brought against the Senators were nolled on the grounds that the evidence of acceptance of the stocks two months after the ad- journment of the Assembly was unwarranted inference of their receiv- ing them for services rendered. Mackenzie and Williamson served jail sentences, but Hayes continued to plead innocence. Against the recom- mendation of the Governor and his friends, Hayes persisted in con- tinuing as Lieutenant Governor, but with the tacit understanding that he would not perform the duties of Lieutenant Governor while the case was in the courts. The case dragged on until August, 1939, when Hayes, along with 22 others, was convicted of conspiracy to defraud the city of Waterbury. The decision was confirmed by the Supreme Court of the
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State in March, 1941. In the meantime the scandals in Waterbury, in the Highway Department, and the involvement of men in public life in the attempt to influence legislation left deep scars on the Democratic Party as it had on the Republican two decades earlier.77
Politics in Connecticut were in an uncertain state as the 1938 state election approached. While Governor Cross was not in any way personally involved in the scandals, yet it could be charged "that the scandals had occurred during his administration, and that due diligence on his part could have helped to prevent them." The recession of 1937 had diminished the aura of the New Deal and the Governor had already passed his 76th birthday. Yet, the proverbial "unfinished business" lured him to make himself available. Once he did, there was little the Democratic Party could do other than to renominate the state ticket, with the exception of replacing T. Frank Hayes by Colonel Thomas Hewes. Within the Republican party there had not emerged a strong leader to take the place of Roraback. There resulted a mad scramble, not only for the Gubernatorial nomination, but for leadership of the party. William J. Pape, the respected publisher of the Waterbury papers who had ferreted out the initial information in that city's scan- dals, was ambitious for the position, as was William H. Blodgett, a rem- nant of the Roraback machine. A group of young Republicans, how- ever, seized control of the party's machinery and supported the election of Benjamin A. Harwood as Chairman of the State Central Committee and of Raymond E. Baldwin, the majority leader of the House in the 1933 session of the Assembly, as their nominee for Governor. A third personality in the campaigning was Jasper McLevy, more McLevy than Socialist, more Republican than Democrat, and more for Bridgeport than for any. The number of votes he would attract from the Demo- cratic candidate was uncertain.78
The campaign was one in which the incumbent was forced to de- fend his record, an advantage for the Republicans which they were quick to seize. Baldwin carried on a vigorous campaign, utilizing all the means of communication. The Republicans denied that econ- omies had been affected as a result of the reorganization, attacked sharply the merit system, and charged that the building program had bogged down in ineffectiveness. Notwithstanding the fact that the
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state's $12,000,000 deficit had accrued during the dark days of the de- pression, and especially as compared to the $8,000,000 surplus Cross in- herited when he became Governor, the deficit loomed large. Cross's age came in for an occasional comment and near the end of the campaign a
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(Photo by James Miller)
TORRINGTON-HEART OF BUSINESS DISTRICT, PRIOR TO FLOOD OF 1955
public protest against car inspection gave the Republicans a lift. The Governor had speculated that if the total vote for McLevy should be held under 25,000 a Democratic victory was assured, but if McLevy's vote mounted to 50,000, the Democrats were in trouble. Because of the unusual circumstances in Waterbury and the strength of McLevy in Bridgeport, Cross had all but written off these cities in the early stages of the campaign, but a concentrated effort in the last stages was to cut McLevy's assumed margin there appreciably. What Cross did not an-
