USA > Connecticut > History of Connecticut, Volume II > Part 21
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Although the weekly pay increased, it hardly kept pace with the advancing prices and resulted in little if any real improvement in the economic lot of the wage earner and in even less for salaried personnel. The rise in the cost of living during the war was estimated to average from 55 to 60 percent. Clothing advanced from 75 to 100 percent, rent from 15 to 45 percent, fuel from 20 to 45 percent and foodstuffs almost a uniform 60 percent. Bargain prices for pork roast in January, 1919, were listed as 32 cents; potatoes, from 45 to 50 cents a peck; eggs, 85 to 90 cents a dozen; coffee, 32 to 38 cents a pound; and oranges, from 50 to 90 cents a dozen. In certain of the cities price increases were espe- cially high. In contrast, although the wages in particular localities and
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occupations varied, the average rise was estimated to be about 41 per- cent. The Bureau of Labor reported that the middle classes suffered most. Although some salaries increased as much as 35 percent, it was estimated that the average increase in salary since 1916 was only about 20 percent.33
The failure of wages to keep pace with the advancing prices coupled with the shortage of labor caused wage earners to resort to strikes in an effort to improve their position. The greatest number of strikes in the state's history occurred in the years 1915-16. There were 422 strikes affecting approximately 68,000 persons. Women were in- volved in the strikes for the first time. There was a noticeable decrease in the number of strikes in the next two years, there being 183 strikes affecting 33,400 employees. In the years 1918 to 1920, "notwithstanding the high wages and the constant demand for workers," the Labor Bureau reported an increase to 280 strikes involving 75,943 employees. Whether the low figure for the years 1916-17 can be attributed to the entry of the United States into the War is conjectural but there was strong public opinion against those who struck for higher wages while other citizens were actively engaged in the war. In any event the strikers were not notably successful in achieving their objectives. Of the 183 strikes in the years 1917-18, the demands of the strikers were met in 31 cases, compromised in 43, and were unsuccessful in 109. In the years 1918-19, the strikers were successful only in 19 cases, achieved a com- promise in 81, and were unsuccessful in 181. Wage earners, then, were completely unsuccessful in more than 62 percent of their strikes in the period from 1917 to 1920.34
Serious housing conditions coincided with the rush of laborers to the cities. Strangers from the western states, on occasion, were forced to enlist the support of the police to secure housing for one night. Long time residents of tenements were forced to vacate their homes by land- lords who doubled and tripled the rent. Dilapidated houses without central heat or plumbing were renting from $125 a month. So serious was the housing, however, that even those who rented these made money by crowding as many as 45 lodgers in a single house at $1.25 a week. The increase in rents was attributed to the increase in the cost of living and to the government's restriction on new construction.35
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(Courtesy Conn. Devel. Comm.)
HARTFORD-STATE OFFICE BUILDING
The shortage was alleviated somewhat by the living quarters pro- vided by a number of the munitions plants. In Bridgeport, the Reming- ton Union Metallic Company invested two million dollars in 1915 in houses for its employees and built dormitories in Bridgeport and in Stamford for women. The Scoville Manufacturing Company in Water- bury purchased a tract of land on which it erected six frame dwellings, sold them to its workers for $3,000, and a number of brick dwellings sold for $4,000. The houses were paid for at the rate of $30.00 per
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month. Similar methods were followed by the Cheney Brothers in Man- chester and by the New Departure Company in Bristol.36
Connecticut residents followed the war in Europe day by day on maps outlining the thrust and counter-thrust of the enemies and the allies. Connecticut troops were in the thick of the effort at Seicheprey to stem the German advance in the Spring of 1917 and helped counter the final desperate attempt of the Germans at the Aisne-Marne in July. As the offensive was seized by the Allies, Connecticut troops were among those who launched the bombardment which leveled Saint Mihiel on September 12, and were engaged in a skirmish at Marcheville on Sep- tember 26. The troops took up a position north of Verdun on October 19 as the Meuse-Argonne battle developed and resulted in the annihila- tion of the Germans and in the Armistice on November 11.37