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ticipate was the placing of a fourth ticket on the ballot under the ban- ner of the Union Party (the Father Coughlin Party of 1936), but with Baldwin at the head of the ticket. The legality of the party had been upheld by the Superior Court and there was not time for an appeal to the Supreme Court. On the eve of the election, nevertheless, Time Magazine speculated that "if old Governor Cross loses to Republican Baldwin . .. , it will largely be due to local by-plays and political scandals."79 As the votes came in on election night, Cross piled up the expected majorities in the cities, and even though McLevy received in excess of 160,000 votes, Cross maintained his lead until the results in the small towns were reported. Baldwin "squeezed through by 2,700 votes." Of his total, 3,046 were gained under the aegis of the union ticket. "Uncle Toby" waited impatiently on inauguration day, then, with cheroot in hand, he doffed his top hat to public service. The first log on the course of contemporary Connecticut had been completed.80
Connecticut, as other states, perhaps owes more to the New Deal than it would ever care to admit. The part which the New Deal played in the industrial recovery of the state remains a matter of conjecture, with the contemporary historian likely to weigh the evidence in ac- cord with his own political and social inclinations, but there can be little doubt that reformers took advantage of the depression to force reforms upon business which made for a better society and in many respects were of greatest benefit to business itself. Labor entered the era depressed and insipid and at its end was strong and aggressive with an implied dictum to assume responsibilities commensurate with its new strength. Citizens were taking a far more active part in public affairs than formerly. The number voting was about twice as many as those voting in 1920 and this increase was almost entirely in the urban centers, the symbol and the result of industrial civilization. In some measure "the shell of crystallized procedure" had been cracked. In this transition in Connecticut life the state was fortunate in having Wilbur Cross as its chief executive. In a sense, the service he performed for the state paralleled that which had been performed by Oliver Wolcott more than a hundred years before, when the Federalist-Congregational hold on the state was broken. After the thirties, there was no turning back. Present-day Democrats find at least an intellectual affinity with the
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Grand Old Man from Yale. Raymond Baldwin was to turn the Repub- licans, also, gently toward the future.
NOTES-CHAPTER XXXII
1 Report of the Commission to Study Pauper Laws (Hartford, 1937), pp. 3-21; The Emergency Relief Commission (Hartford, 1934), pp. 34-36.
2 "Measures to Alleviate Unemployment," Connecticut Unemployment Commission (Orange, Conn., 1932), p. 4.
3 Ibid., pp. 7-13, 65.
4 Ibid., pp. 7-8.
5 Message of the Governor, 1931 (Hartford, 1931), pp. 8-13; Message of the Governor, 1933 (Hartford, 1933), pp. 4-6; Cross, Connecticut Yankee, pp. 253-55; Mitchell, "Social Legislation in Connecticut," pp. 349-53.
6 "Measures to Alleviate Unemployment," pp. 2-4.
7 Ibid., pp. 18-19.
8 Mitchell, "Social Legislation in Connecticut," pp. 355-57.
9 Report of the Bank Commissioner (Hartford, 1932), pp. 5-11.
10 Ibid. (Hartford, 1934), pp. 451 ff.
11 Ibid. (Hartford, 1930), pp. 14-17; ibid., 1932, pp. 1-11.
12 Emergency Relief Commission, 1934, pp. 29-30; Margaret H. Hogg, "Ebb-Tide of Employment," The Survey, Vol. 69, Aug., 1933, p. 279.
13 "Measures to Alleviate Unemployment," pp. 38-42, 58-68.
14 Ibid., pp. 42-45.
15 Ibid., p. 32; Fifteenth Census of the United States, 1929, "Unemployment," I (Wash- ington, 1931), p. 191; Report of the Emergency Relief Commission (Wallingford, Conn., 1934), pp. 27-31.
16 William Bilevitz, "The Connecticut Needle Trade," The Nation, Vol. 135, Nov. 16, 1932, P. 475.
17 Ibid .; Report of Factory Inspection (Hartford, 1933), Pp. 53-54.
18 Bureau of Labor Statistics (Hartford, 1933), P. 31.
19 Bilevitz, "The Connecticut Needle Trade," p. 475; Report on Business and Conditions of Wage Earners in the State (Hartford, 1933), pp. 62-64; "Wages in Connecticut," The Survey, Vol. 70, Jan., 1934, p. 17; Message of the Governor (Hartford, 1933), p. 15; Mitchell, "Social Legislation in Connecticut," pp. 392-93.
20 Report of the Emergency Relief Commission, 1934, pp. 4-5, 80-81.
21 Hartford Courant, Sept. 10, 1932; George E. Clapp, "The Kaiser of Connecticut," The American Mercury, Vol. 129, June, 1933, p. 229; G. C. Edgar, "Insurgents in Connecticut," The Nation, Vol. 135, Oct. 26, 1932, P. 475.