Although some 40 officers, including Colonel James H. Waterman of Hartford, were detached from the Yankee Division for service with the Army of Occupation, the Connecticut troops were encamped in a rest area in France until they would be returned home. Camp routine was broken by the visit of President Wilson on Christmas Day and by the pinning of the Croix de Guerre on the colors of the 102nd for its heroics at Marcheville in January, and by a review for Pershing on Feb- ruary 19. The trip home was uneventful. The troops docked at Boston in the latter part of April and were discharged at Camp Devens, Massa- chusetts, between April 28 and 30, 1919. Enthusiastic citizens cheered the return of their heroes along the route from Camp Devens to Hart- ford where the regimental and battalion colors were deposited in the Battle Flag Corridor in the Capitol.38
The real cost of the war was measured in the number of casualties suffered by Connecticut members of the expeditionary force. A total of 53 officers and 1,236 enlisted men had given their lives in the war to preserve democracy. Of this total, 677 men were killed in action, an additional 258 died of wounds received in battle, and 301 died from disease and other causes. It is striking that approximately half of those who lost their lives were from the National Guard. This may be ex- plained by the fact that these were the first troops in the field and by the comparatively short period of the country's active participation in the war. Of similar interest is the fact that only 100 of those who died
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from disease were from the National Guard troops. The decimation of the population at home by a plague was more extreme.39
An epidemic of influenza swept over the State in the fall of 1918 and endangered the whole of the population. Three hundred thousand of the state's one and one quarter million people suffered from the disease. In all, 6,000 people died, with the death rate reaching 7.5 per thousand in Waterbury where the toll was highest. In Waterbury, to supplement regular facilities, two temporary hospitals were established and the Scoville Manufacturing Company and the Waterbury Country Club extended their facilities. The work of the manufacturing establish- ments all but stopped; one corporation had 300 absent because of the illness. It was charged that the number of deaths was caused by careless- ness and underestimation of the seriousness of the disease. In some towns, Boards of Health performed notable service while others were poorly organized and ineffective. It was more difficult to combat the epidemic because it struck while many doctors and nurses were out of the state because of the war.4º War conditions which posed a direct threat to life at home and abroad ended, but readjustments in Connecti- cut's way of life became an immediate necessity.
The Armistice brought the cancellation of war contracts and a brief post-war industrial slump. It was reported that in Connecticut the Federal government cancelled contracts totaling $55,000,000. In addi- tion to the slackening of demand, an inadequate transportation, a limited credit, and a scarcity of available raw materials were believed to have been contributory to the dullness. The industrial centers of New Haven, Norwich, Bristol, New London, New Britain, and Bridge- port were hardest hit. The decrease in production was greatest in the silk, woolen, cotton, and rubber industries.41
Despite the conviction that the depression was genuine, industry was going through a period of reconversion and the condition was less serious than feared.42 The American Brass Company, for example, went into the automotive, electrical, and appliance industries; the New Britain Machine Company developed a complete line of pressed steel shop furniture; and the Winchester Company introduced a line of hardware and sporting novelties.43 While this reconversion laid a basis for sound industrial expansion in the future, the large amount of capital
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necessary for the introduction of the new lines drained necessary op- erating funds.44 The basic strength of the economy was suggested by the nine million dollar increase in the value of industrial expansion, al- though the number of industrial structures decreased by 199 in the two years after the war.45 Also, an increase in individual savings deposits portended well for the ultimate capital outlook. Over seven million dollars were deposited from Armistice Day to January, 1919. In the city of Bridgeport alone, these deposits were $1,222,000 in the month of December, 1919.46
In the immediate situation, however, unemployment increased, wages fell, and the cost of living reached a new high all over the state. Milk had risen from eight cents a quart in 1915 to 18 cents in 1920. For other items the increase was close to 200 percent, and the average in- crease was estimated to be more than 100 percent. The most notable increases were for wood, coal, food, and clothing. Profiteering reached its highest point in 1920, and buyers' strikes failed to halt the spiraling prices. The situation was aggravated in Connecticut by the fact that prices within the state did not decrease as quickly as those in Rhode Island and Massachusetts.47 It was estimated that by the end of 1920 approximately 14 percent of the work force of the state was idle. Many industries were on a part-time basis, some on a four-day week. Not only had war production stopped, but immigration had been resumed and swelled the labor supply. In the two years immediately after the war there were 280 strikes in the state, which resulted in a loss of 1,307,508 employee days.48 Wages were maintained at no higher rate than pro- curement of laborers made necessary. Subsequently, a labor leader representing textile workers pointed out that the financial statements published by a number of firms had reported increased cash and stock dividends in 1921, "the year when textile workers were forced to take a 221/2% wage cut." It was noted that if these earnings had been passed on to the workers an increase in wages would have resulted.49