22 Ibid .; Cross, Connecticut Yankee, pp. 265-70.
23 Ibid., pp. 270-73; Hartford Times, Oct. 27, Nov. 2, 1932; Hartford Courant, Oct. 28, 29, 1932.
24 Edgar, "Insurgents in Connecticut," pp. 395-96.
25 Statement of Vote (Hartford, 1932), pp. 3-53; Clapp, "The Kaiser of Connecticut," p. 229; Dever Allen, "Connecticut, A Case in Point," The World Tomorrow, Vol. 15, Dec. 7, 1932, p. 546.
26 Message of the Governor (Hartford, 1933); Report of the Budget Bureau of the State Board of Finance and Control (Hartford, 1933), pp. 4-6; Cross, Connecticut Yankee, P. 283.
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27 Ibid .; Message of the Governor, 1933.
28 Cross, Connecticut Yankee, pp. 282-85; Mitchell, "Social Legislation in Connecticut." pp. 362-66; Report of the Emergency Relief Commission, 1934, pp. 16, 43.
29 Cross, Connecticut Yankee, pp. 278, 285-90; Raymond E. Baldwin, Let's Go Into Politics (New York, 1952), pp. 74-75.
30 Ibid., pp. 73-74; Message of the Governor, 1933, pp. 14-15; ibid., 1935, pp. 16-17; Cross, Connecticut Yankee, pp. 291-92; Report of the Bank Commissioner (Hartford, 1934), pp. 1-7.
31 Report of the Emergency Relief Commission, 1934, pp. 16-17, 36; Cross, Connecticut Yankee, p. 283; Baldwin, Politics, p. 74.
32 Hartford Courant, March 22, 23, 1933.
33 Ibid., April 6, June 19, 1933.
34 Emergency Relief Commission, 1934, p. 66; ibid., 1937, p. x.
35 Ibid., 1937, pp. 56-61, 66; Hartford Courant, June 2, 1933.
36 Report of the Emergency Relief Commission, 1934, p. 61.
37 Ibid., 1937, pp. 52-56.
38 Ibid., pp. 89-91; Summary of Relief and Federal Works Program Statistics, Federal Works Progress Administration (Washington, 1941), p. ix.
39 Analysis of Civil Works Program Statistics (Washington, 1939), pp. 3-30; Report of the Emergency Relief Association, 1934, pp. 57-60; ibid., 1937, pp. 28-38, 61-63; Summary of Relief and Federal Work Program Statistics, 1941, p. ix.
40 An Analysis of Projects Placed in Operation through June 30, 1937, Works Progress Administration (Washington, 1937), p. 40; Summary of Relief and Federal Work Program Statistics, Federal Works Progress Administration (Washington, 1941), pp. 11-12; Donald S. Howard, The WPA and Federal Relief Policy (New York, 1943), p. 636; "WPA Federal Art Projects in Connecticut" (New Haven, 1939); Report of the Emergency Relief Commission, 1937, p. 65.
41 Ibid., 1934, p. 34; ibid., 1937, pp. 63-85; Summary of Relief and Federal Work Pro- gram Statistics, 1941, p. 2; Hartford Courant, April 13, 1935; Hartford Times, March 25, 1936.
42 Harold L. Ickes, Back to Work; the Story of the PWA (New York, 1935), pp. 1-23 ff .; The Record of PWA, Public Works Administration (Washington, 1939), pp. 1-49, 147-48, 200, 284; Eugene C. Mckeon and Harold C. Taylor, Public Works and Em- ployment from the Local Government Point of View (A Report of the W. E. Upjohn Institute for Community Research) (Chicago, 1955), pp. 105-23; Marian Murray, "Cleaning up Connecticut," The New Republic, Vol. 80, Sept. 12, 1934, pp. 127-28; Message of the Governor (Hartford, 1935), pp. 12-15.
43 Report of the Labor Commissioner (Hartford, 1934), pp. 11-74; ibid., (Hartford, 1939), p. 10; ibid., (Hartford, 1935), pp. 9-10; "Wages in Connecticut," The Survey, Vol. 70, January, 1934, p. 17; Mitchell, "Social Legislation in Connecticut," pp. 284-85, 399- 406; Cross, Connecticut Yankee, pp. 300-301.
44 Albert Levitt, "Who Owns Connecticut?" The Nation, Vol. 138, May, 1934.
45 Ibid., pp. 504-507; The New Republic, Vol. 80, Aug. 22, 1934, p. 46; Hartford Courant, Sept. 7, Nov. 7, 1934; Cross, Connecticut Yankee, pp. 301-11; Statement of Vote, Hartford, 1934.
46 Message of the Governor (Hartford, 1935), pp. 3-24.
47 Ibid.
48 Cross, Connecticut Yankee, pp. 310-11; New York Times, Nov., 1934.
49 Hartford Courant, Jan. 11, 1935; Bridgeport Post, Jan. 11, 1935.
50 Bridgeport Times Star, Nov. 9, 1934.
52 Mitchell, "Social Legislation in Connecticut," pp. 380-81.
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53 Ibid .; Cross, Connecticut Yankee, pp. 319-21.
54 Ibid., pp. 322-23; Report of the Department of Public Welfare, 1934, p. 6; Report of the Department of State Agencies and Institutions (Hartford, 1936), pp. 4-6; Message of the Governor (Hartford, 1935), p. 16; Mitchell, "Social Legislation in Connecti- cut," pp. 432-43.
55 Ibid., pp. 409-19; Report of the Commissioner of Labor (Hartford, 1934), pp. 12-16; ibid., 1936, p. 33; ibid., 1940, p. 54; "Connecticut Child Labor Law Tells the Whole Story," The Christian Century, Vol. 52, March 20, 1935, p. 356; Cross, Connecticut Yankee, p. 323.
56 W. H. Uhl, A Report by the American Society of Civil Engineers (Washington, 1936), pp. 449-54; Annual Report, The Connecticut Society of Civil Engineers (New Haven, 1936), pp. 22-24; Emergency Relief Commission (Hartford, 1937), p. 86; Hartford Courant, March 13, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 28, 1936; Hartford Times, March 19, 20, 21, 23, 25, 26, 27, 1936; Official Report of Relief Operations, Spring Floods and Tornadoes, 1936, American Red Cross (Washington, 1938).
57 "Flood Emergency Work," Report of the State Director for the National Emergency Council, pp. 39A-39F; Hartford Times, March 23, 26, 1936; Hartford Courant, March 14, 1936.
58 Philip Bradley, "A TVA for New England?" American City, Vol. 40, June, 1935, PP. 39-41; Hartford Courant, March 24, 1936; Hartford Times, March 27, 31, 1936; "Flood Control in Connecticut," Science, Vol. 84, Sept. 11, 1936; Cross, Connecticut Yankee, p. 339; Connecticut Society of Civil Engineers, Symposium on Flood Control, Connecticut River Valley, 1938-41 (Hartford, 1941), pp. 49-76; Donald M. McClel- land, "The Economics of Multipurpose Development of the Connecticut River Basin" (unpublished thesis, Harvard University, March, 1949), pp. 26-29.
59 Cross, Connecticut Yankee, p. 344.
60 Ibid., 340-48; Hartford Courant, Sept. 4, 10, 11, Nov. 4, 1936, May 20, 1937; Baldwin, Politics, p. 51.
61 Report of the Governor's Commission on Unemployment Compensation (Hartford, 1936), pp. 3-126.
62 Ibid .; Cross, Connecticut Yankee, pp. 327-28; Mitchell, "Social Legislation in Connecti- cut," pp. 446-60.
63 Cross, Connecticut Yankee, pp. 358-66; Message of the Governor (Hartford, 1935), pp. 20 ff.
64 Cross, Connecticut Yankee, p. 361.
65 Ibid., 358-66.
66 Ibid., pp. 364, 371-72.
67 Ibid., pp. 351-54; Report of the Labor Commissioner (Hartford, 1939, pp. 49-53.
68 Cross, Connecticut Yankee, pp. 351-54; Mitchell, "Social Legislation in Connecticut," pp. 468-69; Ewing, "History of the Bigelow-Sanford Carpet Company," p. 176.