Reformers believed it was morally wrong for the situation to con- tinue unchanged, and, since the manufacturers would not act, state action was proposed. Further, it was argued and widely feared that if the government did not act, the workers might take matters in their own hands. The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 had focused attention on the
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aliens in Connecticut and the recruitment of soldiers had emphasized the numbers of unassimilated aliens in the Connecticut population. The unsettled labor conditions were related to the fear of Communism which spread over the state at the conclusion of World War I. During the Red Scare in 1919, R. P. Butler of the Consumers League warned that industrial and social legislation must "balance" economic pressures upon the individual if force and bloodshed were to be avoided.50 Wil- lard B. Rogers, a Republican representative from Manchester, a center of silk manufacturing, shared this conviction. Rogers had attended the White House Conference called by the Secretary of Labor to discuss post-war problems and had returned believing that revolution would be entrained by a failure to pass the legislation desired by the workers.51 Charlotte Holloway, the Industrial Investigator employed by the State Bureau of Labor, vigorously denounced the contention of Attorney General Palmer that the Reds were responsible for all of the strikes, but agreed that there was a basis for the belief that an extremely radical element had entered the state and had increased the difficulty of reach- ing an amicable agreement in labor disputes. The Assembly was suf- ficiently concerned in 1919 to appoint a committee to investigate and to report in six weeks. Willard Rogers and his committee found the condition of labor "not seriously abnormal" in the number out of em- ployment, but saw a menace in the mental attitude which had developed "due to the experiences of the past year and the influence of IWW and the Bolshevik propaganda."52
To meet the situation, schools for the masses were urged by some who contended that radical agitators would have less success if an intel- ligent understanding of the history and purposes of the United States were transmitted to the citizenry.53 Others pressed for attention to the state's health and underscored the excessive mortality among children by pointing out that 4,878 children under five died in Connecticut each year.54
NOTES-CHAPTER XXX
1 Jackson, Baldwin, p. 197; Public Documents, 1914, Vol. I, Pt. 1, Inaugural Address of Marcus H. Holcombe, (Hartford, 1915), pp. 3-16.
2 Ibid., 1918, Vol. I, Pt. 2, Report of the Bureau of Labor (Hartford, 1918), p. 29; Osterweis, New Haven, pp. 401-402.
3 Public Documents, 1918, Vol. I, Pt. 2, Report of the Bureau of Labor, (Hartford, 1918), p. 29.
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4 Public Documents, 1916, Vol. I, Pt. 2, Report of the Bureau of Labor on the Conditions of Wage Earning Women and Girls, (Hartford, 1916), p. 23.
5 Public Documents, 1914, Vol. I, Pt. 2, Report of Bureau of Labor Statistics, (Hartford, 1914), p. 9.
6 Ibid., Vol. III, Pt. 1, Report of the Department of Labor on the Conditions of Wage Earners in the State, (Hartford, 1918), p. 15.
7 Osterweis, New Haven, pp. 401-403; The Review of Reviews, Vol. 57, Jan .- June, 1918, P. 520.
8 Ibid., Vol. 55, Jan .- June, 1917, pp. 533-35; Scientific American, Vol. 116, March 17, 1917, p. 280; Public Documents, 1918, Vol. I, Pt. 1, p. 3.
9 Review of Reviews, Vol. 55, Jan .- June 1917, pp. 533-535.
10 Scientific American, Vol. 116, March 17, 1917, p. 293.
11 Ibid., p. 280.
12 Charles W. Burpee, The Story of Connecticut, 4 vols. (New York, 1939), Vol. II, pp. 952-60; Public Documents, 1918, Vol. I, Pt. 1, pp. 4-5.
13 Ibid., 1920, Vol. III, Pt. 1, (Hartford, 1920), Report of the Adjutant General for the Two Years ending June 20, 1920, pp. 21-42; Osterweis, New Haven, pp. 403-404; Charles W. Burpee, "Connecticut in the Wars," in Osborn, History of Connecticut, Vol. V, pp. 129-31.
14 Ibid., pp. 132-35.
15 Public Documents, 1917, Vol. I, Pt. 1, p. 8; Ibid., 1918, Vol. III, Pt. 1, p. 67; Osterweis, New Haven, pp. 493-94.
16 Burpee, Story of Connecticut, Vol. II, pp. 966-67; Review of Reviews, Vol. 57, Jan .- June, 1918, p. 520.
17 Pliny Leroy Harwood, "Savings Banks," in Osborn, History of Connecticut, Vol. V, p. 375; Review of Reviews, Vol. 57, Jan .- June, 1918, p. 521.
18 Osborn, History of Connecticut, Vol. V, p. 122; Burpee, Story of Connecticut, Vol. II, P· 959.
19 Review of Reviews, Vol. 57, Jan .- June, 1918, p. 521; Burpee, Story of Connecticut, Vol. II, p. 967; Public Documents, 1918, Vol. I, Pt. 1, pp. 6-7.
20 Public Documents, 1914, Vol. I, Pt. 2, Report of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, (Hart- ford, 1914), p. 9.