69 Hartford Courant, March 25, 1937.
70 Report of Department of Labor, 1937, pp. 49-57.
71 Official Proceedings, Connecticut Federation of Labor, 1937, pp. 22-23.
72 B. L. Bigwood, "The Hurricane Floods of September, 1938, in Connecticut," Society of Civil Engineers (Hartford, n. d.), quoted in The Connecticut River Valley Flood of September, 1938, in Connecticut, Works Progress Administration (Hartford, 1939), Pp. 11-12.
73 Austin F. Hawes, Hurricane Damaged Forests Still An Important Asset (Rockville, Conn., 1931), p. 3.
74 New England Hurricanes, Works Progress Administration (Boston, 1938), pp. 7-142, 112-25; F. Barrows Colton, "The Geography of a Hurricane," National Geographic,
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Vol. 75, April, 1939, pp. 538-40; Cross, Connecticut Yankee, pp. 396-406; Hawes, Hurricane Damaged Forests, pp. 4-10.
75 Time Magazine, Vol. 32, Dec. 26, 1938.
76 Cross, Connecticut Yankee, pp. 378-88; Robert A. Hurley, Report on the Highway Department and Merritt Parkway to the Governor (Hartford, 1938); Hartford Courant, Feb. 24, Apr. 30, 1938.
77 Cross, Connecticut Yankee, pp. 389-95; Time Magazine, Vol. 32, Dec. 26, 1938; Lock- ard, New England State Politics, p. 260.
78 Ibid., p. 251; Baldwin, Politics, pp. 82-87; Cross, Connecticut Yankee, pp. 407-10.
79 Time Magazine, Vol. 32, Nov. 7, 1938.
80 Cross, Connecticut Yankee, pp. 410-19; Baldwin, Politics, pp. 106-8.
ADDENDUM (Separately Indexed )
Chapter XXXIII The Home Front in World War II
T HE ISSUES of recovery faded with the beginning of World War II and the realization of its significance to Connecticut and its citizens. Manufacturers accepted the war contracts which poured into the state with a cautious skepticism born out of the truths of readjustments of the First World War. Governor Baldwin sensed earlier than most the possibility of the United States' involvement and had taken valuable first steps when bombs rained on Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941. Connecticut citizens, like those of all America, stood ready to do what was necessary and more. Thousands joined the fighting forces and thousands more manned the machines of production. Home front problems, such as hous- ing, rationing, bond drives, and scrap metal collections were contended with. In the course of achieving victory, social changes came which extended the principles of reform that had been introduced during the period of recovery from the recession. In the end, it was an inspiring, but not an unblemished record.
Recovery and Politics
Raymond Baldwin, the newly elected Governor, endeavored to bring the traditional tenets of Republicanism into harmony with the forces of society and the realities of politics. He accepted a responsibility for for- mulating a program to achieve recovery, but believed this must be accom- plished through the genius of private enterprise and by taking the government out of business. "In time of economic stress it is the duty of government to care for its citizens, to help them, not to become the wards of the government, but to get back to jobs in private business and indus- try. ... No government," the Governor said, "can provide permanent
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employment ... unless it steps out of the role of democracy, ... entering the field of private enterprise in direct conflict with its own citizens." He contended that the limits of progress in labor legislation had by no means been reached. "Business men and manufacturers . should realize . . . that they not only owe a duty to the stockholders . . but to the job- holders as well." Labor, he believed was a consumer as well as a producer and had an equal right with capital to organize and bargain collectively. The unreasonable and unrestricted use of the injunction in labor disputes was gone forever he thought.1 After the Assembly had passed an anti- injunction bill, defined the conspiracy law, provided a uniform wages and hour law on public works, revised the unemployment compensation, and outlawed wage kickbacks, Baldwin claimed with some justification that the "1939 General Assembly was one of the most liberal towards labor of any in our history." "We proved," he said, "that labor doesn't have to look to some political machine, doesn't have to bargain for a square deal, not with a truly representative government," because, "a truly representative government represents the people, and you, the people are labor." 2
In that legislation for which Baldwin believed the Assembly would be best remembered it took a characteristically conservative approach. The separations of the judiciary from the legislative branch of the Government had been in evolution since the adoption of the Constitution of 1818. A most significant step had been taken in 1880, when it was provided that the Judges of the Supreme and Superior Courts be appointed by the Assembly, but on the recommendation of the Governor. The method was extended to the Courts of Common Pleas during the first administration of Governor Cross who sought repeatedly, but unsuccessfully, to have the judges of the minor courts named in the same manner. It was recognized in 1939 that the criticisms of the Justice of the Peace Courts were oftentimes justified, but because of the valuable service they rendered, particularly in the rural areas, their elimination was not favored. The basic issue was evaded by the initiation of a constitutional amendment on the appointment of all judges while an effort was made to assure a uniformity of operation in the minor courts by altering the laws governing jurisdiction and procedure. 3
This, as other legislation, was to be accomplished within the prevalent concepts of economy.
So insistent was the Governor on a balanced budget that he recom-
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THE HOME FRONT IN WORLD WAR II
mended, and forced through the House, a proposal that the monies be diverted from the highway fund to the general fund. So heated was the controversy that an amendment to the constitution was proposed to pro- hibit the diversion of the state highway funds. The Courant counseled against such a proposal, pointing to the dangers of anticipating the needs of the future. "Under an ideal situation," the paper editorialized, "all revenues that the State derives from any source would constitute a reservoir from which money could be drawn in proportion to existing needs at any given time, the sole restriction being that the outgo should never leave the reservoir without a margin." The Courant was not certain that the state was ready to make use of its resources in this manner, and the "road block" was sure that it was not. Charles Arrigoni of Durham led the opposition to the proposal which was successfully delayed until other means were devised for balancing the budget and saving the Governor from infamy in the eyes of his own party. The Governor could happily boast of "the greatest record of economy in government this state has ever seen." +
Recovery, reform, and politics, during the period 1939-1945 came to be engulfed, first, in the issue of war or peace and, after Pearl Harbor, in the effort of winning of the conflict. As the crisis mounted, Americans broke with tradition and elected Franklin D. Roosevelt for a third term. In Con- necticut his majority was such as to enable the relatively inexperienced campaigner, Robert A. Hurley, to defeat the Republican incumbent, Ray- mond Baldwin, by a majority of over 13,000. 5
A Basis for Defense
During the campaign Hurley charged that the state defense effort made during Baldwin's administration was little more than a publicity stunt, but it would seem that more had been accomplished. Baldwin had regarded war and the United States' participation in it as inevitable. He had warned that if war came Connecticut would be "the armory of the nation," and had urged sweeping reforms of the state's National Guard upon an unresponsive Assembly. As the danger had increased, however, the Gov- ernor had organized, the following Spring, the State Defense Council, which in 1943 became the Connecticut War Council. This was established to further citizen activities and to coordinate all activities of the State. Information was collected concerning available workmen and their skills
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HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT
and available equipment and training facilities. To supplement state defenses an appeal was addressed in the fall of 1940 to local communities to organize for defense. Before Baldwin retired from office in January, 1941, planning had been accomplished for an air warning service, which became of greater importance as the threat of alien aircraft increased as the state became the center of war production.6 The system had not been perfected but an important basis for defense had been laid.
With the news of September 15, 1940, that night raiders on London had been beaten back, came the information that Congress had voted the nation's first peace time draft. A first step which had been taken in the creation of a new army for the United States by the calling the National Guard was not considered adequate for the perilous conditions which were developing rapidly. Although in retrospect the necessity of the draft has been acknowledged, the Connecticut Federation of Labor in September, 1940, recorded its opposition. Equally strong protests were made against the plan authorizing the president to command the industrial plants. In spite of such protests, Governor Baldwin had anticipated the necessity of increasing the armed forces and, when the announcement of Congressional action requiring a draft came, the state's plan for registration was nearly perfected. Under the direction of Colonel Ernest L. Averill, Connecticut's National Guard had been working on the problem of registration for almost a year. A local board was established for each 30,000 of the population, in general conformity with the state's senatorial districts. On October 16, 222,556 Connecticut residents between the ages of 21 and 36 registered with local draft boards. As Draft numbers, exemptions, and deferments became conversation topics, the retention in industry of those necessary to the production of war materials became the policy of the Selective Serv- ice boards in the months before Pearl Harbor .?
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