21 Public Documents, 1918, Vol. I, Pt. 2, Report of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, p. 53. 22 Public Documents, 1916, Vol. I, Pt. 2, Reprint of the Bureau of Labor on the Con- dition of Wage Earning Women and Girls, (Hartford, 1916), p. 36.
23 George B. Chandler, "Industrial History," in Osborn, History of Connecticut, Vol. IV, pp. 182-202.
24 Hartford Courant, December 5-11, 1914; May 4-12, 1915.
25 Chandler, "Industrial History," in Osborn, History of Connecticut, Vol. IV, pp. 73, 106. 26 Ibid., pp. 122-25.
27 Ibid., pp. 120-21, 277.
28 Ibid., pp. 199-201.
29 Ibid., p. 106, pp. 374-75.
30 Public Documents, 1918, Vol. III, Pt. 2, Report of the Bureau of Labor, (Hartford, 1918), pp. 29-30; Public Documents, 1918, Vol. III, Pt. 1, Report of the Department of Labor on the Condition of the Wage Earner in the State (Hartford, 1918), p. 8.
31 Hartford Times, Feb. 14, 1916.
32 Ibid., pp. 7-8; Public Documents, 1918, Vol. I, Pt. 2, Report of the Bureau of Labor (Hartford, 1918), pp. 29-31; The Survey, Vol. 37, Mar. 10, 1917, pp. 665-66.
33 Public Documents, 1918, Vol. III, Pt. 1, Report on Wage Earners, pp. 101-5; Ibid., 1920, Vol. III, Pt. 1, pp. 20-59.
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34 Public Documents, 1916, Vol. I, Pt. 2, Report of the Bureau of Labor on the Condi- tions of Wage Earning Women and Girls (Hartford, 1916) p. 7; ibid., Vol. I, Pt. 2, P. 39; ibid., 1920, Vol. I, Pt. 2, P. 53.
35 Public Documents, 1918, Vol. III, Pt. 1, p. 37.
86 Ibid., pp. 38-49.
37 Burpee, "Connecticut in the Wars," in Osborn, Vol. V, pp. 167-73.
38 Ibid., pp. 167-73.
39 Public Documents, 1920, Vol. III, Pt. 1, Report of the Adjutant General (Hartford, 1920), pp. 21-42.
40 Public Documents, 1918, Vol. III, Pt. 1, "Wage Earners. . . . ," pp. 23-27.
41 Public Documents, 1918, Vol. III, Pt. 1, "Report of the Department of Labor on the Condition of Wage Earners in the State," (Hartford, 1918), p. 15; ibid., 1920, pp. 6-11.
42 Ibid.
43 Chandler, "Industrial History," in Osborn, History of Connecticut, Vol. IV, pp. 77, 123, 191.
44 Public Documents, 1920, Vol. III, Pt. 1, "Wage Earners," p. 8.
45 Ibid., Vol. I, Pt. 2, "Report of the Bureau of Labor, 1920," (Hartford, 1920), p. 6.
46 Public Documents, 1918, Vol. III, Pt. 1, "Wage Earners," p. 118.
47 Public Documents, 1920, Vol. III, Pt. 1, "Wage Earners," pp. 20, 57-59.
48 Ibid., "Bureau of Labor," pp. 8-11.
49 Rowland L. Mitchell, Jr., "Social Legislation in Connecticut, 1919-1939, A Case Study in the Relations between Business, Labor, Politics, Federalism, and Reform," (Un- published doctoral thesis, Yale University, 1954), p. 197.
50 Ibid., p. 195.
51 Ibid., p. 216.
52 Ibid., p. 252.
53 Public Documents, 1916, Vol. I, Pt. I, p. 8.
54 Ibid., p. 9.
Chapter XXXI The Business Man's Community
T HE NINETEEN TWENTIES belonged to the business men. Industrial expansion was accompanied by great technical ad- vances and the growth of corporate control. The opiates of the era blurred from vision the seriousness of Southern competition in at- tracting industry and the portents of weakness in the transportation system which was decaying in the midst of an expanding economy. The methods of Connecticut business were object lessons for the Connecti- cut farmer, who introduced business practices in the marketing of his products. Not even the industrial workers rippled the apparently tran- quil sea of prosperity. The increasing numbers of laborers were lulled into apathy, in part by the comparative comforts of urban living made possible by paternalistic practices, the introduction of new consumer goods, and a novel credit plan. By these innovations, an insistent de- mand for an increase in real wages was postponed. The appeal of labor organization was too limited for organized labor to bargain with the new power of wealth and industry. Moreover, a large number of the laborers were drawn from immigrant groups which had not been en- franchised, and therefore, Connecticut labor could not exert an effec- tive political influence. In the nineteen twenties, political leadership was held by those who were oriented to the needs of the business community.
Business in Government
That the Republican Party was an effective instrument for the continuance of business-controlled government is revealed by the elec- tion during the decade of five Republican Governors, all the state ex-
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ecutive officers, six Republicans to one Democrat in the State Senate, and four to one in the House. To preserve and to extend the advan- tages, such as tariff, which a favorably disposed central government could provide, all of the Senators and all but one of the Congressmen which Connecticut sent to Washington were Republican. Not only were the elected officials Republican, but those in control of the party represented its most conservative wing. Progressivism had waned with the war and liberal influences were beaten down amidst the Red scare and intra-party strife which left J. Henry Roraback in complete con- trol of the conservative forces.1
J. Henry, as Roraback was popularly known, after graduating from high school, moved with his parents from his native Massachusetts to North Canaan, from where he launched a political career which was to bring him national prestige, the unchallenged leadership of the Repub- lican Party, and a position of greatest influence in Connecticut politics. In 1903, Roraback resigned as a member of the Republican State Cen- tral Committee to become a lobbyist for the New Haven Railroad. The association was of benefit to J. Henry financially and politically. The association was terminated formally in 1910 before the more notorious facts of the condition of the New Haven became public. Two years later Roraback became Chairman of the Republican State Central Com- mittee, by the twenties was a member of the national committee, and by 1924 was the uncrowned ruler of Connecticut politics.2
From the relative seclusion of the Allyn House, Roraback wielded his powers within the time-proved formula for political success. Through legislation of special benefit to rural areas, such as appropria- tions for agricultural services and grants for education, he furthered the political partnership of the rural areas and the business community. This coalition although eventually inadequate was to assure Republi- can success throughout the decade. By skillful exercise of patronage and of a severe party discipline, he kept the dissidents in line. When the Democrats in the more urban centers became too strong, an abominable "ripper bill" designed to strip local officials of some of their power over local government would be pushed through the Assembly. By skillfully scattering the crumbs of patronage, he cut at the roots of the opposition. The fraternal co-existence extended to Homer Cummings,
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(Courtesy Conn. Devel. Comm.)
HARTFORD-SKYLINE VIEW
the Democratic National Chairman, lent credence to the charge that the Democratic Party was but an annex of the Republican Party.3
Roraback's power as a leader of a business-oriented political party was enhanced by his own success in business. He began his career in electric power in 1905 with the purchase of the Berkshire Power Com- pany. Once the company was solvent, he sold it to the Hartford Electric Power Company. In the same year he secured a charter incorporating the Rocky River Power Company "to build and operate dams and
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produce hydro-electric power on the Rocky River, a tributary to the Housatonic." Because of the lack of capital, the right was never exer- cised. However, when in 1917 the New Haven Railroad was forced to sell the Housatonic Power Company, which owned the Milford Power Company and a steam plant in Waterbury, Roraback, using capital pro- vided in large part by the United Gas and Electric, a public utilities holding company in Philadelphia, merged his company with the Housa- tonic under the name of the Connecticut Light and Power Company. Under the Presidency of Roraback, the company benefited enormously. In 1923, the General Assembly authorized the diversion of the waters of the Housatonic over the Rocky River for hydro-electric power. The company in 1927 was granted the power of eminent domain for obtain- ing right of ways to build pipe lines to transport the gas manufactured by the company and to sell gas in all territories of the state which were not allocated to some other company. There was little else the State could do for Connecticut Light and Power. The benefits were illus- trative of the benefits to be derived from a government in which the political leadership was oriented to business.4
The Governors of the state during the decade, with one exception, were all business men. Edward J. Lake (1921-23) was owner of a lumber company in Hartford; Charles A. Templeton (1923-25) was a hardware merchant in Waterbury; and John H. Trumbull (1925-31) was Presi- dent of the Trumbull Electric Company, Director of Connecticut Light and Power, and became Director of a number of other corporations during his term as Governor. The exception was Hiram Bingham, a Yale history Professor, who became Governor for a day. Following his election as Governor in 1924, a vacancy in the Senate occurred as a re- sult of the suicide of Frank B. Brandegee. In the special election in November, Bingham ran for and was elected to the vacant seat. He chose, however, to be sworn in as Governor before assuming the posi- tion as junior Senator from Connecticut. Of these, Lake was at such variance with Roraback that at a Republican rally in 1922, the Gov- ernor could gain admittance only to the balcony. Templeton refused the advice of the party chairman on several occasions and broke with Roraback before his term was concluded so that he was denied re- nomination.5
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